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Introduction  
Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict  
An Introduction to the Research Agenda
 
Rainer Nickel 




1. The need for a New Approach to Supranational 
and International Law-making 
This volume strives to develop and formulate a new perspective on 
supranational and transnational law formations, and to begin a new 
discussion about their methods, forms and functions. It is based upon 
the proceedings of the 2007 RECON conference of Work Package 9 at 
the European University Institute in Florence, and it deals with new 
approaches to supranational and transnational law-generating 
structures. These new approaches, namely, Christian Joerges’ 
theoretical concept based upon the conflict of laws methodology,1 
and additional ideas of constitutional pluralism and of participatory 
transnational governance, are discussed from private, public and 
                                                 
1 Christian Joerges’ conflict of laws approach is the underlying intellectual theme of 
the contributions to this volume. It provides us with a new, normative perspective on 
transnational juridification. See, most recently, Ch. Joerges, “Deliberative Political 
Processes Revisited: What Have we Learnt About the Legitimacy of Supranational 
Decision-Making”, (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies, p. 779; Ch. Joerges, 
“Reconceptualising the Supremacy of European Law: A Plea for a Supranational 
Conflict of Laws”, in: B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger, (eds), Debating the Democratic 
Legitimacy of the European Union, (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2007), p. 311, and his contribution to this volume. 
2 Nickel
 
international law perspectives. They strive to conceptualise the efforts 
to re-constitute democratic post-national constellations in legal 
categories. The volume seeks to find new ways for a democratisation 
of European and transnational governance outside traditional 
models, and more convincing ways of a European and transnational 
“juridification” that reconciles democracy, diversity, and social rights. 
 
It appears particularly timely to talk about such a conceptual re-
orientation if we take the recent developments of the EU legal 
structure and of the constitutionalisation process into account, a 
process which has dominated the European debate during this first 
decade of the new millennium. After the failure of a “formal”, or 
denominational, constitutionalisation in 2005, it is now quite 
sufficiently secured that the Treaty of Lisbon2 will come into effect 
after the second Irish referendum, which will be held on 2 October 
2009. The Treaty of Lisbon ratification process is almost completed, 
and most recently, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
has approved the Treaty as constitutional. Ironically, the Court did 
not join the choir of critics who stress the democratic deficit of the EU, 
but instead told the German parliament that it has to secure its 
democratic rights vis-à-vis the executive branch, i.e., the Federal 
government, while firmly stating that the EU does not need to fulfil 
the same criteria of fully developed democratic institutions that we 
take for granted within the nation state.3 The Court held that the 
Treaty of Lisbon does not lay the foundations for a new political 
entity in the strong sense of a constitutionalisation: the status of EU 
citizenship does not automatically generate such a move, nor does 
the introduction of a Passerelle procedure for simplified treaty 
revisions4 represent a kind of kompetenz-kompetenz which is typical for 
                                                 
2 The Treaty of Lisbon establishes a reformed EU Treaty and converts the EC Treaty 
into the “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. A consolidated version 
of these new treaties can be found at 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights is not an integral part of the Treaty package, but it will have 
“the same legal value” as the two Treaties, see Art. 6.1 of the new TEU. 
3 Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of 30 June 2009 (2 BvE 2/08 and others). The 
Court nullified some provisions of the “Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights 
of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters” (Bundestag 
document 16/8489). A “preliminary” English translation of the FCC decision can be 
found at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, 
on the Federal Constitutional Court’s website. 
4 The Passerelle (“bridge”) procedure in Article 48 ch. 7 of the new TEU and the 
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sovereign entities. The FCC decision confirms that the character of 
the EU and its legal framework remain, even after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, as much in limbo as the character of the WTO, for example, 
which is also oscillating between a mere international organisation 
and a “constitutional” entity.5 
 
The contributions to this volume represent, in one way or another, 
the ambition to find third ways between, on the one hand, a 
constitutionalisation of the EU (or the WTO, or the UN) in the 
classical hierarchical sense, with a fully-fledged harmonisation of its 
legal order, irrespective of the legal orders of its Member States, and, 
on the other, a loose international co-ordination of national policy 
spheres and the accompanying legal instruments. As the emergence 
of a single World Legal Order appears as much illusionary as 
frightening, it is well-justified to take the continuing diversity of legal 
orders as a starting-point. While concepts of legal pluralism6 have 
aptly described and embraced the existence of such a variety, their 
cognitive and explanatory force is rather limited as they cannot 
explain how conflicts between different legal orders can be properly 
defined, contextualised, and finally solved (or avoided). 
 
Supranational and transnational courts are the first ones to be 
confronted with this diversity, and they have been challenged by the 
complexity of colliding legal orders and concepts. Most recent 
examples of conflictual and conflict-laden encounters can be found in 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECJ, in the Kadi and 
Al Barakaat decision7 on the application of the Security Council terror 
                                                                                                                   
simplified procedure in Article 48 ch. 6 of the new TEU allow for simplified treaty 
amendments (similar to the existing provision in Article 42 TEU). If the European 
Council decided to invoke the Passerelle according to Article 48 ch. 7, it could only do 
so unanimously and would first have to seek the consent of the European Parliament 
and notify national parliaments. In addition, any proposal for such a decision could 
be blocked “if a national parliament makes known its opposition within six months 
of the date of such notification”. 
5 See the detailed discussion about different legal concepts of a WTO constitution by 
D.Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) and the critique of E.-U. Petersmann, Book Review, (2006) 43 
CMLR, pp. 890-91. 
6 For an overview, see N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism”, in: (2002) 
65 Modern Law Review, pp. 317-359. 
7 ECJ, joined cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council, judgment 
4 Nickel
 
list resolution within the EU, had to strike a balance between the 
obligations stemming from Article 103 of the UN Charter8 and the 
Rechtsstaat or rule of law principle which guides the EC/EU legal 
order. In contrast to the Court of First Instance, which rejected the 
request of Kadi and Al Barakaat to be deleted from the list, the ECJ 
held that the pleas of Kadi and Al Barakaat “in support of their 
actions for the annulment of the contested regulation and alleging 
breach of their rights of defence, especially the right to be heard, and 
of the principle of effective judicial protection, are well founded”.9 As 
a consequence, Article 103 of the UN Charter, which can be 
interpreted as a rule expressing the unconditional preference of the 
UN legal order, did not prevail within the EU legal order. 
 
The ECHR, for its part, is constantly in a situation in which it needs to 
define the “European Public Order” embodied in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, while, at the same time, it has to pay 
its tribute to the national constitutional orders of the Member States. 
This constellation is tempting for a court with a tendency for judicial 
activism, and the court has, more than once in recent times, been 
accused of overstepping its territory. In its Bosphorus10 decision, 
however, the ECHR went down a different path: It had to define its 
role vis-à-vis the EC/EU legal order, and it came up with a distinctive 
and creative solution. It stated that the EC/EU legal order provides 
for a sufficient degree of legal protection, and that a complainant has 
to show that, in his or her case, this general level of protection has not 
been met. This hurdle, although not as steep as the Solange II 
admissibility hurdle set up by the German FCC in relation to 
constitutional oversight over EC/EU law,11 represents another 
                                                                                                                   
of 03 September 2008. 
8 Article 103 UN Charter reads: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail.” 
9 ECJ, joined cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council, judgment 
of 03 September 2008, para. 353. 
10 ECHR, Bosphorus Hava Yolları v. Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, judgment of 30 
June 2005, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
11 See BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986), Solange II: Constitutional complaints that are based 
upon a claim for the unconstitutionality of EC/EU law are inadmissible unless the 
complainant shows in a detailed analysis that the general level of human rights 
protection within the EU has sunk below the general level of protection guaranteed 
by the German constitution. This is a Herculean task that has not been met in the last 
Introduction   5
 
possible path for a settlement of conflicting legal orders: mutual 
recognition as the rule, stricter scrutiny as the exception. 
2. The Development of a Notion of Supranational 
Conflicts Law 
Both the ECJ and the ECHR have been heavily criticised in recent 
times for their “intrusive”12 and “too detailed”13 judgments. For 
example, the decision of the ECJ in the Mangold case and the decision 
of the ECHR in the von Hanover case have been greeted, almost 
unanimously, with severe criticism, and they caused even alarmist 
and angry comments in Germany.14 The Taxquet decision of the 
                                                                                                                   
23 years since the judgment was handed down in 1986. - The latest judgment in EU 
matters, the Treaty of Lisbon decision (see, supra, note 3) expressly allows for 
complaints directed at EU legal acts which are ultra vires, but it has again confirmed 
the Solange II rationale with regard to constitutional rights protection. 
12 Roman Herzog, the former German President, and former President of the Federal 
Constitutional Court as well as President of the Convention which drew up the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, demanded “Stop the ECJ” in an article written for 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Herzog and his co-author Lüder Gerken found 
“adventurous legal constructs” in the judgments of the ECJ, and asked the FCC to 
take up again its watchdog function against “intrusions” of the ECJ: “Stoppt den 
EuGH”, FAZ, 08 September 2008, available at 
http://www.cep.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Pressemappe/CEP_in_den_Medien/
Herzog-EuGH-Webseite.pdf. An English translation of this article is available at: 
http://www.cep.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Pressemappe/CEP_in_den_Medien/
Herzog-EuGH-Webseite_eng.pdf. A counter-critique by Carl Otto Lenz lists all cases 
mentioned by Herzog and claims that Herzog does not accurately restate the facts 
and the reasoning of the ECJ: C.O. Lenz, “Anmerkungen zu den Fällen aus dem 
Aufsatz von Prof. Herzog ‘Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof’ in der FAZ vom 
8.9.2008”, Walter Hallstein Institut, WHI - Paper 1/09, www.whi-
berlin.de/documents/whi-paper0109.pdf. 
13 Lord Hoffmann, one of the most prominent UK law lords, has publicly criticised 
the ECHR and its jurisprudence as “inconsistent”, that the court has “assumed power 
to legislate”, and that its decisions are too intrusive: “It has been unable to resist the 
temptation to aggrandise its jurisdiction and to impose uniform rules on Member 
States. It considers itself the equivalent of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
laying down a federal law of Europe”. Lord Hoffmann, “The Universality of Human 
Rights”, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, London, 19 March 2009, available at: 
http://www.jsboard.co.uk/downloads/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Univ
ersality_of_Human_Rights.doc, p. 14 and 21. See, also, the (critical) comment by Afua 
Hirsch: “Judges: can’t live with ‘em…”, The Guardian, 06 April 2009, available at:
  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/apr/06/law-eu. 
14 See Herzog (note 12 supra). For an overview, see J. Wieland, “Der EuGH im 
Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Rechtsanwendung und Rechtsgestaltung”, in: (2009) 
62 NJW, pp. 1841-1845. 
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ECHR on jury trials not only stirred emotions in Belgium, from where 
the case originated, but also in Norway, where the criminal court 
system shows similar features and where the fear is rising that the 
country will have to adopt a completely new system of criminal 
procedure prescribed by the ECHR.15 
 
However, the debate is not confined to an academic ivory tower. 
Some of the critics are established and internationally well-known 
judges who served or still serve at the House of Lords or the German 
FCC, and their harsh interventions were not just distributed among 
the expert circles of lawyers and academics. They were held at public 
events and were published in widely-distributed newspapers, thus 
reaching the general public at large. Thus, the legitimacy of the courts 
and of their respective jurisprudence, and even the supranational 
legal systems in which they operate, is also at stake. The central 
question is whether their judgments “deserve recognition”, not only 
in a technical sense, but also with regard to the legal orders that they 
establish and develop further, and, more and more often, the answer 
given is “no”. 
 
EC/EU law represents one of the most challenging riddles for 
lawyers and political scientists alike. For many years, the discussion 
about the basis of its legitimacy had reached a stalemate: it was 
trapped between two alternatives, a conventional criticism of the 
“democratic deficit” of the EU (the “input legitimacy”), on the one 
hand, and those approaches which underlined the problem-solving 
capacity of the EU (the “output legitimacy”), on the other. Christian 
Joerges, in a joint article with Jürgen Neyer, was the first to offer us a 
new and fresh perspective on the discussion about supranational law-
making and its legitimacy problems.16 He developed the idea of 
deliberative supranationalism as a third way of thinking about 
European law: as a means to reconcile national political preferences 
and their external effects on others. In contrast to functional and 
output-oriented approaches, Joerges favours a normative perspective 
                                                 
15 I.L. Backer, “Definition and Development of Human Rights in the International 
Context and Popular Sovereignty – A Comment”, presented at the UNIDEM Seminar 
Frankfurt am Main, 15-16 May 2009, p. 8, on file with author. 
16 This is, of course, their famous article on deliberative supranationalism: Ch. Joerges 
and J. Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political 
Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, in: (1997) 3 European Law 
Journal, pp. 273-299. 
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based upon Jürgen Habermas’ insight that law “deserves 
recognition” only if the law-making procedures themselves are 
designed in an inclusive manner. Joerges and Neyer found elements 
of such a procedure that deserve recognition in the “Comitology” 
committees of the EU. Their peculiar features offer a starting-point 
for the idea that supranational deliberative structures, even if these 
are not democratic in the traditional sense (because, for example, they 
are dominated by bureaucrats, and not by democratically-elected 
representatives), can at least help to “compensate the shortcomings of 
constitutional nation-states”.17 
 
The concept of deliberative supranationalism found wide support 
among lawyers and political scientists, but also invited 
misunderstandings and criticism.18 Supranational Conflict of Laws19 
is a response to these criticisms, and also a response to a new 
challenge to EU law: If it was once the “bureaucratic nightmare” of 
the Brussels regulatory complex that inspired deliberative 
supranationalism, it is now the, so-called, European social dimension 
that calls for a remodelling of its legitimation basis: “The problem of 
the welfare state is the practical-political bête-noire of the European 
project” (Ch. Joerges).20 Inspired by a conflict of laws methodology 
(which also points to his academic roots as a private international 
lawyer21), Joerges argues for a new form of conflict of laws which 
may be characterised as an attempt to formulate a “conflicts law”, a 
Kollisionsrecht of a new type. 
 
We are, indeed, in need of such a new conflicts law: the de-coupling 
of the social from the economic constitution, which characterises the 
structure of the EU, is nowadays even further complicated by a clash 
                                                 
17 Ch. Joerges, “European Law as Conflicts of Law”, in: Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, 
Deliberative supranationalism revisited. 20/2006 EUI Working Paper Law, p. 21. 
18 For an account of these criticisms, see Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, note 17 supra. 
19 For an early version of Joerges’ approach and a first debate on its features, see Ch. 
Joerges, “Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy” with comments by D. Chalmers, 
R. Nickel, F. Rödl and R. Wai, 2005/12 EUI Working Paper LAW, available at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/3332. 
20 Ch. Joerges, “Integration Through Conflicts Law: On the Defence of the European 
Project By Means of Alternative Conceptualisation of Legal Constitutionalisation”, in 
this volume, Chapter 19, sub Part 5. 
21 Ch. Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts. Die “Governmental 
Interest Analysis” und die “Krise des Internationalen Privatrechts”, (Berlin-
Tübingen: deGruyter/Mohr-Siebeck, 1971). 
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of these different rationalities with Europe’s internal diversity: the 
exemplary cases Viking, Laval and Ruffert clearly reveal these 
differences among the Member States’ labour constitutions, and the 
decisions of the ECJ “solved” theses conflicts in a questionable way: 
The court interpreted the four freedoms of the EC treaty in all three 
cases as an overriding quartet, a strict doctrine which is hardly 
reconcilable with a conflicts law approach. 
 
“Conflict born of diversity will continue to characterise the process of 
European integration”,22 and, one may add, also the processes of 
international and transnational juridification. The emergence of a 
World Society,23 accompanied by a rapid construction of its legal 
patterns in the last decades, has only fuelled the need for additional 
conflict-solution or conflict-avoidance strategies (and concepts) that 
are not fixated on a constitutionalisation of a hierarchical World 
Order. This volume strives to prepare the ground for further inquiries 
into this field. 
3. Mapping the Field                                           
Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict 
Part I of the volume (Deliberative Supranationalism: Law and Democracy 
in the Post-National Constellation) lays the groundwork for a normative 
concept of supranational and transnational juridification. It starts 
with a self-assurance about the philosophical, political and legal 
foundations that may serve as compass for the new complexity 
arising from the post-national constellation: Will the concept of 
constitutional and social democracy survive this transformation (J. 
McCormick)? Should we apply justice and the “right to justification” 
– instead of democracy – as the adequate normative yardstick (J. 
Neyer)? And how do we have to re-conceptualise a new international 
law if it was to supply “international public goods” beyond 
intergovernmental structures (E.-U. Petersmann)? 
 
The EU is clearly the most advanced entity in the international 
sphere, both in the institutional sense, and with regard to its ever-
denser internal legal order. Can the EU really compensate the 
shortcomings of the constitutional nation-state, as the concept of 
                                                 
22 Ch. Joerges, note 20 supra, in this volume, Chapter 19, sub Part IV.1. 
23 See the contributions to the collected volume by H. Brunkhorst (ed), Demokratie in 
der Weltgesellschaft, Sonderband Soziale Welt Nr. 18, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009). 
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deliberative supranationalism suggests, or are they just “re-routed to 
the supranational level” (A. Cebada Romero)? Should the U.S. serve 
as a blueprint for the European Union, for a creation of the “United 
States of Europe”, or is Canada as “another American state” more 
fitting a model (J.E. Fossum)? And did the EU produce a new, post-
modern European citizen, or is the European project built upon “the 
false promise of the homo economicus” that tends to exclude “the 
common European man”, and a European judiciary that effects “the 
bourgeois colonisation of the normative framework of European law” 
(M. Everson)? 
 
The legitimacy of the EU rests to a considerable degree upon its 
ability to integrate a very diverse family, with historically very 
diverse rule-making traditions and techniques. The most active part 
of the integration machinery – and, at the same time, the least visible 
– has been labelled European Governance, meant here in the sense of 
an umbrella term for “soft law” techniques such as the Open Method 
of Co-ordination (OMC), as well as for the well-established 
“Comitology” committee system. The latter has become the role-
model for legitimate law-making in the earlier works of Christian 
Joerges. Does Christian Joerges’ new, revised concept of deliberative 
supranationalism, based upon the conflict of laws idea, avoid the/all 
the possible flaws of the original concept, and does it provide for an 
even better normative basis for legitimacy claims (E. Vos)? Can his 
conflict of laws approach also serve as a model for the development 
of ordering principles for a general European administrative law, as 
“a new species of ‘conflicts law’” (K.-H. Ladeur)? And finally, will the 
tendency towards soft law techniques in the EU, such as the OMC, 
threaten not only legally-mediated political decision-making, but also 
the whole concept of modern law as such because it will lead to a 
“de-formalisation through governance” (P. F. Kjaer)? 
 
Part II of this volume enters the debate from a different perspective 
(Transnational Regulation and Societal Constitutionalism: Conflict of Laws 
or Law of Conflicts?). The contributions to this part examine the 
supranational and transnational debate on constitutionalism. Their 
goal is to de-construct the traditional discourse on transnational 
constitutionalisation and leave the worn-out path of a hierarchical, 
exclusively public-law driven constitutionalisation of international 
law behind. Instead, they focus upon the diversity and the fine-print 
of the Post-Westphalian age: Do the corporate codes of 
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multinationals, in the form of company constitutions, represent “law” 
and a “civic constitutionalisation” beyond the state-centred law, and 
can they “guarantee the preservation of high labour standards” in a 
situation in which the traditional preservation concepts such as the 
German company co-determination “is one of the casualties of 
globalisation” (G. Teubner)? Can constitutionalism be taken as a 
“route to a new state-decentred framework of legal authority”, what 
are the frames of this “constitutionalising trend”, and what are the 
antinomies (N. Walker)? Do academics and international judges – as 
the major actors behind this constitutionalising trend beyond the 
state – silently work on, and create, “a common core of global 
constitutional law”, and do they represent “an emerging 
transnational juristocracy” which shows no signs of deference 
towards local knowledge and the embeddedness of all the systems of 
rights (R. Nickel)? Is Christian Joerges’ concept of a “proceduralised 
conflict of laws” the right choice for “entities which are not states, but 
are condensed contractual regimes” with a trend to 
constitutionalisation, and what does this mean for the concept of the 
unity of law, especially with regard to private international law (F. 
Roedl)? 
 
If the “genius of European law lies in its subtle reconciliation of unity 
and diversity”, then it is, first and foremost, the task of the ECJ to 
implement a conflict of laws method. Does its jurisprudence live up 
to this standard, and does the Court show – especially in private law 
matters – the necessary “practical judgement” in the Kantian sense (J. 
Corkin)? And if modern state intervention in markets takes the form 
of a Flucht in das Privatrecht as well as the opposite masquerade – 
giving “a ‘public form’ to private behaviour in order to exempt itself 
from certain community rules” – how can European law deal with 
this type of “chameleon state” and its “blurring of the private/public 
distinction in the market” (M. Poiares Maduro)? 
 
Part III deals with a central aspect of today’s debates on the EU, 
namely, Social Rights and Social Justice: Can “the Social” survive 
European integration? A preference for market-driven integration and 
a neglect of the social sphere is often held responsible for the present 
stalling of the EU’s integration project. The rift is mainly caused by 
the fact that the (Member) States remain without a market and the 
(European) market remains without a state, and this situation creates 
much irritation. If, indeed, European integration is in crisis, can this 
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crisis also be traced back to a “new methodological expansionism of 
the ECJ”, especially in private and labour law, that has lead to a 
situation in which a concept of an effet neolibéral replaces the 
traditional EU law orthodoxy of an effet utile (Ch. Schmid)? As the 
regulation of the Services of General Interest (SGEI) is situated at the 
interface between national social policy and EU competition and 
service law, “can community law resolve the conflict between the 
Member States’ individual concern to control their public services, 
and their common concern to integrate Europe’s service markets and 
keep them competitive” (N. Boeger)? And finally, “what is the scope 
for using the legal concept of Services of General Interest to guarantee 
the provision of universal service in curative health care” (W. 
Sauter)? 
 
Part IV leaves the last word to the author, scholar, and friend 
Christian Joerges, who is the spiritus rector and intellectual source of 
this new approach to supranational and transnational juridification. 
His creativity and his seemingly endless productivity have 
challenged and inspired all the contributions to this volume. 
Christian Joerges will continue to restlessly re-invent criticisms as 
well as defences of the European Project (and its transnational 















Chapter 1  
Habermas on Constitutional and Social 
Democracy in the European Union*  
 
John P. McCormick 




Something of a normative and empirical fog confronts political 
progressives who grapple with “globalisation”. The quandary has 
often been framed in terms of the following two questions: (A) Does 
increased capital mobility undercut the power of states to advance 
social justice on a domestic level? There is growing concern that tax-
bases and regulatory capacities in post-industrial democracies have 
been undermined by the ability of capital to move the sites of 
production and corporate headquarters abroad, or by the credible 
threat to do so.1 (B) Can international institutions, movements and 
associations advance cosmopolitan and universal schemes of rights 
against states that do not observe such rights with regard to 
minorities, women, workers, immigrants, the environment, etc.? Such 
“post-national” human rights strategies capitalise upon recent 
developments such as increased migration flows, changes in work-
force demographics, and greater awareness of the policy implications 
                                                 
* This essay draws upon Chapter 5 of my Weber, Habermas and Transformations of the 
European State, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). I dedicate it to 
Christian Joerges – mentor, friend and inspiration. 
1 See, for example, Saskia Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of 
Globalization, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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of multi-culturalism and environmentalism.2 However, the two 
questions, to some extent, stand in tension with, or work against, 
each other: the first is motivated by trepidation over the diminished 
capacity of the state in the sphere of political economy, while the 
other seeks to accelerate the diminution of the state’s autonomy to 
carry out repressive political and social policies. Nevertheless, in the 
contemporary world, both questions assume a new status for the 
state. 
 
Jürgen Habermas attempts to theorise both of these concerns in the 
context of the European Union (EU), which presently serves as the 
best test case for an analysis of post-national politics. In essays 
composed since the publication of his Between Facts and Norms, some 
of which have been collected in the volumes The Inclusion of the Other 
and The Post-national Constellation,3 Habermas endeavours to 
operationalise the normative blueprint of the former work in 
contemporary historical-empirical circumstances often identified 
with globalisation. One might justly expect that, among 
contemporary social and political theorists, Habermas is the best 
equipped to confront the kind of questions raised above, given his 
previous efforts at combining moral-philosophical, social-scientific 
and historically-grounded modes of analysis. While Habermas may 
have rivals in each of these separate scholarly spheres, he has been a 
peerless practitioner of the kind of inter-disciplinary research 
necessary to begin even confronting a problem as multi-faceted and 
potentially overwhelming as globalisation. For instance, in contrast to 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
3 See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg, (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1996), herein after BFN; 
The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, C. Cronin and P. de Grieff, 
(eds) (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1998), herein after IO; “The European Nation-State and 
the Pressures of Globalization”, (1999) 235 New Left Review, pp. 46-59, herein after 
NLR; “Beyond the Nation-State?: On Some Consequences of Economic 
Globalization”, in: E.O. Eriksen and J.E. Fossum, (eds) Democracy in the European 
Union: Integration Through Deliberation? (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 29-41, 
herein after DEU; The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, M. Pensky, (ed) 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001), herein after PC; and “Warum braucht Europa 
eine Verfassung?” in: Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 2001), pp. 104-29. I cite the English translation by Michelle Everson, 
sponsored by the European University Institute: “So, Why Does Europe Need a 
Constitution?” (http://www.iue.it/RSC/EU/Reform02.pdf), Robert Schuman 
Centre, herein after RSC. 
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Rawls’ justifications for economic re-distribution and, more recently, 
global justice,4 Habermas’ efforts have seldom been entirely confined 
to the realm of “the ought”, but have incorporated state-of-the-art 
knowledge of “the is” as well.5 Habermas’ “critical theory” – at its 
most incisive – has been characterised by concern with “an ought” 
that inheres immanently within the “is” – ideals that reside in reality, 
particularly, a constantly and often rapidly changing reality.6 
 
I begin by elaborating on? Habermas’ account of the problems posed 
by globalisation which necessitate both? the continued integration of 
Europe and the evolution of the EU; I then explicate Habermas’ 
contradictory account of the history of the nation state, and outline 
his legal-discourse model of democracy in the EU. The final section 
uses Habermas’ previous historical and empirical work, and the pre-
suppositions of his present work, against the primary historical-
empirical logic of recent essays, and explores the limits of Habermas’ 
vision of the European Sozialstaat by juxtaposing it with the 
Sektoralstaat model of supranational governance that I suggest is 
emerging in the EU. The latter political configuration is comprised of 
both the transnational “comitological” or “infranational” policy-
making that presently operates under the auspices of the European 
Commission; and the eventuality of “multiple-policy Europes” 
within the EU, a scenario in which different combinations of Member 
States will constitute separate energy, defence, trade, 
communications, welfare, and environmental regulatory regimes. 
1. EU Democracy as a Solution to Global 
Problems 
Habermas conceives of the EU as a post-national vehicle to preserve 
and advance the liberal and social democratic achievements of the 
European nation state; significantly, one that will abstain from the 
domestically- and externally-directed xenophobia and ethnocentrism 
to which the nation state has been susceptible in the past. The EU 
                                                 
4 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1971); and The Law of Peoples: With, the Idea of Public Reason Revisited, (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999). 
5 See Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, (Cambridge MA: MIT, 
1978). 
6 Most explicitly in Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. T. Burger with F. Lawrence, 
(Cambridge MA: MIT, [1962] 1989), herein after STPS. 
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might constitutionally facilitate the self-government and economic 
equality necessary for human autonomy without the war, genocide 
and discrimination which renders the former impossible. Yet, 
Habermas’ analysis of the problems posed by globalisation and 
potentially solved by the EU relies on an account of the historical 
development and the political economy of the modern European 
nation state, which exhibits serious tensions with, and, indeed, 
directly repudiates, his own earlier, but still relevant, writings. 
 
This tension exemplifies the extent to which Habermas’ 
understanding of historical transformation within modernity has 
changed from his earlier work, as well as a more recent tendency to 
paper-over the pathologies of the welfare state or Sozialstaat. Each of 
these “turns” renders problematical the coherence and 
persuasiveness of Habermas’ analysis of EU supranational 
democracy: Habermas often describes the implications of 
globalisation in ways that are reminiscent of the transformation from 
Rechtsstaat to Sozialstaat arrangements that was the central focus of 
the Public Sphere. Moreover, the legitimation and clientalisation 
problems that Habermas previously identified and criticised in the 
Fordist state would conceivably persist and perhaps proliferate in the 
conduct of supranational governance. Habermas renders each of 
these issues subordinate to, respectively, themes of historical 
continuity and welfare-state efficiency in the essays under 
consideration. While I demonstrate that Habermas’ aspirations for 
supranational democracy in Europe are compelling in many 
important respects, since his analysis of the EU abandons the 
sensitivity to both historical change and the constraints posed by 
political economy that set him apart from normative theorists in the 
past, I argue that the methodological approach of these essays 
undermines the efficacy of his normative vision today. 
 
In the essays under consideration, Habermas flirts with the 
identification of globalisation as a structural transformation, then 
demurs from such a step, but ultimately proceeds as if it is, in fact, 
such a transformation, only to take a U-turn in his treatment of 
European integration. Unlike products manufactured in Fordist-
industrial arrangements, those produced and transported via new 
communication technologies can be “stored and then consumed at 
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different locations far removed from one another”.7 Consequently, 
the world economy is now “transnational” and no longer 
“international”, since national boundaries have become blurred, and 
the political scope of states is no longer determined by “the strategic 
decisions of other nation-states, but by systemic interdependencies” 
among them.8 The conduct reflective of these arrangements, and the 
risks entailed by them, can no longer be predicted or calculated by 
projecting the behaviour of strategic actors, as might have been 
possible in the state system.9 Habermas is adamant that the Fordist, 
industrial, international state-system has been displaced and, 
concomitantly, so has its greatest normative achievement: 
globalisation “destroys a historical constellation in which, for a 
certain period and a favoured region, the welfare-state compromise 
was possible”.10 The endangered status of the post-war nation-state’s 
social welfare functions, in what seems to be a structural 
transformation of the state-economy relationship, is Habermas’ first 
concern in these essays. 
 
Habermas equivocates on the nature and the extent of this 
transformation from the Fordist nation-state constellation to the new 
transnational one associated with globalisation, in a way which will 
have serious ramifications for his contemporary normative 
prescriptions. Certainly, Habermas’ language often conjures images 
of structural transformation, as when he speaks of the changing 
“locus of control” from “space to time,” and the replacement of 
“rulers of territory” by “masters of speed”.11 But Habermas 
ultimately eschews the “transformation” question: 
 
Whether we understand economic globalisation as the 
accelerated continuance of long-established trends or as a 
transformation to a new transnational form of capitalism, it 
nonetheless shares the disturbing traits common to all 
accelerated processes of modernization.12 
 
                                                 
7 DEU, note 3 supra, at 31. 
8 Ibid., at 32. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., at 33. 
11 PC, note 3 supra, at 67. 
12 RSC/EUI, note 3 supra, at 8. 
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Thus, having raised the possibility that globalisation represents a new 
structural transformation, Habermas then identifies it as a mere 
“structural adjustment”, similar to others that have asymmetrically 
distributed social costs.13 Nevertheless, as we will see below, this new 
asymmetrical redistribution of social costs and burdens seems so 
drastic that it signals a new historical configuration. While these 
essays waver over continuity and innovation, the Public Sphere 
suggested that new historical configurations require new institutional 
means to secure normative ideals, new or old. 
 
But Habermas does not think that simply identifying the problems 
associated with globalisation suggests the institutional and cultural 
specifics of the solution to them in the EU, the most developed of the 
nascent continental regimes that he mentions. Habermas is still 
sufficiently sensitive to history to look at the development of the 
problems for insight into the particulars of their solution. He claims 
that the history of the nation-state suggests how the latter may be 
overcome in a salutary, rather than regressive, manner at 
supranational level. He states that “the institutionalised capacity for 
democratic self-determination, the political integration of citizens into 
a large scale society counts among the undisputed historical 
achievements of the nation-state”,14 and that these functions must be 
preserved in supranational institutions. I will examine whether his 
account of this history is able to support his conclusions concerning 
the overcoming of the nation-state. 
2. The History of the State as a Guide to the 
Present 
Habermas claims that the “unprecedented increase in abstraction” 
engendered by globalisation is “merely the continuation of a process” 
that began with the initial development of the nation-state.15 Just as 
authority accrued to a higher institutional level and extended over a 
wider territorial expanse in the state-building process, globalisation 
presently abstracts away from and beyond the local and national 
spheres to the regional and universal spheres. A potentially 
important difference between the two moments of this “continuous” 
dynamic are an increased integration in the former and the danger of 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., at 71. 
15 IO, note 3 supra, at 107. 
Habermas on constitutional and social democracy in the EU 21
 
heightened disintegration in the latter. State-building was directed by 
the centralised administrative authority of the newly empowered 
bureaucracies in tandem with market forces, while globalisation is 
driven by a diverse array of international actors and a global market 
significantly free from state direction. While the nation-state initiated 
“a more abstract form of social integration beyond the borders of 
ancestry and dialect”, for social integration to continue today, this 
process must move to “a further abstractive step”.16 As we shall see, 
because Habermas understands the abstraction process of state 
formation to be one of trans-historical continuity, independently of 
whatever minor variations occur within it, he claims that we can 
evaluate the emergence of “post-national societies from the very 
historical model we are on the point of superseding”.17 
 
In other words, since the same process that gave rise to state 
dominance is contributing to its demise, the gains and losses of this 
outcome might be inherent to the process itself: 
 
Though the national state is today running up against its limits, 
we can still learn from its example.18 
 
Habermas’ main question and purpose is whether the integration of 
democratic citizenship previously achieved within the nation state 
can be carried out at a supranational level without recourse to the 
ethnic identity enlisted by the former in this effort.19 He avers that 
attention to an ongoing historical process does not compel us, as if by 
fate, to re-experience the same pathologies that plagued the nation 
state: 
 
[T]here are no laws of history in the strict sense, and human 
beings, even whole societies, are capable of learning.20 
 
Since Habermas understands social evolutionism in cognitive-
adaptive, not deterministically teleological, terms, he does not resort 
to historical determinism, but he does think that historical trends 
                                                 
16 PC, note 3 supra, at 18. 
17 IO, note 3 supra, at 107. 
18 Ibid., at 117. 
19 Ibid. 
20 IO, note 3 supra, at 123; See NLR, note 3 supra, at 47. 
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provide road-maps to paths that may or may not be taken in the 
present and the future. 
 
This ideational account of historical change has ramifications for 
Habermas’ prognosis concerning supranational democracy, as we 
will see below. At this juncture, I would merely point out that these 
observations differ rather drastically from those presented in 
Habermas’ Public Sphere, a work that (a) integrated ideas and 
empirical facts in the subtle transitions of history, and (b) emphasised 
the decidedly abrupt character of change between epochs within 
modernity, as opposed to a generalised continuity of modernity. The 
ideals of the bourgeois public sphere were conditioned by the 
expanded exchange of commodities in the market and the emergence 
of social labour. Moreover, the periodisation central to his analysis in 
this work was not feudal/modern, as it is in the essays under 
consideration, but instead, the more fine-grained distinction among 
feudal, absolutist, mercantilist, laissez-faire, and Fordist phases of 
modern history. 
 
In these essays on the EU, Habermas attributes the development of 
the modern state to the interaction of, and tension between, formal 
citizenship and ethnic nationality.21 Citizenship, based upon popular 
sovereignty and universal rights, justifies political participation, then 
socio-economic entitlement, and develops in “the communicative 
context of the press, and from the discursive struggle for power of 
political parties”.22 But Habermas suggests that this was insufficient 
to “mobilise” people for the domestic or international tasks of state-
building, and that appeals to “nationhood” served to fill the 
motivational vacuum:23 
 
National consciousness owes its existence to the mobilization of 
enfranchised voters in the political public sphere, no less than 
to the mobilization of draftees in defense of the Fatherland.24 
 
In other words, “democratic citizenship” was not a self-motivating 
phenomenon and proved necessary, albeit insufficient, for the task of 
                                                 
21 Ibid., at 113. 
22 PC, note 3 supra, at 102. 
23 IO, note 3 supra, at 115. 
24 PC, note 3 supra, at 102. 
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social integration without the accompaniment of the unattractive 
politics of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Habermas invokes his 
now famous notion of “constitutional patriotism”25 as a progressive 
alternative which was never satisfactorily practiced outside of the 
“immigration nations”.26 According to this ideal, national substance 
was understood in terms of the interpretation of one’s own 
constitution over time, as opposed to appeals to a pre-political 
identity located in either common ethnicity or even language. In this 
alternative account of nationalism, while admitting that political 
mobilisation “depends on a prior cultural integration”,27 Habermas 
insists that political identity is not fundamentally primordial: 
“peoples come into being only with their state constitutions”.28 
 
Nevertheless, in a supranational age, it will not be easy to carry over 
the substantively-formal socio-political integration associated with 
citizenship and constitutional patriotism. Habermas notes that 
contemporary cultural-circumstances entail, on the one hand, a 
hardening of ethnic identities, such as national majorities and 
minorities, but also, on the other, a fragmenting and fracturing of 
them to an individual level via the materialism of the global capitalist 
culture. He suggests that “both tendencies strengthen centrifugal 
forces within the nation-state, and that they will sap the resources of 
civil solidarity unless the historical symbiosis of republicanism and 
nationalism can be broken, and the republican sensibilities of 
populations can be shifted onto the foundations of constitutional 
patriotism”.29 He asks “whether here, in Europe and in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, a cosmopolitan consciousness – the 
consciousness of a compulsory cosmopolitan solidarity, so to speak –
will arise”.30 This requires a tight intra-European solidarity and a 
weaker, but still substantive, solidarity with the peoples of other 
continental regimes throughout the world. 
 
Habermas may seriously over-estimate the extent to which 
constitutional patriotism was ever realised anywhere outside of the 
                                                 
25 IO, note 3 supra, at 114. 
26 See Patchen Markell, “Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On ‘Constitutional 
Patriotism’”, (2000) 28 Political Theory, pp. 38-63. 
27 PC, note 3 supra, at 64. 
28 NLR, note 3 supra, at 57. 
29 PC, note 3 supra, at 76. 
30 Ibid., at 112. 
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writings of Kant, even – or especially – in “immigration nations” such 
as the United States.31 There certainly are more than glimpses of the 
non-exclusionary proceduralist and deliberative aspects of 
nationhood in Habermas’ own account of early 19th-century 
European civil society in Public Sphere. But this work is notorious for 
overlooking virulent nationalism, ethnic prejudice, the subjection of 
women, and class oppression in the bourgeois public sphere.32 
Certainly, in this work, Habermas managed to show how democratic 
citizenship did, in fact, serve as a powerful ideal immanent within 
historical practice, as well as the only possible rival to nationalism for 
putting flesh on the bones of formal constitutional liberties, universal 
rights and popular sovereignty. 
 
However, Habermas insists that nationalism trumped such 
substantive democratic practice too often, often resulting in “the 
expulsion of enemies of the state” and even “the annihilation of the 
Jews”.33 The sheer artificiality of nationalism, in particular, makes it 
susceptible to manipulation by élites. Consequently, the progress of 
democratic citizenship could be de-railed by appeals to homogeneous 
identity on the part of officials who could not, or would not, facilitate 
social and political justice: for instance, the fact that “domestic 
conflicts can be neutralised by foreign military successes rests on a 
socio-psychological mechanism that governments have repeatedly 
exploited”.34 Nationalism could always be whipped up in military 
engagements to distract from the deficiencies of domestic policies and 
politicians.35 
 
                                                 
31 See Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History, 
(New Haven: Yale, 1997). 
32 See Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an 
Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere, (Peter Labanyi et al., trans., 
Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); and Habermas and the 
Public Sphere, (Craig Calhoun ([ed]), Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992). 
33 PC, note 3 supra, at 18. 
34 IO, note 3 supra, at 114. 
35 In this sense, Habermas equivocates on the thesis associated with David Miller, On 
Nationality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), which posits that welfare state 
consolidation required the undergirding of nationalism: Here Habermas suggests 
that nationalism distracted from substantive welfare issues, while later he will admit 
that nationalism provided some of the infrastructure for social democracy. His 
ultimate point is that political culture and redistributive politics can be sustained 
through an intersubjectively- not ethnically-based solidarity, see PC, note 3 supra, at 
99. 
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During the Cold War, however, such options were not available to 
policy élites in European nation states. Habermas gestures to a 
learning process through which policy élites voluntarily sought to 
avoid the economic mistakes of the inter-war period, which, as 
Polanyi pointed out, led to fascism, war and genocide.36 He admits 
that these élites were actually forced, under novel geo-political 
circumstances, to facilitate democratic citizenship through more 
responsible domestic politics: 
 
Under the umbrella of a nuclear balance between the 
superpowers, the European countries – and not just the divided 
Germany – could not conduct a foreign policy of their own. 
Territorial disputes ceased to be an issue. Internal social 
conflicts could not be diverted outward but had to be dealt with 
in accordance with the primacy of domestic politics. Under 
these conditions, it became possible to uncouple the 
universalistic understanding of the democratic constitutional 
state to a large extent from the imperatives of a power politics 
guided by national interests.37 
 
Post-war social democracy carries out this “welfare-state pacification 
of class antagonism” through expanded social security, reforms in 
education, family policy, criminal law, the penal system, data 
protection, etc., as well as tentative provisions for gender equality.38 
Habermas asserts that “within a single generation, the status of 
citizens, however imperfect, was markedly improved in its legal and 
material substance”.39 
 
But Habermas’ account of the welfare state here contravenes his own 
analyses in important earlier works such as Public Sphere, Legitimation 
Crisis and Theory of Communicative Action:40 He now describes Fordist 
policies as though they “benefited the population as a whole”, while 
he had previously emphasised their discriminatory and 
marginalising affects. Whereas Habermas had previously charged the 
mass party/corporatist state with infantilising what where once 
                                                 
36 PC, note 3 supra, at 48. 
37 IO, note 3 supra, at 119. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 1,2 J. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, (Thomas McCarthy trans., 
Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 1984, 1987) [herein after TCA]. 
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deliberating publics, in these essays he remarks that it “improved the 
general level of education”.41 Moreover, the following descriptions 
are simply not consonant with the pathologies of the welfare state 
diagnosed by Habermas in these earlier works: 
 
[C]itizens intuitively realised that they could succeed in 
regulating their private autonomy, and that an intact private 
sphere is in turn a necessary pre-condition of such political 
participation.42 
 
All discussion of the self-defeating and intrusive public policy of LC 
and TCA, as well as the stultification of the populace by the 
plebiscitary politics of the welfare state in STPS seem to have 
vanished. As Habermas moves up to a supranational level, he 
becomes much less stringent on standards for democratic practice at 
national and sub-national level. For instance, is the following 
statement a watering down of his previous nationally-based 
standards for deliberative democracy, and a capitulation to localised 
acclamatory democracy? 
 
Within democratic constitutional states, the public 
communicative infrastructure plays the ideal-typical function of 
crystallizing problems of common social concerns within 
discourses, such that citizens are given the opportunity to 
orient themselves in line with equally weighted arguments and 
take a positive or negative stance on controversial 
contributions. The largely implicit and fragmented yes/no 
reactions to better or less well-founded alternatives are the tiny 
particles, which, on the one shorter-term hand, accrue to 
immediately influential opinions and, on the other longer-term 
hand, make themselves felt in underlying political attitudes and 
democratic electoral results.43 
 
                                                 
41 IO, supra note 3, at 121. 
42 Ibid., at 120. 
43 RSC/EUI, note 3 supra at 19. At one point, Habermas concedes the inadequacy of 
post-war national politics but resorts to referenda, place-markers for deliberation 
translating into action, for supranational accountability: “Political decisions in 
polarized consensus-based democracies are notoriously intransparent. Europe must 
therefore consider the use of Europe-wide referenda in order to give citizens a better 
opportunity to influence the character of policies.” See ibid., at 27. 
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Continuing along these lines, Habermas concludes, “national 
economies provided a range of opportunities for redistribution that 
could be exploited, through wage policies and – on the side of the 
state – welfare and social policies, to satisfy the aspirations of a 
demanding and intelligent population”.44 These great achievements of 
the now glorified Sozialstaat include substantive living conditions, 
educational opportunities, leisure time to foster creativity, in other 
words, the “pre-conditions for effective democratic participation”.45 
 
In these writings on globalisation and the EU, Habermas repeatedly 
invokes the example of “a broad democracy that works reasonably 
well”, or, at least, did so within the nation states of the post-war 
North Atlantic rim.46 He identifies the welfare state, the social project 
achieved during the Hobsbawnian Golden Age of the post-war years, 
as “a specific culture and way of life that is today under threat”.47 
Upon this basis, he poses the question: “Can this form of the 
democratic self-transformation of modern societies be extended 
beyond national borders?”48 But before this can be answered, it must 
be pointed out that Habermas had not previously believed, nor does 
he now demonstrate, that the Sozialstaat operated in such a manner 
within national borders. Habermas may gesture to the clientalisation 
critique of Western welfare states by noting how they hardly 
encouraged “their clients to take charge of their own lives” in an 
unambiguous way.49 He even invokes his former intellectual 
adversary, Michel Foucault, to accentuate the problems of 
bureaucratisation and normalisation in the Sozialstaat, but winds up 
emphasising the successes of liberalism, constitutionalism and 
                                                 
44 IO, note 3 supra, at 121 (emphasis added). Rather than complicit in the political 
apathy of Sozialstaat politics, in these essays, Habermas presents mass 
communication as progressively integrating in an almost unqualified way: “National 
consciousness has derived as much from the mass communication of newspaper 
readers as from the mass mobilisation of conscripts and voters. It has been no less 
shaped by public discourse on the influence and governing power of competing 
political parties than by the construction of proud national histories.” RSC/EUI, 
supra note 3, at 17. Recall that Public Sphere showed mass communication to be as, or 
more, stultifying than it was edifying or progressively integrating. 
45 RSC, note 3 supra, at 4. 
46 NLR, note 3 supra, at 47. 
47 RSC, note 3 supra, at 7. 




democracy within the latter configuration.50 In the most effusive 
language, he asserts that: 
 
[I]n the third quarter of [the 20th] century, the welfare state did 
succeed in substantially offsetting the socially undesirable 
consequences of a highly productive economic system in 
Europe and the OECD states. For the first time in its history, 
capitalism did not thwart the fulfilment of the republican 
promise to include all citizens as equals before the law; it made 
it possible.51 
 
Despite notable instances of state recalcitrance at this very moment 
when the state is “most overwhelmed”, Habermas avers that the 
European nation state: 
 
[S]hould make the heroic effort to overcome its own limitations 
and construct political institutions capable of acting at the 
supranational level. Moreover, the latter would have to be 
connected to processes of democratic will-formation if the 
normative heritage of the democratic constitutional state is to 
function as a break on the at-present unfettered dynamic of 
globalised capitalist production.52 
 
Habermas repeats that the “exemplary case” of the EU “naturally 
comes to mind” as the direction to be followed for “democracy 
functioning beyond the limits of the nation-state”.53 How does he 
evaluate this potential, normatively and realistically, and handicap 
the European “gamble on a post-national democracy”?54 He insists 
that the nation-state cannot “regain its old strength by retreating into 
its shell”.55 It can only regain such strength by no longer operating as 
a state in the traditional sense, but instead by more firmly embedding 
itself in a continental and supranational order. But, as I suggest 
below, Habermas may conceive of the EU as a state writ large, rather 
than as a truly novel amalgamation of states. 
 
                                                 
50 DEU, supra note 3, at 33. 
51 NLR, supra note 3, at 47. 
52 IO, supra note 3, at 124. 
53 PC, supra note 3, at 88, NLR, supra note 3 at 53. 
54 PC, supra note 3, at 88. 
55 Ibid., at 81. 
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3. Critical-Historical Limits of Habermas’ Theory of 
EU Democracy 
My immanent critique of Habermas’ analysis of democracy in the EU 
emphasises the following three points, all of which were alluded to in 
previous sections: the relationship of state-integration of multiplicity 
and locality in the past and the tasks of supranational integration 
today; Habermas’ retrospective romanticising of the national 
Sozialstaat; and the contradictions in, and the ramifications of, his 
“continuity” account of the history of the state. As we have seen, 
Habermas expounds a historical narrative of the nation-state 
according to which its gradual emergence and impending eclipse can 
be conceived as a progressive increase in abstraction. He presents this 
course as a linear development, even if he avoids designating a 
particular telos. Habermas suggests the following with the sometimes 
“painful” process of abstraction entailed by state-building in mind: 
“there is no reason to presume that such a form of civic solidarity will 
find its limits at the borders of the nation state.”56 The question is 
whether this will occur without the aforementioned “pain,” or 
whether we can foresee what kind of “pain” that this, more precisely, 
will entail. However, there is a tension in these essays, which set out 
and then rely upon this account of the modern state: as we observed 
in Part (1), Habermas also describes a post-political horror-show 
portended by globalisation, a neo-liberal nightmare characterised by 
no public provision for common goods of any kind. 
 
When raising this very real alternative scenario, Habermas resorts to 
a language and logic that suggest qualitative historical change – 
structural transformation, if you will – that is not consistent with 
historical continuity in any obvious way. It is the pre-supposition of 
continuity, the dominant theme of Habermas’ account in these essays, 
that makes plausible the robust supranational social democracy that 
will purportedly regulate the elusive dynamics of capitalism without 
the inconvenient obstacles of national borders. Yet Habermas does 
not reconcile these two alternative views of historical change, nor 
does he justify his ultimate adoption of, and reliance on, the latter, 
more optimistic account. He seems motivated by a professed anxiety 
over the intolerable nature of the former possibility, and, perhaps, too 
readily accepts the implications of the “global limits” argument, but 
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does not incorporate them systematically into the historical narrative 
of continuity, as I explain below. 
 
By leaving the two contradictory accounts of globalisation in these 
essays unreconciled – drastic qualitative change that results in 
apocalyptic social, political and economic outcomes versus continued 
increasing abstraction that facilitates a plausible supranational 
extension of the welfare state – and by failing to justify the theoretical 
apparatus which he employs in selecting one over the other, 
Habermas finds himself in a somewhat awkward position. His 
account aspires to a radical break with nationalism which, 
apparently, may not be compatible with a relatively easy extension of 
the Sozialstaat. Habermas’ historical account of the dynamics of 
globalisation does not conclusively show why both outcomes should, 
or could, be expected to emerge in tandem. If globalisation can be 
characterised as a qualitative break, then, the first desideratum of 
overcoming nationalism could, as a novel phenomenon, be plausible, 
but the second one of supranational social democracy would 
certainly not be – at least not without further elaboration. On the 
other hand, if globalisation is, in fact, part of a larger historical 
continuity, then the second goal of welfare state transposition seems 
much more likely than the first, since nationalism still seems inherent 
in the process itself. 
 
To be more specific, if modern history proceeds as a continuous 
dynamic, then capital might, indeed, prove controllable at global 
level. Since the nation-state managed significant, albeit never 
complete, regulation and re-distribution vis-à-vis markets, continental 
regimes could be expected to do so as well. But two aspects of 
Habermas’ own work, subsidiary here and central elsewhere, raise 
doubts about this eventuality. Habermas’ depiction of globalisation 
in these essays harkens back to his STPS description of the transition 
from laissez-faire/liberal to administrative/welfare state capitalism, 
an account in which the preservation of the normative advantages of 
the previous model remained decidedly precarious in the second, or, 
at least, required a thinking-through of alternative means to preserve 
them in a new historical configuration. Doubts about Habermas’ 
model of supranational social democracy are compounded by his 
previous work, such as Legitimation Crisis and Theory of 
Communicative Action, which analysed the crisis-ridden, re-
distributively insufficient and pathology-inducing qualities of the 
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national Sozialstaat even as he reconstructed the model in more 
emancipatory ways. In the essays on the EU, the national Sozialstaat is 
supposed to serve as an unqualified, viable model for just and 
efficient social integration in the future. Furthermore, historical 
continuity in the development of the nation-state would suggest that 
an integrating supranational polity would also make use of 
exclusionary and homogenising notions of identity, rather than 
forsake them as Habermas hopes – at least, he does not explain why 
social democratic advantages should carry over through the 
transition to supranational arrangements while cultural dis-
advantages reminiscent of nationalism fail to do so. 
 
The relatively separate state-society relationship that conditioned the 
emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in the 19th century 
Rechtsstaat was not sustained or extended with the emergence of the 
Sozialstaat, but was, instead, largely overcome and perhaps even 
extinguished by the latter. Habermas suggests that normative 
aspirations remained constant throughout the transformation, but 
that the institutions which might realise them had to change. If the 
phenomena associated with globalisation constitute a similar 
structural transformation, as his account suggests when he speaks in 
terms consistent with scenario (α), then, this might portend the 
demise of the Fordist institutional arrangements of the 20th century, 
rather than their extension to supranational levels. If social change 
within modernity entails dramatic rupture and discontinuity, as 
Public Sphere suggests,57 then a supranational extension of the 
Sozialstaat would not be expected, and the institutions that could 
realise its normative goals would need more careful and specific 
demonstration to be rendered plausible in Habermas’ present 
reflections. 
 
If, on the other hand, social changes within modernity are not nearly 
so drastic as the one between feudalism and modernity, as suggested 
by Habermas’ later writings such as Communicative Action,58 then the 
more continuous and linear understanding would lend feasibility to 
an extension of the welfare state at a continental level. Habermas 
claims to “use the concept of globalisation[…]to describe a process, 
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not an end-state”.59 But how does this viewpoint coincide with his 
assertion of an end of the nation-state epoch in other moments of the 
essays? In the latter case, globalisation would then succeed the nation 
state as a new, if not final, epoch. The distinction between a “process” 
and an “end-state” is potentially meaningless since the 
stateification/societalisation process led to a new epoch, that of the 
Sozialstaat, in STPS, even if Habermas never fully worked out 
continuity/discontinuity issues, and hence periodisations in this 
work. But the nation-state is an end-state if Habermas conceives of 
supranational institutions as replicating its form. 
 
Put differently, in Public Sphere, Habermas could only show, with 
great difficulty, how the normative goals of the Rechtsstaat could be 
attained in the Sozialstaat,60 but he proposed socio-institutional 
reforms through which they might be realized the book’s conclusion. 
Habermas ascended to the more abstract level of social and political 
theory in Communicative Action and Between Facts and Norms, 
respectively, to delineate more optimistically the emancipatory 
possibilities of 20th century nation states, but he could do so only by 
directly identifying the complex structures of the Sozialstaat with 
“modernity” itself, and by neglecting moments of qualitative change 
within the latter historical configuration. Yet, in re-descending from 
these theoretical heights to engage what, in certain moments of his 
account, is a new transformation of the state and the economy under 
conditions of globalisation, Habermas has not resumed historical-
empirical analysis according to the same standards of Public Sphere – 
that is, not in a way that finely details the material gains and losses of 
the historical transformation. On the contrary, Habermas’ view of the 
possibilities of the new scenario is purely stereoscopic: either an 
optimistic or pessimistic extension of some facet of the previous form 
of the nation-state constellation. He chooses to emphasise, perhaps 
arbitrarily, the general conditions that might bring about the more 
optimistic scenario. But this move results in a promotion of the 
Sozialstaat model at supranational level in terms rendered highly 
questionable by other aspects of Habermas’ own efforts here, as well 
as by his more historical and social scientific work of the past. 
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Rather than a failure to consult empirical research in contemporary 
social science literature, I first wish to attribute these deficiencies to 
the unreconciled contradictions in Habermas’ own account of the 
processes leading to contemporary circumstances and his refusal to 
reconsider the methodology of his earlier work, which may, in fact, 
be more appropriate to the present moment. In other words, in this 
essay, I consider this to be a conceptual or categorical problem, rather 
than a factual or informational one. I also consider the extent to which 
Habermas’ Sozialstaat-model of EU democracy conforms with the 
reality of Sektoralstaat governance, which seems to be prevailing at 
supranational level. By the standards set here, Habermas should have 
provided better theoretical justification for abandoning his earlier 
views of the nature of historical change to the Sozialstaat and the 
limitations of political economy within Fordist post-war nation states. 
 
Habermas may well have changed his mind on the worth of the kinds 
of normative insights provided by these earlier methods, but his 
famous reservations about, and lamentations over, “philosophies of 
history” are not sufficient to this end. Indeed, the earlier approach 
reflected in STPS should be acknowledged, if not integrated, into his 
present analysis, precisely because it was directed at a phenomenon – 
qualitative social change within rather than to modernity – that seems 
to have more in common with present circumstances than do his later 
writings, such as Communicative Action and Between Facts and Norms. 
It may be that Habermas casts modern history as continuity in the 
main thrust of these recent essays for the same reason that he did so 
in his mature social and political works: as a direct response to the 
uneasy normative conclusions of his earlier historical works, such as 
Public Sphere, that emphasised structural change. In a way potentially 
consistent with STPS, Habermas states that economic globalisation 
does not pose a threat to “functional and legitimate democratic 
processes as such”, but rather to the nation-state as the “institutional 
form” in which these processes operate;61 it only constitutes a 
“disempowerment” of the nation-state.62 But, with little quail-
fication,63 he upholds the EU as a communicatively-sustained 
supranational social democracy precisely along the institutional 
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model of the nation-state, as well as in line with the developmental 
logic of it. 
 
Whatever Habermas’ motives in emphasising such a temporal 
trajectory, historical continuity does not necessarily guarantee the 
sanguine results for which he hopes: if continuity governs the history 
of the state, then might not history be more likely to “repeat itself” 
than take abrupt and unexpected changes-in-course such as that 
entailed by the discarding of nationalism? If so, apropos criticisms 
raised at the end of the last part, it is especially alarming that 
Habermas provides no firmer evidence in support of the possibility of 
overcoming xenophobia in Europe. Why will élites confronted with 
the integration deficiencies of supranational politics in Europe not be 
tempted to appeal to substantive and exclusionary identities as their 
counterparts did in the earlier history of the nation-state? The 
infamous Huntington scenario whereby continental cultural 
difference leads to violent conflict may have little foundation in 
empirical reality.64 But it is not ruled out by Habermas’ account of the 
history of the state on either factual or historical grounds. 
 
Returning to the plausibility of European social democracy in 
Habermas’ essays – the creation of “a social Europe that can throw its 
weight onto the cosmopolitan scale”65 – the status of transformations 
to and from the Sozialstaat is not the only issue at stake. Precisely how 
the Sozialstaat functions is also a problematical issue in Habermas’ 
prescriptions for the EU. The state regulation of society and the 
economy that he once showed to be a self-contradictory and crisis-
ridden operation is presented in these essays on globalisation and the 
EU as the paragon of re-distributive and solidarity-inducing 
efficiency. At certain points, he admits that the welfare-state 
compromise was by “no means the ideal solution” to the political-
economic dilemma of capitalism, but he insists that it did succeed in 
keeping the social costs of capitalism down to a minimum.66 But such 
statements stand in marked contrast with those found in Habermas’ 
                                                 
64 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 
(London and New York: Free Press, 1998); which is disputed by Bruce Russett, 
Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2000). 
65 PC, note 3 supra, at 112. 
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previous work such as Legitimation Crisis67 and The New 
Conservatism.68 Whereas the latter works grappled with the 
problematical relationship of capital and the state in the post-war era 
– a relationship rife with pathological unintended consequences in 
both material and ideological domains – this recent work fails to 
demonstrate how the EU would adequately address these problems 
nor, for that matter, the one of the flight of capitalism that he 
emphasises so dramatically. 
 
If globalised capital is as slippery as Habermas’ depiction in these 
essays suggests, then it presumably could elude regional or 
continental regimes as easily as it has the state. The ramifications of 
this are exacerbated by Habermas’ retrospective romanticising of the 
national Sozialstaat: if, according to Habermas’ earlier work, the 
national welfare state did not sufficiently control and regulate 
markets and compensate for their deleterious effects, despite its 
territorial authority, why should we expect continental regimes to do 
so with any efficiency? Here, Habermas remarks that the EU can 
“affect” or put a “break” on the dynamic of global capital, but he also 
intimates that the latter is a qualitatively different and not just 
quantitatively extended kind of capitalism; one that may not be 
controlled, albeit imperfectly, in the manner of classic social 
democracy at whatever territorial expanse. At some moments in these 
essays, he attributes global capital’s elusiveness to what is 
qualitatively new in its emerging forms of production, transportation 
and consumption, but, generally, he understands it in terms of the 
expansion of a relatively similar and constant phenomenon beyond 
national borders. 
 
The former understanding makes the case for a supranational welfare 
state exceedingly difficult, but the latter not all that easier: the former 
would require an unprecedented regime of regulation and re-
distribution for which no previous configuration might serve as a 
reliable model, while the latter would be beset by the same or 
exacerbated inefficiencies and pathologies as the national Sozialstaat, 
perhaps to such an extent as to risk its sustainability altogether. The 
                                                 
67 See J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (T. McCarthy, trans., Cambridge MA: Polity 
Press, 1973). 
68 See J. Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians’ Debate, 
(S. Weber Nicholsen, trans., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989). 
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“global limits” logic that Habermas invokes69 buttresses his case 
regarding the geographic constraints that would compel an 
unprecedented engagement with regulatory and re-distributive 
issues among continental regimes. But this pre-supposes that 
globalisation signals the quantitative extension of previous forms of 
capitalism, and not a qualitative break from them, such that territorial 
scope and proximity can still be translated into significant regulative 
capacity. In any case, Habermas does not fully explore the 
ramifications of both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
globalisation, and the tensions between them, which his account 
raises. The “global limits” argument is further undermined by the 
fact that Habermas never previously attributed Sozialstaat 
malfunctioning to its tendency to slough-off costs and burdens 
abroad. Here and elsewhere, Habermas describes the welfare state’s 
regulative successes and failures exclusively in terms of its own 
internal capabilities so that any diminishing capacity to export costs 
should not render it any more effective at national or supranational 
level. 
 
There have always been some questions about the adequacy of 
Habermas’ analyses of the Sozialstaat, both in general, and for a post-
Fordist scenario.70 But this is less of a concern here than the fact that 
Habermas seems to completely abandon or leave unacknowledged 
his earlier Sozialstaat analysis, whatever its shortcomings. For 
Habermas’ prescriptions to carry more weight in the context of these 
essays, he needs to more actively and extensively integrate such work 
into his present engagement with the dilemmas posed by 
globalisation, especially the EU – or, at least, justify why he has 
dispensed with the earlier approach. When a theorist such as 
Habermas abandons, even reverses, the analysis of one socio-political 
configuration at the precise moment when he is confronted by a new 
one, it raises the – admittedly unfashionable – issue of ideology. 
 
The question is one of whether this dilemma is the result of, on the 
one hand, a permanent change in Habermas’ thought towards the 
ideal and away from the historical – one inspired by personal 
                                                 
69 DEU, note 3 supra, at 36. 
70 See Moishe Postone, “History and Critical Social Theory”, (1990) 19 Contemporary 
Sociology, pp. 170-76); Postone, “Political Theory and Historical Analysis”, in: 
Habermas and the Public Sphere, note 32 supra, pp. 164-80. 
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predilections or career trajectory – or, on the other, is generated by 
the nature of the reality confronting Habermas the social scientist. In 
other words, does historical change cause researchers to re-evaluate 
previous epochs, especially the one immediately preceding the 
present, in a way that allows the emerging one to conform more 
easily with one’s normative preferences? In this sense, Weber and 
Habermas both turn to the past to confirm a present that reflects their 
respective theoretical dispositions, be they pessimistic or optimistic. 
Habermas’ stated methodological goals in these essays seem to imply 
that he aspires to something more than a loose application of ideal 
theory to contemporary circumstances. Thus, we need to look past 
personal predilections and the trajectory of his career and fully 
consider the effect of these novel circumstances on Habermas’s 
present categories and mode of analysis. 
 
The issue of historical methodology, as well as the spectre of ideology 
raised above, poses the following generalisable questions regarding 
Habermas’ analysis in the essays under consideration here: Can any 
social science adequately apprehend the present by glossing over or 
jettisoning knowledge of the past? Many scholars of European 
integration, like Habermas, will project a vibrant supranational 
social-constitutional democracy as Europe’s future. On the other 
hand, many other researchers who have devoted years to tracing both 
the deficiencies of the welfare state, and the imperfections of 
democratic accountability in liberal democratic states, now lament the 
demise of regulatory policy and the growing democratic deficits in 
supranational organisations such as the EU. This, too, is a 
phenomenon worth considering in greater depth if we are to take 
changes as vast as those affiliated with globalisation and the EU 
seriously, and the way we should go about analysing them. 
4. Conclusion 
In the immanent critique strains of this chapter, I have suggested that 
by minimising the traumatic nature of the previous transformations 
of the nation state and over-estimating the accomplishments of the 
Sozialstaat, Habermas may too readily accentuate the feasibility of a 
kind of perfected state at European level; he may render too plausible 
the development of a “continental regime” to aufheben, as it were, or 
preserve, the best of the nation state, while shedding its excessive 
tendencies. Habermas’ account of the history of the state exhibits a 
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tension between continuity and discontinuity, which provides no 
clear reason why one should expect that the transition to 
supranational citizenship and economic regulation will be as, or any 
more, continuous than was the transition from the 19th century 
Rechtsstaat to the 20th century Sozialstaat configuration. This problem 
is particularly acute because the more pessimistic possibility outlined 
by Habermas conforms with a conception of historical change 
reminiscent of Habermas’ earlier and more empirically-grounded 
work such as Public Sphere; work that analysed the previous 
transformation in terms of large-scale historical discontinuity. Yet 
without substantive justification, Habermas chooses to carry out the 
bulk of his analysis in these essays on the EU with the conceptual 
apparatus that he developed in his later work, such as Communicative 
Action, which biases his account in favour of less wholesale, less 
drastic, and potentially less intimidating historical change within 
modernity. 
 
By setting out something less than an empirically- and historically-
informed normative framework for a post-national future, Habermas’ 
work on the EU shares widespread assumptions with many 
theoretical engagements with the prospect of democracy in Europe. 
Most speculation about supranational institutions – optimistic and 
sceptical – tend to reify some aspect of the nation state that used to be 
problematical or contested, and deploy it as evidence for the 
development of a certain vision of socio-political arrangements under 
supranational developments. On the one hand, supranationalists 
posit something approximating a constitutional-social democracy at 
continental level, while, on the other, intergovernmentalists predict a 
persistence of state treaty negotiations as the core of future European 
politics. Evidence suggests, as I show in the external thrust of my 
critique, that European politics will look very different than what is 
pre-supposed by either of these models, and, instead, will resemble 
what I call a Sektoralstaat: a polity in which different policy spheres 
are governed by those most closely affected by, or most interested in, 
it, and that this will have serious ramifications for democratic rule, 
legal scope and material equality in Europe’s future – ramifications 
not necessarily well-met by the Habermasian paradigm in the 
following ways. 
 
The Sektoralstaat: (1) dismisses, or, at the very least, downgrades the 
participation or “say” of those less affected but still concretely affected 
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by a policy; (2) virtually abandons the participation of, or sanctioning 
by, the polity at large, through either constitutional or statutory law; 
and (3) tolerates different levels of social protection and re-
distribution throughout what, in this case, is somewhat ironically 
named the “Union”. For these reasons, the Sektoralstaat model 
emerging in Europe raises the issue of dissonance between the 
functioning of multifarious policy sub-groups and the rights and 
interests of the larger public in a way, perhaps, never before observed 
in European democratic theory and practice. They highlight the way 
in which participation, egalitarianism and accountability, and the 
feasibility of their legal facilitation, will be the mission of democratic 
theory in Europe, and the world, in the coming century.71 
 
However, I do not intend for the above analysis of Habermas’ 
reflections on the EU to imply that we ought not to be hopeful about 
the future of democratic practices in supranational institutions, and 
therefore not work to attain them. I merely wish to emphasise the 
necessity of better attention to the historical suppositions 
undergirding attempts to theorise supranational democracy. In fact, 
on normative-empirical grounds, I would suggest that we should not 
place the bar for the possibility of supranational social democracy too 
high. In fact, I think that it would be a mistake to forget the leftist 
critique of the national Sozialstaat that accused the latter (i) of not 
going nearly far enough in re-distributing wealth, (ii) of creating 
social pathologies and economic crises for which solutions were 
never sought, let alone found, and (iii) for simply being too friendly 
to capital. These facts ought not to be flushed away as we evaluate 
contemporary standards of responsiveness, accountability, 
participation, equality, etc., in supranational contexts. 
 
                                                 
71 Inspired by and responding to Christian Joerges’ work on deliberative 
supranationalism, I develop the notion of the Sektoralstaat most fully in McCormick, 
Weber, Habermas and Transformations of the European State, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), Chapter 6. See Ch. Joerges, “Deliberative Supranationalism” 
– Two Defences, (2002) 8 European Law Journal, p. 145; Christian Joerges, 
“Bureaucratic Nightmare, Technocratic Regime and the Dream of Good 
Transnational Governance”, in: EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, pp. 
3-17, Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos, (eds), (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999); and 
Christian Joerges, The Law in the Process of Constitutionalising Europe, in: Constitution-




Despite Habermas’ best intentions, democracy in a supranational age 
could never stand up to criteria derived from a democratic past that 
never existed. In short, if the theoretical and practical stakes in 
ascertaining the institutional requirements for supranational 
democracy were not so high, it would be almost amusing to hear talk 
of the “democratic deficit” in the EU, as if there is, or ever was, a 
democratic equilibrium, let alone a surplus, in industrial-democratic 
states. Social and political theorists need to compare the respective 
democratic deficits of the nation state and continental regimes such as 
the EU without recourse to illusions about the former that encourage 
ineffectual analyses of the institutions that comprise the latter. In the 
spirit of the critical theory of Habermas’ Public Sphere, this mission 
demands efforts at reviving and refining our notions of both history 
and historical change as we approach and evaluate democracy in a 
supranational present and future. 
 
Chapter 2  
Justice or Democracy?  
Power and  Justification in the EU and other 
International Organizations 
Jürgen Neyer 




The main task of international organisations is to provide a corrective 
mechanism to the normative and functional failures of the nation-
state under conditions of inter-dependence.1 Assessments of the 
legitimacy of international organisations should judge them to the 
degree to which they fulfil that task. This chapter submits the idea to 
use the concept of justice as a proxy for such an assessment. The main 
part of the article is devoted to identifying three major obstacles for 
realising justice in international politics and explains how 
supranational organisations help these obstacles to be overcome. The 
concluding section summarises the argument and discusses its 
relevance for the debate on the legitimacy of international 
organisations. 
 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this chapter have been presented to the conference on “Justice 
and Global Democracy”, Frankfurt am Main, 25-26 May 2007 and the workshop on 
“Transnational Standards of Social Protection: Contrasting European and 
International Governance”, Bremen, 23-24 November 2007. The author is thankful for 
critical comments by the participants of both meetings, especially Andreas 
Niederberger and Karl-Heinz Ladeur. 
42 Neyer
 
1. Beyond the Democratic Deficit 
Much of the debate on the legitimacy of the EU and other 
international organisations is built upon the assumption of a 
universal applicability of the concept of democracy. Conceptions of 
legitimate governance are exported from standard democratic theory, 
and are applied to the EU without systematically investigating 
whether the notion of democracy is the adequate standard at all. 
Democracy, so the implicit argument goes, is a value that cannot be 
meaningfully disputed. It is a normative good in itself, and is, 
therefore, applicable always and everywhere, indiscriminately of 
whether the object under scrutiny is a city, a state, a region or an 
international organisation. However, this approach is difficult to 
justify both for theoretical and empirical reasons. 
 
On a theoretical level, it ignores the insight that all theories are built 
upon abstractions and that they therefore only work under specific 
conditions. In positive theory, this insight is reflected in the use of 
scope conditions, i.e., the identification of conditions which limit the 
range of the applicability of a certain statement. Scope conditions are 
of eminent importance in most positive theories, for example, in 
liberal intergovernmentalism or in neo-functionalism. None of these 
theories claims to offer a universally valid explanation, but they all 
limit their propositions to certain specified conditions. However, the 
modesty that accompanies the notion of scope conditions is 
sometimes lacking in normative theory. It is not clear, for example, 
why the logical nexus between abstract categories and the limited 
applicability of the theory (which is established on these categories) 
should not hold true for normative theory. The implication of this 
argument is that we should demand any normative theory of 
democracy to identify its analytical abstractions and to explicate to 
what extent they limit the range of the argument. 
 
On an empirical level, there are likewise good reasons to be sceptical 
about the analytical usefulness of the notion of democracy for 
justifying the EU. The EU lacks all those political competences which 
lie at the heart of any state governance and which have historically 
been the most prominent resources for the provision of public order: 
the powers to tax, to enforce sanctions by means of coercion, and to 
provide security against foreign powers. The EU has none of these 
competencies. It does not levy taxes, it commands no police, and its 
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defence and security policy is embryonic at the very least. In 
addition, even after the Treaty of Lisbon, it still is the case that the 
supremacy of European law is not explicitly mentioned in the law of 
the Union and that every Member State could, by means of simple 
legislation, revoke its Anwendungsvorrang. The EU – or any other 
international organisation – also has no demos. European-wide public 
discourses emerge only sporadically as responses to political scandals 
or soccer championships. The nation-state is still the primary locus of 
allegiance in Europe and the place where political discourse and 
democratic reflection take place. Democratic theory, be it in a 
Rawlsian, in a Habermasian or in a Dahlian fashion, emphasises that 
democracy necessarily entails a demos which identifies itself with a 
certain authoritative structure (even if it is only understood in the 
Habermasian term of Verfassungspatriotismus). There can be no 
democracy without a demos. 
 
In addition, the EU lacks firm borders and a clear demarcation 
between insiders and outsiders. The EU is a set of policy-specific 
regimes Democracy is also hard to imagine without firm borders. 
Although many speculate about the possibility of democratic 
governance in functionally-specified policy networks, all established 
theories of democracy again underline the importance of drawing a 
line between those who are insiders and those who are outsiders. It 
makes common sense that democratic procedures are instruments for 
identifying and implementing the normative ideas as they are held by 
a people with a clear territorial and juridical distinction. If adopted, 
these ideas become norms and rules which apply to all the people 
within the demarcated territory and to no one outside that territory. 
The EU does not only violate this principle, but follows an entirely 
different logic. It does not have fixed borders but consists of a set of 
functionally-specified political regimes with changing memberships. 
Whilst some regimes, such as the CFSP, accept only governments as 
members, others guarantee broad rights to individuals. In addition, 
some regimes cover all 27 Member States of the EU, whilst others are 
more exclusive. It must also be mentioned that the EU does not limit 
its influence to its 27 Member States, but is proud to export its norms 
to its neighbours and to make close co-operation dependent upon 
their compliance with the EU’s standards of democracy, human 
rights and, last but not least, industrial products. In sharp contrast to 
any nation-state, the EU does not respect territorial boundaries, but, 
in the words of the Declaration of Laeken, respects “only democracy 
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and human rights”.2 In short, most contributions to the debate on the 
democratic deficit of international organisations, which apply the 
domestic analogy and use a normative concept that is deeply rooted 
in the history and the structure of the nation-state, commit a 
categorical mistake. 
2. Transnational Justice as a Right to Justification 
One option, in order to avoid such a categorical mistake and to 
formulate politically significant ideas of legitimacy, is to ensure that 
the analytical categories that we are using are not only normatively 
introduced but also empirically explained. Normative categories 
should be formulated with a view to the connection between “ought” 
and “can” and reflect an awareness that normative requirements will 
only be convincing to the degree that we provide evidence that they 
are indeed “fit for reality”. It is true, however, that such evidence is 
often hard to collect. Any statement about the possibility of 
transforming normative ideas into real-world conditions must always 
remain, to some degree, speculative, and can be formulated only 
hypothetically. Nevertheless, in order to make the criterion 
operational, we can consider all the normative ideas, which build 
upon some existing element of the empirical reality and merely 
expand its reach, rather than invent something completely new, to be 
prima facie fit-for-reality. This idea reflects Rawls’s insight that a 
necessary pre-condition for a convincing normative concept is “that 
its major principles and instructions are practiced and can be applied 
to existing political and social institutions”.3 Hence, such a concept 
expands “the borders of what we usually consider practically-
politically possible”4 while, at the same time, remaining on solid 
empirical ground. 
 
An interesting possibility, in order to move in this direction, is 
offered by a concept of justice which focuses upon the right to 
justification. An important advantage of switching from the 
                                                 
2 “The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights”, 
Declaration of Laeken 2001, European Council. 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); 
and The Law of Peoples: With, the Idea of Public Reason Revisited, (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 15. 
4 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); 
and The Law of Peoples: With, the Idea of Public Reason Revisited, (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 4. 
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democracy discourse to the justice discourse is that the notion of 
justice can, indeed, be applied to all political contexts. It is applicable 
to private settings such as in a family, to the internal organisations of 
a company, or even to the political system of a state or a 
supranational entity. In addition, justice is a normative standard 
which is not lower than any other standard of legitimacy. It is, in the 
words of John Rawls, even the prime social virtue, the most 
important virtue of social institutions. No other quality can substitute 
for a lack of justice. Only conditions that are just are acceptable, never 
unjust conditions. Everything which is unjust has to be rectified 
through practical political measures and improved upon. Democracy 
and justice are closely related to one another. Democracy is cherished 
by most of us because of its contribution to the fostering of politics 
that are just. We cherish democracy because is the political procedure 
with the highest probability of producing outcomes that are just. 
 
According to Rainer Forst, the right to justification is not a luxury 
good that is provided by well-developed democracies, but must be 
seen as a most basic human right.5 It is centred on the idea that any 
restriction of individual freedom must be justified by whoever causes 
the restriction in question or has the intention to do so. This argument 
takes the freedom of the individual from domination as a starting 
point and places any restriction of this freedom under the reservation 
of good reasons. In crafting the argumentative design of a 
justification, the justifying person or organisation cannot act 
arbitrarily, but must apply good reasons. Only the reasons are to be 
understood to be good reasons which fulfil the two minimum 
conditions of reciprocity and universality, which means that nothing 
more is demanded from anybody than we are willing to concede 
ourselves, and that the reasons apply to everybody to the same 
degree. 
 
Understanding justice as the “right to justification” gives the notion 
of justice an intrinsically procedural and discursive character. Any 
question about the specific implication of justice in a specific situation 
is answered with reference to a normatively-demanding discursive 
procedure. A thus defined right to justification can well be applied to 
international relations. It resonates with the idea of self-
                                                 
5 See Rainer Forst: Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen 
Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007). 
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determination and refers to the basic right of every society to choose, 
independently of foreign influence, its political status, its form of 
state and government and its economic, social and cultural 
development. As a matter of principle, restrictions of this freedom are 
acceptable only when a state either voluntarily complies with an 
international legal provision, when ius cogens is applicable, or when 
other good reasons can be articulated. 
 
It is important to note that self-determination cannot be equated with 
autonomy today. The global condition of complex inter-dependence 
implies that one can neither pursue a successful unilateral money and 
currency policy, nor conduct a sensible unilateral security policy. All 
these policy areas are characterised by a significantly reduced ability 
of single states to realise their preferences independently of the 
actions of other states. It is a generally shared insight, therefore, that 
complex inter-dependence among national societies has turned a 
purely national organisation of politics into a problem for democratic 
governance itself: in a great number of issues areas, from 
environmental degradation to security affairs and migration issues, 
the single nation-states is increasingly inappropriate for the 
formulation and implementation of effective policies. The normative 
deficiency of the nation-state is not limited to its capacity as an 
effective problem-solver, however. It also applies to the related 
structural phenomenon that the political measures taken by 
individual states often have effects for other states. The decision to 
raise or lower the interest rates of a central bank may have the effect 
of making neighbouring countries more, or less, attractive to capital. 
The easing or restricting of national provisions for immigration will 
likewise re-orient the decisions of individuals seeking refuge from 
violence or a better income, and have an effect on the relative 
attractiveness of other states. The national establishment of certain 
requirements for legally-sold products will make it more, or less, 
costly for producers in foreign states to import their products, and 
may lead to losses or gains or employment opportunities. All these 
effects are structural phenomena under conditions of inter-
dependence. Without being embedded in an international structure 
of policy co-ordination, the individual nation-state has little incentive 
to take the external effects of its actions seriously, i.e., to integrate 
them systematically as an important calculus into its own decision-
making practices. The basic normative principle, that those who are 
affected by a decision should have a say in its making, is, therefore, 
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systematically violated by almost all inter-dependent nation-states if 
they are not embedded in an international structure that fosters the 
internalisation of the external effects of domestic decision-making. 
 
Thus, international organisations such as the EU, the WTO, the ILO 
or even the United Nations (UN) derive their legitimacy, first of all, 
from their function as a correcting mechanism for this systematic 
nation-state failure. They foster the right to justification by making 
inter-dependent nation-states systematically aware of one another, by 
helping to pool resources that are necessary for tackling pressing 
cross-border problems, and by providing an organisational setting, in 
which the responsibility to take the concerns of other states seriously 
is transformed into legal obligations.6 International organisations, 
therefore, carry, first of all, the potential to remedy the structural 
shortcomings of the nation-state, and should be seen as important 
and necessary devices for adapting the nation-state to the condition 
of complex inter-dependence. Today, insisting on a traditional form 
of self-determination that emphasises both the right and the ability to 
unilateral action (sovereignty and autonomy), leads not to more 
freedom, but runs into the paradox of self-chosen heteronomy. A 
modern concept of self-determination entails participation in the 
political discourses and justificatory practices of international 
organisations and of multilateral co-operation. 
3. Obstacles to Transnational Justice 
Is the right to justification just another normative utopia without any 
fair chance to be realized? Or does it comply with the requirement of 
normative realism to explicate how the “ought” and the “is” relate to 
one another and how and by what means the normative idea can be 
fostered? This section analyses three major difficulties of realizing the 
right to justification. 
 
The existence of asymmetrically distributed international power 
resources poses a major challenge to the idea of a transnational 
discourse on justification. From world trade politics to environmental 
politics to international security politics, we can observe that the 
more powerful states dominate the policy-making process, while the 
                                                 
6 Ch. Joerges “European Law as Conflicts of Law”, in: Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, 
Deliberative supranationalism: revisited. 20/2006 EUI Working Papers; Ch. Joerges, 
“Deliberative Supranationalism” – Two Defences, (2002) 8 European Law Journal. 
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smaller states have to subordinate themselves to the policies agreed 
upon by the bigger states. Due to the unequal ability of states to 
transform their interests into international norms which are binding 
for other states, many international regimes only reflect the particular 
interests of a limited number of powerful states. Many international 
regimes produce heteronomy for weaker states, instead of 
international justice. Within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
for instance, the big member states, until recently, negotiated all the 
important agreements among themselves in a so-called “Green Room 
Procedure” and announced their findings to the secretary general. He 
then presented the outcome as a “consensus” to the rest of the 
member states.7 Clearly, such a procedure leaves little scope for a 
justice-oriented discourse of mutual justifications. 
 
Power asymmetries exist not only in the horizontal dimension of 
cross-border politics, but also in its vertical dimension. In 
international politics, executives have far more leeway to use their 
discretionary powers than in the domestic realm.8 In democratic 
domestic politics, governments act as the legislature’s executive 
organ, and are normally delegated the task of implementing its 
decisions. By contrast, in international politics, executives generally 
act as gatekeepers for political proposals, and decide which issues are 
discussed and which are to be dealt with at all. The legislative branch 
can only ask its government to put an issue on the international 
agenda, thereby promoting the involvement of other governments. 
Unlike national politics, the legislative branch has no right to set the 
political agenda of an international organisation or to call upon a 
government, or, in this case, a group of governments, actually to 
implement a certain legal norm. Governments are, by and large, free 
to set the international agenda as they wish, and to decide among 
themselves upon regulations. It is true that international rules 
concluded among executives become domestic law only after a 
national parliament has ratified a legal act, thereby transforming it 
into its national legislation. Thus, the legislative branches retain a 
veto – albeit only formally. However, at the same time, a 
parliamentary veto against a legal act concluded among executives is, 
                                                 
7 See A. Kwa (2003) Power Politics in the WTO, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok: 
Chulalogkorn University. 
8 See A. Moravcsik, (1994) Why the European Community Strengthens the State: 
Domestic Politics and International Co-operation, (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University: Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series 52). 
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for good reasons, very rare. Vetoing a legal act by refusing to ratify it 
is a massive declaration of mistrust from the parliamentary majority 
towards the government. This is unlikely to happen in parliamentary 
systems in which the government can rely on a parliamentary 
majority. The problem of executive empowerment through 
international negotiations is aggravated by the fact that executives 
usually possess better information about the positions and the scopes 
of other executives, and are, therefore, able to assess what is 
politically viable with greater accuracy. Through their membership in 
international organisations, such as the OECD, the World Bank or the 
IMF, they have access to a kind of specialised expertise that is not – or 
only with considerable effort – available to MPs. Thus, a parliament 
arguing against an internationally negotiated regulation and denying 
its ratification implicitly arrogates to itself a better knowledge of what 
is politically viable than the executive – despite the fact that it is less 
informed. A denied ratification is also improbable because it is the 
executives themselves who decide on which information about the 
positions and the scopes of other executives to pass on to the media 
and to parliament. Thus, the executives not only have the possibility 
of determining the international agenda, they are also in a strong 
position to influence the perception of the respective legislature (and 
the national public) about what is actually politically viable at all. 
 
A third crucial obstacle relates to the non-coercive nature of the 
international system. Justice-oriented discourses pre-suppose that 
successful justification is a necessary pre-condition for implementing 
a certain policy and that, therefore, any failure to explain or to justify 
incurs costs for a policy entrepreneur. Costs, however, will only be 
incurred by a policy entrepreneur if the group towards whom the 
justificatory effort is directed has some enforcement capacity which it 
can exert in the event of a failure, i.e., a non-convincing justification. 
However, because the international system is a self-help system, the 
power to impose costs on other states is structurally limited to the 
powerful states. It is for this reason that the limited capacity of the 
international community to provide incentives in order to make 
powerful states comply with their legal commitment is often 
described as the Achilles’ heel of effective global governance.9 Some 
even dispute that international legal rules are proper legal rules. And, 
                                                 
9 See Oran R. Young, 1999, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), Ch. 4. 
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indeed, in international relations, it is only too often the case that 
weaker states have a formal right to some justification, explanation or 
even compensation, but lack any means to enforce that right. Thus, 
justice-oriented discourses pre-suppose that not only strong, but also 
weak states have access to effective enforcement capacities in order to 
give a significant incentive to powerful actors to take justificatory 
discourses seriously. 
4. Supranationalism as a New Context for Justice 
The considerations above are hardly apt to form much optimism with 
regard to the chances of a justice-oriented transnational discourse. 
The international polity is a space in which horizontal and vertical 
power-asymmetries, and the inexistence of global coercive power, are 
important factors in policy outcomes. Under conditions of 
supranational integration, however, much of the scepticism can be 
relaxed. Supranational structures combine a vertical and hierarchical 
legal order with a horizontal and non-hierarchical coercive order.10 
They are neither state nor international politics. Supranationalism is 
established not on a monopoly of power, but on an oligopoly of 
power. All member states remain in full command of their legitimate 
monopoly of coercion and none of that is transferred to the 
supranational level. Supranationalism is, likewise, different if 
compared with traditional international diplomacy. Vertical legal 
integration ties individuals, governments and supranational 
organisations together into a multi-level legal structure in which the 
legal requirement to justify and give reasons is codified, and can be 
enforced by both supranational and domestic courts.11 Law in a 
supranational setting is, therefore, similar to national law, in that it 
distinguishes between basic norms (primary or constitutional law) 
and secondary law (statutory law), with the former more difficult to 
change than the latter. Individuals are not merely subjects and 
affected parties as they are under international law, they are also 
empowered with domestically enforceable rights. 
 
                                                 
10 See J.H.H. Weiler, (1981) “The Community System: The Dual Character of 
Supranationalism”, Yearbook of European Law 1: p. 267. 
11 See Ingolf Pernice: “Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: 
European Constitution-Making Revisited”, in: (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review, 
pp. 703-750. 
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4.1. Transforming Bargaining into Legal Reasoning 
A supranational context has important implications for the 
probability of effective justificatory discourses. In order to 
understand the difference that supranationalism makes, it is 
important to recall that power in international relations is most often 
exerted in the mode of intergovernmental bargaining. State 
preferences are treated as intrinsically legitimate reflections of 
domestic political processes. Most often, international negotiations 
are not about justifying governmental preferences, but about 
bargaining over the differences.Under conditions of 
supranationalism, i.e., in a highly legalised setting, bargaining is, in 
general, an inappropriate mode of interaction. Highly legalised 
settings such as in the European Community (EC), prescribe both 
material and procedural norms against which the preferences of 
actors are to be weighted. Complying with these norms necessitates 
justifying preferences by explaining how they relate to them. Legal 
integration forces actors to abstain from simply issuing threats and 
promises, and requires them to re-formulate their preferences in the 
language of law (by referring to material and procedural norms). 
Legal integration transforms bargaining into legal reasoning. 
 
It is true that legal reasoning is not immune to power asymmetries. 
Good arguments are often expensive arguments, because they require 
good lawyers and often have to refer to technical expertise or 
scientific evidence. It is also true, however, that re-formulating 
preferences in the language of law acts as a filtering mechanism, 
which limits the range of preferences that can be put on the table to 
those preferences which can be publicly justified. In his discussion of 
the analytical differences between arguing and bargaining, and their 
effects on political outcomes, Elster refers to this effect as the 
“civilising force of hypocrisy”.12 In order to argue, speakers must 
hide base motives. However, hiding base motives requires proposals 
to be subjected to a number of constraints which may modify them 
quite substantially. The first constraint is the “imperfection 
constraint”, which implies that proposals must show less than a 
perfect coincidence between private interests and impartial 
arguments in order to be perceived as good arguments. Arguments 
                                                 
12 See Jon Elster: “Deliberation and Constitution Making”, in: Jon Elster (ed.), 




must also be in accordance with positions that have been formulated 
at an earlier point in time, and be maintained even if they no longer 
serve the speaker’s interests (consistency constraint). Otherwise, a 
speaker will easily be viewed as acting opportunistically and lose his 
or her credibility. And, finally, arguments must abstain from making 
claims which can easily be shown to be incorrect (plausibility 
constraint). Together, all three constraints work as a filter against 
openly selfish claims and thus civilise interaction by forcing the 
disputants to engage in argumentative interaction. Legal reasoning is, 
therefore, a deliberative mode of interaction, which forces actors to 
perform in accordance with shared legal norms, even if they only 
have self-minded interests. 
 
By fostering argumentation in cross-border policy-making, 
supranationalism implies a change in the mode of representation. In 
international relations, states are, in general, represented by 
governments. International negotiations are, in fact, 
intergovernmental negotiations in which the weight of an argument 
depends upon the power resources of the state that is represented by 
that government. The importance that is attached to good arguments 
in a supranational context significantly changes this. Under 
conditions of legal reasoning, it is no longer a state’s vulnerability to a 
failure of negotiations that decides who obtains what, but the quality 
of the argument which the opposing sides can make. 
Supranationalism is, therefore, about the representation of 
arguments, and not about power and preferences. Under conditions 
of anarchy, states bargain; in supranational structures, they argue. 
 
Although it is hardly possible to observe instances of purely legal 
reasoning in any real-world organisational context,13 it is also true 
that most political discussions in close-to-supranational entities such 
as the EC, or (with even less approximation) the WTO, show 
significant elements of such a justificatory balancing of arguments. 
Articles 28 and 30 of the European Community Treaty (ECT) describe 
the prohibition of discriminatory trade practices and list the reasons 
which can be brought forward in order to justify an exemption. The 
                                                 
13 For an empirical research project that tried to describe instances of international 
arguing, see Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller: “Theoretical Paradise – 
Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas”, (together with Harald Müller); (2005) 31 
Review of International Studies, pp. 167-179). 
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overwhelming majority of political disputes and decisions of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the EC fall under the rubric of 
these legal provisions. Even more importantly, most legal (and even 
most political science) scholars agree that the decisions of the ECJ are 
hardly ever motivated by the difference in the size or the wealth of 
the disputing parties.14 It is arguments and justification, not 
preferences and power, which carry the day. Likewise, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) and the Appellate Body (AB) of the WTO 
mainly have to decide on disputes that take issue with equivalent 
principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity, as well as a 
multitude of exemptions that define and restrict the normative 
framework described. 
 
It is important to reflect upon a final caveat: even if supranational 
organisations have the capacity to transform bargaining into legal 
reasoning, they are, nevertheless, founded on an original bargaining 
process and often reflect – to some degree – the outcome of an 
asymmetrical distribution of power. The founding of WTO is most 
often described as reflecting a blackmailing process in which the 
Northern states threatened to conclude among themselves a mini-
WTO if the Southern world refused to accept the inclusion of Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and a General 
Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) into the legal framework of 
the new WTO.15 Thus, one is tempted to assume that even an ideal 
mode of transnational legal reasoning only applies the procedural 
and material norms which have been dictated by the powerful actors. 
If this were true, then legal reasoning would only perform as though 
it were a neutral and fair language, but, in fact, would express 
nothing but the hidden dominance of the powerful. However, it is 
also the case that the law is a living thing which adopts its own 
dynamics? once it has been established. The practices of the ECJ and 
the DSB provide clear evidence that Courts are only – to a limited 
degree – under the control of the member states, and have some 
leeway in interpreting the law in a way which is compatible with 
shared notions of fairness. Here, Burley and Mattli have explained 
the incomplete political control of the member states over “their” 
                                                 
14 See Karen J. Alter: Establishing the Supremacy of European law: The Making of an 
International Rule of Law in Europe, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
15 See Richard H. Steinberg: “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, (2004) 98 The American Journal of 
International Law, pp. 247-275. 
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Court, with reference to the argument that the law acts “as a mask 
and shield” against politics.16 It is also worth mentioning that 
intergovernmental bargaining hardly ever takes place in a 
normatively void environment. International customary law provides 
a distinct normative environment that encompasses compelling 
formal and informal norms such as the ideas of reciprocity, 
sovereignty, pacta sund servanda, and ius cogens. Thus, international 
law is not only the product of intergovernmental bargaining, but is 
also the normative frame in which negotiations are conducted. 
 
4.2. Safeguarding Executive Responsiveness 
Legal integration in a supranational context is not limited to the 
horizontal level of intergovernmental relations but also applies to its 
vertical dimension. In abstract terms, vertical legal integration can be 
understood as connecting supranational, national and individual 
actors by means of legal provisions so that justifications can, and 
must, be exchanged. Legal integration thus is not limited to relations 
among supranational organisations, but, instead, covers the whole 
range of relevant political actors in a multi-level structure. 
Supranational legal integration is highly relevant for establishing the 
pre-conditions of transnational justificatory discourses since it has the 
potential to safeguard that governmental and supranational actors 
are compelled to comply with the requirement to justify their actions, 
and that their policy discretion is not expanded beyond a degree 
which can be justified towards their respective principles. 
 
At member state level, legal integration can tie executive discretion to 
a mandate formulated by a parliamentary committee. The Danish 
Folketing, for example, exercises its control over the Danish 
government in European affairs by clearly outlining in advance 
which positions the governmental delegate may present and which 
go beyond its mandate. The responsible minister has to present his 
proposal in person to a specialised European Affairs Committee of 
the Folketing and to reach a supportive majority. The members of the 
committee not only vote on the proposal, but also have the right to 
propose amendments. The minister has no right to enter into any 
negotiations in Brussels if he or she does not convince the majority of 
                                                 
16 See Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli: “Europe Before the Court: A Political 
Theory of Legal Integration”, in: (1993) 47 International Organization, pp. 41-76. 
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the committee of his or her proposal. Likewise, if the negotiations in 
Brussels make it necessary to change the Danish position, and if the 
minister wants to go beyond the authorisations given by the 
mandate, then he or she must present new suggestions to the 
committee and wait for new instructions. The integration of the 
Folketing into the daily decision-making in Brussels is an important 
element for explaining the high political awareness toward European 
affairs in Denmark. European politics is not limited to executive 
discretion but is an essential part of domestic legislative politics. 
Although this awareness may, from time to time, lead to a critical 
stance of the public toward the EU, it is obviously highly attractive 
from the perspective of a justificatory discourse. 
 
The justificatory discipline of supranational legal integration also 
covers relations between the EC’s supranational institutions and its 
Member States. The delegation of competences to the Commission is 
almost always only conditional, and subject to control mechanisms. 
The provisions of Article 202 ECT are a typical example. The article 
stipulates in its first sentence that the Council delegates all 
competences to the Commission to implement its legislative acts. The 
second sentence, however, immediately adds that the Council may 
establish certain modalities for the execution of these competences. In 
practice, the second sentence has been a major reason for the huge 
growth of the European comitology system, which acts as a safeguard 
against the Commission becoming a “run-away bureaucracy”.17 Even 
in an area such as external trade, where the Commission has broad 
competences which were already codified in the Treaty of Rome, it 
must justify its international policies towards the Member States. 
According to Article 133 ECT, the Commission can act only after it 
has presented recommendations to the Council of Ministers, and after 
these recommendations have been authorised. In addition, every 
international legally-binding agreement that was concluded by the 
Commission on the part of the EC is subject to critical scrutiny in the 
Council. 
 
It is true that all of these mechanisms do not provide any guarantee 
for the complete lifting of vertical power asymmetries between the 
supranational bodies of the EU, the Member States and individuals. 
                                                 
17 See Mark A. Pollack, “Delegation, agency and agenda-setting in the European 
Community”, (1997) 51 International Organization , pp. 99-134. 
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Organisational procedures never determine action but only provide 
incentives to act according to prescribed rules. It is also true, 
however, that the list above is far from complete and only presents 
selected parts of a picture which, in reality, is much more complex 
and imposes a much more rigid discipline than the three mechanisms 
imply. In addition, the very existence of these procedures provides 
evidence that supranational legal integration is not only a means to 
expand governmental discretion but also simultaneously imposes 
additional needs for justification. Supranationalism, therefore, does 
not just expand or limit governmental discretion, but also provides an 
argumentative discipline according to which it is to be exercised. 
 
4.3. Healing the Achilles’ Heel 
It is an often cited conclusion that “almost all nations observe almost 
all the principles of international law and all of their obligations 
almost all of the time”.18 This observation has recently been re-
discovered by scholars endeavouring to understand why and when 
international regulations are complied with.19 According to their 
findings, good legal management of rules is the most important factor 
for eliciting compliance. Chayes and Chayes20 have put this finding 
quite clearly: 
 
Enforcement through these interacting measures of assistance 
and persuasion is less costly and intrusive and is certainly less 
dramatic than coercive sanctions, the easy and usual policy 
elixir for non-compliance. 
 
It is the power of the legitimacy of legal norms, the way legal norms 
work once they are established, and the smart management of cases 
of alleged non-compliance, which leads to compliance. The reasoning 
of Henkin, and Chayes and Chayes is based upon the insight that a 
rule which is part of a broader legal system usually has a far stronger 
compliance-pull than an individuated legal rule, because the former 
                                                 
18 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd 
ed.,1979), p. 47. 
19 For an overview, see R.B. Mitchell: “Compliance Theory: An Overview”, in: J. 
Cameron and J. Werksman and P. Roderick (eds), Improving Compliance with 
International Environmental Law, (London: Earthscan, 1996), pp. 3-28. 
20 See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes: The New Sovereignty: Compliance 
with International Regulatory Agreements, (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univerity Press, 
1995), p. 205. 
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is part of a larger normative design and embodies basic principles 
which are generally perceived as being legitimate or just. Even in the 
light of explicitly opposing interests, specific international legal 
norms have a high probability of being observed because they are 
perceived by the members of the international community as being 
part of an encompassing normative superstructure. It is also 
important to underline that a well-functioning international legal 
system is both in the interest of weak and strong states.21 For weak 
states, an international legal order is an important pre-condition for 
there to be any chance at all for their concerns to be heard and taken 
seriously. Weak states will only have a chance of succeeding in 
international negotiations against more powerful states if they have 
enforceable rights. Likewise, powerful states are normally those states 
which have a prime interest in the stability of an international order. 
Any such stability, however, depends on rules which are accepted by 
most, if not all, states. Acceptance for rules pre-supposes that they are 
not the product of purely arbitrary decisions, but that they are based 
upon commonly agreed ethical standards and form part of an 
overarching normative superstructure (see above). In short, stability 
requires law. In this sense, it is, indeed, appropriate to argue that 
legal rules possess a compliance-pull of their own.22 
 
It follows that the more a rule is considered to be part of a legal 
system, or, to put it differently, the more an international 
organisation is legalised, the more likely compliance with the rule in 
question becomes. Empirical evidence is highly supportive of the 
legalisation hypotheses:23 in fact, the impressive compliance record of 
the EC is hard to explain without referring to its character as a legal 
community.24 The strongest single procedure with regard to 
                                                 
21 See Andrew Hurrell: “International Society and the Study of Regimes. A Reflective 
Approach”, in: Volker Rittberger (ed.): Regime Theory and International Relations, 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 49-72. 
22 See Thomas M. Franck: The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
23 See the contributions in the special issue on Legalization of International 
Organisation (54:3), and in: Joerges and Zürn (eds), Law and Governance in 
Postnational Europe. Compliance beyond the Nation-State, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
24 See Michael Zürn and Jürgen Neyer: “Conclusions. The Conditions of 
Compliance”, in: Michael Zürn and Christian Joerges (eds.), Law and Governance in 
Postnational Constellations: Compliance Beyond the Nation State, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
58 Neyer
 
compliance enforcement is the preliminary ruling procedure 
according to Article 234 ECT. It directly connects governments to the 
control exerted by their citizens, and instrumentalises national courts 
as agents of supranational law. Article 234 ECT provides that any 
national legal person may sue his or her government if that 
government has violated a legal provision of the EU and inflicted 
damage upon that legal person. Governments are thus not only liable 
to each other by means of an international legal obligation, but have 
also adopted responsibilities towards their citizens.25 A supranational 
legal order is thus categorically different from a merely international 
legal order, because individuals may use their member state’s courts 
against political decisions taken by the government or the parliament 
of that state. Thus, it is not surprising that the direct linkage between 
the EC’s supranational institutions and its citizens is often interpreted 
as a major constitutional step towards the establishment of a 
European political order sui generis. 
5. Multi-Level Legitimacy: Justice and Democracy 
This chapter began with the diagnosis of a categorical mistake often 
made when reflecting upon the adequate normative foundations of 
international organisations. International organisations have neither 
the capacity for state-like governance, nor will they acquire – in the 
foreseeable future – political competences which cover more than 
narrowly-defined policies. It is inadequate, therefore, to assess their 
legitimacy in categories taken from the analysis of democratic 
statehood, and is more appropriate to consider their contribution(s) 
to transnational justice. Although this argument seems to put 
primary emphasis on justice and to downplay democracy, it is 
ultimately oriented at explaining the relationship between national 
democracy and transnational justice: the normative promise of 
national democracy to foster self-governance will only survive 
globalisation if it is supplemented by an organizational layer that 
fosters transnational justice. And, vice versa, if transnational justice is 
to have a realistic chance, it must be established on strengthened 
domestic procedures of strong domestic control mechanisms, which 
guarantee that the executives remain closely connected to their 
constituencies and national parliaments. Legitimacy in the new 
                                                 
25 See Rs. 26/62, van Gend and Loos (N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie 
Onderneming van Gend and Loos gegen Niederländische Finanzverwaltung), Urteil 
vom 5. Februar 1963; Slg. 1963, 1, 24. 
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international system can only be adequately conceptualised if it is 
explained as a normative multi-level structure in which the domestic 
and the international level are closely interwoven. 
 
Only if interdependent national democracies are supplemented by a 
transnational layer of justificatory discourses can we expect them 
systematically to respect the external effects of their decisions as a 
relevant factor for domestic decision-making. Democracy entails that 
those who rule and who take the decisions are identical with those 
who are addressed by those decisions. If that standard is to be 
respected, i.e., if we are not ready to accept the effects of the decisions 
of other nation-states without having had the chance to make our 
concerns heard in “their” decision-making processes, and if we are 
not willing to make other citizenries subject to our decisions, then we 
have to work for a system of collective multi-level governance, in 
which national democracies open up to the concerns of foreigners. 
Under conditions of interdependence, transnational justice and 
national democracy mutually support and necessitate each other. 
 
The good news of this article is that supranationalism can deliver 
some of the functions which we traditionally attach to democratic 
procedures. Supranationalism promotes the cause of justice by 
providing an effective remedy to horizontal and vertical power 
asymmetries, as well as to the problem of non-compliance. Legal 
integration transforms intergovernmental bargaining into 
transnational deliberations by providing incentives to governments 
to re-formulate preferences in the language of legal reasoning. In 
doing so, legal integration transforms the mode of representation 
from preferences and power to arguments and reasons. In addition, 
legal integration has the capacity to provide mechanisms which 
safeguard against the impact of vertical power asymmetries on the 
justificatory discourse. Finally, legal integration exerts a compliance-
pull of its own by increasing the costs of non-compliance to both 
powerful and weak states. 
 
It is true that legal integration has no built-in causal connection to 
justice. Thus, at the end of the day, even the best procedures only 
provide incentives. In addition, it must be underlined that they will 
only be effective if the powerful actors realise that it is, indeed, in 
their best interest to accept the discipline that is imposed upon them 
by supranational legal norms. If powerful states prefer to go it alone, 
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supranational organisations have nothing but economic and political 
incentives to change the courses of action of these states. Real-world 
supranational integration must be understood as a long-term learning 
process which may lead to a constitutionalisation of effective 
justificatory discourses. It is also true, however, that the two real-
world close-to-supranational entities that we know, the EC and the 
WTO, are moving slowly but steadily towards that goal. Both the EC 
and the WTO embody some significant elements of justificatory 
discourses and can easily be understood as (imperfect) 
approximations of this ideal. They are both to be cherished for the 
degree to which they have walked down the road already, and to be 
criticised for the long way that is still ahead of them. 
 
 
Chapter 3  
Can International Public Goods be 
Supplied without Multilevel Constitutional 
Democracy and “Constitutional Justice”?  
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 




1. Introduction and Summary                                  
From Realism to Multilevel Democratic 
Constitutionalism in International Law 
International law was developed by states using their power in order 
to advance the interests of their rulers. Since the emergence of 
constitutional democracies in the Eighteenth century, elected 
governments have increasingly recognised that “state interests” must 
be defined in terms of the constitutional rules and interests of civil 
society, rather than only in terms of national security and welfare of 
the rulers. Yet, due to the rational ignorance of most citizens vis-à-vis 
foreign policy and mutually beneficial “international public goods”,1 
most areas of international law continue to be shaped by 
intergovernmental rules that define the pursuit of “state interests”, 
their intergovernmental co-ordination, co-operation among states or 
                                                 
1 On the criteria used by economists for defining pubic goods (i.e., non-rivalry use, 
non-excludability), and on the “jurisdictional gap”, the “participation gap” and 
“incentive gap” impeding a more effective supply of global public goods, see I. Kaul, 




hegemonic coercion without effective civil society participation.2 This 
power-oriented, state-centred focus of international law is 
increasingly challenged by citizens for its failures to protect human 
rights, democratic peace, rule of law and other international public 
goods more effectively also in the ever more important transnational 
relations beyond the state. 
 
Post-Second World War European integration has demonstrated that 
international law and institutions can protect the interests of citizens 
against the centuries-old abuses of state powers, and enable 
governments to protect international public goods (such as a common 
market and democratic peace among 480 million European 
Community (EC) citizens). All 27 Member States of the European 
Union (EU), all 30 member states of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), and all 47 member states of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) have accepted that the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Court, and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) review state regulations 
in terms of human rights, fundamental freedoms and other 
international rules which protect general citizen interests, such as 
non-discrimination, the necessity and the proportionality of 
governmental restrictions. All three courts interpret the ECHR and 
EC agreements as “constitutional instruments” which protect 
multilevel, democratic governance for the collective supply of 
European public goods. As state-centred theories cannot explain this 
successful “constitutionalisation” of European integration, “realism” 
requires the reality of “constitutional pluralism” at national and 
European levels be taken into account in order to explore the policy 
question of whether multilevel constitutionalism offers lessons also 
for the collective supply of global public goods. 
 
                                                 
2 See J. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), whose identification of “state interests” with “the preferences 
of the state’s political leadership” (at 6) entails an authoritarian theory of 
international law which neither explains international legal practice in Europe (for 
example, the transfer of state powers to the EC) nor the constitutional limits of 
intergovernmental power politics. As inside constitutional democracies, these 
constitutional limits of state powers (for example, deriving from the worldwide 
recognition of inalienable human rights as jus cogens) offer constitutional options for 
the international protection of citizen interests beyond power politics. 
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Virtually all 192 United Nations (UN) member states have adopted 
national constitutions and human rights obligations (for example, 
under UN law) based upon the insight that, as stated in numerous 
UN human rights instruments, “recognition of … inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world”. All UN member states have also accepted 
one or more international “treaty constitutions” for the collective 
supply of certain international public goods, such as the constitutions 
(sic) establishing the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for the 
protection of “social justice” and labour rights, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) for the protection of “the highest attainable 
standard of health” as “one of the fundamental rights of every human 
being” (WHO Constitution), the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) for “ensuring humanity’s freedom from hunger” (FAO 
Constitution), and the UN Education and Scientific Co-operation 
Organisation for contributing “to peace and security by promoting 
collaboration among the nations through education, science and 
culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of 
law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms […] 
affirmed […] by the Charter of the United Nations” (Article I United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
Constitution). Clearly, such limited international treaty constitutions 
differ fundamentally from national constitutions. Why is it that – 
within Europe – the inter-relationships between national 
constitutions and international treaty constitutions are increasingly 
analysed in constitutional terms, whereas – outside Europe – most 
economists, lawyers, political scientists and governments deny the 
very existence of multilevel constitutionalism? 
 
This apparent paradox can be explained by the political reality of 
state-centred, intergovernmental power politics in worldwide 
institutions, which differs fundamentally from the citizen-oriented 
transformations of European common market law, competition law 
and human rights law. Hence, the normative question – whether 
constitutional approaches to international law are legally and 
politically necessary for the collective supply of international public 
goods outside Europe – is considered naïve by most academics and 
governments. Worldwide organisations and international courts 
(such as the International Court of Justice, the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies, investor-state arbitration tribunals) also avoid 
constitutional discourse in their interpretation and application of 
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worldwide agreements (such as the UN Charter, the agreements 
establishing the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
Group, the WTO, and multilateral environmental agreements). Yet, is 
such implicit acceptance of governance failures (such as the obvious 
disregard for the effective protection of human rights, the reduction 
of poverty and parliamentary democracy in intergovernmental UN 
negotiations, and the neglect for general consumer welfare in 
intergovernmental WTO negotiations) realistic and democratic? If, 
after centuries of intergovernmental power politics in Europe, diverse 
forms of “constitutionalising” European law have proven possible 
(such as supranational EC law, intergovernmental EEA law, and 
subsidiary multilevel ECHR constitutionalism): Is it not time to 
examine which European experiences offer lessons for reducing the 
ubiquitous governance failures in the worldwide supply of 
international public goods? The main argument of this chapter is that 
the European experience – that collective supply of international 
public goods requires multilevel constitutional democracy and 
multilevel judicial protection of the rule of international law – holds 
true also for the collective supply of many international public goods 
outside Europe, notably in citizen–driven areas of international co-
operation such as the worldwide division of labour. 
 
The reality of multilevel constitutional democracy in Europe is not 
inconsistent with the realist claim that international law and 
international organisations are products of the rational self-interests 
of states (rather than constituting exogenous legal constraints which 
curtail state interests). Citizens and their democratically-elected 
governments have rational self-interests in promoting constitutional 
democracy also in multilevel governance for the collective supply of 
international public goods so as to limit the state-centred biases of 
national democracies (for example, the focus of national politicians on 
protecting national interests) in favour of the collective protection of 
cosmopolitan interests. In a globally interdependent world, multilevel 
constitutional democracy is as necessary for the collective supply of 
international public goods as constitutional democracy is indispensable 
for promoting national public goods. Giovanni Sartori, in his classic The 
Theory of Democracy Revisited, criticised the term “democracy” as a 
misleading and pompous “name for something that does not exist”;3 
                                                 
3 G. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited: Part One, (Chatham: Chatham House 
Publishers, 1987), p. 7. 
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the existing national and international rules and institutions which 
promote democratic rights, democratic procedures, parliamentary, 
participatory and deliberative democracy fall short of the normative 
ideals of “governance by discussion” and “government of the people, 
by the people, and for the people”. Yet, even if most citizens remain 
“rationally ignorant” of most governance problems, and “élitist 
democracy” has been described as the worst system of governance 
with the exception of all the others: the historical failures of all non-
democratic governance alternatives make democracy an 
inconvertible, normative ideal. European law has proven that diverse 
forms of “transnational constitutional democracy” are politically 
practical, and that the four normative premises of democratic and 
economic constitutionalism are not limited to relations inside state 
borders: 
 
First, the value premise of normative individualism (i.e., that 
governments can derive value only from the free and informed 
consent of the governed individuals) applies also to transnational 
governance and requires international markets no less than national 
markets (including both consumer-driven economic markets as well 
as citizen-driven political markets) as decentralized information 
mechanisms, without which citizens and their governments can 
neither know nor efficiently satisfy individual preferences. 
 
Second, the diversity of individual preferences, the scarcity of 
resources and the inevitable ubiquity of conflicts – both within 
individuals (for example, between their rational egoism and social 
reasonableness) as well as among individuals (for example, in their 
rational pursuit of self-interests) – require the constitutional and 
judicial restraints of the Hobbesian war of each against all in 
transnational relations just as much as within states. As respect for 
normative individualism makes consensus among citizens on the 
outcomes of economic and political competition impossible, human 
reasonableness requires the constitutional protection of a limited 
“overlapping consensus” on constitutional rules of justice (as 
reflected, for example, in the universal recognition of inalienable 




Third, as explained by constitutional economics,4 worldwide division 
of labour based on consumer-driven market competition (as the most 
efficient information, allocation and co-ordination mechanism for 
increasing individual and social productivity and consumer welfare) 
depends on constitutional guarantees of the “constitutive principles” 
of market economies (such as freedom of contract, private property, 
monetary stability, freedom of profession, rule of law, legal 
accountability), as well as of “regulative principles” of market 
economies (such as competition, environmental and social rules), 
which empower citizens to engage in mutually beneficial market 
exchanges subject to the rules and governmental limitations of 
“market failures”. The lack of an international “economic 
constitution”5 beyond Europe and North America is a major reason 
for the unnecessary poverty and exploitation, by abuses of private – 
as well as public – power, of more than one billion people living 
without adequate access to essential goods. 
 
Fourth, in view of the ubiquity of abuses of private and public power, 
“enabling constitutions” must be complemented by “limiting 
constitutions” which constrain the abuses of power by governmental 
and private actors. Just as democratic governance for the collective 
supply of national and European public goods has proven sustainable 
only in mutually-agreed frameworks of multilevel constitutional 
restraints, so can non-discriminatory competition in international 
markets remain effective only to the extent that market actors and 
market regulators are constitutionally restrained from abusing their 
                                                 
4 See E.-U. Petersmann, Constitutionalism and the Regulation of International 
Markets, EUI Working Paper Law 2007/23. 
5 In almost all countries, national constitutions protect a national market economy. 
For example, the US Constitution protects a common market, private liberty and 
property rights. The EC’s treaty constitution protects a common market based upon 
constitutional market freedoms, competition law and regulatory policies. The term 
“economic constitution” does not necessarily refer to formal constitutional law. The 
basic idea is the psychological insight that rational individuals should commit 
themselves to legal rules of a higher rank that empower individuals vis-à-vis abuse of 
private and public power. In common law countries such as England, the common 
law guarantees of freedom of profession, freedom of contract and judicial protection 
of rule of law empower citizens to engage in effective market competition and 
division of labour (as described already by Adam Smith). Competition law and 
monetary law are examples of constitutional market rules in EC law, but are based 
only upon legislation in most countries. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) offers intergovernmental guarantees of market freedoms, property rights 
and rule of law that are far less supra-national than EC law. 
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powers. Transnational constitutionalism – not only in Europe but also 
outside – is necessary for reforming “constitutional failures” (such as 
harmful externalities of national interest group politics on states and 
citizens abroad) and for enabling governments to collectively supply 
international public goods. 
 
The thesis of this chapter – to wit, that international public goods 
(such as an efficient worldwide division of labour) cannot be 
effectively supplied by intergovernmental power politics without 
multilevel constitutionalism – risks being criticised as anti-
democratic, similar to the populist criticism of the US Constitution 
and of constitutional adjudication as anti-democratic limitations of 
majority politics.6 Constitutional reforms of international law must be 
prepared by challenging the prevailing paradigms of realist power 
politics and “international law among states”. According to J. Rawls, 
“in a constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason is the 
reason of its supreme court”; it is of constitutional importance for the 
“overlapping, constitutional consensus” necessary for a stable and 
just society among free, equal and rational citizens who tend to be 
deeply divided by conflicting moral, religious and philosophical 
doctrines.7 In Europe, the judicial transformation of 
intergovernmental treaties into citizen-oriented constitutional 
guarantees was accepted by citizens, national courts, parliaments and 
governments because the judicial “European public reason” 
protected individual rights and European public goods more 
effectively. The “Solange method” of multilevel judicial co-operation 
“as long as” constitutional rights are adequately protected, reflects an 
“overlapping constitutional consensus” on the need for 
“constitutional justice” in European law. The power-oriented 
rationality of governments interested in limiting their judicial 
accountability is increasingly challenged also in worldwide dispute 
settlement practices. Judicial interpretation of intergovernmental 
                                                 
6 On the endless American discussions of “counter-majoritarian difficulties” of 
constitutionalism, see G.S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). 
7 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 231 et 
seq. Rawls explains the Kantian distinction between the reasonable (which aim at just 
terms of social co-operation by basing individual actions upon universalisable 
principles) and the rational egoism of individuals (pursuing their individual ends 
without moral sensibility for the consequences of their actions on the well-being of 
others), p. 48 et seq. 
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rules as protecting also individual rights may be justifiable notably in 
citizen-driven areas of international economic law, in which 
individual rights (for example, of access to courts) can enhance the 
mutual benefits of co-operation among citizens and self-interested, 
individual enforcement of rule of law. Multilevel economic, 
environmental and human rights governance can become more 
reasonable, more efficient and more lawful if national and 
international courts co-operate in protecting the rule of international 
law for the benefit of citizens (as “democratic principals” of 
governments) affected by arbitrary governmental violations of 
international legal obligations. 
 
In his Theory of Justice,8 Rawls used the idea of reasonableness for 
designing fair procedures that prompt reasonable citizens (as 
autonomous moral agents) to agree upon basic equal freedoms and 
other principles of justice. In his later book, on Political Liberalism, 
Rawls re-framed his theory of justice as fairness by emphasising the 
importance of the public use of reason for maintaining a stable, 
liberal society confronted with the problem of reasonable 
disagreement about individual conceptions for a good life and a just 
society. “Deliberative democracy” and cosmopolitan reasonableness 
require legal guarantees of basic equal rights (for example, freedoms 
to participate as equals in public discourse) and a democratic 
constitution (for example, the independent judicial protection of basic 
rights) as legal and institutional preconditions for public debate 
defining the conditions for a stable consensus on the principles of 
justice.9 This contribution explains why the universal recognition of 
human rights and the increasing number of international courts for 
settling disputes “in conformity with principles of justice” and 
human rights (as required by the customary methods of treaty 
interpretation as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT)) entail that judicial and democratic reasoning 
increasingly challenge both the power-oriented “intergovernmental 
reasoning” and the state-centred opinio juris sive necessitatis which 
dominate the Westphalian system of “international law among 
states” (Sections 2-4). In Europe, three different ways of judicial 
                                                 
8 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1973). 
9 On these dual functions of reasonableness in Rawls’ theory of justice, see J. 
Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism”, in: (1995) 92 The Journal of Philosophy. 
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transformation of intergovernmental treaties into objective 
constitutional orders – i.e., the judicial “constitutionalisation” of the 
intergovernmental EC Treaty and of the ECHR, and, to a lesser 
extent, also of the EEA Agreement – succeeded because their 
multilevel judicial protection of constitutional citizen rights vis-à-vis 
transnational abuses of governance powers was accepted by citizens, 
national courts and parliaments as legitimate (Section 5). Sections 6 
and 7 argue that the European “Solange method” of judicial co-
operation “as long as” other courts respect the constitutional 
principles of justice should be supported by citizens, judges, civil 
society and their democratic representatives also in judicial co-
operation with worldwide courts and dispute settlement bodies. 
Section 8 concludes that “public reasonableness” and democracy 
require an “overlapping consensus” on rule of law not only within 
constitutional democracies, but also in the international division of 
labour and mutually beneficial co-operation among citizens across 
national frontiers. Just as “public reason” among the 480 million EC 
citizens has constitutionally restrained the reasoning of their 27 
national governments, worldwide economic integration law (for 
example, in the WTO) also requires “cosmopolitan public reasoning” 
as a democratic foundation of the inter-state structures of 
international law. In a world dominated by power politics and by 
reasonable “constitutional pluralism”, international judges may find 
it easier to meet their obligation to settle disputes “in conformity with 
principles of justice” if courts co-operate and base their “judicial 
discourses” on “constitutional justice”, notably the judicial protection 
of human rights and “fundamental freedoms for all” (Preamble 
VCLT). 
2. Cosmopolitan Reasonableness as a 
Requirement of UN Human Rights Law and 
European Law 
UN human rights law proceeds from the constitutional premise that – 
as emphasised in the Preambles to the 1966 UN Covenants on civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights – human rights “derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person” and are based upon 
the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family (as) the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”. The 
Preambles make it clear that human rights precede “the obligation of 
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states under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms”, a 
general obligation universally recognised in UN human rights 
covenants. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) had 
already recognised that “human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law” (Preamble); yet, they exist as the inherent birthright of 
every human being independently of their legal recognition in UN 
human rights instruments. The universal recognition by all states – in 
hundreds of UN, regional and national human rights instruments 
and national constitutions – of inalienable human rights has 
objectively changed the legal status of individuals as legal subjects of 
international law: inalienable human rights now exist erga omnes and 
require respect, legal protection and fulfilment of inalienable human 
rights by all governments. Due to their progressive transformation 
into international ius cogens, the fragmented, treaty-based UN human 
rights guarantees gradually evolve into a UN human rights 
constitution, which also limits the powers of international 
organisations.10 As in European human rights law, international 
human rights serve only as a “second line of constitutional 
entrenchment” which respect the right of self-determination of 
peoples as the constitutional foundation of modern international law 
based upon an inalienable core of human rights. 
 
All six major UN human rights covenants acknowledge in their 
Preambles the close inter-relationship between “the inherent dignity 
and … the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family”. The universal recognition of human dignity as the 
constitutive principle for human rights suggests that a common 
understanding cannot be found by interpreting human dignity in the 
light of theological concepts of “person” (for example, the creation of 
man in God’s image). The explicit link made in Article 1 of the UDHR 
between “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights” (first sentence), and “They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood” (second sentence), confirms that “reason and 
conscience” must be regarded as the defining elements of humanity 
                                                 
10 See E.-U. Petersmann, “Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare: 
Constitutional Functions of the Emerging UN Human Rights Constitution”, in: F.M. 
Abbott, C. Breining-Kaufmann and T. Cottier (eds), International Trade and Human 
Rights, (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2006), pp. 29-67. 
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and dignity.11 The appeal to moral conduct “in a spirit of 
brotherhood” further indicates that “reason and conscience” are 
referred to not only as anthropological facts, but as sources for moral 
reasoning which enable mankind to secure universal equal rights as 
the legal “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” 
(Preamble UDHR) and of enjoyment by everybody of “an existence 
worthy of human dignity” (Article 23 UDHR). 
 
Human dignity is also recognised as constitutive principle in Article 1 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed by the 
European Parliament, the EU Commission and the EU Council in 
December 2000,12 and incorporated into the 2004 Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, as well as into the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon. 
Some national constitutional systems (for example, in Germany, 
India, Israel and South Africa) and regional constitutional systems 
(such as EC law, as protected by the EC courts, and the ECHR, as 
protected by the European Court of Human Rights) explicitly 
recognise human dignity as a constitutional value underlying human 
rights (for example, the ECHR), or as a human right (for example, as 
protected in EC law by the EC Court of Justice). Yet, political and 
legal conceptions of human rights continue to differ dependent on 
how human dignity is conceptualised. For instance, while the EC 
Court and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights protect “market 
freedoms” guaranteed in the EC Treaty as conferring “fundamental 
rights” to individuals, Anglo-Saxon human rights lawyers from 
common law countries without constitutional guarantees of 
comprehensive liberty rights often disregard constitutional traditions 
of protecting liberty rights in the economy; some claim that market 
freedoms are not directly rooted in human dignity and that they are 
fundamentally different from the human rights and the “fundamental 
freedoms” protected by UN human rights law.13 Regardless of 
                                                 
11 See K. Dicke, “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”, in: D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds), The Concept of 
Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
pp. 111 and 117. 
12 The text of this Charter is published in the Official Journal of the EC, C 364/1-22 of 
18 December 2000. On the controversy over whether Article 1 recognises a 
fundamental right to human dignity or merely an objective constitutional principle, 
see the commentary on Article 1 of the Charter by Borowsky in: J. Meyer (ed), 
Kommentar zur Charta der Grundrechte der EU, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2002), 
pp. 45 et seq. 
13 On this controversy, see, for example, E.-U. Petersmann, “Taking Human Dignity, 
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whether human dignity is recognised as the most fundamental 
human right from which all other rights flow (as, for example, in 
German and Israeli constitutional law), or whether human dignity is 
viewed only as a constitutional principle, both legal traditions 
recognise respect for the moral and rational autonomy of individuals 
as the normative source of inalienable human rights which require 
democratic self-government based upon “public reasoning” (as 
protected by freedom of opinion, freedom of the press, freedom of 
religion, rights to democratic governance, etc.) and entail obligations 
by governments to respect, protect and promote human rights “in a 
spirit of brotherhood” (Article 1 UDHR) and in the context of “an 
effective political democracy” (Preamble ECHR). 
3. Citizen-oriented Reasonableness as a 
Requirement of Constitutional Justice in 
International Law 
A second source of reasonableness as a constitutional principle of 
international law derives from the customary law requirement of 
protecting “constitutional justice” as a general principle of 
international law. Denial of justice is one of the oldest principles of 
state responsibility in international law. Under the customary 
international law rules for the protection of aliens, the international 
minimum standard with regard to the duties of states to provide 
justice to foreigners focused on procedural due process of law and 
the duty of states “to create and maintain a system of justice which 
ensures that unfairness to foreigners either does not happen, or is 
corrected”;14 state responsibility for denial of justice depended on 
proof of a systemic failure in the national administration of justice, 
either by a miscarriage of justice by the judiciary, or by non-judicial 
authorities (for example, if they prevented the judiciary from 
administering justice in a fair manner). The universal recognition – in 
regional and worldwide human rights conventions, as well as in 
national laws – of human rights of access “to a fair and public hearing 
                                                                                                                   
Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston”, in: 
(2002) 13 European Journal of International Law (EJIL), pp. 845-851; idem, Human Rights 
and “International Trade Law: Defining and Connecting the two Fields”, in: T. 
Cottier et al. (eds), Human Rights and International Trade, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 29-94. 
14 See J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), pp. 7 and 36. 
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within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law” for the “determination of civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge” has re-inforced the 
intergovernmental prohibition of a denial of justice by individual 
rights of access to justice.15 The progressive extension – by an ever 
larger number of other international treaties, notably in the field of 
international economic and environmental law – of individual rights 
of access to courts and to effective legal remedies increasingly 
confronts judges with a “constitutional dilemma”: 
 
• On the one hand, foreigners and their home states 
increasingly invoke specific treaty obligations (for example, 
relating to human rights of access to justice, labour rights, 
intellectual property rights, investor rights, trading rights, 
fishing rights and other freedoms of the sea, etc.) rather than 
general international law rules on denial of justice in cases of 
unfair treatment of foreigners. 
• On the other hand, most intergovernmental treaties on the 
protection of human rights and other individual rights do not 
offer effective legal and judicial remedies to the individual;16 
hence, national and international judges are increasingly 
confronted with legal claims that intergovernmental treaty 
rules on the protection of individual rights (for example, in 
                                                 
15 See Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights and similar guarantees in 
other regional human rights conventions (for example, Article 8 American 
Convention on Human Rights), UN human rights conventions (for example, Article 
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and other UN human rights 
instruments (for example, Article 10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights), which 
have given rise to a comprehensive case law clarifying the rights of access to courts 
and related guarantees of due process of law (for example, justice delayed may be 
justice denied, see D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, (2nd 
ed.)(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 113 et seq.; F. Francioni (ed), Access to 
Justice as a Human Right, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
16 See J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection (International Law 
Commission UN Doc. A/CN.4/506, 2000), para. 25: “To suggest that universal 
human rights conventions, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, provide individuals with effective remedies for the protection of 
their human rights is to engage in a fantasy which, unlike fiction, has no place in 
legal reasoning. The sad truth is that only a handful of individuals, in the limited 
number of States that accept the right to individual petition to the monitoring bodies 
of these conventions, have obtained or will obtain satisfactory remedies from these 
conventions.” On the dual meaning of remedies (for example, in terms of access to 
justice and substantive redress), see D. Shelton note 15 supra, p. 7 et seq. 
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UN human rights conventions, World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) conventions on intellectual property 
rights, ILO conventions on labour and social rights, WTO 
rules and regional trade agreements on individual freedoms 
of trade, investment treaties protecting investor rights) should 
be legally protected by judges as constituting individual rights 
and legal remedies. 
 
The UN Charter (Article 1) and the VCLT recall the general obligation 
under international law “that disputes concerning treaties, like other 
international disputes, should be settled by peaceful means and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law”, 
including “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all” (VCLT, Preamble). The functional 
inter-relationships between law, judges and justice are reflected in 
legal language from antiquity (for example, in the common core of 
the Latin terms jus, judex, justitia) up to modern times (see the Anglo-
American legal traditions of speaking of courts of justice, and giving 
judges the title of Mr. Justice, Lord Justice, or Chief Justice). Like the 
Roman god Janus, justice and judges face two different perspectives: 
their “conservative function” is to apply the existing law and protect 
the existing system of rights so as “to render to each person what is 
his [right]”. Yet, laws tend to be incomplete and are subject to change. 
Impartial justice may require “reformative interpretations” of legal 
rules in response to changing social conceptions of justice. This is 
particularly true following the universal recognition - by all 192 UN 
member states – of inalienable human rights, which call for citizen-
oriented interpretations of the power-oriented structures of 
international law. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his 
final address as UN Secretary-General to world leaders assembled in 
the UN General Assembly on 19 September 2006, criticized the 
power-oriented UN system as “unjust, discriminatory and 
irresponsible” in view of its failures to respond effectively to the three 
global challenges to the United Nations: “to ensure that globalisation 
would benefit the entire human race; to heal the disorder of the post-
Cold War world, replacing it with a genuinely new world order of 
peace and freedom; and to protect the rights and dignity of 
individuals, particularly women, which were so widely trampled 
underfoot.” According to Kofi Annan, these three challenges – “an 
unjust world economy, world disorder and widespread contempt for 
human rights and the rule of law” – entail divisions that “threaten the 
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very notion of an international community, upon which the UN 
stands”.17 Under what conditions may national and international 
judges respond to this “constitutional dilemma” by interpreting 
“principles of justice and international law” from citizen-oriented, 
human rights perspectives, as opposed to the state-centred 
perspectives of governments, whose representatives all too often 
pursue self-interests in limiting their personal accountability by 
treating citizens as mere objects of international law and of 
discretionary foreign policies? 
4. International Courts as Guardians of Public 
Reason in Modern International Law 
The functions of judges are defined not only in the legal instruments 
establishing courts. Since legal antiquity, judges also invoke inherent 
powers deriving from the constitutional context of the respective 
legal systems (such as constitutional safeguards of the independence 
of courts in the Magna Carta and in the US Constitution), often in 
response to claims to impartial, judicial protection of “justice”. Article 
III, sect. 2 of the US Constitution provides, for example, that the 
“judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made… under their Authority” (etc). Based upon this Anglo-Saxon 
distinction between statute law and equity, which limits the 
permissible content of governmental regulations, courts and judge-
made law have assumed a crucial role in the development of “equity 
law” and “constitutional justice” in many countries.18 In international 
law, too, international courts invoke inherent powers to protect 
procedural fairness and the principles of reciprocal, corrective and 
distributive justice, for example, by using principles of equity for the 
de-limitation of conflicting claims to maritime waters and to the 
underlying seabed.19 Since the democratic constitutions of the 18th 
century, almost all UN member states have adopted national 
constitutions and international agreements that have progressively 
expanded the power of judges in most states as well as in 
                                                 
17 The speech of Kofi Annan is reproduced in UN document GA/105000 of 19 
September 2006. 
18 See T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice. A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
19 See the examples given by T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapters 3 and 10. 
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international relations.20 The constitutional separation of powers 
provides for ever more comprehensive legal safeguards of the 
impartiality, integrity, institutional and personal independence of 
judges.21 
 
Alexander Hamilton, in the “Federalist Papers”, described the judiciary 
as “the least dangerous branch of government” in view of the fact 
that courts dispose neither of “the power of the sword” nor of “the 
power of the purse”.22 In modern, multilevel governance systems 
based upon hundreds of functionally-limited, intergovernmental 
treaty regimes, courts remain the most impartial and independent 
“forum of principle” and “exemplar of public reason”.23 For example, 
fair and public judicial procedures and “amicus curiae briefs” may not 
only enable all the parties involved to present and challenge all the 
relevant arguments, they may also require more comprehensive and 
principled justification of judicial decisions, in comparison with 
political and administrative decisions. As all laws and all 
international treaties use vague terms and incomplete rules, the 
judicial function goes inevitably beyond being merely “la bouche qui 
prononce les mots de la loi” (Montesquieu). By choosing from among 
the alternative interpretations of rules, “filling gaps” in the name of 
justice, and by protecting the general principles underlying the 
hundreds of specialised treaty regimes, judicial decisions interpret, 
progressively develop, and complement legislative rules and 
intergovernmental treaties in order to settle disputes “in conformity 
with principles of justice”. The multilevel judicial protection of 
constitutional citizen rights in Europe (see Section 5 infra) illustrates 
that the independence and impartiality of national and international 
judges makes them the most effective guardians of the “constitutional 
essentials” and “overlapping consensus” (J. Rawls) underlying 
national and international human rights law as the constitutional 
foundation of democratic self-government. Both positivist-legal 
theories and moral-prescriptive theories of adjudication justify such 
                                                 
20 See C. Guarnieri and P. Pederzoli, The Power of Judges, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
21 See A. Sajo (ed), Judicial Integrity, (Leiden: Nijhoff Publishers, 2004). 
22 A. Hamilton, The Judiciary Department, The Federalist Papers No. 78, in: A. 
Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers, (New York: Bantam Publishers, 
1789/1789). 
23 On supreme courts as “exemplar of public reasons”, see J. Rawls note 7 supra, p. 
231 et seq. 
Multilevel governance for international public goods 77
 
judicial clarification and progressive development of indeterminate 
legal rules (for example, general human rights guarantees) on the 
grounds that independent courts are the most principled guardians 
of constitutional rights and of “deliberative, constitutionally limited 
democracy”, of which the public reasoning of courts is an important 
part.24 For example, the judicial protection of equal treatment for 
children of different colour by the US Supreme Court in the 
celebrated case of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 – 
notwithstanding earlier denials by the law-maker and by other courts 
of such a judicial reading of the US Constitution’s safeguards of 
“equal protection of the laws” (Fourteenth Amendment) – was 
democratically supported by the other branches of government and is 
today celebrated by civil society as a crucial contribution to 
protecting the goals of the US Constitutions (including its Preamble 
objective “to establish justice and secure the blessings of liberty”) and 
human rights more effectively. 
 
In its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) emphasised that – also in international law – legal 
institutions ought not to be viewed statically and must interpret 
international law in the light of the legal principles prevailing at the 
moment that legal issues arise concerning them: 
 
An international instrument has to be interpreted and applied 
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at 
the time of the interpretation.25 
 
International human rights courts, such as the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), just as economic courts, such as the EC 
Court, have often emphasised that effective protection of human 
rights and of non-discriminatory conditions of competition may 
require “dynamic interpretations” of international rules with due 
regard to changed circumstances (such as new risks to human health, 
competition and the environment). As in domestic legal systems, 
intergovernmental and judicial rule-making are inter-related even in 
international relations: as all international treaties remain incomplete 
                                                 
24 For a justification of judicial review as being essential for protecting and promoting 
deliberative democracy, see C.F. Zurn, Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of 
Judicial Review, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
25 ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 31, para. 53. 
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and build upon general principles of law, the judicial interpretation, 
clarification and application of international law rules, like judicial 
decisions on particular disputes, inevitably influence the dynamic 
evolution and clarification of the opinio juris voiced by governments, 
judges, parliaments, citizens and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) with regard to the progressive development of international 
rules. The universal recognition, by all 192 UN member states, of 
“inalienable” human rights deriving from respect for human dignity, 
and the ever more specific legal obligations to protect human rights 
entail that citizens (as the “democratic owners” of international law 
and institutions) and judges (as the most independent and impartial 
guardians of “principles of justice” underlying international law) can 
assert no less democratic legitimacy for defining and protecting 
human rights than governments that often dislike empowering 
citizens in international relations, and prefer to treat citizens as mere 
objects of international law in most UN institutions. From the 
perspective of citizens and “deliberative democracies”, active judicial 
protection of constitutional citizen rights (including human rights) is 
essential for “constitutionalising”, “democraticising” and 
transforming international law into a constitutional order, as is 
emerging for the more than 800 million European citizens who 
benefit from the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected 
by the ECtHR, and especially for the 480 million EC citizens who 
have been granted – by EC law and by European courts – 
constitutional freedoms and social rights across the EC that national 
governments had never protected before. The inalienable jus cogens 
and erga omnes core of human rights, and the judicial obligation to 
settle disputes “in conformity with principles of justice and 
international law”, are of constitutional importance for protecting 
“constitutional justice” in international law in the 21st century. 
5. Constitutional Pluralism: Three Different Kinds 
of Multilevel Judicial Protection of Citizen Rights in 
Europe 
An ever larger number of empirical political science analyses of the 
global rise of judicial power, and of “judicial activism” by supreme 
courts and international courts in Europe, confirm the political 
impact of judicial interpretations on the development of national and 
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European law and policies.26 This section argues that the multilevel 
judicial protection of European law – for instance, by the EC courts, 
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Court, the ECtHR and national 
courts – was a pre-condition for the multilevel, democratic supply of 
European “public goods”, and was supported as reasonable and 
“just” by judges, citizens and parliaments because it enlarged the 
constitutional rights of EC citizens. Sections 6 and 7 explain why the 
European “Solange method” of judicial co-operation – “as long as” 
other courts respect constitutional principles of justice – deserves 
support by citizens, judges, civil society and their democratic 
representatives as the most reasonable basis for judicial co-operation, 
judicial dialogues and “judicial competition” also in international 
relations beyond Europe. Section 8 concludes that – in a world 
dominated by power politics and by reasonable “constitutional 
pluralism” – it is easier for international judges to meet their 
obligation to settle disputes “in conformity with principles of justice” 
if courts co-operate in the protection of rule of law and base their 
“judicial discourses” upon “public reason” and the judicial protection 
of the constitutional principles underlying human rights law. 
 
Judicial protection of human rights derived from respect for human 
dignity as the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace”, and the 
multilevel judicial protection of equal liberty rights in the European 
economy as in the polity, were the driving forces in the progressive 
                                                 
26 A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges. Constitutional Politics in Europe, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) describes how much third-party dispute resolution 
and judicial rule-making have become privileged mechanisms of adapting national 
and intergovernmental rule-systems to the needs of citizens and their constitutional 
rights. In his book on The Judicial Construction of Europe, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), Stone Sweet, analyses the judicial “constructing of a supra-national 
constitution” (Chapter II) as a self-reinforcing system driven by self-interested 
private market actors, litigators, judges, European parliamentarians and academic 
communities. The former EC Court judge P. Pescatore confirmed that – when 
deciding the case van Gend and Loos – the judges had a certain idea of Europe, and 
that these judicial ideas - “and not arguments based on legal technicalities of the 
matter” - had been decisive (P. Pescatore, “The Doctrine of Direct Effect”, in: (1983) 8 
European Law Review, p. 157). On the criticism of such “judicial law-making”, see T. 
Mähner, Der Europäische Gerichtshof als Gericht, (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2005), 
who criticises the inadequate democratic legitimacy of the ECJ’s expansive case-law 
limiting national sovereignty in unforeseen ways (for example, by judicial 
recognition of fundamental rights as general principles of Community law). From the 
point of view of “deliberative democracy”, however, the ECJ’s case-law has been 
approved by EC Member States, parliaments and citizens. 
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transformation of the intergovernmental EC treaties and the ECHR 
into constitutional instruments which protect citizen rights and 
community interests (such as the EC’s common market and 
multilevel democracy) across national frontiers by three different 
kinds of “multilevel judicial governance” and of “multilevel 
constitutionalism”: 
 
• The multilevel judicial governance in the EC among national 
courts and European courts remains characterised by the 
supranational structures of EC law and the fact that the 
fundamental freedoms of EC law and related social 
guarantees go far beyond the national laws of EC Member 
States (infra 1). 
• The multilevel judicial governance of national courts and the 
ECtHR in the field of human rights differs fundamentally 
from the multilevel judicial governance in European economic 
law: Both the ECtHR and the ECHR assert only subsidiary 
constitutional functions vis-à-vis national human rights 
guarantees and respect the diverse democratic traditions in 
the 47 countries that have ratified the ECHR (infra 2). 
• The multilevel judicial governance among national courts and 
the EFTA Court has extended the EC’s common market law to 
the three EFTA members (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) 
of the European Economic Area (EEA) through 
intergovernmental modes of co-operation, rather than by 
using the EC’s constitutional principles of legal primacy, 
direct effect and the direct applicability of the EC’s common 
market law. This different kind of multilevel judicial co-
operation (for example, based upon voluntary compliance 
with legally non-binding preliminary opinions by the EFTA 
Court) confirms the legitimacy of constitutional pluralism: 
citizens in third countries can effectively benefit from the legal 
“market freedoms” and social benefits of European 
integration law without full membership in the EC (infra 3). 
 
5.1. Multilevel Judicial Protection of EC Law has 
extended the Constitutional Rights of EC Citizens 
A citizen-driven common market with free movement of goods, 
services, persons, capital and payments inside the EC can work 
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effectively only to the extent that the common European market and 
competition rules are applied and protected in coherent ways in 
national courts in all 27 EC Member States. As the declared objective 
of an “ever-closer union between the peoples of Europe” (Preamble 
to the EC Treaty) was to be brought about by economic and legal 
integration requiring additional law-making, administrative 
decisions and common policies by the European institutions, the EC 
Treaty differs from other international treaties by its innovative 
judicial safeguards for the protection of rule of law – not only in 
intergovernmental relations among EC Member States, but also in the 
citizen-driven common market as well as in the common policies of 
the European Communities. Whereas most international jurisdictions 
(like the ICJ, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Law of the Sea 
Tribunal, and WTO dispute settlement bodies) remain characterised 
by intergovernmental procedures, the EC Treaty provides unique 
legal remedies not only for the Member States, but also for EC 
citizens and EC institutions as the guardians of EC law and of its 
“constitutional functions” for correcting “governance failures” at 
national and European levels: 
 
• The citizen-driven co-operation among national courts and the 
EC Court in the context of preliminary rulings procedures 
(Article 234 EC) has uniquely empowered national and 
European judges to co-operate, at the request of EC citizens, in 
the multilevel judicial protection of citizen rights protected by 
EC law. 
• The empowerment of the European Commission to initiate 
infringement proceedings (Article 226 EC) rendered the ECJ’s 
function as an intergovernmental court much more effective 
than would have been possible under purely inter-state 
infringement proceedings (Article 227 EC). 
• The Court’s “constitutional functions” (for example, in cases 
of actions by Member States or EC institutions for the 
annulment of EC regulations), as well as its functions as an 
“administrative court” (for example, protecting private rights 
and rule of law in response to direct actions by natural or legal 
persons for the annulment of EC acts, failure to act, or actions 
for damages), offered unique legal remedies for maintaining 
and developing the constitutional coherence of EC law. 
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• The EC Court’s teleological reasoning based upon 
communitarian needs (for example, in terms of the protection 
of EC citizen rights, consumer welfare, and of undistorted 
competition in the common market) justified constitutional 
interpretations of “fundamental freedoms” of EC citizens that 
would hardly have been acceptable in purely 
intergovernmental treaty regimes. 
 
The diverse forms of judicial dialogues (for example, on the 
interpretation and protection of fundamental rights), judicial 
contestation (for example, of the scope of EC competences) and 
judicial co-operation (for example, in preliminary ruling procedures) 
emphasised the need to respect the common constitutional principles 
derived from the EC Member States’ obligations under their national 
constitutions, under the ECHR (as interpreted by the ECtHR), as well 
as under the constitution law of the EC. This judicial respect for 
“constitutional pluralism” promoted judicial comity among national 
courts, the ECJ and the ECtHR in their complementary, multilevel 
protection of constitutional rights, with due respect for the diversity 
of national constitutional and judicial traditions. Arguably, it was this 
multilevel judicial protection of the common constitutional principles 
underlying European law and national constitutions which enabled 
the EC Court, and also the ECtHR, progressively to transcend the 
intergovernmental structures of European law by focusing on the 
judicial protection of individual rights in constitutional democracies 
and in common markets, rather than on state interests in 
intergovernmental relations. 
5.2. Multilevel Judicial Enforcement of the ECHR: the 
Subsidiary “Constitutional Functions” of the ECtHR 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), like most other 
international human rights conventions, sets out minimum standards 
for the treatment of individuals that respect the diversity of the 
democratic constitutional traditions of defining individual rights in 
democratic communities. The 14 Protocols to the ECHR and the 
European Social Charter (as revised in 1998) also reflect the 
constitutional experiences, in some European countries (such as 
France and Germany), of protecting economic and social rights as 
integral parts of their constitutional and economic laws. For example, 
in order to avoid a repetition of the systemic political abuse of 
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economic regulation prior to 1945,27 the ECHR also includes 
guarantees of property rights and the rights of companies. The 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR for the collective enforcement of the ECHR 
– based upon complaints not only by Member States but also by 
private persons – prompted the Court to interpret the ECHR as a 
constitutional charter of Europe28 for the protection of human rights 
across Europe as an objective “constitutional order”.29 The multilevel 
judicial interpretation and protection of fundamental rights, as well 
as of their governmental restrictions “in the interests of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society” (Article 6), are of a 
constitutional nature. But ECtHR judges rightly emphasise the 
subsidiary functions of the ECHR and of its Court: 
 
these issues are more properly decided, in conformity with the 
subsidiary logic of the system of protection set up by the 
European Convention on Human Rights, by the national 
judicial authorities themselves and notably courts of 
constitutional jurisdiction. European control is a fail-safe device 
designed to catch the breaches that escape the rigorous scrutiny 
of the national constitutional bodies.30 
 
The Court aims to resist the “temptation of delving too deep into 
issues of fact and of law, of becoming the famous ‘fourth instance’ 
that it has always insisted it is not”.31 It also exercises deference by 
recognising that the democratically-elected legislatures in the 
Member States enjoy a “margin of appreciation” in the balancing of 
public and private interests, provided the measures taken in the 
general interest bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality both 
                                                 
27 For example, the wide-ranging guarantees of economic regulation and legally 
enforceable social rights in Germany’s 1919 Constitution for the “Weimar Republic” 
had led to ever more restrictive government interventions into labour markets, 
capital markets, interest rates, as well as to expropriations “in the general interest” 
which – during the Nazi dictatorship from 1933 to 1945 – led to systemic political 
abuse of these regulatory powers. 
28 See Ireland v United Kingdom (1979), 2 European Human Rights Reports 25. 
29 See the judgment of the ECtHR in Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) of 23 
March 1995, para. 75, referring to the status of human rights in Europe. Unlike the 
ECJ, the ECtHR has no jurisdiction for judicial review of acts of the international 
organization (the Council of Europe) of which the Court forms part. 
30 L. Wildhaber, “A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?” 
in: (2002) 23 Human Rights Law Journal, p. 161 et seq. 
31 See Wildhaber, note 30 supra, p. 161. 
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to the aims pursued and the effects on the individual interests 
affected.32 Instead of imposing uniform approaches to the diverse 
human rights problems in the ECHR Member States, the ECtHR often 
exercises judicial self-restraint, for example: 
 
• by leaving the process of implementing its judgments to the 
Member States, subject to the “peer review” by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, rather than asserting 
judicial powers to order consequential measures; 
• by viewing the discretionary scheme of Article 41 ECHR for 
awarding just satisfaction “if necessary” as being secondary to 
the primary aim of the ECtHR in order to protect minimum 
standards of human rights protection in all Convention 
Member States;33 
• by concentrating on “constitutional decisions of principle” 
and “pilot proceedings” that appear to be relevant for many 
individual complaints and for the judicial protection of a 
European public order based upon human rights, democracy 
and rule of law; and 
• by filtering out early manifestly ill-founded complaints 
because the Court perceives its “individual relief function” as 
being subsidiary to its constitutional function. 
 
Article 34 of the ECHR permits individual complaints not only “from 
any person”, but also from “non-governmental organisations or 
groups of individuals claiming to be the victims of a violation” of 
ECHR rights by one of the Member State parties. Whereas the 
African, American, Arab and UN human rights conventions protect 
human rights only of individuals and of people, the ECHR and the 
European Social Charter also protect the human rights of non-
governmental legal organisations. The protection of this collective 
dimension of human rights (for example, of legal persons that are 
composed of natural persons) has prompted the ECtHR to protect 
procedural human rights (for example, under Articles 6, 13, 34 
ECHR), as well as substantive human rights of companies (for 
                                                 
32 See J. Schokkenbrock, “The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin-of-
Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, in: 
(1998) 19 Human Rights Law Journal, pp. 30-36. 
33 See Wildhaber, note 30 supra, pp. 164-165. 
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example, under Articles 8, 10, 11 ECHR, Protocol 1)34 in conformity 
with the national constitutional traditions in many European states as 
well as inside the EC (for example, the EC guarantees of market 
freedoms and other economic and social rights of companies). The 
rights and freedoms of the ECHR can thus be divided into 3 groups: 
 
• Some rights are inherently limited to natural persons (for 
example, Article 2: right to life) and focus on their legal 
protection (for example, Article 3: prohibition of torture; 
prohibition of arbitrary detention in Article 5; Article 9: 
freedom of conscience). 
• Some provision of the ECHR explicitly protect also rights of 
“legal persons” (for example, property rights protected in 
Article 1 of Protocol 1). 
• The rights of companies have become recognised by the 
ECtHR also in respect of other ECHR provisions that protect 
the rights of “everybody”, without mentioning the rights of 
NGOs, notably the rights of companies to invoke the right to a 
fair trial in the determination of civil rights (protected under 
Article 6), the right to respect one’s home (protected under 
Article 8), freedom of expression (Article 10), freedom of 
assembly (Article 11), freedom of religion/worship (Article 9), 
the right to an effective remedy (Article 13), and the right to 
request compensation for non-material damage (Article 41). 
Freedom of contract and of economic activity is not 
specifically protected in the ECHR, which focuses on civil and 
political rights; but the right to form companies in order to 
pursue private interests collectively is protected by freedom of 
association (Article 11), by the right to property (Protocol 1) 
and, indirectly, also by the protection of “civil rights” in 
Article 6 ECHR. 
 
This broad scope of human rights protection is reflected in the 
requirement of Article 1 to secure the human rights “to everyone 
within their jurisdiction”, which also protects traders and companies 
from outside Europe, and may even cover state acts implemented 
outside the national territory of ECHR Member States or 
implementing obligations under EC law. Yet, compared with the 
                                                 
34 See M. Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies. Exploring the Structure of 
ECHR Protection, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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large number of complaints by companies brought to the EC Court of 
Justice, less than 3% of judgments by the ECtHR relate to complaints 
by companies. So far, such complaints concerned mainly Article 6:1 
(the right to a fair trial), Article 8 (the right to respect for one’s home 
and correspondence), Article 10 (freedom of expression, including 
commercial free speech), and the guarantee of property rights in 
Protocol 1 to the ECHR. 
 
Similar to the constitutional and teleological interpretation methods 
used by the EC Court, the ECtHR – in its judicial interpretation of the 
ECHR – applies principles of “effective interpretation” aimed at 
protecting human rights in a practical and effective manner. These 
principles of effective treaty interpretation include a principle of 
“dynamic interpretation” of the ECHR as a “constitutional 
instrument of European public order” that must be interpreted with 
due regard to contemporary realities so as to protect “an effective 
political democracy” (which is mentioned in the Preamble as an 
objective of the ECHR).35 Limitations of the fundamental rights of 
economic actors are reviewed by the ECtHR as to whether they are 
determined by law, in conformity with the ECHR, and whether they 
are “necessary in a democratic society”. Governmental limitations of 
civil and political human rights tend to be reviewed by the ECtHR 
more strictly (for example, as to whether they maintain an 
appropriate balance between the human rights concerned and the 
need for “an effective political democracy”) than governmental 
restrictions of private economic activity, which tend to be reviewed 
by the Court upon the basis of a more lenient standard of judicial 
review which allows for a “margin of appreciation” of governments. 
 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR protects “peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions”(paragraph 1); The term “property” is used only in 
paragraph 2. The ECtHR has clarified that Article 1 guarantees rights 
of property not only in corporeal things (rights in rem), but also 
intellectual property rights, and private law or public law claims in 
personam (for example, monetary claims based upon private 
contracts, employment and business rights, pecuniary claims against 
                                                 
35 On the Court’s teleological interpretation of the ECHR in the light of its “object and 
purpose”, see Emberland, note 34 supra, p. 20 et seq. 
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public authorities).36 In Immobiliare Saffi v Italy, the Court also 
recognised positive state duties to protect private property, for 
example, to provide police assistance in evacuating a tenant from the 
applicant’s apartment; the lack of such police assistance for executing 
a judicial order to evacuate a tenant was found to constitute a breach 
of the applicant’s property right.37 The inclusion of the right to 
property into the ECHR confirms that property is perceived as a 
fundamental right that is indispensable for personal self-realisation in 
dignity.38 As the moral justifications of private property do not 
warrant absolute property rights, Article 1 recognises – in conformity 
with the constitutional traditions of many national European 
constitutions which emphasise the individual, as well as the social, 
functions of property (for example, in Article 14 of the German Basic 
Law) – that private property can be restricted for legitimate reasons. 
The case law of the ECtHR confirms that such restrictions may 
include, for example: 
 
• taxation for the common financing of public goods (including 
re-distributive taxation if it can be justified upon grounds of 
reciprocal benefit, the correction of past injustices or re-
distributive justice); 
• governmental control of harmful uses of property (for 
example, by police power regulations designed to prevent 
harm to others); as well as 
                                                 
36 On private law and constitutional law meanings of property (as a relationship to 
objects of property and to other legal subjects that have to respect property rights), 
and on the different kinds of property protected in the case-law of the ECtHR, see A. 
Riza Coban, Protection of Property Rights within the European Convention on Human 
Rights, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), Chapters 2 and 6. 
37 Immobiliare Saffi v Italy, Reports 1999-V (2000), 30 EHRR 756. 
38 On the moral foundations of market freedoms, see Petersmann, note 10 supra, p. 29 
and 48 et seq. Coban, note 36 supra, Chapter 3, justifies property rights as prima facie 
human rights upon the basis of four arguments: (1) both the use value and the 
exchange value of property are essential for private autonomy; (2) a system of private 
property is also essential for personal self-fulfilment; (3) respect for individual 
autonomy requires respect for the entitlement of people to the fruits of their labour as 
well as respect for the outcome of peaceful, voluntary co-operation (for example, in 
markets driven by consumer demand and competition); and (4) a system of private 
property further encourages fruitful initiative and an autonomy-enhancing society 




• governmental taking of property by power of eminent 
domain, whose lawful exercise depends on the necessity and 
proportionality of the taking for realising a legitimate public 
interest and – especially if the taking imposes a discriminatory 
burden only on some individuals – may require the payment 
of compensation for the property taken. 
 
Even though the ECtHR respects a wide margin of appreciation of 
Member States to limit and interfere with property rights (for 
example, by means of taxation) and to balance individual and public 
interests (for example, in cases of a taking of property without full 
compensation), the Court’s expansive protection – as property or 
“possessions” – of almost all pecuniary interests and legitimate 
expectations arising from private and public law relationships reveals 
a strong judicial awareness of the importance of private economic 
activities and economic law for the effective protection of human 
rights and personal self-realisation in the economy and civil society. 
The Court’s review of governmental limitations of, and interferences 
with, property rights is based on “substantive due process” standards 
that go far beyond the “procedural due process” standards applied 
by the US Supreme Court since the 1930s.39 In the different European 
context of creating an ever broader “social market economy” across 
the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, the ECtHR’s 
constitutional approach to the protection of broadly defined property 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of companies, 
appears reasonable. 
                                                 
39 The US Constitution (Amendments V and XIV) includes strong guarantees of 
private liberty and property rights against takings without “due process of law” and 
“just compensation”. Up to the late 1930s, the US Supreme Court frequently 
overturned legislation on the grounds that it violated economic liberties. Yet, when 
the Democrats took over the US Supreme Court in 1937, the Court had limited 
judicial protection of “substantive due process of law” essentially to civil and 
political rights; in the economic field, the Court introduced a constitutional 
presumption (in the famous Carolene Products case of 1938, 304 U.S. 144) that 
legislative restrictions of private property are presumed to be lawful and no longer 
subject to judicial review of “economic due process of law”. The commerce clause in 
the US Constitution does not guarantee individual economic liberties as in the EC 
Treaty, but merely gives regulatory authority to the US Congress. 
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5.3. The Diversity of Multilevel Judicial Governance in 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs): the Example of the 
EFTA Court 
The 1992 Agreement between the EC and the EFTA states (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway) establishing the European Economic Area 
(EEA),40 is the legally most developed of the more than 250 FTAs (in 
terms of GATT Article XXIV) concluded after World War II. The 
EFTA Court illustrates the reasonable diversity of judicial procedures 
and approaches to the interpretation of international trade law, and 
confirms the importance of “judicial dialogues” among international 
and domestic courts for the promotion of rule of law in international 
trade. In order to ensure that the extension of the EC’s common 
market law to the EFTA countries would function in the same 
manner as in the EC’s internal market, the 1991 Draft Agreement for 
the EEA had provided for the establishment of an EEA Court, 
composed of judges from the ECJ as well as from the EFTA countries, 
and for the application by the EEA Court of the case law of the EC 
Court. In Opinion 1/1991, the EC Court objected to the structure and 
competences of such an EEA Court on the grounds that its legally-
binding interpretations could adversely affect the autonomy and 
exclusive jurisdiction (Articles 220, 292 EC) of the EC Court (for 
example, for interpreting the respective competences of the EC and 
EC Member States concerning matters governed by EEA 
provisions).41 Following the Court’s negative Opinion, the EEA 
Agreement’s provisions on judicial supervision were re-negotiated 
and the EEA Court was replaced by an EFTA Court with more 
limited jurisdiction, and composed only of judges from the EFTA 
countries. In a second Opinion, the EC Court confirmed the 
consistency of the revised EEA Agreement,42 subject to certain legal 
interpretations of this agreement by the EC Court.43 In order to 
promote legal homogeneity between EC and EEA market law, Article 
6 of the revised EEA Agreement provides for the following principle 
of interpretation and judicial cooperation: 
 
Without prejudice to future developments of case law, the 
provisions of this Agreement, in so far as they are identical in 
                                                 
40 Signed on 2 May 1992 and in force as of 1 January 1994, OJ EC 1994, L 1/3. 
41 Opinion 1/91, Agreement on the EEA, ECR 1991 I-6079, paras. 31 et seq. 
42 See Official Journal EC 1994, L 1/3. 
43 See Opinion 1/92, Agreement on the EEA, ECR 1992 I-2821. 
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substance to corresponding rules of the [EC Treaty and the 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC)] and to 
acts adopted in application of these two Treaties, shall, in their 
implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity 
with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the (EC) 
given prior to the date of signature of the agreement.44 
 
According to the 1994 Agreement between the EFTA member states 
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of 
Justice (SCA),45 the Court has jurisdiction for infringement 
proceedings by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against an EFTA 
state (Article 31), actions concerning the settlement of disputes 
between EFTA states (Article 32), advisory opinions on the 
interpretation of the EEA Agreement (Article 33), review of penalties 
imposed by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (Article 35), as well as 
jurisdiction in actions brought by an EFTA state or by natural or legal 
persons against decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (Article 
36) or against failure to act (Article 37). Out of the 62 cases lodged 
during the first ten years of the EFTA Court, 18 related to direct 
actions, 42 concerned requests by national courts for advisory 
opinions, and 2 related to requests for legal aid and the suspension of 
a measure.46 
 
In its interpretation of EC law provisions that are identical to EEA 
rules (for example, concerning common market and competition 
rules), the EEA Court has regularly followed ECJ case –law, and has 
fulfilled the homogeneity objectives of EEA law in terms of the 
outcome of cases, if not in terms of their legal reasoning. In its very 
first case, Restamark,47 the EFTA Court interpreted the notion of court 
                                                 
44 The limitation to prior case law was due to the refusal by EFTA countries to 
commit themselves to unforeseeable, future case law of the EU courts on which they 
are not represented. V. Skouris, “The ECJ and the EFTA Court under the EEA 
Agreement: A Paradigm for International Cooperation between Judicial Institutions”, 
in: C. Baudenbacher, P. Tresselt and T. Orlygsson (eds), The EFTA Court. Ten Years 
On, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 123 et seq., concludes, however, that “it does 
not seem that the EFTA Court has treated the ECJ case law differently depending on 
when the pertinent judgments were rendered” (p. 124). 
45 Official Journal EC 1994, L 344/1. 
46 See H.P. Graver, “The Effects of EFTA Court Jurisprudence on the Legal Orders of 
the EFTA States”, in: C. Baudenbacher, P. Tresselt and T. Orlygsson, note 44 supra, p. 
79 et seq. 
47 Case E-1/94, EFTA Court Reports 1994-95, 15. 
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or tribunal (in the sense of Article 34 SCA, regarding requests by 
national courts for preliminary opinions) by proceeding from the ”six 
factor test” applied by the ECJ in its interpretation of the 
corresponding provision in Article 234 EC: the referring body must, 
in order to constitute a “court or tribunal”, (1) be established by law 
(rather than by private agreement, as in the case of commercial 
arbitration); (2) be permanent; (3) have compulsory jurisdiction for 
legally-binding decisions on issues of a justiciable nature (res judicata); 
(4) conduct inter-partes procedures; (5) apply rules of law and 
evidence; and (6) be independent. Notwithstanding this, the EFTA 
Court considered the request admissible even if, as frequently occurs 
in administrative court proceedings in Finland and Sweden, only one 
party appeared in the proceedings. In the EC Court judgments in 
cases Dorsch Consult of 199748 and Gabalfrisa of 2000,49 the ECJ 
followed suit and acknowledged that the inter-partes requirement was 
not absolute. The case law of the EFTA Court on questions of the 
locus standi of private associations to bring an action for the 
annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority offers 
another example of liberal interpretations of procedural requirements 
by the EFTA Court.50 
 
The EC Court, in its Opinion 1/91, held that the Community law 
principles of legal primacy and direct effect were not applicable to the 
EEA Agreement and were “irreconcilable” with its characteristics as 
an international agreement which conferred rights only on the 
participating states and the EC.51 The EFTA Court, in its Restamark 
judgment of December 1994, followed from Protocol 35 (on achieving 
a homogenous EEA based upon common rules) that individuals and 
economic operators must be entitled to invoke and to claim at 
national level any rights that could be derived from precise and 
unconditional EEA provisions if they had been made part of the 
national legal orders.52 In its 2002 Einarsson judgment, the EFTA 
Court further followed from Protocol 35 that such provisions with 
quasi-direct effect must take legal precedence over conflicting 
                                                 
48 Case C-54/96, ECR 1997 I-4961. 
49 Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98, ECR 2000 I-1577. 
50 See C. Baudenbacher, “The EFTA Court Ten Years On”, in: Baudenbacher et al., 
note 44 supra, p. 13 et seq., and p. 24 (who mentions that this liberal tendency might 
be influenced by the fact that the EFTA Court, unlike the ECJ, is not overburdened). 
51 Opinion 1/91, EEA Agreement, ECR 1991 I-6079, para. 28. 
52 Case E-1/94, EFTA Court Reports 1994-95, 15. 
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provisions of national law.53 In 1998, in its Sveinbjörnsdottir judgment, 
the EFTA Court had already characterised the legal nature of the EEA 
Agreement as an international treaty sui generis that had created a 
distinct legal order of its own; the Court therefore found that the 
principle of state liability for breaches of EEA law must be presumed 
to be part of EEA law.54 This judicial recognition of the corresponding 
EC law principles was confirmed in the 2002 Karlsson judgment, in 
which the EFTA Court further held that EEA law – while not 
prescribing that individuals and economic operators be directly able 
to rely on non-implemented EEA rules before national courts – 
required national courts to consider EEA rules as relevant, whether 
implemented or not, when interpreting international and domestic 
law.55 
6. Lessons from the European ‘Solange Method’ of 
Judicial Co-operation for Worldwide Economic and 
Human Rights Law? 
From the perspectives of economics and international law, FTAs are 
sometimes viewed as being sub-optimal compared with the rules of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for trade liberalisation, rule-
making and compulsory dispute settlement at worldwide levels. For 
example: 
 
• As most FTAs only provide for diplomatic dispute settlement 
procedures (for example, consultations, mediation, 
conciliation, panel procedures subject to political approval by 
the member states) without preventing their member 
countries from submitting trade disputes to the quasi judicial 
WTO dispute settlement procedures, the compulsory WTO 
dispute settlement system may offer comparatively more 
effective legal remedies. This is illustrated by the fact that 
most intergovernmental trade disputes among the 3 member 
countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) have been submitted to the WTO dispute settlement 
system, rather than to the legally weaker dispute settlement 
procedures of Chapter 20 of the NAFTA Agreement).56 
                                                 
53 Case E 1/01, EFTA Court Reports 2002, 1. 
54 Case E 7/97, EFTA Courts Reports 1998, 95. 
55 Case E 4/01, EFTA Court Reports 2002, 240 (para. 28). 
56 See W.J. Davey, “Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment”, in: L. 
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• The submission of trade disputes among FTA member 
countries to the WTO has only rarely given rise to legal 
problems, for example, if the respondent country could not 
invoke, in the WTO dispute settlement procedures, legal 
justifications based upon FTA rules57 or on FTA dispute 
settlement procedures.58 The rare instances of successive 
invocations of FTA and WTO dispute settlement procedures 
which challenged the same trade measure59 did not amount to 
“abuses of rights”, for WTO members have rights to conclude 
regional trade agreements with separate dispute settlement 
procedures, as well as rights to the quasi automatic 
establishment of WTO dispute settlement bodies to examine 
complaints in the WTO on the different legal basis of WTO 
law. 
 
Yet, from the perspective of citizens and their economic rights as 
protected by courts in Europe, the EC and EFTA courts offer citizens 
direct access and judicial remedies that appear economically more 
efficient, legally more effective, and democratically more legitimate 
than politicised, intergovernmental procedures among states for the 
                                                                                                                   
Bartels and F. Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 343-357. There have been only 3 
intergovernmental disputes under Chapter 20 since NAFTA entered into force in 
1994. On the other six NAFTA dispute settlement procedures and their very diverse 
records, see A. de Mestral, “NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Creative Experiment or 
Confusion?” in: L. Bartels and F. Ortino, pp. 359-381. 
57 For example, in the WTO dispute between the USA and Canada over Canadian 
restrictions on “split-run periodicals” (WTO Panel Report, Canada-Periodicals, 
WT/DS31/R, adopted 30 July 1997), Canada did not consider it was entitled to 
justify in the WTO its violation of GATT Article III by invoking Article 2106 NAFTA 
permitting preferential measures in favour of cultural industries, see de Mestral, note 
56 supra, pp. 364-365. 
58 For instance, the WTO Appellate Body report on Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft 
Drinks, (WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted in May 2006) upheld the WTO Panel’s 
conclusion that the Panel had no discretion “to decline to exercise its jurisdiction” 
based upon the existence of a NAFTA dispute on an allegedly related matter (see 
paras. 44-53). 
59 Examples would include challenges of US import restrictions on Canadian lumber 
in both NAFTA and WTO panels, challenges of EC import restrictions on bananas 
and genetically modified organisms in the ECJ and in the WTO, challenges of 
Argentine import restrictions on cotton and of Brazilian import restrictions of 
retreaded tyres in both Mercosur and WTO dispute settlement proceedings; see K. 
Kwak and G. Marceau, “Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the WTO 
and Regional Trade Agreements”, in: Bartels and Ortino, note 56 supra, pp. 465-485. 
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settlement of disputes involving private economic actors. The fact 
that the EC Court has rendered only three judgments in international 
disputes among EC Member States since the establishment of the ECJ 
in 1952 illustrates that many intergovernmental disputes (for 
example, over private rights) could be prevented or settled by 
alternative dispute settlement procedures if governments granted 
private economic actors more effective legal and judicial remedies in 
national and regional courts against governmental restrictions. 
Unfortunately, national and international judges often fail to co-
operate in their judicial protection of the rule of law in international 
relations beyond the EC and ECHR, for example, because they 
perceive international and domestic law as being based upon 
mutually conflicting conceptions of justice. For instance, US courts 
claim that WTO dispute settlement rulings “are not binding on the 
US, much less this court”;60 similarly, the EC Court has long since 
refrained – at the request of the political EC institutions which have 
repeatedly misled the ECJ about the interpretation of WTO 
obligations in order to limit their own judicial accountability61 – from 
reviewing the legality of EC measures in the light of the EC’s GATT 
and WTO obligations. WTO law tends to be perceived as 
intergovernmental rules, which governments and domestic courts 
may ignore without legal and judicial remedies by their citizens 
adversely affected by welfare-reducing violations of WTO guarantees 
                                                 
60 US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, judgment of 21 January 2005 (Corus 
Staal), available at: http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-1107.pdf). In the Corus Staal 
dispute, the US Supreme Court denied petition for certiorari on 9 January 2006 
(http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-364.htm), notwithstanding an amicus 
curiae brief filed by the EC Commission supporting this petition (“We argue that the 
Federal Circuit went too far by construing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act to 
make considerations of compliance with international obligations completely 
irrelevant in construing a Department of Commerce anti-dumping determination, 
and further argue that the Department’s ‘zeroing’ methodology – held invalid by 
both a WTO Appellate Body and a NAFTA Bi-national Panel – is not entitled to 
Chevron deference because it would bring the United States into non-compliance 
with treaty obligations.” (available at: 
http://www.robbinsrussell.com/pdf/265.pdf). 
61 See P.J. Kuijper, WTO Law in the European Court of Justice, (2005) 42 Common 
Market Law Review, p. 1313, who claims (p. 1334) that “it is difficult to point out one 
specific moment at which it can be established beyond doubt that WTO rules have 
been breached, even after a decision of a panel or report of the Appellate Body”, and 
“that it is rarely or never possible to speak of a sufficiently serious breach of WTO 
law” by the political EC institutions justifying the EC’s non-contractual liability for 
damages pursuant to Article 288 EC Treaty. 
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of market access and rule of law.62 Both the EC and US governments 
have requested their respective domestic courts to refrain from 
applying WTO rules at the request of citizens or of NGOs;63 in order 
to limit their own judicial accountability, they have repeatedly 
encouraged their respective courts to apply domestic trade 
regulations without regard to WTO dispute settlement findings on 
their illegality.64 The simultaneous insistence, by the same trade 
politicians, that WTO rules are enforceable at their own request in 
domestic courts vis-à-vis violations of WTO law by states within the EC 
or within the US, illustrates the political, rather than legal, nature of 
such Machiavellian objections against judicial accountability for 
violations by trade bureaucracies of the international rule of law. 
 
This contribution began by arguing that the universal recognition of 
inalienable human rights requires national and international courts to 
review whether – in their judicial settlement of “disputes concerning 
treaties, like other international disputes,[…] in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law” (Preamble VCLT) – 
human rights and other principles of justice (such as due process of 
law) justify judicial application of international guarantees of 
                                                 
62 See, for example, the criticism by the EC’s legal advisor Kuijper (note 61) of the 
ECJ’s “Kupferberg jurisprudence” on the judicial applicability of the EC’s free trade 
area agreements at the request of citizens as politically “naïve” (p. 1320). 
63 On the exclusion of “direct applicability” of WTO rules in the EC and US laws on 
the implementation of the WTO agreements, see E.-U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, (The Hague: Kluwer, 1997), p. 19 et seq. At the request of 
the political EC institutions, the EC Court has refrained long since from reviewing 
the legality of EC acts in the light of the EC’s GATT and WTO obligations; the Court 
refers only very rarely to WTO rules and WTO dispute settlement rulings in support 
of the ECJ’s interpretations of EC law. In the US, courts are barred by legislation from 
challenging the WTO-consistency of US federal measures. 
64 See J.A. Restani and I. Bloom, “Interpreting International Trade Statutes: Is The 
Charming Betsy Sinking?” (2001) 24 Fordham Int’l L J., p. 1533. On the controversial 
relationship between the “Charming Betsy doctrine” of consistent interpretation and 
the “Chevron doctrine” of judicial deference, see, A. Davies, “Connecting or 
Compartmentalizing the WTO and United States Legal Systems? The Role of the 
Charming Betsy Canon, (2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law, pp. 117-
149.The European Court of Justice has a long history of ignoring GATT and WTO 
rules at the request of political EC bodies which have often misinformed the EC 
Court on the meaning of GATT/WTO rules and dispute settlement reports (for 
example, in Case 112/80, Dürbeck, ECR 1981, 1095, the Commission misinformed the 
EC Court on an unpublished GATT dispute settlement finding against the EC, and 
the Court relied on this information without verifying the obviously wrong 
information submitted to the Court). 
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freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law and social safeguard 
measures for the benefit of citizens. Section 5 described the citizen-
driven, multilevel judicial protection of the EC, EEA and ECHR 
guarantees of freedoms, fundamental rights and rule of law as 
models for decentralising and transforming intergovernmental rules 
and dispute settlement procedures for the benefit of citizens. Sections 
6 and 7 suggest that the “Solange method” of conditional co-
operation by national courts with the EC Court “as long as” (which 
means “Solange” in German) the ECJ protects the constitutional rights 
of citizens (below 6.1), as well as the judicial self-restraint by the 
ECtHR vis-à-vis alleged violations of human rights by EC institutions 
“as long as” the EC Court protects the human rights guarantees of the 
ECHR (below 6.2), should serve as a model for “conditional co-
operation” among international courts and national courts also in 
international economic law, environmental law and human rights 
law beyond Europe. Section 8 concludes by asking whether the 
judicial function to settle disputes in conformity with principles of 
procedural and substantive justice can assert democratic legitimacy in 
international relations which – beyond rights-based European 
integration law – continue to be dominated by power politics. It is 
argued that the legitimacy of judicial co-operation, self-restraint, 
“judicial competition” and “judicial dialogues” among courts derives 
from their protection of constitutional citizen rights as a 
constitutional pre-condition for individual and democratic self-
development in a constitutionally-protected framework of 
“participatory”, “deliberative” and “cosmopolitan democracy”. 
Citizens and courts have reason to support the multilevel, judicial 
protection of citizen rights in European law, and to challenge 
international judges (for example, in worldwide and non-European 
institutions) if they perceive themselves mere agents of governments 
and disregard the constitutional obligation of judges to settle disputes 
in conformity with human rights. 
6.1. The “Solange method” of Judicial Co-operation 
among the German Constitutional Court and the EC 
Court in the Protection of Fundamental Rights 
The EC Court, the EFTA Court and the ECtHR have – albeit in 
different ways – interpreted the intergovernmental EC, EEA and 
ECHR treaties as objective legal orders which also protect individual 
rights of citizens. All three courts have acknowledged that the human 
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rights goals to empower individuals and effectively protect human 
rights, like the objective of international trade agreements to enable 
citizens to engage in mutually beneficial trade transactions under 
non-discriminatory conditions of competition, call for “dynamic 
judicial interpretations” of treaty rules with due regard to the need 
for the judicial protection of citizen interests in economic markets and 
constitutional democracies. These citizen-oriented interpretations of 
the EC and EEA Agreements were influenced by the long-standing 
insistency by the German Constitutional Court on its constitutional 
mandate to protect fundamental rights and constitutional democracy 
also vis-à-vis abuse of EC powers affecting citizens in Germany. The 
“Solange jurisprudence” of the German Constitutional Court, akin to 
similar interactions between other national constitutional courts and 
the EC Court,65 contributed to the progressive extension of the 
judicial protection of human rights in Community law: 
 
• In its Solange I judgment of 1974, the German Constitutional 
Court held that “as long as” the integration process of the EC 
did not include a catalogue of fundamental rights 
corresponding to that of the German Basic Law, German 
courts could, after having requested a preliminary ruling from 
the EC Court, also request a ruling from the German 
Constitutional Court regarding the compatibility of EC acts 
with fundamental rights and the German Constitution.66 This 
judicial insistence on the then higher level of fundamental 
rights protection in German constitutional law was 
instrumental for the ECJ’s judicial protection of human rights 
as common, yet unwritten, constitutional guarantees of EC 
law.67 
• In view of the emerging human rights protection in EC law, 
the German Constitutional Court held – in its Solange II 
judgment of 198668– that it would no longer exercise its 
jurisdiction for reviewing EC legal acts “as long as” the EC 
                                                 
65 See F.C. Mayer, “The European Constitution and the Courts”, in: A. v. Bogdandy 
and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2006), pp. 281-334. 
66 BVerfGE 37, p.327. 
67 The ECJ’s judicial protection of human rights since 1969 (Case 29/69, Stauder v City 
of Ulm, ECR 1969, 419; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECR 1970, 1125; 
Case 4/73, Nold, ECR 1974, 491) continues to evolve. 
68 BVerfGE 73, 339, at p.375. 
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Court continued, generally and effectively, to protect 
fundamental rights against EC measures in ways comparable 
to the essential safeguards of German constitutional law. 
• In its Maastricht judgment (Solange III) of 1993, however, the 
German Constitutional Court re-asserted its jurisdiction to 
defend the scope of German constitutional law: EC measures 
exceeding the limited EC competences covered by the German 
Act ratifying the EU Treaty (“ausbrechende Gemeinschaftsakte”) 
could not be legally-binding and applicable in Germany.69 
• Following GATT and WTO dispute settlement rulings that the 
EC import restrictions on bananas violated WTO law, and in 
view of an ECJ judgment which upheld these restrictions 
without reviewing their inconsistencies with WTO law, 
several German courts requested the Constitutional Court to 
declare these EC restrictions to be ultra vires (i.e., exceeding 
the EC’s limited competences) and to restrict the 
constitutional freedoms of German importers illegally. The 
German Constitutional Court, in its judgment of 200270 
(Solange IV), declared the application inadmissible on the 
grounds that it had not been argued that the required level of 
human rights protection in the EC had generally fallen below 
the minimum level required by the German Constitution. 
• In its judgment of 2005 on the German act implementing the 
EU Framework Decision (adopted under the Third Pillar of 
the EU) on the European Arrest Warrant, the Constitutional 
Court held that the automatically binding force and mutual 
recognition in Germany of arrest orders from other EU 
Member States were inconsistent with the fundamental rights 
guarantees of the German Basic Law.71 The limited 
jurisdiction of the EC Court for Third Pillar decisions 
concerning police and judicial co-operation might have 
contributed to this assertion of national constitutional 
jurisdiction for safeguarding fundamental rights vis-à-vis EU 
decisions in the area of criminal law and their legislative 
implementation in Germany. 
 
                                                 
69 BVerfGE 89, p.115. 
70 BVerfGE 102, p.147. 
71 BVerfGE 113, p.273. 
Multilevel governance for international public goods 99
 
The progressively expanding legal protection of fundamental rights 
in EC law in response to their judicial protection by national and 
European courts illustrates how judicial co-operation has been 
successful in Europe far beyond economic law. Judge A. Rosas72 has 
distinguished the following five “stages” in the case law of the EC 
Court on the protection of human rights: 
 
• In the supra-national, but functionally-limited European Coal 
and Steel Community, the Court held that it lacked the 
competence to examine whether an ECSC decision amounted 
to an infringement of fundamental rights as recognised in the 
constitution of a member state.73 
• Since its Stauder judgment of 1969, the EC Court has declared, 
in a series of judgments, that fundamental rights form part of 
the general principles of Community law binding the Member 
States and EC institutions, and that the EC Court ensures their 
observance.74 
• Since 1975, the ever more extensive case law of the EC courts 
explicitly refers to the ECHR and protects ever more human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in a wide array of 
Community law areas, including civil, political, economic, 
social and labour rights, drawing inspiration “from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the 
guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of 
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of 
which they are signatories”.75 
• Since 1989, the ECHR has been characterised by the EC Court 
as having “special significance” for the interpretation and 
development of EU law76 in view of the fact that the ECHR is 
the only international human rights convention mentioned in 
Article 6 EU. 
• In the 1990s, the EC courts began to refer to individual 
judgments of the EctHR,77 and have clarified that – in 
reconciling economic freedoms guaranteed by EC law with 
                                                 
72 A. Rosas, “Fundamental Rights in the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts”, in: C. 
Baudenbacher, P. Tresselt and T. Orlygsson, note 44 supra, p. 163 and 169. 
73 Case 1/58, Storck v High Authority, ECR 1959, 43. 
74 See the cases cited in note 67 supra. 
75 See, for example, Opinion 2/1994 on the ECHR, ECR 1996 I-1759, para. 33. 
76 Joined Cases 46/87 and 222/88, Hoechst, ECR 1989, 2859, para.13. 
77 See Case 13/94, P v S, ECR 1996 I-2143, para.16. 
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human rights guarantees of the ECHR that admit restrictions – 
all interests involved has to be weighed “having regard to all 
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair 
balance was struck between those interests”, without giving 
priority to the economic freedoms of the EC Treaty at the 
expense of other fundamental rights.78 The EC courts have 
also been willing to adjust their case law to new developments 
in the case-law of the EctHR,79 and to differentiate – as in the 
case law of the ECtHR – between judicial review of EC 
measures,80 state measures,81 and private restrictions of 
economic freedoms in the light of fundamental rights.82 
                                                 
78 See Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, ECR 2003 I-5659. The Court began by examining 
the EC’s economic freedom, as requested by the national court, and observed that 
“since both the Community and its Member States are required to respect 
fundamental rights, the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in 
principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even 
under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the free movement 
of goods”; “unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as 
the right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, which admit no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor the 
freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be 
viewed in relation to its social purpose” (para.80). The judicial balancing by the ECJ 
refutes the claim that the ECJ gives priority to economic freedoms at the expense of 
other human rights. 
79 In Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères, ECR 2002 I-9011, para. 29, for example, the ECJ 
referred explicitly to new case-law of the ECtHR on the protection of the right to 
privacy of commercial enterprises in order to explain why – despite having 
suggested the opposite in the ECJ’s earlier judgment in Hoechst – such enterprises 
may benefit from Article 8 ECHR: “For the purposes of determining the scope of that 
principle in relation to the protection of business premises, regard must be had to the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights subsequent to the judgment in 
Hoechst. According to that case-law, the protection of the home provided in Article 8 
of the ECHR may in certain circumstances be extended to cover such premises (see, 
in particular, the judgment of 16 April 2002 in Colas Est and Others v France, not yet 
published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions) and second, the right of interference 
established by Article 8(2) of the ECHR might well be more far-reaching where 
professional or business activities or premises were involved than would otherwise 
be the case.” 
80 See, for example, the ECJ cases listed in note 67 supra. 
81 See, for example, the Omega Case C-36/02, ECR 2004 I-9609, in which the ECJ 
acknowledged that the restriction of market freedoms could be necessary for the 
protection of human dignity despite the fact that the German conception of 
protecting human dignity as a human right was not shared by all other EC Member 
States. 
82 See Emberland (note 34 supra) and the Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in 
Case C-341/05, Laval (still pending before the ECJ), as well as of Advocate General 
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6.2. “Horizontal” Co-operation among the EC Courts, the 
EFTA Court and the ECtHR in Protecting Individual 
Rights in the EEA 
Judicial co-operation between the EC courts and the EFTA Court was 
legally mandated in the EEA Agreement (for example, Article 6) and 
facilitated by the fact that the EEA law to be interpreted by the EC 
and EFTA courts was largely identical with the EC’s common market 
rules (notwithstanding the different context of the EC’s common 
market and the EEA’s free trade area). The EC Court of First Instance, 
in its Opel Austria judgment of 1997, held that Article 10 of the EEA 
Agreement (corresponding to the free trade rules in Articles 12, 13, 16 
and 17 EC Treaty) had direct effect in EC law in view of the high 
degree of integration protected by the EEA Agreement, whose 
objectives exceeded those of a mere free trade agreement, and 
required the contracting parties to establish a dynamic and 
homogenous EEA.83 In numerous cases, EC court judgments referred 
to the case law of the EFTA Court, for example, by pointing out “that 
the principles governing the liability of an EFTA state for 
infringement of a directive referred to in the EEA Agreement were 
the subject of the EFTA Court’s judgment of 10 December 1998 in 
Sveinbjörnsdottir”.84 In its Ospelt judgment, the EC Court emphasised 
that: 
 
[O]ne of the principal aims of the EEA Agreement is to provide 
for the fullest possible realisation of the four freedoms within 
the whole EEA, so that the internal market established within 
the European Union is extended to the EFTA states.85 
 
The case law of the EFTA Court evolved in close co-operation with 
the EC courts, national courts in EFTA countries and with due regard 
also to the case law of the ECtHR. In view of the intergovernmental 
                                                                                                                   
Poiares Maduro in Case C-438/05, Viking Line (Case C-438/05, judgment of 11 
December 2007, nyr): both Advocates General recommend that the ECJ should 
recognise that trade unions are legally bound by the EC’s common market freedoms, 
and that the private plaintiffs in these cases can rely directly on the EC Treaty in their 
judicial challenge of restrictions imposed on market freedoms by trade unions 
invoking their social rights to strike (for example, in order to prevent relocation of 
Viking Line to another EC Member State). 
83 Case T-115/94, ECR 1997 II-39. 
84 Case C-140/97, Rechberger, ECR 1999 I-3499, para. 39. 
85 Case C-452/01, ECR 2003 I-9743, para. 29. 
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structures of the EEA Agreement, the legal homogeneity obligations 
in the EEA Agreement (for example, Article 6) as well as in the 
Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a 
Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (for example, Article 3) 
were interpreted only as obligations de résultat with regard to the legal 
protection of market freedoms and individual rights in EFTA 
countries. Yet, the EFTA Court effectively promoted “quasi-direct 
effect” and “quasi-primacy” (C. Baudenbacher), as well as full state 
liability and the protection of individual rights of market participants 
in national courts in all EEA countries.86 In various judgments, the 
EFTA Court followed the ECJ case law also by interpreting EEA law 
in conformity with the human rights guarantees of the ECHR and the 
judgments of the ECtHR (for example, concerning Article 6 ECHR on 
access to justice, and Article 10 on freedom of expression). In its 
Asgeirsson judgment, the EFTA Court rejected the argument that the 
reference to the EFTA Court had unduly prolonged the national court 
proceeding in violation of the right to a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time (Article 6 ECHR); referring to a judgment by the 
ECtHR in a case concerning a delay of two years and seven months 
due to a reference by a national court to the ECJ (pursuant to Article 
234 EC), the EFTA Court shared the reasoning of the ECtHR that 
adding the period of preliminary references (which was less than 6 
months in the case before the EFTA Court) could undermine the 
legitimate functions of such co-operation among national and 
international courts in their joint protection of the rule of law. 
 
The ECtHR has frequently referred, in its judgments, to provisions of 
EU law and to judgments of the ECJ. In Goodwin, for example, the 
ECtHR referred to Article 9 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(the right to marry) in order to back up its judgment that the refusal 
to recognise a change of sex for the purposes of marriage constituted 
a violation of Article 12 ECHR.87 In Dangeville, the ECtHR’s 
determination that interference with the right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions was not required in the general interest 
                                                 
86 See the EFTA Court President C. Baudenbacher, “The EFTA Court Ten Years On”, 
in: Baudenbacher et al. (note 44), and H.P. Graver, note 46 supra, p. 97: “Direct effect 
of primary law, state liability and the duty of the courts to interpret national law in 
the light of EEA obligations have been clearly and firmly accepted in national law by 
Norwegian courts.” 
87 Goodwin v United Kingdom, judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2002-VI, paras. 58 and 100. 
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took the fact that the French measures were incompatible with EC 
law into account.88 In joined cases Waite and Kennedy v Germany, the 
ECtHR held that it would be incompatible with the purpose and 
object of the ECHR if an attribution of tasks to an international 
organisation or in the context of international agreements could 
absolve the contracting states of their obligations under the ECHR.89 
In the Bosphorus case, the ECtHR had to examine the consistency of 
the impounding of a Yugoslavian aircraft by Ireland upon the legal 
basis of EC regulations imposing sanctions against the former Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia; the ECtHR referred to the ECJ case –law, 
according to which respect for fundamental rights is a condition of 
the lawfulness of EC acts, as well as to the ECJ preliminary ruling that 
“the impounding of the aircraft in question[…] cannot be regarded as 
inappropriate or disproportionate”; in its examination of whether 
compliance with EC obligations could justify the interference by 
Ireland with the applicant’s property rights, the ECtHR proceeded 
upon the basis of the following four principles:90 
 
• “A Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the 
Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless 
of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence 
of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with 
international legal obligations.” 
 
• “State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations 
is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to 
protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive 
guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their 
observance, in a manner which can be considered at least 
equivalent to that for which the Convention provides.” 
 
• “If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by 
the organisation, the presumption will be that a state has not 
departed from the requirements of the Convention when it 
                                                 
88 SA Dangeville v France judgment of 16 April 2002, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2002-III, paras. 31 et seq. 
89 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, judgment of 18 February 1999, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 1999-I, para. 67. 
90 Case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, European 
Human Rights Reports 42 (2006) 1, paras. 153 et seq. 
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does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from 
its membership of the organisation.” 
 
• “However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the 
circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the 
protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In 
such cases, the interest of international co-operation would be 
outweighed by the Convention’s role as a ‘constitutional 
instrument of European public order’ in the field of human 
rights.” 
 
After examining the comprehensive EC guarantees of fundamental 
rights and judicial remedies, the ECtHR found that: 
 
the protection of fundamental rights by EC law can be 
considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, 
‘equivalent’… to that of the Convention system. Consequently, 
the presumption arises that Ireland did not depart from 
requirements of the Convention when it implemented legal 
obligations flowing from its membership of the EC. 
 
As the Court did not find any “manifest deficiency” in the protection 
of the applicant’s Convention rights, the relevant presumption of 
compliance with the ECHR had not been rebutted.91 
7. Conditional “Solange-co-operation” among 
International Trade- and Environmental Courts 
Beyond Europe? 
The plurality of national constitutions and of complementary 
international treaty constitutions recognising inalienable human 
rights entail that national and international courts must carefully 
examine the conditions under which the judicial interpretation and 
the application of intergovernmental rules remains consistent with 
the constitutional principles applicable in the respective jurisdiction. 
Many rules of the Westphalian “international law among states” 
reflect power politics, rather than respect for human rights and 
democratic governance. Competing multilateral treaty and dispute 
settlement systems with “forum selection clauses” enabling 
                                                 
91 Case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland, note 90 supra, paras. 165-166. 
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governments to submit disputes to competing jurisdictions (with the 
risk of conflicting judgments) continue to multiply also outside 
economic law and human rights law, for example, in international 
environmental law, maritime law, criminal law and other areas of 
international law. Proposals to co-ordinate such overlapping 
jurisdictions through hierarchical procedures (for example, 
preliminary rulings or advisory opinions by the ICJ) are rightly 
opposed by most governments. Agreement on exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses (as in Article 292 EC Treaty, Article 23 DSU/WTO, Article 282 
Law of the Sea Convention) may not prevent the submission of 
disputes involving several treaty regimes to competing dispute 
settlement fora. For example, in the dispute between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom over radioactive pollution from the MOX plant in 
Sellafield (UK), four dispute settlement bodies were seized and used 
diverging methods for co-ordinating their respective jurisdictions: 
7.1. The OSPAR arbitral award of 2003 on the MOX 
Plant dispute 
In order to clarify the obligations of the United Kingdom to make 
available all information “on the state of the maritime area, on 
activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect it” 
pursuant to Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR), Ireland and 
the United Kingdom agreed to establish an arbitral tribunal under 
this OSPAR Convention. Even though Article 35, para. 5a of the 
Convention requires the tribunal to decide according to “the rules of 
international law, and in particular those of the Convention”, the 
tribunal’s award of July 2003 was based only upon the OSPAR 
Convention, without taking the relevant environmental regulations of 
the EC and of the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (ratified by all EC member states as well as by 
the EC) into account. The OSPAR arbitral tribunal decided in favour 
of the United Kingdom that the latter had not violated its treaty 
obligations by not disclosing the information sought by Ireland.92 
                                                 
92 See T. McDorman, Access to Information under Article 9 OSPAR Convention 
(Ireland v UK), Final Award, in: (2004) 98 American Journal of Int’l Law, p. 330 et seq. 
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7.2. The UNCLOS 2001 provisional measures and 2003 
arbitral decision in the MOX Plant dispute 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) offers parties 
the choice (in Articles 281 et seq.) of submitting disputes to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the ICJ, arbitral 
tribunals or other dispute settlement fora established by regional or 
bilateral treaties. As Ireland claimed that the discharges released by 
the MOX Plant contaminated Irish waters in violation of UNCLOS, it 
requested the establishment of an arbitral tribunal and – pending this 
procedure – requested interim protection measures from the ITLOS 
pursuant to Article 290 UNCLOS. The ITLOS order of December 
2001, after determining the prima facie jurisdiction of the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal to decide the merits of the dispute, requested both 
parties to co-operate and consult with regard to the emissions from 
the MOX plant into the Irish Sea, pending the decision on the merits 
by the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral tribunal suspended its 
proceedings in June 2003 and requested the parties to clarify whether, 
as claimed by the United Kingdom, the EC Court had jurisdiction to 
decide this dispute upon the basis of the relevant EC and EURATOM 
rules, including UNCLOS as an integral part of the Community legal 
system.93 
7.3. The EC Court judgment of May 2006 in the MOX 
Plant Dispute 
In October 2003, the EU Commission started an infringement 
proceeding against Ireland on the grounds that – as the EC had 
ratified and transformed UNCLOS into an integral part of the EC 
legal system – Ireland’s submission of the dispute to tribunals outside 
the Community legal order had violated the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the EC Court under Article 292 EC and Article 193 of the EURATOM 
Treaty. In its judgment of May 2006, the Court confirmed its exclusive 
jurisdiction on the grounds that the UNCLOS provisions on the 
prevention of marine pollution relied on by Ireland in its dispute 
relating to the MOX plant “are rules which form part of the 
Community legal order”.94 The Court followed from the autonomy of 
the Community legal system and from Article 282 UNCLOS that the 
                                                 
93 See Y. Shany, “The First MOX Plant Award: The Need to Harmonise Competing 
Environmental Regimes and Dispute Settlement Procedures”, in: (2004) 17 Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 815 et seq. 
94 ECJ Case C-459/2003, Commission v Ireland ECR (2006) I-4635, para. 121. 
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system for the resolution of disputes set out in the EC Treaty must, in 
principle, take precedence over that provided for in Part XV of 
UNCLOS. As the dispute concerned the interpretation and 
application of EC law within the terms of Article 292 EC, “Articles 
220 EC and 292 EC precluded Ireland from initiating proceedings 
before the Arbitral Tribunal with a view to resolving the dispute 
concerning the MOX plant”.95 By requesting the arbitral tribunal to 
decide disputes concerning the interpretation and application of 
Community law, Ireland had violated the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Court under Article 292 EC, as well as the EC Member States’ duties 
of close co-operation, prior information and loyal consultation of the 
competent Community institutions as prescribed in Article 10 EC. 
7.4. The 2004 IJzeren Rijn Arbitration between the 
Netherlands and Belgium 
The IJzeren Rijn arbitration under the auspices of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration concerned a dispute between Belgium and the 
Netherlands over Belgium’s right to the use and the re-opening of an 
old railway-line leading through a protected natural habitat and the 
payment of the costs involved.96 The arbitral tribunal was requested 
to settle the dispute upon the basis of international law, including – if 
necessary – EC law, with due respect to the obligations of these EC 
Member States under Article 292 EC. The Tribunal agreed with the 
view shared by both parties that there was no dispute within the 
meaning of Article 292 EC because its decision on the apportionment 
of costs did not require any interpretation of EC law (for example, the 
Council Directive on the Conservation of Natural Habitats). 
7.5. The “Solange method” as Reciprocal Respect for 
Constitutional Justice 
The above-mentioned examples for competing jurisdictions for the 
settlement of environmental disputes among European states raise 
questions similar to those regarding overlapping jurisdictions for the 
settlement of trade disputes, human rights disputes or criminal 
proceedings in national and international criminal courts. The 
UNCLOS provisions for dispute settlement upon the basis of “this 
Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible 
                                                 
95 ECR (2006) I-4635, para. 133. 
96 See N. Lavranos, “The MOX Plant and IJzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court is the 
Supreme Arbiter? in: (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 1-24. 
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with this Convention” (Article 288) prompted the ITLOS to affirm 
prima facie jurisdiction in the MOX plant dispute. The Annex VII 
Arbitral Tribunal argued convincingly, however, that the prospect of 
resolving this dispute in the EC Court upon the basis of EC law 
risked leading to conflicting decisions which, bearing in mind 
considerations of mutual respect and comity between judicial 
institutions and the explicit recognition of mutually agreed regional 
jurisdictions in Article 282 UNCLOS, justified suspending the arbitral 
proceeding and enjoining the parties to resolve the Community law 
issues within the institutional framework of the EC. 
 
WTO law recognises similar rights of WTO members to conclude 
regional trade agreements with autonomous dispute settlement 
procedures; however, the lack of a WTO provision corresponding to 
Article 282 UNCLOS, and the WTO rights to the quasi automatic 
establishment of WTO dispute settlement panels entail that WTO 
dispute settlement bodies must respect the right of WTO members to 
receive a WTO dispute settlement ruling on the WTO obligations of 
the members of FTAs, even if the respondent WTO member would 
prefer to settle the dispute in the framework of the FTA procedures. 
The EC Court’s persistent refusal to decide disputes upon the basis of 
the WTO obligations of the EC and its Member States offers an 
additional argument for WTO dispute settlement bodies to respect 
the rights of WTO members (including EC Member States) to WTO 
dispute settlement rulings on alleged violations of WTO rights and 
obligations (for example, by the EC Council’s import restrictions on 
bananas), notwithstanding the exclusive ECJ jurisdiction for settling 
disputes over WTO law inside the EC as an integral part of the 
Community legal system: “as long as” the EC Court continues to 
ignore the WTO obligations of the EC in its dispute settlement 
practices, and offers EC Member States no judicial remedy against EC 
majority decisions violating WTO law, WTO dispute settlement 
bodies may see no reason to exercise judicial self-restraint in WTO 
disputes over violations by the EC of its WTO obligations vis-à-vis EC 
Member States.97 The lack of a treaty provision similar to Article 282 
                                                 
97 Such challenges in the WTO by EC Member States of EC acts violating WTO law 
have never occurred so far. Most Community lawyers (such as Lavranos, note 96 
supra, pp. 10-11) argue that not only from the point of view of Community law, but 
also “from the point of view of international law, the supremacy of Community law 
within the EC and its member states must be accepted” (pp. 10-11). Yet, it is arguable 
even from the point of view of Community law that the duty of loyalty (Article 10 
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UNCLOS might also have prompted the OSPAR arbitral tribunal to 
decide on the claim of an alleged violation of the OSPAR Convention, 
without any discussion of Article 292 EC, and without prejudice to 
future dispute settlement proceedings in the EC Court based upon 
EC law (which, arguably, includes more comprehensive information 
disclosure requirements). The Ijzeren Rijn arbitral tribunal examined, 
as requested by the parties, the legal relevance of Article 292 EC and 
decided the dispute without prejudice to EC law. 
 
The “Solange principle” conditions the respect for competing 
jurisdictions with respect for the constitutional principles of human 
rights and rule of law. It has also been applied by the EC Court itself, 
for instance when – in its Opinion 1/91 on the inconsistency of the 
EEA Draft Agreement with EC law – the EC Court found the EEA 
provisions for the establishment of an EEA Court to be inconsistent 
with the “autonomy of the Community legal order” and the 
“exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice” (for example, in so far 
as the EEA provisions did not guarantee legally-binding effects of 
“advisory opinions” by the EEA Court on national courts in EEA 
member states).98 The “Solange principle” can explain the 
jurisprudence of both the EC Court,99 as well as the EFTA Court,100 
which voluntarily agreed that private arbitral tribunals are not 
recognised as courts or tribunals of Member States (within the 
meaning of Article 234 EC and Article 33 SCA) entitled to request 
preliminary rulings by the European courts. The fact that 
international arbitral tribunals (such as the OSPAR and IJzeren Rijn 
arbitral tribunals mentioned above) are likewise not entitled to 
request preliminary rulings from the European Courts, may justify 
judicial self-restraint and deference to the competing jurisdiction of 
European courts in disputes requiring the interpretation and the 
application of European law. To the extent that conflicts of 
jurisdiction and conflicting judgments cannot be prevented by means 
                                                                                                                   
EC) applies only “as long as” the ECJ offers effective judicial remedies against 
obvious violations by EC institutions of their obligations (for example, under Articles 
220, 300 EC) to respect the rule of law and protect EC Member States from 
international legal responsibility for EC majority decisions violating mixed 
agreements. 
98 ECJ Opinion 1/91, EEA Draft Agreement ECR 1991 I-6079. 
99 Case C-125/2004, Denuit/Cordenier v Transorient, ECJ judgment of 27 January 2005. 
100 See note 46 supra. 
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of exclusive jurisdictions and hierarchical rules,101 international courts 
should follow the example of both national civil and commercial 
courts and European courts, and resolve conflicts through judicial co-
operation and “judicial dialogues” based upon principles of judicial 
comity and judicial protection of constitutional principles (such as 
due process of law, res judicata, human rights) underlying modern 
international law. The horizontal co-operation among national and 
international courts with overlapping jurisdictions for the protection 
of constitutional rights in Europe reflects the constitutional duty of 
judges to protect “constitutional justice”; it should serve as a model 
for similar co-operation among national and international courts with 
overlapping jurisdictions in other field of international law,102 
notably, if the intergovernmental rules protect co-operation among 
citizens across national frontiers, such as the settlement of 
transnational trade, investment and environmental disputes. 
Especially in these areas of intergovernmental regulation where states 
remain reluctant to submit to review by international courts (for 
example, as in the Second and Third Pillars of the EU Treaty), national 
courts must remain vigilant guardians in order to protect citizens and 
their constitutional rights from inadequate judicial remedies at the 
international level of multilevel governance in order to guarantee the 
collective supply of international public goods demanded by citizens. 
8. Multilevel Judicial Protection of Constitutional 
Rights as Pre-condition for International Rule of 
Law and Democratic Supply of ‘International Public 
Goods 
European integration suggests that multilevel legal and judicial 
protection of constitutional rights is a pre-condition for the 
transformation of the power-oriented “international law among 
states” into citizen-oriented international rules which protect 
                                                 
101 See Lavranos, note 96 supra, p. 20: “the key to all solutions is hierarchy”. 
102 See N. Lavranos, “Towards a Solange-Method between International Courts and 
Tribunals?” in: T. Broude and Y. Shany (eds), The Allocation of Authority in 
International Law. Essays in Honour of Prof. R. Lapidoth (2008): “if the Solange method 
would be applied by all international courts and tribunals in case of jurisdictional 
overlap, the risk of diverging or conflicting judgments could be effectively 
minimised, thus reducing the danger of a fragmentation of the international legal 
order... One could argue that the Solange-method, and for that matter judicial comity 
in general, is part of the legal duty of each and every court to deliver justice.” 
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international public goods (such as democratic peace in Europe). Rule 
of international law must remain consistent with the legitimate 
plurality of constitutional principles and constitutional rights. The 
European “Solange jurisprudence” rightly challenges the prevailing 
perception and authoritarian premises of the “international law 
among states” as foreign policy instrument for advancing state 
interests as defined by governments. For example, state-centred 
lawyers and power-oriented diplomats argue that effective 
international tribunals must remain “dependent” tribunals staffed by 
ad hoc judges closely controlled by governments (for example, 
through their power of re-appointment and threats of retaliation). 
Independent international courts are perceived with suspicion 
because independent judges risk allowing moral ideals and interests 
of third parties to influence their judgments. The domestic ideal of 
rule of law is seen as inappropriate for the reality of international 
power politics: 
 
Dependent tribunals are more likely to render judgments that 
reflect the interests of the states at the time that they submit the 
dispute to the tribunal.103 
 
In support of such power-oriented conceptions of international 
judges as the agents of the governments which appoint them, 
reference is also made to the empirical voting patterns of ad hoc 
judges (for example, in the ICJ and arbitral tribunals) who side much 
more often with the legal claims of the government nominating the 
judge than with the legal claims of the other party to the dispute.104 
From such state-centred, rather than citizen-oriented, perspectives, 
intergovernmental trade and economic rules are perceived and 
applied as intergovernmental commitments about reciprocal market 
access without private rights of action.105 
 
                                                 
103 See E. Posner and J.C. Yoo, “Judicial Independence in International Tribunals”, 
(2005) 93 California Law Review, p. 6, who define the function of international 
tribunals as providing states with neutral information about the facts and the law in 
a particular dispute. 
104 See E.A. Posner and F.P. de Figueiredo, “Is the International Court of Justice 
Politically Biased?” (2005) 34 Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 599-630. 
105 See A.O. Sykes, “Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic 
Law: Standing and Remedy”, (2005) 34 Journal of Legal Studies, p. 631. 
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Citizen-oriented constitutional approaches, in contrast, emphasise the 
“constitutional functions” of international law for correcting 
governance failures at national levels and for enabling citizens to 
supply collectively private and public goods beyond what is possible 
through national power politics. The more citizens live and co-
operate not only in local and national, but also in transnational 
communities (for example, as EC citizen, migrant worker protected 
by ILO conventions, refugees protected by UN human rights and 
humanitarian assistance, researchers protected by UNESCO and 
WIPO conventions), the more the universal recognition of inalienable 
human rights calls for citizens to be provided with effective legal and 
judicial remedies for the decentralised enforcement of citizen 
interests across national frontiers. Empirical evidence confirms that 
most national parliaments do not effectively control 
intergovernmental rule-making in worldwide organisations;106 hence, 
parliamentary democracy must be supplemented by more 
decentralised forms of participatory, rights-based democracy which 
empower self-interested individuals to co-operate across frontiers. 
The ideal of “deliberative democracy” – i.e., that all rules and 
governance powers be justified through a fully inclusive, informed 
discourse among all persons affected by the rules – remains utopian 
in view of the rational ignorance of individuals, their limited 
cognitive capacities, and the inevitable “discourse failures” (for 
example, due to asymmetries of power and knowledge).107 Rights-
based “cosmopolitan justice” and independent, impartial courts 
settling disputes “in conformity with principles of justice and 
international law” offer horizontal and vertical “checks and balances” 
that limit abuse of power without relying on unrealistic idealisation 
of citizens, civil society, organisations and rulers. 
 
The jus cogens core of inalienable human rights, the ever increasing 
number of international “treaty constitutions” limiting national 
                                                 
106 On the inadequate parliamentary control of intergovernmental rule-making in the 
WTO, see, for example, the following two publications by the European Parliament: 
Role of Parliaments in Scrutinising and Influencing Trade Policy (European Parliament 
Study December 2005, DV/603690.doc); The Parliamentary Dimension of the WTO 
(2006). 
107 See G. Pincione and F. Teson, Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation: A 
Theory of Discourse Failure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); A. 
Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders. Justice and Representation in Global 
Institutions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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policy discretion by collective rule-making and international 
adjudication, the proliferation of international courts, their 
conditional co-operation (“as long as” other jurisdictions respect 
essential constitutional principles) in the judicial protection of rule of 
law continue to transform the intergovernmental structures of 
European law by procedural, as well as substantive, “constitutional 
restraints”. Multilevel constitutionalism and rights-based 
“constitutional justice” have become a reality for ever more European 
citizens thanks to the multilevel co-operation of judges in European 
integration. Disputes among European states have become rare not 
only in the EC Court, the EFTA Court and in the ECtHR, they are also 
decreasing in worldwide courts (for example, the ICJ) and in other 
dispute settlement bodies (such as the WTO). The ever closer 
networks of independent regulatory agencies and other multilevel 
governance institutions in Europe, and the rare recourse to the 
“horizontal” enforcement mechanisms of international law (such as 
inter-state sanctions) in relations among European democracies, 
confirm that “state sovereignty” is “disaggregating” in Europe.108 
Constitutional rights and principles of justice have been protected 
more effectively by means of the “Solange-method” of multilevel 
judicial co-operation in transnational relations among European 
states than at any previous time during the centuries of 
intergovernmental power politics that depended on national 
majorities and interest group support for periodically elected 
governments. 
 
In Europe, the “public reasoning” and multilevel co-operation of 
independent and impartial judges has become an important 
constitutional constraint on intergovernmental power politics (for 
example, one-sided government efforts to avoid judicial 
accountability for violations of international law). Multilevel judicial 
governance has become one of the most “principled” parts of 
constitutional democracy in Europe. The limited role of European 
courts in the Second and Third “Pillars” of the European Union, as 
well as the limited co-operation among European and worldwide 
courts (such as the ICJ and the Appellate Body of the WTO) illustrate 
the political limits of international courts also in Europe, notably in 
areas of national security and foreign policy disputes over the 
                                                 
108 More generally on “disaggregated sovereignty”, see A.-M. Slaughter, A New World 
Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), at 266 et seq. 
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distribution of power or the legitimacy of international law rules. 
Beyond Europe, international relations remain dominated by power 
politics, refusal by most UN member states to submit to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, insistence on state sovereignty and 
introverted “constitutional nationalism” which impedes the collective 
supply of global public goods.109 Proposals for extending European 
“multilevel constitutionalism” to worldwide organisations (such as 
the UN and the WTO) are opposed by most states outside Europe 
(including the United States) in view of their different constitutional 
and democratic traditions and power-oriented foreign policies. The 
more intergovernmental networks and worldwide organisations 
evade parliamentary and democratic control, and the more legislators 
fail to correct the ubiquitous “market failures” and “governance 
failures” in international relations, the more citizens – as the legal 
subjects of international law and the “democratic principals” of 
government agents – have reason to appeal to the “public reasoning” 
of independent and impartial courts mandated to protect 
constitutional rights and rule of law “in conformity with principles of 
justice”. 
 
If democratic institutions are perceived as instruments for protecting 
the constitutional rights and self-governance of citizens against abuse 
of power (including majoritarian abuse of parliamentary powers), 
then the multilevel judicial protection of the fundamental freedoms of 
citizens can be justified as a necessary pre-condition for constitutional 
democracy in a globally-integrated world. The risk of paternalist 
abuses of judicial powers must be countered by “deliberative 
democracy” and “public reasoning”. Rights-based “judicial 
discourses” which focus on the “principles of justice” tend to be more 
precise and more rational than political promises to protect vaguely-
defined state interests. Similar to European courts, national 
constitutional judges and international courts outside Europe 
increasingly argue that constitutional democracies must be premised 
                                                 
109 On this “globalisation paradox” (i.e., needing multilevel governance for the 
collective supply of international pubic goods, but fearing and opposing such 
governance), see Slaughter, note 108 supra, p. 8 et seq. On the need for “multilevel 
constitutionalism” as a necessary legal framework for collective, democratic supply 
of an efficient world trading system, see E.-U. Petersmann, “Multilevel Trade 
Governance Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism”, in: Ch. Joerges and E.-U. 
Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, 
(Oxford and Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 5-57. 
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on “active liberty”; hence, the exercise of rights to individual and 
democratic self-government (in citizen-driven “political markets” as 
well as in consumer-driven economic markets) may serve as a 
“source of judicial authority and an interpretative aid to more 
effective protection of ancient and modern liberty alike”.110 Judicial 
determination of the international opinio juris sive necessitatis must 
insist that legitimacy is no longer derived from (inter-)governmental 
fiat, but from democratic and judicial justification of the relevant rules 
as being reasonable and just.111 The independence, impartiality and 
constitutional function of judges to protect constitutional rights 
against abuse of power legitimise adjudication as a necessary 
component of constitutional democracy. Citizens must hold judges 
more accountable for meeting their constitutional obligation to 
protect “constitutional justice” in terms of justifying legal 
interpretations and judicial decisions in conformity with the human 
rights obligations of government institutions and the constitutional 
rights of citizens. The increasing cross-references in ECJ and EFTA 
judgments to their respective case-law, as well as to other European 
and international courts (such as the ECtHR, WTO dispute settlement 
rulings, and the ICJ), should serve as models for co-operation also 
among other international courts in order to co-ordinate better their 
respective jurisprudence upon the basis of common legal 
principles.112 
 
Civil society and its democratic representatives rightly challenge 
traditional conceptions of international justice which shields an 
authoritarian “international law among states” as being inconsistent 
                                                 
110 See US Supreme Court Justice S. Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic 
Constitution, (New York: Knopf, 2005). 
111 On the diverse (for example, rational Kantian, contractarian Rawlsian and 
discursive Habermasian) methodological approaches to identifying just rules see, for 
example, C.S. Nino, “Can there be Law-abiding Judges?” in: M. Troper and L. Jaume 
(eds), 1789 et l’invention de la constitution, (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994), p. 275 and 286 et 
seq. On “justice as fairness” and “first virtue of social institutions”, see J. Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, (revised edition, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 
3. See, also, R. Forst, Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
2007), who infers from the Kantian idea of reason based upon universalisable 
principles that individuals can reasonably claim moral and legal rights to 
participation in decision-making which affects them, as well as to receive a 
justification of restrictions of individual freedoms. 
112 A. Rosas, “With a Little Help from My Friends: International Case Law as a Source 
of Reference for the EU Courts”, in: The Global Community Yearbook of International 
Law and Jurisprudence 2005, Vol. I (Leiden: Kluwer Publishers, 2006), pp. 201-230. 
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with the universal recognition of inalienable human rights, which call 
for constitutional conceptions of justice as a shield of the individual 
and of his or her human rights against abuse of power. As long as 
world governance for the collective supply of the ever more needed 
“global public goods” remains as deficient as it is, the legal and 
judicial protection of constitutional rights in transnational relations 
“in conformity with principles of justice and international law” are 
essential for the protection of human rights through pragmatic 
piecemeal reforms of international legal practices. It is to be 
welcomed that ever more international dispute settlement bodies (for 
example, in the WTO and investor-state arbitration) – by admitting 
amicus curiae briefs – are willing to listen to the public reasoning of 
citizens, whose opinio juris – as the “democratic principals” of 
government agents – may be relevant for judicial limitations of abuse 
of government powers (for example, if concession contracts with non-
democratic rulers are influenced by corruption). Just as multilevel 
constitutionalism in Europe was promoted by the intergovernmental 
creation and judicial protection of common markets and of rights-
based, transnational communities (rather than by “Wilsonian 
liberalism” projecting national democratic institutions to the 
worldwide level), so the needed “constitutionalisation” of 
intergovernmental power politics and “cosmopolitan peace” will 
crucially depend upon the vigilance of democratic citizens and upon 
both the wisdom and the courage of judges who support the citizen-
oriented reforms of international law and the judicial protection of 
constitutional rights in the peaceful co-operation among citizens 
across national frontiers. 
 
Chapter 4  
The European Union and “Otherness” 
Can The European Union Compensate the 
Shortcomings of Constitutional Nation-
States, or are they just Re-routed to the 
supranational level?  
A view from International Law 
Alicia Cebada Romero 




1. Introductory Remarks 
One of the central ideas on which Professor Joerges’ approach to the 
European Union pivots is that the European Union, as a 
supranational body, serves to alleviate the democratic deficits of 
constitutional nation state democracies (“compensating the 
shortcomings of constitutional nation-states”1). According to 
Professor Joerges, “we should stop complaining about the democracy 
deficits of the EU and, instead, turn our attention to the democracy 
failures of the constitutional national State”.2 This particular way of 
looking at the legitimacy of the European Union echoes the 
Habermas approach to the legitimacy of law.3 In this vein, the 
European Union is portrayed as a supranational framework in which 
                                                 
1 Ch. Joerges “European Law as Conflicts of Law”, in: Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, 
Deliberative supranationalism: revisited. 20/2006 EUI Working Papers, Law 21. 
2 Ch. Joerges “European Law as Conflicts of Law” op. cit. at p. 22. 
3 Jürgen Habermas “On the internal relation between the rule of law and 
democracy”, (1995) 3 European Journal of Philosophy, p. 12. 
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each Member State is compelled to take into consideration the 
interests of the other Member States. In his contribution to this 
volume, Jürgen Neyer sustains that, as a result, transnational justice is 
strengthened.4 
 
There exists little doubt that the European Union has already 
contributed notably to fuel regional (or intra-regional) transnational 
justice, but is it really re-inforcing transnational justice as well? The 
sceptics might answer that the (re-) distribution of welfare among 
comparatively wealthy Member States that takes place within the 
European Union, appears to be a rather negligible contribution to 
transnational justice. However, I will try to demonstrate that the 
European contribution is not as negligible as it might seem at first 
sight. 
 
It is the thesis of this chapter that the European Union is, indeed, a 
suitable framework when it comes to propel transnational justice as 
embodied in the multilateral agenda. Nevertheless, in order to 
sustain this contention, further explanation is needed. If we only refer 
to the inclusion of more of those States that might be affected by 
European policies in the decision-making process, we will fail to 
understand why the European Union may exert such a positive 
influence. In fact, the analysis of the way in which the European 
Union operates on the world stage casts many doubts on whether the 
“compensation effect” described by Christian Joerges suffices to vest 
legitimacy upon it. The contention that more of those affected by the 
European policies are included in the decision-making process seems 
to be almost sarcastic when applied to the realm of the common 
agricultural policy. And it would not be difficult to adduce further 
evidence pointing in the same direction. At first glance, it might seem 
that Professor Joerges’ optimistic approach to the legitimacy of the 
European Union has a Euro-centric bias. Furthermore, when a 
broader lens is applied, it could even be contended that the 
democratic shortfalls of the constitutional state democracies are just 
being transplanted onto the European Union, so that the legitimacy of 
the latter is undermined, rather than strengthened. In my view, when 
it comes to tracking a possible positive European influence on 
transnational justice, the crucial point should not be to highlight that, 
                                                 
4 See, in this volume, Jürgen Neyer: “Supranationality and Transnational Justice. 
Beyond the Debate on the Democratic Deficit of International Institutions.” 
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within the European Union, the members of the community take part 
in the decision-making process, but rather to determine whether the 
interests of the non-members are also taken into account – and to 
what extent–, even if, as non-members, they are not granted access to 
the decision-making process. On a closer look at the performance of 
the European Union as an international actor, there are reasons to 
support the idea that the EU might be characterised by its openness 
to the “otherness”. 
 
Thus, in the subsequent sections of this chapter, I will make an 
attempt to prove that the European Union, operating as a “civilian 
power” 5 on the world stage, is more responsive than the Member 
States of which it is composed to the interests of those that might be, 
or are, affected by its policies. And, furthermore, it will also be 
sustained that it is in the interest of the European Union itself to be 
more open to “the others” because its very legitimacy is strengthened 
as a result. Should the European Union fully develop the civilian 
power paradigm, it would make a remarkable contribution to 
transnational justice. However, this is not an easy assignment, as will 
be explained later on in this chapter. 
2. The European Union as an “Open” Community 
Christian Joerges’ approach, which centres on the “compensation of 
Constitutional Nation-States democracy failures-effect”,6 should be 
read alongside the “new sovereignty” approach developed by Abram 
and Antonia Chayes.7 Both ideas (the compensation for the 
democratic deficits of states, and new sovereignty) seem to be 
applicable not only to supranational structures, but also to any non-
                                                 
5 B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum. “Civilian Power or soft imperalism: the EU as a global 
actor and the role of interregionalism”, (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review, p. 
536. The European model has also been called “liberal internationalism” by 
Söderbaum: “The EU’s external relations objectives with a strong emphasis on the 
human benefits of economic interdependence, democracy, human rights and the 
principles of sustainable and participatory development, are often referred to as a 
‘liberal internationalist’ approach to international relations.” Fredrik Söderbaum, 
Patrik Stalgren and Luk van Langenhove. “The EU as a global actor and the 
dynamics of inter-regionalism: a comparative analysis”, (2005) 27 European 
Integration, p. 368. 
6 Ch. Joerges “European Law as Conflicts of Law”, in: Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer 
Deliberative supranationalism: revisited, 20/2006 EUI Working Papers, Law 21. 
7 Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The new Sovereignty, (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995). 
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supranational international institutional structure. Moreover, 
according to what has been stated in the previous section, it might 
seem that, the more multilateral an international institutional 
framework becomes, the closer it might come to the idea of a “global 
community” in which the interests of every member are somehow 
represented. In the following lines, it will be shown that the way in 
which the interests of the members are represented in a supranational 
framework clearly differs from the way in which they are represented 
in a non-supranational multilateral framework. 
 
So, what are the particularities of the European Union, as a 
supranational institutional framework? First of all, the willingness of 
the leaders to take the interest of the weaker Member States into 
consideration is clearer in the case of a supranational structure, 
because, in this kind of framework, particularly in a supranational 
process like the European Union in which the idea of solidarity is 
clearly embedded, the Member States are structurally bound to take 
these interests into account. In contrast, within other international 
institutional frameworks, this is more a question of political 
willingness (consider the failure of the Doha Round in the WTO as an 
example). In his contribution to this volume, Jürgen Neyer hints at 
this idea when he points out that “Legal integration therefore aims to 
transform bargaining into legal reasoning”. Clearly, we must not lose 
sight of the fact that, as Neyer also contends, “even if supranational 
institutions have the capacity to transform bargaining into legal 
reasoning, they are, nevertheless, founded on an original bargaining 
process, and often reflect, to some degree, the outcome of an 
asymmetrical distribution of power” (in this regard, it is sufficient to 
make reference to the difficulties to obtain consensus on the Treaty of 
European Union). From the perspective of the “new sovereignty”, it 
is easier to see how, within non-supranational international 
institutional frameworks, the chance for the least well-off members to 
participate in the decision-making as well as to make their voices and 
receive adequate responses to their claims is more theoretical than 
real. (Here, it is worth mentioning the sharp critical analysis of 
current international institutions accomplished by Chimni8 or 
Pogge9). 
                                                 
8 B.S. Chimni “International Institutions today: an imperial global State in the 
making”, (2004) 15 Eur. J. Int´l L, p. 1-37.; B.S. Chimni. “The World Trade 
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The “compensation effect” taking place within the European Union 
may be better understood if we refer to the concept of “community”. 
In this regard, and in order to keep expectations at bay, it must be 
borne in mind that the European Union is neither a “regional”, nor a 
“global” community, and it will, therefore, always be possible to 
differentiate between the consideration given to the interests of the 
Member States and the attention paid to the interests of the non-
Member States. According to Dworkin, a “community” might be 
defined as follows: 
 
Membership in a collective unit of responsibility involves 
reciprocity: a person is not a member of a collective unit sharing 
success and failure unless he is treated as a member by others, 
and treating him as a member means accepting that the impact 
of collective action on his life and interests is as important to the 
overall success of the action as the impact on the life and 
interests of any other member.10 
 
The reference to this conception of community is very enlightening, 
for it makes it clear that only the interests of those who are recognised 
as full members of the community will be fully taken into account. 
Nevertheless, it also holds true that a given community may be more 
or less responsive to the interests of non-members. As already 
advanced, if we engage in the analysis of the performance of the 
European Union as an international actor, we will see that there are 
reasons to maintain that the European Union is more open to the 
“otherness” than the other forms of hegemony used to be, even 
though there are, of course, also numerous black holes of 
inconsistency undermining European Union’s legitimacy. 
 
The openness of the European Union is illustrated by its attitude 
towards third states (if the analysis were extended to encompass the 
policies for the admission of individuals as well, the account would 
be completely different, though). In this vein, it has become 
                                                                                                                   
Organization, democracy and development: a view from the South”, (2006) 40 JWT, 
p. 5-36. 
9 Thomas Pogge “Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights 
of the Global Poor”, (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law, p. 717. 
10 Ronald Dworkin “Equality, Democracy and Constitution: We the People in Court”, 
(1990) 28 Alberta Law Review, p. 324, at 339. 
122 Cebada Romero
 
commonplace nowadays to refer to the European Union as an 
advanced illustration of open regionalism.11 
 
The recent European Consensus on Development illustrates the 
intention of the European Union to give adequate responses to the 
needs of third countries. In this document, the commitment to 
responding to the needs of partner countries is spelled out.12 And it is 
worth underlining that the goal here is not only to set up a 
development co-operation policy tailored to the needs of developing 
countries, but also to increase the consistency between this policy and 
others whose objectives may clash with those that inspired the co-
operation for the development agenda (trade or environmental 
policies are clear examples). 
 
This openness is also illustrated by the fact that the European Union 
is linked to many third states through international agreements. 
These agreements might be seen as a response to the need to 
conciliate on the one hand, the acceptance of geographical limitations 
(inherent to the idea of a “regional” community), with the parallel 
need to offer, at least to some countries, a chance to participate in the 
benefits resulting from the European regional integration process, on 
the other. The responsiveness of the European Union to the claims of 
third states is expressed in the association and co-operation 
agreements signed not only with third states, but also with other 
regional blocs.13 Even though I cannot go in depth into the subject, it is 
worth mentioning that, in this vein, the efforts on the part of the EU 
to set up a special and privileged framework for the relations with 
neighbouring countries are particularly remarkable. The 
Neighbourhood Policy is being designed upon a bilateral basis and is, 
                                                 
11 For a critical approach to open regionalism, see M. Shiff and L. Winters, Regional 
Integration and Development, (Washington: World Bank, 2003), p. 244: “open 
regionalism is a slogan rather than an analytical term.” 
12 “Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’”, 
Council of the European Union, Brussels, 22 November 2005, 14820/05, Section 3. 
13 “The EC responds to outside pressures related to the impact of the internal market 
and its policies by expanding membership to applicants; offering association and 
preferential trade accords, development assistance, partnerships and dialogues with 
other regional blocs”. R.H. Ginsberg, “Conceptualizing the EU as an international 
actor: narrowing the theoretical capability-expectations gap”, (1999) 37 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, p. 429, at 437. 
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therefore, better adapted – at least potentially – to the particular 
interests of the EU’s partners.14 The comprehensive relationship with 
Russia could also be mentioned. 
 
It is sufficient to examine the extensive network of agreements to see 
the extent to which the European Union can be characterised by its 
openness. On the other hand, the intensity with which the European 
Union has implemented its ius contrahendi can be taken as proof of its 
vitality as an international actor. It might also be of interest to 
underline that these agreements are multi-dimensional themselves. 
Within the “multi-dimensional” relationship arising from these 
treaties, the interests and claims of both parties might be better 
accommodated. 
 
Finally, I briefly wish to mention here the other clear expression of 
the EU’s openness, which pertains to the enlargement of the 
community itself through the admission of new Member States. 
Notwithstanding this, the enlargement of a regional community has 
its limits, and the European Union is currently striving to de-limit its 
borders. For this chapter, the important point is that the fact that the 
EU has gone through 6 enlargement processes (or 5 +) and has 
established enhanced relations not only with neighbouring countries, 
but also with other countries and regional blocs across the world, are 
reflective of its openness. 
3. The ways in which the EU, as an International 
Actor, Can Propel Transnational Justice Forward 
The Characterisation of the EU as a “Smart” 
Civilian Power 
It is commonplace to characterise the European Union as a civilian 
power (soft power). There has been a long-lasting debate about the 
viability of this model and about the success achieved by the 
European Union in its implementation. In fact, the question might be 
asked as to whether the model is itself currently going through a 
substantial transformation.15 There is an interesting piece of research 
work written by Chaban, Elgstrom and Holland, whose main goal 
                                                 
14 R. Dannreuther, “Developing the alternative to enlargement: the European 
neighbourhood policy”, (2006) 11 EFAR, p. 183, at 183-184. 
15 The progress within the area of security policy could be read in this direction. 
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was to identify – upon the basis of personal interviews and opinion 
polls – the image that the European Union projects externally.16 And 
it is striking to ascertain that, according to this work, the European 
Union is still seen as a prospective (possible) leader, rather than as a 
real one. It seems that the people interviewed were not confident that 
the European Union might play an influential role in the world by 
implementing a civilian power paradigm (based upon acceptance, 
linked to reputation and authority) instead of by following the model 
that has been traditionally applied by hegemons, one that would, 
instead, be based upon imposition, linked to power, including 
military coercion. This work (Chaban et al.) points to the fact that the 
European Union is still fully expected to develop a military 
dimension. In my opinion, attention should be drawn to the fact that, 
should this development actually take place, it might end up 
displacing the European Union from the civilian paradigm to the 
more traditional one. Thus, the work of Chaban et al., would seem to 
demonstrate the failure of the European Union to persuade the world 
of the viability of the civilian power model. 
 
Benita Ferrero has recently declared that “those who believe the EU is 
still principally a soft power are behind the times”.17 And she went on 
to add: 
 
For over a decade, the EU’s foreign policy has been adding 
more tools to its repertoire, including, crucially, a military 
dimension and crisis management functions. 
 
In the same address, she re-named the paradigm applicable to the 
EU’s external action as “smart power”. It is clearly the case that the 
progress accomplished over the last years within the realm of the 
European defence policy is undeniable, but I do not think it can be 
contended that it has led to a change in the nature of EU power. In 
contrast to the analysis that points to military weakness as the reason 
for the poor image that the European Union projects externally, it 
could also be sustained that, in reality, the weaknesses of the 
European Union as an international actor might be a consequence of 
                                                 
16 Natalie Chaban, Ole Elgström and Martin Holland. “The EU as others see it”, 
(2006) 11 EFAR, pp. 245-262. 
17 Speech by Benita Ferrero: “The European Union and the World: a hard look at soft 
power”, given at Columbia University (New York), on 24 September 2007. Available 
at: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7330_en.htm. 
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its own inconsistencies in the implementation of the civilian power 
paradigm. In this vein, the challenge should be for the European 
Union to prove that it is possible to reach a hegemonic position even 
without a fully developed military dimension. In other words, 
without renouncing to be a “soft power”.18 There can be little doubt 
that this is not an easy task.19 In fact, it has been sustained that the 
civilian power paradigm is a contradictio in terminis, that it is 
unviable.20 I prefer to side with those who, in contrast, contend that it 
is something new, not a contradiction in terms, but an oxymoron.21 
 
What, then, are the axes of the civilian power paradigm? One of the 
keys – as has been already said – is that it does not rest on military 
coercion. This is not tantamount to say that the military dimension 
cannot be developed; on the contrary, it can be, but it should not 
become the central point of the external action of the EU. In this 
sense, we have to bear in mind that an external action which pivots 
                                                 
18 B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum, “Civilian Power or soft imperalism: the EU as a 
global actor and the role of interregionalism”, (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs 
Review, pp. 535-582, at 536. Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “What Binds 
Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of 
Europe”, (2003) 10 Constellations, p. 291. See, also, Jürgen Habermas, “Why Europe 
needs a Constitution”, (2001) 11 New Left Review, p. 5, at 12. It is of interest to notice 
that, within the USA, a shift from the hard power to the “smart power” paradigm is 
also being advocated. See, for example, the work of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power, with the motto: “a 
smarter, more secure America.” Available at: http://www.csis.org/smartpower/. 
These words of Professor Nye are illustrative of the scope of this Commission: “Rich 
and I and the rest of the commission are looking at how America wields power in the 
world and what type of posture is most effective. Hard power — basically military 
and economic might (coercion and payments) — is a vital element, but as we’ve seen 
over the past few years, it doesn’t necessarily translate into influence in today’s 
world. Smart power is about tapping into diverse sources of American power, 
including our soft power, to attract others. It is about how we can get other countries 
to share our goals without resorting to coercion, which is limited and inevitably 
costly”. See the rest of the interview at:  http://www.the-american-
interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=346&MId=16. 
19 M. Farrell, “EU External Relations: exporting the EU Model of Governance?”, 
(2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review, p. 451, at 453: “As much as American 
unilateralism renews the legitimacy of power politics on the world stage, the 
normative approach in the European management of international relations sustains 
the relevance of the very notion of global governance.” 
20 Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: a contradiction in terms”, (1982) 12 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, p. 149. 
21 K. Nicolaides and R. Howse, “This is my EUtopia…:Narrative as power”, (2002) 40 
JCMS, p. 767. 
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on security issues would fall closer to the traditional paradigm and 
might become a way for the Member States to regain control over the 
EU’s external action. In contrast, should the military dimension be 
implemented in full respect of the European commitment to 
multilateralism, the progress in this field would perfectly fit into the 
“civilian power” paradigm. In this vein, EU military missions, as the 
recently deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic 
following the United Nations mandate,22 do not call the nature of the 
EU power into question. 
 
Civilian power might be also characterised by the way in which it 
approaches international law, a particular approach that might 
further propel both a “humanised” reading of, and a multilateral 
approach to, international rules. At first sight, it might seem that the 
European Union utilises international law as the hegemons have 
traditionally done. As Nico Krish has already explained, the latter 
oscillate between submission to international law as a way of gaining 
legitimacy and the infringement of international rules whenever it is 
necessary for them to pursue short-term self-interests.23 Even though 
this oscillation is also visible in the case of the European Union, there 
still exists a major difference between the way in which the European 
Union interacts with international law and the way in which 
powerful states do. What are the particularities in the case of the 
European Union? 
 
Firstly, it’s worth stressing that the European Union – like every 
international organisation24 – defines itself through discourse.25 In the 
                                                 
22 UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007); Council Joint Action 2007/677 CFSP 
of 15 October 2007, on EU military operation in the Republic of Chad and the Central 
African Republic; see http://euobserver.com/9/24603. 
23 Nico Krisch, “International Law in times of hegemony: unequal power and the 
shaping of the international legal order”, (2005) 16 Eur. J. Int´l L., p. 369. 
24 In contrast to States, which see how the content of their international subjectivity is 
defined by General International Law, the content of the subjectivity of international 
organisations is determined on a case by case basis, according to what has been 
established in the Founding Treaty as well as what has been expressed in the 
implementation thereof through the enactment of secondary rules by the Institutions 
of the Organisation. 
It could be contended that the categorisation of the European Union as an 
international organisation is outdated. In my opinion, if we consider the European 
Union as an international actor, it has to be conceptualised as an international 
organisation, albeit a “unique” one. Actually, within the international organisations 
landscape, the “uniqueness” of the European Union becomes one of its defining 
The EU and “otherness" 127
 
case of the European Union’s discourse (partly enshrined in legal 
rules: primary and secondary), the commitment to International Law 
and Multilateralism occupies a prominent place. This multilateral 
orientation is even more valuable because it comes from a non-
multilateral international actor and because it is rather rare to find 
this kind of commitment in the case of powerful states (the USA, for 
example).26 Indeed, the European Union’s leverage in the world is 
certainly greater than that of the vast majority of the international 
actors typically interested in supporting multilateralism. This is 
beneficial for multilateralism itself and for the multilateral agenda. 
From the European discourse, high expectations arise with regard to 
its commitment to development co-operation, the promotion and the 
protection of human rights, the protection of the environment, and so 
forth. 
 
On the other hand, it is well-known that, within the European Union, 
the Member States have gone the furthest in the transference of 
competences to a supranational institutional body. This 
unprecedented transference endows the European Union with an 
exceptional multidimensionality (it becomes an advanced expression 
of the so-called “new regionalism”27) which places it in an ideal 
position to pursue many of the goals that make up the rather 
fragmented multilateral agenda. This goes hand in hand with the 
already mentioned firm European commitment to multilateralism. 
 
It is also remarkable that the European Union is built upon the idea of 
regional solidarity, articulated through social and regional cohesion 
tools. Although it is clear that the European Union is not a model that 
might just be transplanted to other areas of the world, nobody would 
deny that the European Union is influencing, sometimes in a subtle 
                                                                                                                   
features. To say that it is an international organisation only means it has been created 
by a founding international treaty and it has a permanent international structure and 
legal personality. 
25 Fastenrath. “Relative normativity in International Law”, (1993) 4 EJIL, p. 336. 
26 Fassbender sustains that the European Union is intrinsically bound to promote 
multilateralism: Fassbender, “The better peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s 
Practice and the United Nations”, (2004) 15 EJIL, p. 857. 
27 On the various models of regionalism, see Andrew Hurrell, “The regional 
dimension in International Relations Theory”, in: M. Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luk 
van Langenhove, The Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice. (London: Pluto 
Press, 2005), pp. 38-53. See, also, Mario Telo, (ed). European Union and new regionalism. 
Regional actors and global governance in a post-hegemonic era, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 
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way, the creation and implementation of other regional integration 
experiences throughout the world.28 Here, mention could be made of 
the efforts on the part of the European Union to persuade other 
countries that solidarity and social cohesion must be a necessary 
component of any integration process. This aspect will be further 
developed in the next section of this chapter. Should the EU succeed 
in the promotion of solidarity, the result could be beneficial for 
transnational justice. This is one reason for welcoming the EU’s 
efforts to promote regional integration as such. In this line, it is 
remarkable that the EU not only supports existing regional processes, 
but also encourages third countries to engage in new regional 
integration adventures (The Association and Stabilisation 
Agreements with Balkan countries provide a good example of this). 
 
The last idea that I wish to offer with a view to explaining why the 
position of the European Union, vis-à-vis international law, differs 
from the traditional position of the powerful states is that the 
acceptance of the fundamental general principles (and values) upon 
which international law is based, as embodied in the concept of ius 
cogens, is a constitutive feature in the case of the European Union. 
While the existence of a state does not depend at all on its attitude 
towards international law, the European Union – like every 
International Organisation – is founded upon an international treaty, 
and is, consequently, bound to abide by peremptory rules, according 
to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to bear in mind that different 
conceptions of International Law are reflected in the general 
principles, so that when one talks about the contribution of the 
European Union to transnational justice, it is not only important to 
ascertain that it adheres (even structurally) to these principles, but 
also important to stress that it advocates a special informal hierarchy 
among principles, in which precedence is granted to those that come 
closer to a humanised and multilateral-oriented account of the 
                                                 
28 Rainer Nickel, “¿El futuro inevitable del MERCOSUR? “Gobernanza, democracia y 
control judicial en la Unión Europea como modelo de institucionalización 
supranacional”, in: A. Ferraro, En busca del buen gobierno: nuevas perspectivas sobre 
políticas y gestión del Estado en América Latina, (Barcellona: Ediciones Bellaterra, 2007), 
p. 19. He brings attention to some features of the European integration process that 
should not be emulated, in particular, to the problem from which the European 
governance is suffering: “carencia de una estructura jurídica coherente e integral”, at 
p. 47. 
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international legal order. In this regard, the clear commitment to the 
protection of human rights and the central position occupied by the 
individual within the European Community legal order are of the 
utmost importance. 
 
To sum up, civilian power maintains a particular relationship with 
International Law, one in which commitment to multilateralism and 
solidarity occupies a prominent position, one that could further 
propel the process of the “humanisation” of international law, and, 
eventually, advance transnational justice. In their search to increase 
their standing in the world, the hegemons are striving to find the 
right combination between hard and soft power. It is in this vein that 
the term “smart power” has been coined.29 And I am convinced that 
the smarter option for the European Union is to remain with its 
civilian power paradigm. 
 
4. The Subtle Influence of the European Union the 
Pledge for Solidarity 
The solidarity principle has been developed within the European 
Union in two main dimensions: inter-territorial solidarity and social 
cohesion. 
 
In spite of the reluctance on the part of the Member States to bestow 
the European Union with competence in the realm of social policy, 
the European Union has not been prevented from developing a 
“social agenda”, structured according to the Lisbon Strategy. It is 
well-known that, from the very outset of the EU, EU action within the 
field of social policy was confined to the regulation of the free 
movement of workers and of gender equality with regard to working 
conditions. Over the years, the perception that the progress in the 
integration process should be coupled with advances in the social 
field has steadily been increasing. Encouraged, maybe, by the 
progress attained at multilateral level (the UN Copenhagen Summit 
on Social Development of 1995 could be mentioned as an example), 
the EU launched its Lisbon Strategy (2000), which focused on the 
social dimension of the integration process. It was acknowledged 
there that, even in Europe, there was an unacceptable amount of the 
                                                 
29 See note 21 supra. 
130 Cebada Romero
 
EU population living in poverty, or close to the poverty line.30 Within 
the Lisbon Strategy, the proclaimed main goals are to create 
employment (“decent work for all” is the motto repeatedly used by 
the European Institutions in line with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO)), as well as to favour social integration by both 
protecting minorities properly and guaranteeing an improved access 
to basic services, such as education and health. I have already 
mentioned the EU’s multi-dimensionality,31 which basically means 
that the European process embraces not only economic, but also 
political and social, domains. When designing regional solidarity 
schemes, the deployment of an extensive array of tools is required: 
social, economic, political, environmental and so forth. In a certain 
way, it could be said that the new regionalism as incarnated in the 
European Union, seems particularly adapt to face problems such as 
social exclusion and poverty, which are multidimensional in 
themselves. 
 
The mechanism enshrined in the Lisbon Strategy, in order to proceed 
within the social field, is the so-called Open Method of Co-ordination 
(OMC).32 In short, it basically consists of agreeing upon Common 
Goals to be pursued by all the EU Member States, leaving the latter 
with the freedom to select the tools through which those Common 
                                                 
30 There are some estimates in this regard.   
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/international_cooperation/docs/s
eminar_13jan05/farrell_%20speech_en.pdf. 
31 J.H. Jackson, “Perspectives on regionalism in trade relations”, (1996) 27 Law & Pol’y 
Int’l Bus., p. 873. See, also, Mary Farrell, “The Global Politics of Regionalism: an 
introduction”, in: M. Farrell, B. Hettne and Luk van Langenhove, Global Politics of 
Regionalism, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 8. It should be said that this multi-
dimensionality can be traced in every regional scheme. Even in such projects as the 
Free Trade Area of Americas, which is primarily oriented towards trade, other 
dimensions are also being considered. Adelle Blackett, for example, pleas for the re-
inforcement of social dimension within the framework of regional integration 
schemes in America. “Toward social regionalism in the Americas”, (2002) 23 Comp. 
Lab L & Pol´y J., p. 901. 
32 For a description of the OMC, see: “When do policy innovations spread? Lessons 
for advocates of lesson drawing”, (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review, p. 1467; Maurizio 
Ferrera, Manos Matsaganis and Stefano Sacchi, “Open Co-ordination Against 
Poverty: The New EU Social Inclusion Process”, (2002) 12 J. Eur. Soc. Pol'y, p. 227; See 
Jean-Claude Barbier, “The European Employment Strategy, A Channel for Activating 
Social Protection?” in: Jonathan Zeitlin and Philippe Pochet (eds) The Open Method of 
Co-ordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, p.417, 
at 419-25 (Brussels: Peter Lang Publisher, 2005); Research Forum on the Open Method of 
Coordination: http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC. 
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Goals are allegedly to be attained. The Member States are called upon 
to announce their national strategies (in the so-called National Action 
Plans). The OMC also comprises a peer review mechanism (the 
Member States are required to deliver a biannual report on the 
progress accomplished). Through the application of this mechanism, 
a considerable amount of information is gathered not only with 
regard to the formulae applied in each country but also with regard 
to the results achieved, which facilitates a mutual learning process, 
which basically takes place through the sharing of good practices. 
The European Commission and the Council both play an important 
role as monitoring bodies. 
 
The second dimension of the solidarity principle that we find within 
the European regional integration process is inter-territorial 
solidarity, which has been crucial for enhancing internal cohesion 
and ultimately for the re-inforcement of the organisation itself (it 
gives substantial content to the idea of community). Usually, it is at 
state level that these schemes implementing territorial solidarity can 
be found, although, of course, it is also necessary to acknowledge that 
there exist numerous states whose territories and populations are 
suffering from the lack of such schemes. To date, this has been 
particularly the case of Latin American States,33 although they are 
gradually becoming aware of the need to work in this direction. As 
an illustration of the growing awareness among Latin-American 
governments of the need to reverse this situation, I can refer to the 
Declaration of Mar del Plata, issued within the framework of the 
Fourth Summit of the Americas.34 
 
It is less common to have regional solidarity mechanisms working 
effectively beyond the framework of the Member States, but this is 
precisely what we find within the European Union. In the EU, 
                                                 
33 In the XXXI session of the ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and 
Caribbean (ECLAC), on 22 March 2006 in Montevideo, it was stressed that “the LAC 
countries should re-assess the role of the state in fighting inequalities and that 
economic policies can hide the reality in Latin America: a region rich in natural 
resources but with great social inequalities”. Background paper. High Level 
Conference: promoting social cohesion: the European Union – Latin America and 
Caribbean experiences. Brussels, 27-28 March 2006: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/lac-
vienna/events/idb_ec_background_230306.pdf. 
34 “Creating jobs to fight poverty and strengthen Democratic Governance”, Mar del 
Plata, Argentina, 5 November 2005. 
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regional solidarity tools have been implemented quite successfully, 
such as the Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds which finance the 
regional policy. 
 
Solidarity, as approached by the European Union, has an external 
side as well. And both sides – external and internal – have been 
brought together within the enlargement process.35 The ongoing 
debate on the limits to the geographical expansion of Europe is 
related to the limits for the solidarity effort which is required from 
the Member States.36 Regional solidarity enhances internal cohesion, 
but when the solidarity effort required is excessive, internal cohesion 
might be put at risk.37 
 
At the external level, solidarity is advocated by the European Union 
both within the framework of bilateral and inter-regional relations 
and within international organisations. In this way, the openness of 
the European Union represents a unique opportunity for it to spread 
various features of its model across the world, a model in which 
solidarity occupies a central position. 
 
The fact that the European Union has little room for manoeuvre 
within the social realm makes its performance on the international 
arena even more valuable. The efforts of the European Union in this 
area might also be more generally read as an illustration of its 
commitment to the promotion of solidarity. The greater the success of 
the European Union in strengthening solidarity as a general principle 
of international law, the closer it (the EU) will come to the 
compensation of the drawbacks of state constitutional democracies. 
In this vein, the need to improve social cohesion in developing 
countries has been repeatedly underlined by the European Union at 
multilateral, as well as at bilateral, level. At multilateral level, the 
intention on the part of the European Union to link the Lisbon 
Strategy to the Copenhagen Process, implemented under the auspices 
                                                 
35 Marise Cremona, “EU enlargement: solidarity and conditionality”, (2005) 30 
European Law Review, p. 3. 
36 Benita Ferrero has recently declared in a speech in Stockholm that it is clear that 
the European Union “cannot enlarge ad infinitum”:  
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/149&. 
37 M. Teló, “Globalization, new regionalism and the role of the European Union” in: 
Teló(ed) European Union and new regionalism. Regional actors and global governance in a 
post-hegemonic era. (Aldershot : Ashgate, 2001), pp. 21-37. 
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of the United Nations, might be underscored. At bilateral level, I 
would focus on the relationship with Latin-American countries 
within which the EU is conferring remarkable relevance to social 
cohesion. It might be said that the European experience in the social 
field is influencing, albeit in a very subtle way, the design of the 
regional mechanisms designed to foster social cohesion in Latin-
America. 
4.1. The External Side of the European Union’s Social 
Agenda 
Let us go into the external projection of the social dimension of the 
European integration process in greater depth.38 It might be advanced 
that the results might not be spectacular, but they are more valuable 
if we keep sight on the fact that – as already underlined – the social 
field is the one in which the Member States have been highly 
reluctant to yield decision-making to the European Institutions, 
thereby hindering the inception of European policies.39 
 
At multilateral level, the European Union advocated the feasibility of 
using the OMC within the 43rd Session of the United Nations (UN) 
Commission for Social Development (CSD) – held in New York, in 
February 2005.40 The scope of this Session was to review the 
Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development drawn up in that 
city 10 years before. The three over-riding issues addressed within 
the CSD Summit were the usual topics included in the multilateral 
social agenda:41 the eradication of poverty, the promotion of full 
                                                 
38 COM (2005) 33 final Communication on the Social Agenda, at p. 5: the main goals 
are: the incorporation of the European social model into external dialogue and 
measures at bilateral, regional and multilateral level; and the promotion of decent 
work as a global objectives at all levels. 
39 T. Atkinson, “Social inclusion and the European Union”, (2002) 40 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, p. 625. On the (in)existence of a European social model, see 
W. Schelkle, “Can there be a European social model?” in: Joerges; Eriksen and Rödl 
(eds) Law and Democracy in the Post-national Union. 1/2006 ARENA Report 233. In the 
same volume, see F. Rödl, “Constitutional integration of labour Constitutions”, p. 
289. 
40 This was idea underlying this Seminar organised by the European Commission 
shortly before the SDC Session was hold:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/international_cooperation/semina
r13jan05_en.htm. 
41 On the incorporation of the social domain into the Multilateral Agenda on 
Development, see Kerry Rittich, “The future of Law and development: second 
generation reforms and the incorporation of the social”, (2004) 26 Mich. J. Int’l L., p. 
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employment and social integration, including the human rights 
perspective, the call for the improvement in the access to basic 
services, such as education and health, and the promotion of gender 
equality. At the end of this Session of the Social Development 
Commission, a report was issued, within which it is possible to find 
some references which echo the OMC.42 In the next session of the 
Commission for Social Development, in 2006, the central topic was 
the eradication of poverty, and the importance of the implementation 
of the African Peer Review mechanism to advance in the social 
dimensions of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development was 
emphasised.43 
 
There are other examples of the action undertaken by the European 
Union at multilateral level, which could be associated with its effort 
to project its social agenda externally. Its discourse is articulated in 
various multilateral frameworks. For instance, the EU is engaged in 
the promotion of social cohesion in Latin-American in co-operation 
with other International Organisations. Mention could be made of the 
Summit on Social Cohesion in Latin-American held in Washington in 
May 2005, in which the European Commission participated along 
with the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB).44 At this Summit, the parties decided to set up a joint 
                                                                                                                   
199. 
42 For example, with regard to the review of the implementation of the Copenhagen 
Declaration, it is stated that “the Commission should emphasise increased exchange 
of national, regional and international experiences, focused and interactive dialogues 
among experts and practitioners, and sharing of best practices and lessons learned” 
Page 7 of the Report: Draft Resolution III: Future Organisation and methods of work 
of the Commission for Social Development, paragraph 4. 
43 E/2006/26; E/CN.5/2006/6, at 7, para 5. Available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/288/49/PDF/N0628849.pdf?O
penElement 
44 Just after this Summit, the IDB delivered its Report on “the Millennium 
Development Goals in Latin American and the Caribbean: progress and priorities 
and IDB Support for its implementation”, August 2005. From 2002, the European 
Commission and the IDB are linked through a Memorandum of Understanding 
addressed to the development of common initiatives within which social cohesion is 
given the highest priority 
(http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/la/doc/memo05_02.htm) 
The “shared priorities for collaboration” are: the consolidation of democracy on 
human rights issues, social equality and poverty reduction, regional integration and 
development of information technologies and shared knowledge society. 
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technical working group with a view to exchanging experiences in 
social cohesion. 
 
The social dimension is one of the three pillars of sustainable 
development,45 which embraces concerns about employment, as well 
as social and environmental policies. With regard to employment, the 
EU underscores the need to promote decent work for all in line with 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Other over-riding 
concerns in this regard include the provision of support for fair trade 
and encouraging European companies to adhere to the principles of 
corporate social responsibility. 
 
With all this multilateral action in sight, it might be contended that, 
rather than a “European social agenda”, what we actually have is the 
European Union “importing” the social multilateral agenda. But even 
if this holds true, the important point is that, once this multilateral 
agenda has been properly internalised at European level, it is also 
externally promoted by the European Union. In a way, the European 
experience in this field is an excellent illustration of the already 
highlighted ability of the EU to propel the multilateral agenda. 
 
The external dimension of the social agenda is also implemented 
within the relationship between the European Union and third 
countries (at either bilateral or inter-regional level). 
 
As an illustration of the relevance granted to the promotion of social 
standards, attention could be brought to the Cotonou Agreement, 
particularly Article 1 and Article 9.46 In the democratic clause 
enshrined in this Agreement, the social rights are considered essential 
element of it. The Agreements concluded by the European 
Community and its Member States with Latin-American countries 
also include democratic clauses of the kind. If we look at the last of 
the Association Agreements concluded with Latin-American 
countries – the Agreement with Chile47 – we can see that “social 
                                                 
45 COM (2005) 311 final. “An European Consensus on development policy.” 
46 http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22000A1215(01):EN:HTML. 





development” is conceived of as a “guiding principle” for the 
implementation of the Agreement. 
 
In addition to the bilateral agreements, the EU also contributes to 
promoting the implementation of social rights through unilateral 
tools such as the Generalised System of Preferences Scheme (GSP). 
Under this new scheme which has been fully applied since 2006, 
within the framework of the so-called GSP Plus, enhanced 
preferences are granted to the countries that have ratified and 
implemented the core ILO and UN Conventions on human rights and 
labour rights listed in part A of Annex III.48 Furthermore, a “negative 
conditionality” mechanism is set up in Article 16 of the Regulation, 
under the heading “temporary withdrawal”. This withdrawal may be 
decided by the European Community as a response to serious and 
systematic violations of the principles laid down in the Conventions 
listed in Part A of Annex III by one of the GSP beneficiaries, which, as 
stated above, comprises the main human rights and labour rights of 
the UN and ILO Conventions. To date, the negative conditionality 
has only been applied with regard to Burma/Myanmar (1997) and 
Belarus (2006).49 
4.2  Examples of the Influence of the European Union 
the Latin-American Case 
The concern with social cohesion is present in the relationship 
between Europe and Latin-America from the 1990s, at least; although 
it is primarily since the beginning of the new millennium that this 
concern has been prioritised in the inter-regional Agenda, first by 
Commissioner Patten,50 and then by his successor, Benita Ferrero. 
Fighting social inequalities in order to bring about a more inclusive 
society with more equal opportunities for all is conceived of as a first 
priority within the region with the highest average level of inequality 
                                                 
48 See Council Regulation n. 980/2005. 
49 Yaraslau Kryvoi, “Why European Union trade sanctions do not work?”, 4/2007 
Harvard European Law Working Paper, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007387. 
50 See, for instance, this speech by Patten in 2002:   
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp02_447.htm 
or this intervention at the Rio Group ministerial meeting in 2003:   
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp03_160.htm  
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in the world.51 Despite the political progress achieved in Latin 
American on its way towards democratisation, it is acknowledged 
that this progress had not been translated into a substantial 
improvement in living conditions. 
 
Latin-America has also a long record with regard to regional 
integration. Over the years, the regional integration processes there 
have evolved into “new regionalism” incarnations. Thus, it could be 
held that the conditions for the creation and implementation of 
mechanisms expressing regional solidarity already exist. And, as a 
matter of fact, there have been recent developments in some of the 
Latin-American regional integration processes, which could be 
deciphered in this direction. Mention could be made, for instance, to 
the advances recently accomplished in Mercosur as well as in the 
Andean Community. 
 
Before going into the analysis of some cases in order to illustrate the 
Latin-American experience, I want to refer generally to the emphasis 
placed by the EU on the need to go further in the attainment of social 
cohesion in Latin-America. Social (Regional) Cohesion (LAC) was one 
of the pivotal ideas in the Guadalajara EU/LAC Summit (200452) and 
of the primary issues tackled in the Vienna Summit (May, 2006),53 In 
Vienna, the decision was taken to organise Social Cohesion Fora on a 
periodical basis with a view to fostering the dialogue and co-
operation between the two regions on equality, the fight against 
poverty and social inclusion. The first Forum was held on 23-25 
                                                 
51 Inter-American Development Bank. “Social cohesion in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: analysis, action and co-ordination”: “Latin America is the most unequal 
region in the world. There are vast inequalities in the distribution of income, assets, 
and services, including education and access to credit. These are detrimental to the 
development prospects of the region. While the average Gini coefficient for Latin 
America is 0.51, that of Eastern Europe is 0.29, and the Gini coefficients 
corresponding to developed countries, Southeast Asia, and Africa are 0.33, 0.37, and 
0.46, respectively (see next section). Inequalities are exacerbated by the exclusion of 
certain population groups that are targets of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity 
or race, gender, physical disability, and/or age, or because of their geographic 
isolation. 
Therefore, in order to attain the social cohesion necessary for sustainable 
development, the region needs to overcome major challenges related to inequality.” 
Document available at: www.iadb.org. 
52 http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/lac-guadal/00_index.htm See, also, COM 




September 2007 in Santiago in Chile. The thrust of this meeting was 
the need to co-ordinate social and economic policies. Solidarity is 
proclaimed anew as the guiding principle for health care and social 
security policies.54 The exchange of experience, know-how and good 
practices is presented as a key element of the co-operation between 
the two regions in this field. It is of interest to highlight that both 
parties agree that the European Union has a record of successful 
experience in reducing disparities, not only economic and social, but 
also territorial. In 2006, the Third European-Latin 
American/Caribbean social civil Forum was held prior to the Vienna 
Summit,55 and it is remarkable to see that, within this Framework, the 
inconsistencies of the European Union were clearly denounced by its 
Latin-American counterparts. 
 
Let us move on now to explore the Andean Community’s (AC) most 
recent experience in this regard. Within this region, there is a regional 
mechanism whose functioning resembles the European Open Method 
of Co-ordination. It is the so-called Integral Plan for Social 
Development56 set up by Decision 611 of the Andean Community 
Foreign Affairs Council.57 The proclaimed goals under this plan 
replicate the Millennium Development Goals exactly: employment, 
the reduction of poverty, and social integration. The scopes upon 
which the Andean countries agreed might be considered to be 
excessively general. As a matter of fact, it is hard to see what is the 
added value associated with acting at regional level if the countries 
within the region are unable to reach a more tailored definition of 
their goals. The designation of the common objectives should be 
further adapted to the particular situation of the Andean region. In 
other words, greater effort should be required from the Andean 
countries with a view to agreeing on more specific goals. 
                                                 
54 The Conclusions of Chile Forum: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/la/doc/07_conclusions_en.pdf. 
55 http://ec.europa.eu/world/lac/events/civil_society/declaration_en.pdf. It is a 
dialogue organised by the Commission and is open to the participation of non-
governmental organisations, trade unions, universities, employers’ associations, 
consumers’ organisations, and other representatives of civil society. 
56 The final Declaration drawn up with occasion of the last Summit EU/Andean 
Community, held in Luxembourg in May 2005, acknowledged that this Plan is a 
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The working method laid out in the AC’s Integral Plan resembles the 
EU’s OMC. The European Commission had already underscored the 
feasibility of using the Open Method of Co-ordination within the 
Latin American context.58 
 
Within the framework of the Andean Community’s Plan, three 
courses of action were established: 1) technical co-operation on social 
policy, including the exchange of good practices; 2) regional 
monitoring of the implementation of the Millennium Development 
Goals; and, 3) the implementation of individual projects selected at 
regional level (the projects may involve one or more countries within 
the region). Thus, the presence of the three basic components of the 
OMC can be easily traced: the common definition of goals, peer 
review, and the mutual exchange of practices conducive to mutual 
learning. 
 
On the other hand, and with a view to providing some remedy to the 
inequalities between countries and regions within the Andean area, 
the possibility of creating a “financial instrument destined to fund 
some social cohesion programmes and projects” is currently being 
debated. This proposal was launched upon the basis of the Quirama 
Declaration issued within the framework of the XIV Andean 
Presidential Council Summit (2003), which called for the creation of 
new financing mechanisms specifically addressed to the 
entrenchment of democratic governance as well as to fighting 
poverty. This project is similar to the European Cohesion Funds. 
                                                 
58 In this vein, reference might be made to the 2004 Communication on the goals in 
the relationship with Latin-America within which the improvements in social 
cohesion are defined as an over-riding priority, and where, with regard to to the 
application of the OMC in particular, the Commission declared: “In deciding how to 
develop a European perspective on issues of poverty and social exclusion, the Lisbon 
European Council chose to draw on the experience of the European strategy for 
employment which has been in place since 1997. It thus adopted what is known as an 
Open Method of Co-ordination. This method allows for dialogue, exchange of 
experience, the establishment of common objectives and evaluation of policies in 
areas relevant for fighting exclusion. The Commission encourages the countries of 
Latin America to launch a regional process which will create a new dynamic for 
dialogue and exchanges between countries of the region, allowing them to learn from 
each other’s successes and failures. If the countries of Latin-America were to decide 
to establish such a mechanism, the Commission would be willing to provide and 
finance technical support. In this context it is also worth noting the importance of 




In Mercosur, and more in line with the idea of inter-territorial 
solidarity, a Convergence Structural Fund has already been created.  
 
Mercosur has just agreed to set up a Convergence Structural 
Fund (FOCEM) to promote structural adjustment between 
Mercosur members, focusing on the poorest territories and 
citizens. The fund will support added-value generating projects 
in the fields of infrastructure, productive investment, fight 
against poverty and employment promotion and finally 
capacity building of the Mercosur administrations.59 
 
This Fund was set up by the Decision Consejo Mercado Común N° 
45/04. Subsequently, the Decision 18/05 set forth a Social Cohesion 
Programme60 along with another three Programmes (Convergence 
Structural, Enhanced competitiveness, and the strengthening of the 
institutional structure and the integration process) to be implemented 
within the framework of the Fund. The funds come from the states, 
with Brazil bearing the lion’s share of the cost (70%).61 
 
It is not my intention to affirm here that, with these recent 
developments, Mercosur as well as the Andean Community are 
consciously following the European path, but this path is there, 
                                                 
59 Background paper. High Level Conference: promoting social cohesion: the 
European Union – Latin-America and Caribbean experiences. Brussels 27-28 March 
2006, p. 11: http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/lac-
vienna/events/idb_ec_background_230306.pdf. 
60 “Los proyectos del Programa III deberán contribuir al desarrollo social, en 
particular, en las zonas de frontera, y podrán incluir proyectos de interés 




61 Argentina bears 27%; Uruguay (2%); Paraguay (1%). The total amount is $ 100 
million. It is very interesting to see that the regulation of the distribution of the funds 
is reflective of the concept of regional solidarity, with 80% of the funds bound to 
Paraguay and Uruguay, whereas only 20% of the funds to be devoted to projects 
submitted by either Brazil or Argentina. After the inception of this Fund, it has been 
contended that a “new Mercosur” is born: A.E. Monsanto, El Nuevo MERCOSUR: 
Fondos estructurales, sociedad civil y desarrollo juridico-institucional: 
http://www.unr.edu.ar/internacional/catedra-andres-
bello/downloads/elnuevomercosur.pdf. 
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presented as an unprecedented successful formula,62, so the European 
influence is, to some extent, unavoidable. 
 
It should be noticed that the Open Method of Co-ordination has been 
subject to heavy criticism in Europe, but when this formula was 
applied within Latin-America, it looked like a remarkable 
achievement. It is true that it could also be said that it is the European 
Union that is adopting a practice (OMC) that seems better suited for 
multilateral fora than for a supranational body. Nevertheless, from 
my point of view, the fact that the European Union is directly 
involved in the mutual learning process, considering its successful 
experience concerning the implementation of the solidarity principle, 
is good in itself. 
5. The Problems of the European Union to stick to 
its Civilian Power Paradigm 
The European Union is probably the international actor that has 
contributed the most to disseminate the human rights “culture”, and, 
consequently, to propel the idea of human rights as an essential 
component of a possible international Constitution. In this way, it is 
contributing to shape a “substantial” conception of such a 
Constitution. As underlined in the preliminary remarks, the 
European Union is in a perfect position to propel the good evolution 
of the international legal order, by contributing to the delineation of 
both the contours and the content of the slippery notion of ius cogens. 
However, this is not an easy task, and sometimes the European 
Union shows a rather hesitant face. In fact, we will see how, even 
within the realm of human rights protection, the European 
inconsistency emerges.63 
 
In fact, it might be that the European institutions are not fully aware 
of the extraordinary influential role that the European Union may 
play in this regard.64 At this point, mention can be made to the Court 
                                                 
62 For instance, within the Report issued in 2004 by the ILO World Commission on 
the social dimension of globalisation, the role of the Eureopean Union in promoting 
the social model is acknowledged 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf, paragraphs 313-334. 
63 “La cláusula democracia/derechos humanos como instrumento de 
condicionalidad en las relaciones exteriores de la CE” in: XIX Jornadas de la AEPDIRI 
(Madrid, BOE; Universidad de Cantabria; AEPDIRI, 2003), pp. 86-105. 
64 CFI, Judgments 21 September 2005, T-315/01 and T-306/01; Judgment 12 July 2006, 
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of First Instance (CFI) jurisprudence on the EU’s implementation of 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions imposing sanctions on 
individuals, who are held responsible for being associated with Bin 
Laden or Al Qaida. Although an in-depth examination of these 
judgments is beyond the scope of this contribution, I cannot avoid 
offering some general remarks about them. In this jurisprudence, it is 
recognised that international organisations are intrinsically bound to 
abide by ius cogens, according to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. Nevertheless, in spite of the relevance of the 
recognition of this “constitutive” submission to ius cogens, the CFI’s 
pronouncements are disappointing, for the Court develops a 
restrictive approach to human rights protection, opting for an 
interpretation of international law in which the interest in security 
prevails over the interest to protect the fundamental rights of the 
individuals adequately. The CFI does not acknowledge the 
unprecedented development of the international law on human 
rights that has taken place in Europe, a reference that might have 
driven it to examine the possible existence of a European (regional) 
ius cogens within this particular field. Instead, what we find is a 
recognition of the primacy of the United Nations Charter, and 
consequently of the Security Council resolutions, over EC law, 
according to the same parameters upon which the primacy of EC law 
over domestic law is articulated.65 The result is a rather simplistic 
construction, in which regard is not paid to the fact that the Court of 
First Instance, when it comes to the implementation of Security 
Council resolutions, is in the position that was occupied by the 
Constitutional Courts when the definition of the relationship between 
the national Constitutions and the European legal order came into 
play. Moreover, the European Court of First Instance does not take 
into account that it was precisely the Constitutional Court’s 
reluctance to accept the primacy of EC law with regard to the 
national constitutional rules enshrining human rights protection, that 
pushed the European Court to accept a gradual opening of the 
European legal order to the values enshrined in the national 
Constitutions, giving rise to a process in which the humanisation of 
EC law was propelled forward. No consideration is given by the CFI 
                                                                                                                   
T-253/02. On this jurisprudence, see I. Blázquez and C. Espósito, “Los límites al 
control judicial de las medidas de aplicación de la política exterior en los asuntos 
Ahmed Ali Yusuf/Al Barakaat International Foundation y Yassin Abdullah Kadi”, 
(2006) 17 Revista Española de Derecho Europeo, p. 123. 
65 See, for example, Judgment 21 September 2005, T-315/01, p. 224. 
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to the fact that, in contrast to the existence of a judicial mechanism 
within the European realm, there is not any institutional mechanism 
charged with the task of monitoring the “legality” of the Security 
Council’s action. My hope is that the European Court of Justice, 
which will have the last say,66 may still deliver a decision suitable to 
propel still forward, instead of reversing, the process of the 
humanisation of international law67. 
 
And, of course, talking about the incoherence which seriously hinders 
the implementation of the civilian power model, and, thus, 
undermines the EU’s legitimacy, some of the areas that have to be 
mentioned include trade as well as immigration and asylum. In both 
fields, it is easy to trace further evidence of the inconsistencies of the 
European Union; the list would be long – undoubtedly – but I cannot 
go into any of them in depth here. With regard to the immigration 
policy, it could be advisable, for the sake of consistency, for the 
European Union to stay focused on designing integration policies 
based upon the idea of cultural diversity.68 But what we are, instead, 
witnessing is how the European Union appears more focused on 
tightening border control (family re-union and asylum are clear 
examples69), The same European Union from which the 
neighbourhood policy comes out,70 is also developing a rather 
restrictive approach towards the admission of individuals.71 And, of 
                                                 
66 The cases have been brought before the ECJ in appeal: C-402/05; C-415/05 
67 After this chapter had been presented, the ECJ delivered, on 3 September 2008, a 
Judgment reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance: cases C-402/05 and 
415/05. 
68 I am grateful to Professor Armin von Bogdandy for sharing with me his 
knowledge about the European Union approach to cultural diversity as well as for 
drawing my attention to the relevant role that the EU is playing with regard to the re-
inforcement of cultural diversity as a principle within the international legal order. 
69 A. Cebada Romero, “The coherence of the European Union as an International 
actor: facing the challenge of Immigration and Asylum” 7/06 Jean Monnet Working 
Paper, available at:  http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/index.html. 
Nevertheless, the last proposal delivered by the European Commision at the end of 
October, 2007, on the “green card” for highly-skilled workers is a good sign. 
70 Roberto Aliboni,. “The geopolitical implications of the European neighbourhood 
policy”, (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review, p. 1; Raffaella Del Sarto and Tobias 
Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What’s a stake with the European Neighbourhood 
Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?”, (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs 
Review, p. 17. 
71 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), p. 236. They talk about the “exclusionary dimension of self-
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course, it is not easy to keep a balance between these two courses of 
action.72 
6. Concluding Remarks 
When it comes to the task of defining a model of external action, it 
would be essential for the European Union to maintain the civilian 
power paradigm. Should it be fully developed, the European Union 
would make a remarkable contribution to transnational justice. As 
already stated, the legitimacy for soft power depends on recognition, 
linked to reputation and authority, and this is something that may be 
only achieved by taking into account the interests of those whose 
recognition is needed. And, in the case of the European Union, 
recognition does not come exclusively from the constituent Member 
States, but also comes from its citizens and third countries. In this 
sense, there appear to be two options for the European Union: 
 
Either by continuing to strive to persuade the rest of the world that 
the civilian power paradigm is plausible and viable, by fully 
implementing it. Should the European Union take this course of 
action, it would find some relief for the shortcomings inherited from 
the Member States. 
 
Or by renouncing this paradigm, blurring its contours through 
continuous incoherence, and eventually switching to a more classic 
hegemonic paradigm. And, at this point, it might not be necessary to 
insist that, in my view, this would not be just “unsmart”, but also 
detrimental for the European Union itself as well as for international 
society and its legal order. 
                                                                                                                   
identity determination”. 
72 Sara Dillon, “Looking for the progressive empire: Where is the European Union’s 
Foreign Policy?”, (2004) 19 Connecticut Journal of International law, p. 275. 
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The last years have seen deep transatlantic rifts. But the presence of 
rifts should not deceive us into ignoring the great attraction that the 
United States has exerted, and continues to exert, on Europeans. 
There are deep ideational and historical bonds between Europeans 
and Americans; these are sustained and re-enforced through 
immigration and close contact, given direct social-institutional and 
even constitutional sustenance (consider America’s central role in 
Europe’s post-war reconstruction, and the transfer of the central 
features of its constitutional model to Germany). Ideational and 
emotional bonds are maintained by a wide range of direct 
transatlantic links. Europeans have not only been influenced by 
America, as a kind of external presence or force, but the American 
presence is also deeply embedded in the very way in which 
Europeans perceive themselves. To many Europeans, Americans are 
not “them”, but “us” – a fact which is re-enforced by the 
commonalities embedded in the notion of “the West”.1 
                                                 
1 “The idea of Europe during the greater part of the Twentieth century was 
subordinated to the notion of the West.” (G. Delanty, Inventing Europe – Idea, Identity, 
Reality, (London: MacMillan, 1995), p.115. 
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Europeans even set the U.S. up as a mirror of themselves: 
 
Observation of the American social experiment has always been 
a cause of reflection and self-interpretation concerning 
European identity.2 
 
European scholars have discussed the potentials and pitfalls of 
“American exceptionalism”,3 and have discussed what is more 
probable and preferable: the Americanisation of Europe or the 
Europeanisation of America.4 
 
Given this historical propensity for Europeans to discuss the U.S. as a 
possible model for Europe, it would only be logical that Europeans – 
now steeped in their greatest ever peaceful experiment in fashioning 
a continent-wide system of governance – were to look closely at how 
Americans first managed to establish a continent-wide system, and 
subsequently extend its influence to near-global proportions. 
 
How prominently, then, does the U.S. figure as a model for the 
European Union? The U.S. certainly serves as a key comparative 
reference for students of the EU.5 The U.S. may even be the most 
widely-cited state that people want the EU to emulate. Simply 
consider the frequent invocation of the notion of “United States of 
Europe”.6 Such pleas for emulation also appear quite unidirectional: 
                                                 
2 See C. Offe, Reflections on America – Tocqueville, Weber, and Adorno in the United 
States, (Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 2005), p. 4. 
3 See, especially, S.M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism – A double-edged Sword, (New 
York, Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), who describes the American creed in the 
following terms: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire. 
The religious dimension is also stressed: “Tocqueville noted, and contemporary 
survey data document quantitatively, that the United States has been the most 
religious country in Christendom.”(19) 
4 See C. Offe, note 2 supra. 
5 For a brief selection of contemporary sources, consider K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse, 
(eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the 
European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); G. Majone, Dilemmas of 
European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); see, also, contributions to “Altneuland: The 
Constitution of Europe in an American Perspective”, 28–30April 2004, at:  
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/conference_JMC_Princeton/index.html. 
6 The name United States of Europe is highly evocative: Jean Monnet, one of the 
founders of the EU, wrote: “Little by little the work of the Community will be felt ... 
Then the everyday realities themselves will make it possible to form the political 
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there are few on either side of the Atlantic that urge the U.S. to 
emulate the EU.7 Many of those that underline that there is a deep 
gap between the EU and the U.S. insist that the gap can best be 
bridged by the EU becoming similar to the U.S.8 
 
The European Union is often thought of as an experiment – both in 
governance and in polity terms. Europe, once the cradle of the 
Westphalian state system, is today held up as the place where the 
nation-state as an organisational form and mode of community is 
experiencing its greatest transformation.9 The EU re-ignites and gives 
added weight to the question of the normative viability and empirical 
salience of the Westphalian state system as the key which structures 
the legal-political meta-frame. This system has framed our thinking 
on political organisation and mode of community for centuries.10 
                                                                                                                   
union which is the goal of our Community and to establish the United States of 
Europe ... [T]he idea is clear: political Europe will be created by human effort, when 
the time comes, on the basis of reality...” Cited in M. Holland, “Jean Monnet and the 
federal functionalist approach to European Unity”, in: P. Murray and P. Rich (eds), 
Visions of European Unity, (Boulder CA: Westview Press, 1996), p. 97. 
7 The debate that Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, (2002) Policy Review, no. 113, 
idem, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, (New York: 
Knopf, 2003), sparked was set off precisely to underline the differences between the 
EU and the U.S. The many analysts that see the EU as a kind of international 
organisation (see A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, (London: Univesity College 
Press, 1998), and A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, (London: 
Routledge, 1992), transnational entity, and the non-state system of multilevel 
governance, explicitly or implicitly stress the differences between the EU and the U.S. 
Exceptions include J. Rifkin’s The European Dream, (Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 
2004), in which he argues that Americans should look to the EU for a better future, 
and Manners’ conception of “normative power Europe” (see I. Manners, “Normative 
European Power – A Contradiction in Terms?”, in (2002) 13 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, pp. 235-58, idem, “Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the 
crossroads”, (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 182-199) which is also, to 
some extent, a plea for others/the U.S. to emulate the EU. 
8 See R. Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, (2002) Policy Review, no 113, available at: 
www.policyreview.org/jun02/. 
9 Note that by transformation is meant the change into some other form of political 
entity, as distinct from the withering-away of distinctive political forms which some 
hyper-globalists claim is taking place. 
10 With the modern European nation-state emerged a vocabulary and a set of 
normative principles that greatly contributed to its sustenance and legitimacy (See M. 
Oakeshott, “The vocabulary of the modern European State”, (1975) 2 Political Studies, 
pp. 319-341, ibid., 4 Political Studies, pp. 409-415, and A. Linklater, The Transformation 
of Political Community, (Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 1998), p. 29) This vocabulary 
glossed over logical contradictions and ambiguities – terms such as nation “which 
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Through the core concepts, the normative principles and the 
attendant institutional-constitutional arrangements, this system has 
offered a ready-made set of interpretations, conceptions of 
appropriate organisational arrangements, and systems of meaning in 
order to make sense of, and structure, a complex and dynamic 
political reality. As the most powerful state today, the U.S. serves not 
only as the embodiment of the core traits of this meta-frame,11 but, 
through situational definitions and actions, it also sustains this 
frame.12 The issue is, therefore, whether the EU will conform to this 
frame, or whether the EU might become a – stable and normatively 
viable – alternative to it. 
 
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, I seek to uncover the 
normative assumptions that underpin the U.S. as an exemplar for the 
EU, as seen from a European perspective. This is not intended as an 
assessment of the U.S. What I am doing is to try to (re)construct a 
credible European viewpoint. For the reconstruction to be considered 
credible, it must be rooted in a coherently articulated European 
viewpoint, or, barring that, a European? discourse. With the 
complexity of Europe in mind, it must be conceded that it is not likely 
to offer anything that remotely resembles a complete representation 
of the European position(s). 
 
The reconstruction avails itself of constitutive frames.13 Key to this is 
the notion of polity model, which refers to how a set of principles is 
reflected in a given institutional-constitutional form. It seeks to offer a 
guide to how normative principles have been imagined to inform 
                                                                                                                   
purport to disclose conditions of association but which specify no mode of 
association”. (See Oakeshott, note 10 supra, at 338). 
11 This goes beyond the debate on American exceptionalism. S.M. Lipset, note 3 supra, 
one of the foremost proponents of American exceptionalism, speaks of the distinctive 
traits of the U.S. as a state. His argument does not touch upon the state at the level of 
an organising meta-frame. 
12 Consider how the U.S. frames its onslaught on terror in statist terms: as a war on 
terror; terror as propounded by states (the axis of evil); and as upheld by state-based 
regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
13 See E. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1974) initially developed the notion of 
frame analysis, which spurned a comprehensive body of literature. I here draw 
foremost from M. Rein and D. Schön, “Reframing Policy Discourse”, in: F. Fisher and 
J. Forrester (eds), The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis, (Durham NC: Duke 
University Press, 1993), pp. 145-66. 
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institutional and political reality within a given political setting. It 
consists of four elements: constitutive principles; core values; a set of 
institutional arrangements; and a view on their capability or ability to 
persist over time. Europeans should, accordingly, find the U.S. an 
attractive polity model.14 My starting assumption is that Europeans 
have, historically speaking, come to associate the U.S. with a set of 
important normative principles (such as individual autonomy), with 
a set of basic values (such as democracy), with a set of attractive 
institutional-constitutional features, and with successful performance 
(relevant factors could be economic efficiency, affluence, politico-
military global presence, etc.). 
 
Second, I briefly consider whether the traits that Europeans find 
attractive about the U.S. as a polity model have much real bearing on 
the EU, not in terms of how Europeans would want the EU to be, but 
in terms of how the EU presently is. The aim is to obtain a sense of 
the empirical distance that Europeans would have to travel if they 
were to transpose what they find attractive about the U.S. to the EU. 
Are the features which Europeans hold to be attractive about the U.S. 
also available in Europe? Or do they make it clear how different the 
two entities actually are? To clarify this, I consider how the EU fits in 
with the dimensions that were singled out for the U.S. I also discuss 
whether the traits that characterise the EU sum up to anything 
resembling a coherent EU polity model. 
 
These two undertakings set the stage for the third, and most original, 
endeavour, which is to consider whether there are entities that are 
more compatible with what we currently find in Europe. The case 
that I have singled out is another American state, namely, Canada. A 
clarification and critical assessment of what I refer to here as 
“Europe’s American Dream” is intended to serve as a kind of mirror 
for Europeans to clarify whether the European project is (a) one of 
emulating the U.S.; (b) a unique experiment; or (c) an EU that is closer 
to Canada than to the U.S.? If the reality of Canada is more proximate 
to the reality of the EU, should, then, Canada serve as “Europe’s 
American Dream”, instead? 
 
 
                                                 




2. The “Dream” 
The U.S. played a central role in the forging of the EU. It has also 
offloaded the EU through the security guarantee within the NATO 
framework. European policy-making has also drawn heavily on the 
U.S.15 Thus, there are important empirical grounds for students of the 
EU to direct their attention to the U.S. This is, if anything, amplified 
by the dominant role American scholars played in analysing, and 
thus also affecting, European integration.16 All these and numerous 
other factors relate to what amounts to a particularly strong 
contemporary European exposure to, familiarity with, and influence 
by America and Americans – in standards, in ideas and in 
experiences. 
 
Nevertheless, despite this strong exposure, it is not indisputable that 
Europeans should draw on the U.S. as the model for the EU’s own 
development. The EU, after all, has its roots in an international 
organisation and is formed on top of states, each of which has sought 
to emulate the U.S. in one way or the other, while, in contrast, the EU 
itself does not share many institutional or other traits with the U.S.17 
The EU is neither a state, nor is it a nation; hence, any “natural” 
propensity on the part of Europeans to draw on the U.S. needs 
further explanation. 
 
I have singled out three features of the U.S. that I believe to appeal to 
Europeans. These mutually appear to re-enforce one another to form 
a coherent polity model: 
 
 
                                                 
15 During the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, the U.S. became a model for Europeans 
bent on down-sizing the state, through New Public Management and numerous 
other reforms which also fed into the European integration process (consider for 
instance the Single European Act (SEA), 1986). 
16 Consider the central role of the founding generation of Europeanists such as Ernst 
Haas, Karl Deutsch, Stanley Hoffmann, Leon Lindberg, and, last, but not least, Eric 
Stein, who invited Europeans to the U.S. and trained them in European law. More 
recent scholars include Andrew Moravcsik, Alberta Sbragia and Jeff Checkel – 
together with “Americanised Europeans” or Europeans with legs in both the 
American and the European scholarly community, such as Phillippe Schmitter and 
Joseph Weiler. 
17 This is certainly the case in macroscopic terms; but varies at the level of specific 
institutions and policy options. Majone, for instance (1996), shows the relevance of 
the so-called American-style regulation also for the EU. 
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2.1. A New Beginning: The U.S as Polity Model 
2.1.1. Brief Description of the Phenomenon 
The U.S. as an independent state was born through revolution. This 
was a revolution in a political, as well as in a constitutional, sense. 
The revolutionary beginning of the U.S. has left an indelible mark on 
it.18 Politically, through the revolution, it sought to free itself from 
oppressive British rule and colonialism. The founding of the U.S. thus 
entailed the act of severing the link to its European origin: to be free 
and independent, Americans had to rid themselves of the shackles of 
their oppressive European past. This was done through two steps: 
emigration and the Declaration of Independence – and revolutionary 
war. This revolutionary beginning has become an intrinsic part of the 
U.S. founding rationale. The American Revolution was justified by 
universal principles – and many of those very same normative ideals 
subsequently came to inform the French Revolution. 
 
The American Revolution also heralded in a new revolutionary 
constitutional tradition.19 The constitution founded a new political 
order, and thus instituted a rupture or a break with the past. 
 
With this, constitution becomes an exclusive concept: it is 
striking that certain forms of order are now no longer labeled as 
faulty or wrong constitutions; rather, their claim to be 
constitutions at all is denied.20 
 
The American constitution thus helped to establish a set of 
benchmarks for what counts as a constitution in the first place. The 
critical component here was not its formal and written character; 
                                                 
18 See S.M. Lipset, The First New Nation, (New York: Norton & Company, Inc., 1979), 
idem, Continental Divide – The Values and Institutions of the United States and 
Canada, (New York: Routledge, 1990), idem, American Exceptionalism – A double-
edged Sword, (New York: Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), and A. Stephanson, 
Manifest Destiny, American Expansion and the Empire of Right, (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1995). 
19 See B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, (Cambridge MA: The Bellknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1991), C. Möllers, “The Politics of Law and the Law of 
Politics: Two Constitutional Traditions in Europe”, in: E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and 
A.J. Menéndez (eds), Developing a Constitution for Europe, (London: Routledge, 2004), 
pp. 129-139, and H. Brunkhorst, “A Policy without a State? European 
Constitutionalism between Evolution and Revolution”, in: ibid., pp. 88-105. 
20 See C. Möllers, note 19 supra, p. 130. 
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instead, what was critical was the focus on individual freedom, which 
underpinned its democratic character. 
 
The new political system was equipped with an institutional 
structure that entrenched democracy and thus differed from its 
contemporaries. America re-invented federalism, in such a way as to 
turn statism on its head. Whereas Bodinian statism pre-supposed “a 
single sovereign in a highly centralized state striving for homogeneity 
and self-sufficiency … American federalism, by contrast vested 
sovereignty in the people to prevent the development of a 
centralized, reified state by making all governments no more than 
governments of delegated powers whose scope the people could 
define and change as they pleased through a constitutional system”.21 
This political system permitted the forging of a new nation: one based 
upon the embracing of democratic egalitarianism, achievement, and 
the explicit abolition of European status hierarchies.22 Over time, 
what was forged was a new kind of, and sense of, community: the 
inclusive nation, or the “melting-pot”. 
2.1.2. Justification for why Europeans would see this as 
Relevant to the EU 
The revolutionary democratic beginning of the U.S. attracts 
Europeans. The American Revolution was not only seen as a rejection 
of the oppressive and destructive aspects of the European past, the 
commitment to democracy also promised to herald in a new and 
unique opportunity. Tocqueville’s project was to draw lessons for 
Europe from the American idea of, and experience with, democratic 
equality. His aim was precisely to probe the notion of the U.S. as a 
democratic polity model: 
 
I admit that I saw in America more than America; it was the 
shape of democracy itself which I sought, its inclinations, 
character, prejudices and passions…23 
                                                 
21 See D.J. Elazar, “The United States and the European Union: Models for their 
Epochs”, in: K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and 
Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 31-53 
22 S.M. Lipset, (1979) note 18 supra, labels the U.S. as the first new nation, because it 
was the first colony that successfully revolted against colonial rule. 
23 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 Vols, (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1969), p 19. 
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The European integration process entices Europeans to invoke the 
same spirit of breaking with the shackles of their European past, 
which is one of aggressive nationalism in a Europe divided into 
distinctive national entities. There are some clear parallels here 
between Europe and the U.S. that feed this attractiveness. First, the 
forgers of the EU could argue that it represented a rejection of 
Europe’s war-prone past, a past which was extremely destructive, 
oppressive and divisive, precisely because Europe’s past was based 
upon national sovereignty and not federalism.24 Second, they could 
use the EU to embark on a new future of all-European democracy. 
Third, they could join the Americans in justifying their actions in 
those very same universal values that had been used to justify the 
American (and French) Revolutions.25 For these and other reasons, 
the initial movers and shakers of European integration sought to 
replicate American federalism in Europe through a United States of 
Europe, a European federation following the American model.26 
 
Many saw the recent process of constitution-making in Europe as a 
new chance to re-launch the EU on a course more similar to that of 
the U.S. The very use of the term Convention evoked images of the 
Philadelphia Convention, and explicit parallels were drawn between 
the two, even by the Convention Chair, Valery Giscard d’Estaing.27 
 
From a polity model perspective, the U.S. was a pioneer, in that it 
appealed to universal principles and was the first to entrench such 
principles in explicit constitutional form. There is thus a great 
attraction in linking up to this aspect of the American experience. 
Given the strong normative-conceptual status of the American 
constitution, that is, as a benchmark for what counts as a democratic 
constitution, evoking this standard can lend great credence and 
legitimacy to the European undertaking. 
                                                 
24 Consider Ernesto Rossi and Altieri Spinelli “The Ventotene Manifesto”, August 
1941; Jean Monnet, “Algiers Memorandum”, August 1943. Collected in: T. Salmon 
and W. Nicoll, Building European Union – A documentary history and analysis, 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1997). 
25 The Laeken Declaration explicitly addresses these three dimensions. 
26 See D.J. Elazar, note 21 supra, p. 36. As early as in 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi, in his 
“Pan-Europe”, said that: “The crowning act of pan-European efforts would be the 
constitution of the United States of Europe on the model of the United States of 
America.”(cited in Salmon and Nicoll, note 24 supra, p. 9). 
27 In the context of the European Convention, its chair, Valery Giscard d’Estaing even 
proposed the United States of Europe as one possible name for the new entity. 
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As is even acknowledged by sceptics, there appears to be a kind of 
inevitability here, which can be summed up as follows: in a modern 
democratic context, once you embark on the constitutional exercise, 
to establish a formal, democratic constitution, you are almost 
compelled by nature to go down the American path. Is there really a 
viable alternative or alternative way to go than precisely that of the 
U.S.? 
2.2. The “City on the Hill” 
2.2.1. Description of the Phenomenon: 
This notion relates to the American propensity – from the very outset 
– to portray itself as exceptional from a moral point of view. There are 
two dimensions to American exceptionalism, which are particularly 
relevant here. The first is the puritan roots which go back especially 
to English Protestantism; he puritans who went to America broke 
with English Protestantism because they found it to be deficient – 
infected by Catholicism. To them, America offered the prospect of a 
new beginning.28 It was the special responsibility that accompanied 
this that John Winthrop expressed in his famous sermon, the Arbella 
Covenant (1630), in which he said that “[...] for we must consider that 
we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us 
[...]”.29 This was later interpreted as instantiating the notion of 
Manifest Destiny. The U.S. was to carry on God’s mission and set a 
shining example for the rest of the world. This puritan theme has 
resonated throughout American history.30 
 
Second, American exceptionalism represents a particular fusion 
between Puritanism and Nationalism (which is such a central concept 
to Europe).31 
                                                 
28 See A. Stephanson, note 18 supra. 
29 http://www.csustan.edu/english/reuben/pal/append/axt.html. 
30 “Of course, it was Ronald Reagan who perhaps most often and most dramatically 
cited Winthrop in his political career. Throughout his campaigns and his presidency, 
Reagan loved to talk about ‘the shining city on the hill’.” In his farewell address to 
the nation at the 1992 Republican Convention, Reagan said, “The phrase comes from 
John Winthrop, who wrote it to describe the America he imagined…In my mind, it 
was a tall, proud city, built on rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-
blessed…That’s how I saw it, and see it still.” Paul S. Sawyer, “The City on the Hill”, 
8 August 2004, http://www.firstparish.org/sermons/2004-08-08.html. 
31 “The Puritan break would then eventually serve to invest American nationality 
with a ‘symbology’ of exceptionalism or separateness that has survived remarkably 
intact.” (Stephanson, note 18 supra, p. 4). 
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Visions of the United States as a sacred space providentially 
selected for divine purposes found a counterpart in the secular 
idea of the new nation of liberty as a privileged ‘stage’ … for 
the exhibition of a new world order, a great ‘experiment’ for the 
benefit of humankind as a whole.32 
 
Richard Hofstadter has noted that: “It has been our fate as a nation 
not to have ideologies, but to be one.”33 Lipset also refers to Abraham 
Lincoln, who spoke of his country’s political religion. In that sense, to 
become an American is “a religious, that is, ideological act”.34 
 
Americans have come to see themselves as chosen for greater tasks, 
not only domestically, but also internationally – to propound the 
central principles of their political system to the rest of the world, in 
the service of God. To many Americans, the image of the US as “The 
City on the Hill” was one that should also inform U.S. foreign policy 
and the role of the U.S. throughout the world. The U.S. had a special 
obligation to ensure democracy and human rights worldwide. This is 
the hallmark of the Wilsonian school of American foreign policy.35 
But even Wilson’s civilisational project had a strong religious tenor, 
as, for him, Christianity was a vital component of civilisation. 
2.2.2. Justification for why Europeans would see this as 
Relevant to the EU 
For integration-friendly Europeans, to inject a spirit similar to the 
U.S. notion of the “City on the Hill” and Manifest Destiny into the 
European Union, would rectify one of the European Union’s main 
deficiencies, its lack of a clear telos.36 A European Union imbued with 
a sense of Manifest Destiny would lend a sense of inspiration and 
direction, as well as a deeper justification for the entire integration 
project. It could, then, also help to restore the centuries-old image of 
                                                 
32 See A. Stephanson, note 18 supra, p. 5. 
33 Cited in Lipset, note 3 supra, p. 18. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See W.R. Mead, Special Providence – American Foreign Policy and How it 
Changed the World, (London: Routledge, 2002) 
36 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the new clothes have an Emperor?” 
and other essays on European Integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), and, idem, “Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg”, in: K. 
Nicolaidis and R. Howse, (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance 
in the United States and the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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Europe as the centre of the world. and as its source of modern 
civilisation.37 Such a vision of Europe’s past was apparent in the 
preamble of the defunct Constitutional Treaty which stated that: 
 
DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and 
humanist inheritance of Europe, have developed the universal 
values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human 
person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law[…] 
[original capitals] 
 
If we take the notion that these values emerged in Europe literally, 
then the U.S. notion of Manifest Destiny represents an appropriation 
of these values by the U.S. to serve its own aims (a notion that would 
be greatly amplified through American unilateralism). Only by 
instilling a similar sense of purpose would Europe then be able to 
regain possession of its rightful moral leadership. Thus, there are 
reasons pertaining to both the European Union’s internal and 
external dimension that could entice Europeans to Manifest Destiny. 
The internal dimension addresses a common purpose and 
justification for the still highly-contested integration project; the 
external dimension addresses Europe’s restoration of its centuries-
long and – it is widely held, “rightful” role as the centre of the 
world.38 But in order to do so, it would also require the necessary 
means; those that the U.S. might possess. Emulating the U.S., in this 
respect, constitutes the third part of the “European Dream”. 
2.3. The “Words of Power” 
2.3.1. Description of the Phenomenon 
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. ascended to the role of the 
sole global superpower. “The United States possesses unprecedented 
– unequalled – strength and influence in the world…”39 At the turn of 
                                                 
37 Europe as the cradle of civilisation, (see G. Delanty, Inventing Europe – Idea, Identity, 
Reality, (London: MacMillan, 1995). 
38 The Laeken Declaration asks: “Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a 
leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a 
stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and 
peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of 
Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, 
solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others’ languages, cultures 
and traditions. The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human 
rights.” 
39 The Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy cited in: I.H. Daalder, 
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the millennium, it was deemed to be so powerful that former French 
foreign minister Hubert Védrine no longer found the notion of 
superpower adequate; hence, he coined a new term: hyperpower.40 
Other analysts also considered U.S. power “systemic” in the sense 
that the U.S., while formally a state, would no longer – like any other 
state – be reined in by the constraints built into the system of states, 
or international institutions for that matter (hence, the frequent 
references to empire and hegemony). 
 
The peculiarity of the United States is that, because of its global 
presence and power, it is able to demand a kind of external 
sovereignty and monopoly of decision-making, which, in cases 
of conflict, are not seriously hampered by the restrictions of 
supranational regulations and factual constraints that apply to 
all other states.41 
 
According to the Reagan and Bush administrations (I and II), its 
might and democratic conviction enabled it to stand up to, and 
eventually win, the global value-battle against Soviet Communism 
(Reagan’s Evil Empire). Its power has given it a degree of freedom to 
act that is quite unprecedented. This freedom, it is claimed, has been 
used in the global fight against evil (and now also terrorism), a fight 
wherein the U.S. actively propounds its values, culture, and sense of 
community. 
2.3.2. Justification for why Europeans would see this as 
Relevant to the EU 
The obvious attraction is inherent to the unique ability that the U.S. 
has acquired to pursue its values and convictions over and beyond 
international, institutional and state systemic constraints. The 
attraction is two-faceted: the first is for the EU to equip itself with the 
necessary tools to fulfil Europe’s destiny in the world, in a way 
similar to that of the U.S. Power, then, serves to ensure that Europe is 
able to operate as another “City on the Hill”. It should be note that this 
has a significant restorative dimension: to recover Europe’s previous 
role as the centre of the world. Here, there is, of course, also an 
                                                                                                                   
“The End of Atlanticism”, in: T. Lindberg (ed), Beyond Paradise and Power, (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 44. 
40 See P. Boniface, “Reflections on America as a World Power: A European View”, in: 
(2000) 29 Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 5-15. 
41 C. Offe, note 2 supra, p. 98. 
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explicit “realist” side, in the sense that it presumes that ideas do not 
succeed unless they are backed by power: it evokes the all-too-
familiar notion that, only through might, can we be sure that we will 
be able to pursue our convictions and fulfil our objectives. 
 
When stripped of its idealist overtones, the second facet is for Europe 
to match U.S. hegemony and power.42 This can be given a co-
operative and a competitive twist. On the former, Tony Blair noted 
that: 
 
[A] single-power world is inherently unstable. I mean, that’s the 
rationale for Europe to unite. When we work together, the 
European Union can stand on par as a superpower and a 
partner with the U.S.43 
 
On the latter, the U.S. can also be seen as representing both a 
potential threat and an obstacle to European ambitions. The previous 
U.S. administration (George W. Bush II) sees military might as an 
intrinsic part of Manifest Destiny. Many Europeans have argued that 
this sets the U.S. on a dangerous course, with the implication that the 
EU should amass strength in order to thwart such U.S. ambitions. 
2.4.  A Coherent Model? 
Do these factors sum up to a coherent polity model which Europeans 
can emulate? This would appear to be so: the U.S.’s revolutionary 
beginning was founded upon a commitment to human rights, which 
helped to equip the ensuing American nationalism with a universal 
orientation. This became wedded with a communal sense of purpose 
or even telos through the notion of Manifest Destiny. The eventual U.S. 
status as a so-called hyperpower has equipped it with the military, 
political and even economic means of power to propound its values – 
without having to tie itself down to multilateral or other restrictions. 
                                                 
42 For references to the US as a hegemon, see R. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic 
Stability and Change in International Economic Regimes”, in: O. Holsti, R.M. 
Siverson and A. George (eds), Change in the International System, (Boulder CA: 
Westview Press, 1980); R, Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), idem, The Political Economy of International 
Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). A major US consideration 
that also motivated the second George W. Bush administration was to avoid imperial 
decline. 
43 T.R. Reid, The United States of Europe, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 4. 
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These factors address an apparent mutually re-enforcing combination 
of motivation, moral justification, and physical ability to perform the 
tasks. 
 
But, when considered more closely, we shall see that these elements 
are not as mutually re-enforcing as they might appear. Furthermore, 
the reality of the EU is quite far from any one of them. 
 
First, the core principles that inform the U.S. revolutionary 
constitution are universal. One core normative issue is whether these 
principles can be properly entrenched in the state form. Another, is 
how they sit with nationalism. Furthermore, U.S. power is sustained 
by the U.S. state (some label it as a warrior state: see Smith 2004), 
whose raison d’être is as much that of self-preservation and autonomy, 
as human rights and democracy. America’s domestic, and, even more 
so, international, pursuit of the universal constitutional principles is 
affected by an American national identity with a distinctly religious – 
Christian – tenor, which infringes upon all aspects of their universal 
orientation. 
 
Second, Manifest Destiny, understood as a particular fusion of religion 
and nationalism, is not merely a cultural and ideational phenomenon; 
it has also become deeply institutionalised. Oddly enough, this has a 
constitutional basis, entrenched, as it has become, in the very 
separation of state and church. In some contrast to Europe, the 
separation of state and church in the U.S. was understood to protect 
religion from state power. This has been re-enforced by another feature 
of the U.S. Constitution: it protects individuals against the state, but 
offers limited protection from the damage inflicted on individuals by 
other societal actors, hence, placing obstacles in the way of public social 
protection. Claus Offe has noted that: 
 
The suspicion of any social service provided by the state is 
nourished by the constitutional order and is constantly 
renewed in its virulence; and it means that, from the beginning 
and still today, political elites have felt obliged to represent the 
identity of the American nation as a community of free 
communities in ‘God’s own country’, by means of official 
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symbols (‘God bless America’, ‘In God we trust’, ‘City on the 
Hill’) and gestures of deference towards the religious life[…]44 
 
America’s institutional-constitutional structure helps to sustain the 
religious dimension; it also contributes to crowd out alternative, 
entirely secular, sources of allegiance. By virtually prohibiting the 
development of an American welfare state, which could serve as a 
source of social solidarity, it renders policy stances highly susceptible 
to the influence of organised religion.45 
 
Third, if U.S. power is to serve as a viable instrument for 
propounding core constitutional principles, there has to be a coherent 
line in U.S. foreign policy. Instead of one coherent line, Mead notes 
that U.S. foreign policy has been marked by a centuries-old struggle 
among four different schools, labelled as Madisonians, Jeffersonians, 
Wilsonians and Jacksonians.46 A somewhat different reading of the 
past would claim that the cyclical changes between the deep 
international engagement and isolationism that run through the 
centuries of American foreign policy still resonate with the notion of 
Manifest Destiny, as they reflect a tension between a dominant 
impulse to serve as “an exemplary state separate from the corrupt and 
fallen world... [and a countervailing desire] to push the world along 
by means of regenerative intervention”.47 This latter position would 
address a closer relationship between the two latter attractions 
(Manifest Destiny and World Power), but without any obvious 
connection to the basic principles informing the first, constitutional, 
one. The use of power, then, easily ends up by becoming simply a 
self-serving act. 
 
The different attractions reside in different conceptions of polity 
model. There is greater tension than what might initially have been 
expected between the kind of polity model that we can discern from 
                                                 
44 C. Offe, note 2 supra, p. 36. 
45 Fred Block (2007) points out how the development of tight links between the 
American business community and the Religious Right began in the 1970s, an 
alliance which the religious groups came to dominate in the 1990s. The growing 
importance of the Religious Right was an important instigator of the Bush 
Administration’s foreign policy of unilateralism. 
46 See W.R. Mead, note 35 supra. 
47 See A. Stephanson, note 18 supra, p. xii. 
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the core American principles on the one hand, and how the U.S. 
operates on the other. 
3. The European Union 
3.1. Constitution-making European Style 
The European Union is based upon many of the same universal 
principles that inform the model conception of the democratic 
constitutional state, as well as the actual U.S. Constitution.48 But the 
European constitutional situation is very different from that of the 
U.S. Some would argue that the main difference is that the U.S. has a 
constitution, whereas the EU does not. But this is only partly true, as 
the EU has a constitutional arrangement, which predates the Laeken 
and Lisbon reform failures. It does not qualify as a formal, but rather 
as a material, constitution,49 and it lacks explicit democratic sanction. 
Thus, it does not qualify as a democratic constitution on a par with the 
U.S. Constitution. This does not preclude the European Union’s 
constitutional arrangement from acquiring democratic sanction at a 
future point in time. The EU has been involved in constitution-
making for decades already, and this is a process that is distinctly 
different from U.S. constitution-making. The forging of the EU’s 
material constitutional construct has taken place in a setting of already 
constitutionalised entities. This process, to be legitimate, had to relate to 
the already justified norms that were embedded in the national 
constitutional orders. The European process could not replicate the 
revolutionary impetus of its American counterpart; nor could it 
obtain the same democratic dignity. Thus, its greatest constitutional 
dignity would come not from its novelty, but from the extent to 
which it would succeed in forging a viable synthesis of the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.50 Despite the 
difference in process, then, if this thrust can be sustained, it will 
                                                 
48 Article 6 TEU asserts that: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States.” 
49 For this notion, see A.J. Ménendez, “Three Conceptions of the European 
Constitution”, in: E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and A.J. Ménendez, (eds), Developing a 
Constitution for Europe, (London: Routledge, 2004). 
50 See J.E. Fossum and A.J. Ménendez, “The Constitution’s Gift? A Deliberative 
Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union”, (2005) 11 
European Law Journal, pp. 380-410, and A.J. Ménendez, “Is European Union law a 
pluralist legal order?”, in: J.E. Fossum and A.J. Ménendez, (eds), The Post-Sovereign 
Constellation, ARENA Report, No 4/08. 
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channel European constitution-making in a state-based constitutional 
direction. But how far this will be able to go is not easy to tell, 
because of other distinct features of EU constitution-making, the most 
notable among which is the presence of multiple constitutional publics. 
This is directly reflected in the formal procedure for treaty change, 
which is conducted by the heads of state and government, in which 
each Member State enjoys a veto. The European process thus cannot 
be reduced to the image of the constitutional moment in which the 
will of a pre-constituted people is enshrined into the law in one single 
stroke. 
 
The diversity of the European constitutional setting requires an 
alternative conception of constitution-making. Precisely because 
every effort to forge a formal democratic constitution for Europe will 
have to run up against the risk of twenty-seven national vetos, the 
threshold for striking a constitutional accord is very high. One 
possibility is to think of European constitution-making not foremost 
as a process that ends up in a contractual arrangement that is 
established or given at a particular point in time, but rather as an 
ongoing process.51 This could also have implications for the very 
conception of the constitution. It would neither be a mere contractual 
arrangement nor a founding pact between the citizens, but a set of 
procedures and rights that could accommodate an ongoing process of 
discursive validation of the structure in place. Reflexive constitution-
making might be an apt term to call this.52 
 
The end result is that the European constitution-making experience 
has so many distinctive traits that set it apart from the American one 
that our effort is best expended on clarifying the distinctive character 
of the European exercise, or through looking for more appropriate 
contemporary examples. 
3.2.  Not the City for Europe 
Europeans picked up on the American notion of City on the Hill and 
Manifest Destiny early on, but, even then, far from all endorsed it 
                                                 
51 See. S. Chambers, “Contract or Conversation. Theoretical Lessons from the 
Canadian Constitutional Crisis”, in (1998) 26 Politics and Society, pp. 143-72. 
52 See J. Bowman, “Constitution Making and Democratic Innovation: The European 
Union and Transnational Governance”, in: (2004) 29 European Journal of Political 
Theory, pp. 315-337. 
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totally or perhaps even partially.53 Today, many Europeans are more 
likely to see the City on the Hill and Manifest Destiny as justifications 
for American expansionism and aggrandisement than as vehicles to 
foster democracy and liberty. 
 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that part of the European integration 
process is a search for a normative telos. But this search takes place in 
a setting of deeply entrenched, national communities, which has 
largely prevented the quest for a unifying telos from espousing and 
entrenching a distinctive European community identity. This has not 
prevented efforts from being made to entrench a thicker sense of 
community, even with a religious imprint. During the Laeken 
constitutional process, for instance, the Pope, the Member States, 
political parties and other organisations sought to insert a Christian 
reference into the Constitutional Treaty. Their efforts were 
successfully rejected by a strong secularist front, with France in the 
lead. This has served to clarify that the European Union is a secular 
organisation, and one that cannot draw upon religious imagery in its 
search for a common purpose. 
 
The European Union is officially justified with reference to (a) general 
principles such as democracy, human rights and respect for the rule 
of law, and (b) respect for difference and diversity. The projected 
mode of allegiance that we can discern from the Treaties is not only 
thinner than nationalism, it is also often presented as an explicit 
rejection of nationalism. 
 
The American approach to the fostering of community could draw on 
the City on the Hill image in order to justify the so-called melting-pot 
model. Europeans recognised, from the EU’s very beginnings, the 
problems in transposing the U.S. notion of the melting-pot to Europe: 
they rejected both its assimilationist assumptions and its foundation 
in nationalism. Indeed, some analysts have referred to the Union as 
                                                 
53 Alexis de Tocqueville, for one, warned of the dangers of American exceptionalism 
when, in 1833, he wrote that, “It has been constantly repeated to the inhabitants of 
the United States that they form the only religious, enlightened, and free people. 
They see that up to now, democratic institutions have prospered among them; they 
therefore have an immense opinion of themselves, and they are not far from 




being based upon constitutional tolerance; others have highlighted 
the EU as a Union of Deep Diversity.54 
 
Many Europeans have also been deeply critical of the manner in 
which the previous U.S./George W. Bush administration pursued 
democracy and American values abroad. Thus, the U.S. appears not 
as a cosmopolitan guarantor of democracy and human rights, but as a 
national defender of sovereignty – in classical Westphalian fashion 
(albeit a nation-state that is not prepared to respect the sovereignty of 
other states). 
 
In summary, the American notion of the City on the Hill (and Manifest 
Destiny) is not the bridge to the future that Europeans have yearned 
for. Indeed, its nationalist and religious orientation might, instead, 
serve to remind Europeans of what they have sought to leave behind. 
3.3. The “Power of Words” 
The European Union has very limited recourse to military power. 
Military and security matters are still decided by the Member States 
and/or under the aegis of NATO. Nevertheless, the EU’s external 
presence has increased in the last decades, as the EU has taken on an 
increasingly important role in conflict prevention, including the 
establishment of a new European Defence Agency and Battle 
Groups.55 With this have come renewed efforts to define, explain and 
justify the EU’s role in the world. 
 
The prevailing image of the EU has been one of a Civilian Power 
Union,56 which was long on economic power, and short on military 
                                                 
54 As Joseph Weiler notes with regard to the EU: “the Union … is to remain a union 
among distinct peoples, distinct political identities, distinct political communities… 
The call to bond with those very others in an ever closer union demands an 
internalisation – individual and societal – of a very high degree of tolerance.”(J.H.H. 
Weiler, “Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg”, in: K. 
Nicolaidis and R. Howse, (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance 
in the United States and the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 
68) For the notion of the EU as a Union of Deep Diversity, see J.E. Fossum, “The 
European Union – In search of an Identity”, (2003) 2 European Journal of Political 
Theory, pp. 319-340. 
55 On the European Defence Agency, see: http://www.eda.europa.eu/ On the 
European Battle Groups, see: http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-
battlegroups-archived/article-150151.4 
56 See F Duchêne, “Europe’s role in world peace”, in: R. Mayne (ed), Europe 
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power, it relied on diplomacy in the handling of international 
conflicts and problems, and was willing to submit to legally-binding 
supranational institutions. Ian Manners, in his recent work, has 
labelled the EU a normative power:  
 
[T]he central component of normative power in Europe is that it 
exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that 
this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative 
way.57 
 
To Manners, this normative propensity stems from the particular 
historical context within which it was forged, which highlighted the 
need to entrench peace and move beyond aggressive nationalism, its 
hybrid, less bounded and more permeable post-Westphalian form, 
and its legal constitution, which highlights human rights. The 
presumption is that the EU, as an organisation, is set up so as to be 
able to change the international system. Furthermore, this implies 
that it actually also acts to change this system, and, finally, that it 
should act in this manner. 
 
The notion of European normative power is contested. However, 
whatever designation is chosen, it is quite clear that the EU places far 
more onus on legally-binding international co-operation than the U.S. 
does (certainly the previous U.S. George W. Bush administration) 
did. This, combined with its very limited military capacity, makes the 
European Union rely on “the power of words”, and not the words of 
power in its external dealings. 
 
To sum up thus far, the EU is a case not of new revolutionary 
beginnings, but of polity formation within a setting of established 
democracies. The challenge facing the European Union is to establish 
a type of polity that is able to resolve the problems and challenges 
that each state is not able to do on its own; based in a set of 
institutions that are in compliance with established normative 
principles, that foster both a sense of solidarity and a sense of 
belonging that is strong enough to sustain the entity, and is 
                                                                                                                   
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972), pp. 32-47, 
and idem, “The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence”, in: 
M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems 
Before the Community, (London: MacMillan, 1973), pp. 1-21. 
57 See I. Manners, note 7 supra. 
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simultaneously not so strong as to raise doubts about the entity’s 
respect for all relevant forms of difference and diversity. The U.S. has 
faced some of these challenges, but did so in a different period, at a 
time when the state system was still deeply entrenched. The 
European Union is trying to grapple with these challenges at a point 
in time when the Westphalian state system is undergoing profound 
changes. 
4. Canada – Closer to Europeans’ American 
Dream? 
4.1. From Counter-revolution to Charter Revolution 
Analysts have long spoken of the important difference in the 
American and Canadian formative moments: 
 
Americans do not know but Canadians cannot forget that two 
nations, not one, came out of the American Revolution… One 
celebrates the overthrow of an oppressive state, the triumph of 
the people, a successful effort to create a type of government 
never seen before. The other commemorates a defeat and a long 
struggle to preserve a historical source of legitimacy: 
government’s deriving its title-to-rule from a monarchy linked 
to church establishment.58 
 
But Canada’s formal patriation of the Constitution from the UK in 
1982 – notably the Charter of Rights and Freedoms – has brought 
Canada’s constitution closer to its American counterpart. This act of 
patriation represented the first explicit effort on the part of the 
Canadians to found themselves as a people.59 Since then, 
“…Canadians have experienced a Charter revolution. The Charter 
has given birth to a vigorous rights-oriented discourse and a dramatic 
increase in the propensity to litigate”.60 
 
                                                 
58 See S.M. Lipset, (1990) note 18 supra, p. 1. 
59 See P.H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians become a Sovereign People?, 
2nd edition, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 
60 See A.C. Cairns, “The Canadian experience of a Charter of Rights”, in: E.O. 
Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and A.J. Menéndez (eds), The Chartering of Europe: The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), 
pp. 93-111, at 105, and, for the notion of “Charter Revolution”, see, also, F.L. Morton 
and R. Knopf, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party, (Peterborough, O.N.: 
Broadview Press, 2000) 
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But although these traits sit well with the U.S. experience, there are 
also important differences which set Canada apart from its American 
counterpart, notably Canada’s attempt to combine individual rights 
with a significant recognition of group-based rights. The Charter also 
contributed to a political mobilisation of women’s groups, 
aboriginals, and a wide range of ethno-linguistic groups.61 The 
Charter Revolution has clear traits of cathartic constitution-making: the 
high-stakes politics has resulted in a re-configured conception of 
justice, in which weak disenfranchised groups have been given 
special constitutional recognition. This has manifested itself in a 
range of progressive policies, such as policies on aboriginal self-
government, and same-sex marriage. 
 
Another important difference to the U.S. is that there is still no 
constitutional agreement in Canada (the province of Quebec has not 
signed the Constitution Act of 1982), but it should also be added that 
Canadians are no less law-abiding than their U.S. counterparts. This 
adds up to an important similarity between the EU and Canada, 
because Canadian constitution-making must also respond to multiple 
constitutional publics. This has been extended to a de facto veto on 
constitutional change for each province. 
 
Both the EU and Canada have also sought to democratise and open 
up the closed intergovernmental procedures for constitution-making, 
but neither has succeeded in obtaining constitutional agreement from 
these attempts. 
 
Canadians share with Europeans a complex conception of 
constitution: both seek to grapple with deeply-entrenched forms of 
difference and diversity; both are marked by ongoing processes of 
élite-run constitution-making; and their constitutional arrangements 
are neither agreed-upon contractual arrangements, nor founding 
pacts between the citizens. In both cases, however, there are 
procedures and rights that can accommodate an ongoing process of 
discursive validation of the structure in place. Agreement is 
notoriously difficult to achieve because this process deals with issues 
                                                 
61 This has been dealt with extensively in the literature. See the writings of Alan 
Cairns, Rainer Knopff, Ted Morton, Janet Hiebert, Miriam Smith and a host of others. 
For the citizenship implications, consider, in particular, W. Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford, Clarendon Press,1995), and 
idem, Finding our Way, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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that are unlikely to find permanent resolutions, and, instead, require 
ongoing handling and balancing off. 
4.2. Canada – EU: Towards Post-National 
Convergence? 
Canada has, historically speaking, figured as a rather unlikely polity 
model, notably because many have portrayed it as a failed nation-
state. The notion that Canada was made up of two founding nations 
has made it impossible to agree on a Canadian nation based upon the 
normal markers of nationalism (common language, etc.) Instead, 
managing diversity has become a key trait of Canada’s self-
understanding. This is also apparent in the general principles that are 
used to depict Canada: cultural and linguistic tolerance, inclusive 
community, federalism, inter-regional sharing, democracy, rule of 
law, and equality of opportunity, as well as respect for, and 
accommodation of, difference. 
 
In a post-Westphalian context, where the nation-state is being called 
into question, Canada’s initial “failure” to comply with the nation-
state mould may be an advantage today, as it can now pose as a kind 
of vanguard in managing diversity: 
 
Canada is a world leader in three of the most important areas of 
ethnocultural relations: immigration, indigenous peoples, and 
the accommodation of minority nationalisms. Many other 
countries have one or more of these forms of diversity, but very 
few have all three, and none has the same wealth of historical 
experience in dealing with them.62 
 
Canada’s diversity has long been officially recognised through 
aboriginal self-government, bilingualism and multiculturalism.63 
Multiculturalism as a doctrine is premised on the notion of integrating 
                                                 
62 W. Kymlicka, Finding our Way, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 1 and 
pp.2-3, and idem, Multicultural Odysseys, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
63 The Canadian multiculturalism policy was introduced in 1971, and, in 1988, it 
became officially enshrined in the Multiculturalism Act. The policy had four 
objectives: “to support the cultural development of ethnocultural groups; to help 
members of ethnocultural groups overcome barriers to full participation in Canadian 
society; to promote creative encounters and interchange among all ethnocultural 
groups; and to assist new Canadians in acquiring at least one of Canada’s official 
languages.” (Kymlicka 1998, note 61 supra, p. 15). 
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immigrants from diverse cultural backgrounds into society – without 
eliminating their characteristics. It seeks to avoid the twin evils of 
assimilation and ethnic separation or ghettoisation. It is also an 
ideology that addresses inter-ethnic tolerance and the benefits that a 
society accrues from its diversity.64 This doctrine is premised on the 
notion that the integration or incorporation of people from different 
backgrounds is a two-way process, which places requirements on 
those that integrate, but also on those who are already there. It can 
heighten social inclusiveness as well as self-reflection on the part of 
both the arriving minority(ies) and the receiving majority, in order to 
foster a process of mutual accommodation and change. Analysts find 
that the Canadian multiculturalism programme has been informed by 
these notions, although it is contested how well it has done. 
 
Multiculturalism’s approach to socialisation and incorporation differs 
from nationalism, which is far more attuned to integrating people 
into a set mould, or into a community with a clear sense of both itself 
and its national identity. 
 
A trait that also sets Canada apart from the U.S. is that, in Canada, 
ethnic diversity is dealt with through publicly sustained welfare. 
Some analysts hold the American experience up as a kind of “master 
narrative” to the effect that ethnic diversity erodes redistribution.65 In 
this light, Canada can be seen as a kind of “counter-narrative”: 
 
[T]he evidence to date about public attitudes in Canada stands 
as a challenge to assertions that ethnic diversity inevitably 
weakens support for social programs; and the evolution of 
Canadian politics suggests that immigration, multiculturalism 
policies and social redistribution can represent a stable political 
equilibrium.66 
 
                                                 
64 See W. Norman, “Justice and Stability in Multination States”, in: A. Gagnon and J. 
Tully, Struggles for Recognition in Multinational Societies, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
65 See D. Goodhart, “Too Diverse?”, (2004) Prospect, pp. 30-37. available at: 
http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=5835. 
66 See K.G. Banting, “Canada ascounter-narrative, Multiculturism, Recognition and 
Redistribution”, paper presented at the seminar The Ties that Bind: Accommodating 
Complex Diversity in Canada and the European Union, (Brussels, Belgium 17-19 
November 2005), p. 11. 
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We can understand Canada as an experiment in devising a particular 
balance of social solidarity and accommodation of difference – within 
a communal frame with a post-national orientation. This might 
suggest a certain post-national convergence between the EU and 
Canada. 
4.3. Canada – also Propounds the “Power of Words” 
Canada is no major military power and it mainly depends on 
favourable geography and the U.S. and NATO for its security. Like 
the EU, Canada is a strong supporter of international co-operation 
and self-binding legislation through legal provisions (it did not 
support the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example). It has also been one 
of the foremost international peacekeepers, and has also been a key 
proponent of a foreign policy based upon human security.67 This 
specific commitment has waned, although the core aims of Canadian 
foreign policy since the 1990s still remain to project Canadian values 
and culture abroad, through “respect for democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and the environment”.68 Canadians believe that their 
centuries-long experience with managing internal diversity provides 
them with a special acumen for handling international tension and 
conflicts. Thus, Canada also enjoys a very high international 
reputation for international co-operation and for its contribution to 
conflict handling (although researchers also find a clear discrepancy 
between high-minded rhetoric and practical pragmatism). 
 
Canada’s approach to conflict management, similar to that of the EU, 
relies not on force, but on “the power of words”, the onus being on 
bringing the parties together in order to seek ways of resolving 
issues. 
5. Concluding Reflections 
This article has discussed the polity model that we can discern from 
the U.S., and has briefly considered it in relation to the reality of the 
                                                 
67 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade “Human Security 
Programme”. http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/psh-e.asp, 16.07.02. Canada was 
active in the development of ICC. The president of the International Criminal Court 
and its chief architect, Phillippe Kirsch is also a Canadian. 
68 Canada, Canada in the World: Government Statement, (Ottawa, 1995). See, also, 
Nossal, “The World we want? The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals, and 
Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy (2003); available at: 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20World%20We%20Want.pdf. 
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European Union. When we dis-entangle the components of the U.S. 
understood as a polity model, we find a significant tension between 
moral universalism and ethical-religious and national difference. The 
American Constitution enjoys unique status as the pioneering edifice 
of the modern democratic state, but this democratic constitution was 
framed when the state system was consolidating, and was framed to 
suit the spirit of nationalism. The strong religious influence on 
American politics has variously given licence to international 
institution-building (the Wilsonian tradition) and to the recent 
American unilateralism. 
 
Europe of today cannot echo the American constitutional process. 
European constitution-making takes place within a setting of already 
constitutionalised entities. These have all been inspired by the basic 
principles that inform the U.S. Constitution, and now also feed into 
the European constitutional edifice; hence, there appears to be no 
need for Europe to abandon the normative standards that the U.S. 
Constitution played such a central role to propagate. But today’s 
challenge is, nevertheless, different, namely, to entrench these 
principles properly in a post-Westphalian political entity. To this, the 
other two components that I singled out as attractive about the U.S. 
do not offer much instruction, as they are accompanied by strong 
national, and even religious, overtones. A similar tension is seen in 
the U.S.’s global role: the U.S. was essential in establishing the 
components of cosmopolitan law,69 yet it has veered from 
cosmopolitan self-binding to moralistic unilateralism in defiance of 
those very rules. In this sense, the U.S., steeped, as it still is, within a 
Westphalian frame, is hardly the most suitable polity for the EU to 
emulate – partly because it is too much of a state (in its external role) 
and partly because it is too little of a state (in its internal, social role) 
 
The EU represents the most explicit attempt to date to break out of 
the nationalist mould and to foster a different – post-national – sense 
of allegiance within a structure that is more permeable and reflexive 
than any nation-state. The question is whether this sets the EU apart 
from the rest of the world, as an idiosyncrasy and as a reflection of 
unique European patterns, or whether European developments 
resonate with developments elsewhere. Clearly, if we talk about the 
                                                 
69 See J. Habermas, “America and the World – A Conversation with Jürgen 
Habermas”, with Eduardo Mendieta. 
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prospects for changes in constitutive frames, then isolated 
developments in one corner of the world need not amount to much. 
 
In this article, I have looked at the “other” of North-America as a 
possible parallel to the EU. Somewhat paradoxically, given the 
inability to reach agreement on a made-in-Canada Constitution, 
Canada’s commitment to the rule of law – both in its internal and in 
its external orientations – reflects a more “cosmopolitanised state”. 
Such a state seeks to uphold core democratic principles, both 
internally and externally, has lower thresholds between its internal 
and external orientations, and seeks to foster a post-national and 
thinner-than-nationalism mode of allegiance. Such an internationally 
permeable state has traits in common with the EU. Both Canada and 
the EU share certain promising features in terms of fostering new 
constitutive frames. The really important challenge is to find out if 
these traits are more than just isolated components. 
 
However, to argue that Canada fulfils Europe’s “American Dream” 
would be to overstate the case. But Canada should figure here. 
Europeans might usefully set up Canada as a mirror of themselves, as 
Canada is the state that comes closest to the EU in several critical 
respects. Canada might be a useful mirror also because it addresses 
how far we can “stretch” the state form in diversity accommodation 
terms. If Canada can demonstrate that the state form is so flexible and 
so accommodating of difference, and still manages to retain a 
fundamental commitment to rights and democracy, then this 
suggests that the state form of political organisation could still work 
for Europe. Then, a further and equally demanding challenge could 
be addressed, whether a cosmopolitanised state could uphold the 
sanctioning force of the law, internally and externally. What matters 
today, it seems, is to establish how we might wed the great ideals 
espoused by the American Revolution with the experiences and 
efforts that Canada and the EU are going through. 
 
Chapter 6  
European Citizenship and the Dillusion of 
the Common Man 
 
Michelle Everson 
Birkbeck College, University of London 
 
1. Introduction 
Almost 20 years ago, the European Union was born, and with it, the 
European citizen.1 Today, we may have grown used to the concept of 
a European citizen; but, in the heady days following the dedication of 
a, once, European (Economic) Community to a, forever, “closer union 
of the peoples of Europe”, the novel concept of supranational 
citizenship drew a host of excited comment. But where was it to be 
located amongst the sliding range of communitarian, republican and 
identity-based theories of citizenships, and could it be deployed to 
give voice to traditionally marginalised constituencies?2 
Alternatively, should it be dismissed as impossible on its own terms 
— after all, when have we ever seen a citizenship without a state? — 
and, accordingly, treated as a veiled, but nonetheless usurping, threat 
to the sovereignty of the Member States.3 Or, was it simply a chimera, 
which, with its paltry catalogue of political rights, merely masked the 
                                                 
1 Treaty on European Union, Articles 17-21. 
2 Jo Shaw, “The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union”, 
(1997) 22 European Law Review p. 554. U.K. Preuß, “Problems of a Concept of 
European Citizenship”, (1995) 1 European Law Journal. 
3 Preuß, note 2 supra. 
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essential character of the European as homo economicus; a pale modern 
echo of Bismark’s Wirtschaftsbürger, and a vehicle for the creation of 
an irredeemably neo-liberal European market as the ill-conceived 
precursor to the forced creation of a European state grand goût?4 
 
Today, both overly optimistic and menacingly apocalyptic visions of 
the European citizen might appear to have been misplaced. 
Notwithstanding all this, we have not witnessed the emergence of a 
new, instantly recognisable, post-modern European citizen, armed 
with the necessary rights to forge his or her own identity against the 
once unyielding backdrops of “imagined” (national) collectivities;5 
nor have we seen the creation of the State of Europe, neo-liberal or 
otherwise. Instead, and all grand, but failed, constitutional 
aspirations apart, the legal vehicle of citizenship would appear to 
share this much with all European mechanisms of potential 
constitutional renewal: legal evolution is not so much a child of 
minutely-planned conceptual revolution, but, rather, a matter of 
incremental pragmatism, whereby citizenship is unfolded by means 
of judicial response to instances of the assertion of individual right. 
European citizenship has thus proceeded slowly to recognise the free-
standing (non-economic) right of free movement (Martinez Sala6), to 
establish an essential link between the acquisition of “derivative” 
rights of citizenship and human rights (Chen7), and to concede a 
measure of transnational solidarity (Grzelcyk8). 
 
Is this, then, the end of the story of European citizenship? Might we 
accordingly be satisfied that the incremental legal evolution of 
Articles 17-21 of the European Treaty will provide us with an 
appropriate vehicle of self-recognition and self-projection for the 
individual European? The following pages argue that this question 
must be answered with a resounding “‘no”. Things are now far from 
well in the world of European citizenship. The initial impetus for this 
negative assessment is drawn from a discipline foreign to legal 
                                                 
4 M. Everson, “The Legacy of the Market Citizen”, in: J. Shaw and G. More (eds), New 
Legal Dynamics of European Union, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 73-89. 
5 M. Everson and J. Eisner, with reference to the pluralist tradition, The Making of a 
European Constitution, (Oxford and New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
6 Case C-85/96, Maria Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
7 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. 
8 C-184/99 Grzelcyk v Centre Public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 
[2001] ECR I-6193. 
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science, and, above all, from Neil Fligstein’s recent sociological-
empirical finding that economically-driven processes of European 
integration only have the full support of a very small and financially 
very privileged group of Europeans (10-15% of the European 
population).9 However, the lesson that the entire project of European 
integration is now threatened by its own fatal disregard for the 
historical core of citizenship — the binding together of disparate and 
antagonistic classes within a community of fate — is one that is drawn 
specifically for legal science; and, above all, in promotion of a form 
and rigorous method of legal scholarship that has, all Europeanised 
temptation apart, retained its primary respect for the achievements of 
the post-war national constitutional settlement, but which has, 
likewise, never failed to pay due note to its historically-conditioned 
failings.10 
2. Maastricht: The False Promise of the Homo 
Economicus? 
Making an initial and brief historical detour, it is worth recalling 
exactly why the original concept of European citizenship was subject 
to such suspicion when viewed through the lenses of a historical 
citizenship theory.11 In this view, the European scheme whereby the 
existence of the European citizen was boldly declared, was linked 
with the nationality law of the Member States, and was further 
elaborated with specific reference to a restricted set of (European) 
political rights and rights of consular representation, was not merely 
to be doubted with regard to its lack of an independent genesis for 
European citizenship. It was, instead, to be decried for its seeming 
failure to establish “allegiance”, or to ensure that European citizens 
would be “bound to one another by the personal bond of fellow-
membership of one body”.12 
 
Thus, critique did not focus upon the lack of a pre-political, or 
communitarian, wellspring for European “being” within a common 
European language, religion or race.13 Nor, importantly, did it 
                                                 
9 N. Fligstein, Euro-Clash: The EU, European Identity and the Future of Europe, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
10 In short, the legal science pursued by Christian Joerges (see, below, Section V). 
11 I refer primarily to my own analysis, M. Everson (1995). 
12 J.W. Salmond, “Citizenship and Allegiance”, (Part II), (1902) 17 LQR, pp. 49-63. 
13 See, for explanation of communitarian visions of acquisition of citizenship, note 2 
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descend into a republican-liberal reverie to dream of a common 
illiberal European enemy and thus to bemoan the lack of concomitant 
citizenship duties (military service), whose exercise might 
accordingly unite the body of imagined Europeans through shared 
adversity.14 Instead, the homily that nationality is merely “the other 
side of the citizenship coin” to rights15 was placed within its 
historical-industrial context to breathe new comparative force into 
T.H. Marshall’s seminal narrative of the evolution of citizenship.16 
The vital question then posed was one of whether European 
citizenship had been consciously developed in order to compensate 
for the inequalities of the emerging European market, and thus to 
ensure the continuing loyalty of Europeans to the project of Europe, 
even if its market should be experienced in a negative light. 
 
Outside the communitarian perspective, the acquisition of European 
citizenship by virtue of possession of the nationality of one of the 
Member States does not preclude the establishment of reciprocal 
loyalty between individual Europeans. Instead, with an eye to 
contractual theories of the establishment of res publica, T.H. Marshall 
tells us the stirring concrete story of the evolution of industrial 
citizenship within the United Kingdom – and similarly lays the 
fundaments for the telling of the abstract tale of the creation of 
allegiance to the alienating state of modernity and the modern mass 
economy – with recourse to rights rather than nation. Citizenship is a 
historical and a violent happening, which both creates and tames the 
market and the state: civic rights – including, most importantly, the 
right to contract – are medieval artefacts whose post-Black Death 
development shattered the feudal system and elevated the feudal 
subject to the status of a contractual party, who might then forge a 
new market-based economy; political rights are the child of the 17th 
century and the struggle by market burghers to assert their growing 
economic power by means of violent struggle for a share in the 
political powers of the sovereign; social rights are corrective, status-
based, mechanisms, politically hard-fought-for by the industrial 
classes of the 19th and 20th centuries in response to the necessary 
                                                                                                                   
supra. 
14 For a disturbing example of this tendency, see Ulrich Haltern, “On Finality”, in: A. 
von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 373-403. 
15 Preuß, note 2 supra. 
16 T.H. Marshall, (1953) Citizenship and Social Class, (Pluto Press: London, 1992). 
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functional differentiations of the mass economy, as well as the abject 
indifference of a bourgeois state to the inequalities of class. From 
subjecthood, to contract, to status, the historical antagonisms 
captured within the concept of citizenship are then, in turn, 
seemingly reconciled, as – following the formula given by Ralph 
Dahrendorf17 – civic, political and social rights are concentrically 
constitutionalised within the post-war national settlement, furnishing 
each such reborn nation with a normative concept of citizenship, 
which both recognises its own historical class struggle, and holds it in 
permanent equilibrium; a concept of citizenship which guarantees, 
not only the market, with its myriad inequalities, but also the means 
of its social correction within a politically-inclusive state. 
 
Citizen is brother to citizen, and all citizens have reason to be loyal to 
their state. What then of the rights of the European Union citizen? 
Herein, the critique of the Maastricht citizen is to be found: clearly, 
rights to vote and stand in European and local elections, together 
with the right to petition the European ombudsman, as well as the 
right to consular protection, were not born out of portentous 
European class struggle, nor do they represent a genuine European 
effort to reproduce the normative, concentric scheme of Dahrendorf’s 
“allegiance-inducing” civic, political and social rights. More tellingly 
still, the core and unique right of the Union citizen, the right to move 
and reside freely within the borders of the EU, appeared, in the 
Maastricht Treaty at least, to be qualified, exercisable only “subject to 
the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect” (now, Article 18(1) European 
Treaty). Alternatively, Article 18 explicitly related the new Union 
Citizenship to older provisions of European law, and, more 
particularly, to the existing right of free movement for European 
workers now laid down in Article 39 EC; one of the quartet of 
European rights of labour movement, establishment (Article 43), 
service provision (Article 49) and capital movement (56), commonly 
known as the “four freedoms”. 
With this irresistible reminder of the economic antecedents of 
European integration, the TEU’s chapter on citizenship itself placed 
renewed emphasis upon an existing vision of the individual 
European as homo economicus; the economically active and pro-active 
                                                 




European economic citizen, who, in the manner of Bismark’s 
Wirtschaftsbürger, would be the primary instigator – creatur ex nihilo – 
of a European market, asserting European economic rationality and, 
where necessary, setting the obstructions of national regulatory 
provisions aside. Was this, then, the true face of European 
citizenship, a face of naked entrepreneurial endeavour? Given the 
weak nature of the political rights within the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
absence of a normatively-stated social commitment to the correction 
of market inequalities at European level, and the proven juridical 
strength of the four freedoms, the European homo economicus was 
undoubtedly still predominant. Furthermore, lacking even the 
paternalistic (anti-democratic) framework of social provision and 
control within which Bismark sought to neutralise the individualism 
(inherent cosmopolitanism) of his Witschaftsbürger, the European 
economic citizen could surely not be other than a selfish being; a 
contractual party dedicated by European right to personal profit, a 
cosmopolitan dismissive of the feudal confines of the nation state, a 
solipsist utterly without loyalty to his or her fellow Europeans, and 
also – where no individual profit was to be made – without status 
within, or allegiance to, any common European project. 
3. The End of Nation and History within European 
Citizenship 
That was then, and now is now. The European Court of Justice has 
since pronounced repeatedly upon the notion of the European citizen. 
Further, responding to the pragmatic problems thrown up by 
integration processes, the ECJ has surprised and confounded 
traditional citizenship theory. The primary European “bolt from the 
blue” was to come in the seminal case of Martinez Sala in 1998,18 
which severed the existing link between free movement and 
economic activity. Thereafter, judicial inventiveness was 
fundamentally to refashion all accepted understandings of the nature 
of citizenship: on the one hand, allowing for the derivation of a right 
to citizenship, not from nationality, but from human rights; and, on 
the other, extending rights of solidarity across the once wholly-
impermeable borders of national solidarity collectivities – and this in 
disregard of the wishes of the Council. With this, it might, 
                                                 
18 See note 6 supra. For details of the extraordinary and immediate resonance of this 
case, see S. O’Leary, “Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Citizenship”, (1999) 24 
European Law Review, p. 68. 
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accordingly, be argued that European citizenship is evolving, not as 
an unconscionable assault upon traditional citizens, but rather as a 
promising solution to the inherently exclusionary nature of the 
historical citizen. 
 
Thus, the case of Sala – confirming that Article 18 EC Treaty was a 
free standing Treaty right, and was not qualified by Article 39 EC 
Treaty – was revolutionary in its effects, not simply since it expanded 
the dramatis personae of the European integration stage to include 
persons moving across frontiers for non-economic reasons, but also, 
since it laid the foundations for a series of subsequent cases,19 which 
can be viewed as divorcing the legal vehicle of Union citizenship 
from notions of nationality, locating its genus within human rights, 
instead. Citizenship, it should never be forgotten,20 matches its own 
inclusionary aspirations with its own exclusionary impact: even in its 
republican/contractual variant, which rejects all pre-political notions 
of belonging, to include citizens within the state by means of rights, 
the legal vehicle of nationality — typically ius soli based — draws an 
exclusionary line, in fact, if not in theory,21 based solely upon the 
accident of birth. Nationality is the gateway to citizenship. An 
exclusionary feature of citizenship that has long haunted the 
enlightenment ideal of a universal brotherhood of man, the gate of 
nationality has, nonetheless, been prised open by an ECJ, which has 
collapsed the distinction between “the rights of man and the rights of 
                                                 
19 There is very little room here to detail all the cases and commentary on a complex 
area of European law. Interested readers should refer to: A. Tryfonidou, “Jia or 
‘Carpenter II’: the edge of reason”, (2008) 32 European Law Review, p. 908; E. 
Drywood, “Giving with one hand, taking with the other”, (2007), 32 European Law 
Review, p. 369; O. Golynker, “Student loans: the concept of social justice according to 
Bidar”, (2006) 31 European Law Review, p. 390; Ch. Hilson, “What’s in a right? The 
relationship between Community, fundamental and citizenship rights in EU law”, 
(2004) 29 European Law Review, p. 636; S. Peers, “Implementing equality? The 
Directive on long term resident third-country nationals”, (2004) 29 European Law 
Review, p. 437; R.C.A. White, “Conflicting competences: free movement rules and 
immigration laws”, (2004) 29 European Law Review, p. 385. 
20 See U.K. Preuß and M. Everson, “Concepts, Foundations and Limits of European 
Citizenship”, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 2/95, ZERP an der Universität Bremen (1995); 
P. Tuitt, Race, Law, Resistance, (London: Glasshouse Press, 2004); D. Heater, 
Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History and Politics, (London: Longman, 1990). 
21 In its original revolutionary form, the French Constitution offered French 
citizenship to all who professed to share in the ideals of the Republic; French-
speaking slaves within the Caribbean foolishly relied upon this sentiment, only to be 
bloodily suppressed by the young Republic: see Heater note 20 supra. 
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the citizen”, extending derivative rights of European citizenship to 
individuals who are not nationals of a Member State. The exemplary 
case here is that of Chen.22 Master Chen, at the planned instigation of 
his Chinese parents, was born in Northern Ireland, becoming a 
citizen of the Irish Republic by virtue of ius soli and,23 thus, a 
European citizen by virtue of Article 17(2) EC. Accordingly, Master 
Chen could exercise his Article 18 EC right of free movement to re-
locate to London. But, what of his Chinese mother? Surely, the UK 
Home Office could exercise its right to exclude a Chinese national? 
Not so, said the ECJ: human rights, particularly the right to the 
enjoyment of family life, would determine that Mrs Chen, as the 
primary carer, could move with her son. 
 
The derivative exercise of a European right of free movement by a 
Chinese national, may not initially appear to be such a momentous 
evolution, being qualified, as it is, by the need to establish a relational 
connection between a non-EU mother and an EU child. However, the 
core sociological-empirical element within the judgment – the ECJ’s 
recognition of a need to deal pragmatically with a simple human 
happening, the birth of a child24 – and its use of human rights to 
imbue the particularist/exclusionary vehicle of citizenship with a 
measure of universal humanity, further gains in significance if read in 
the light of the ECJ’s recent and notable efforts to expand the 
addressees of national solidarity collectives to include the figure of 
the impecunious, but needy, stranger. Article 18 EC and the free-
standing (non-economic) European right of movement, thus sets its 
own limits on its exercise by European citizens, reserving to the 
Council a right to determine the conditions under which it will be 
exercised (Article 18(2) EC). Predictably, Council action to implement 
the right of free movement within the Union has seen the re-
emergence of economic qualifications within the concept of European 
citizenship, this time, with regard to the assertion of the primacy of 
the national solidarity collective. Most recently, then, Directive 
2004/3825 on free movement re-emphasises the closed nature of the 
                                                 
22 See note 7 supra. 
23 The Republic extends its ius soli rule to include all persons born within the island of 
Ireland. 
24 Even in the face of suggestions that the situation had been contrived by the 
parents. See, however, an opposite finding in Akrich (Case C-109/01 ECR I-9607), 
where the “misconduct” of the applicant defeats the claim to derivative citizenship. 
25 [2004] O.J. L158/77. 
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national solidarity collective – or the exclusionary notion that the re-
distributive social benefits of citizenship are reserved for members of 
the nation alone – by granting EU citizens and their family members 
a right of residence throughout Europe only “as long as they do not 
become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the 
host Member State” (Article 6). 
 
The operative word here, the measure of the willingness of the 
Member States to open up national solidarity to afford real succour to 
the indigent Union citizen, is to be found in the word 
“unreasonable”;26 and it is here, too, that the determination of the ECJ 
to pry open that door further is demonstrated. Prior to the 
implementation of Directive 2004/38, the Court had already firmly 
signalled its universalist welfare aspirations in cases such as 
Grzelczyk, accordingly stating that the fact that Directive 93/9627 
regulating movement of students did not provide for benefits for 
students, similarly did not preclude the extension of national benefits 
to EU students where such students found themselves in the same 
needy circumstances as national students. In Baumbast, where a 
German national had not satisfied UK requirements that he maintain 
sufficient sickness insurance for himself and his family, the Court 
accordingly declared that national legislation implementing Directive 
2004/38 must be “proportionate”. As has been cleverly noted,28 the 
imposition of the community principle of proportionality to national 
implementing legislation thus also amounted to a “constitutional 
review” of the efforts of the Council to set the legislative limits to 
national solidarity through the judicial frontline assessment of the 
impact of a notion of “unreasonable burden” in the light of every-
day-cases in individual Member States. 
 
Naturally, this constitutionally-oriented aspiration to review the 
actions of the Council in setting limits to national solidarity 
collectives has also inexorably implicated the ECJ in a series of 
intricate judgments, concerning the intimate tax, benefits and 
financial dealings of a host of EU citizens from students to 
pensioners.29 Nonetheless, such painstaking judicial labour has also 
                                                 
26 M. Dougan, “The constitutional dimension to the case law on Union citizenship”, 
(2006) 31 European Law Review, p. 613. 
27 [1993] OJ L317/59. 
28 M. Dougan (2006). 
29 Here, it suffices to note only Case C-258/04 Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275, in which 
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brought with it immense benefits in terms of the pursuit of the 
Court’s dedicated campaign to re-orient Union citizenship in line 
with common understandings of the simple humanity that is due 
from man to man under circumstances of real human want. 
Abstracting to the level of political theory, the Court’s very real 
materiality, its willingness to engage with an “other” within the 
immediacy of needy circumstances, is reborn as a pragmatic, 
empathetic and reflex-driven reproach to Hannah Arendt’s eternally 
sorrowful observation of the human condition and the imperative 
need to “locate” humanity – the recognition of the human by humans 
as a human – within time and within “space”.30 Temporality and 
spatiality are the measure of the traditional concept of citizenship: 
Mrs Chen’s maternal pre-occupations are wholly irrelevant to a 
republican nation which demands individual philosophical 
concordance with revolutionary principles born out of, and reified 
within, bloody history; contractual citizenship and solidarity, 
invigorated by a shared geographical experience of class struggle and 
re-distributive resolution, is utterly blind to Mr Baumbast’s, or the 
geographical stranger’s, need for immediate medical care for his 
family. 
 
This need not be so, intones the ECJ: the measure of recognition and 
solidarity within Europe is certainly not to be negated by spatially-
bounded history; still less, is it to be found within a simple reciprocal 
display of solidarity between and beyond actuarial national 
calculations of the costs and benefits in social provision.31 Instead, a 
“wonder” of extra-European recognition is invoked into being as the 
Court’s very post-modern act of observing and responding to the 
                                                                                                                   
the Court continued to struggle to identify “an effective and genuine link” between 
the applicant and the host state. 
30 H. Lindahl, “Finding a place for freedom, security and justice: The European 
Union’s claim to territorial unity”, (2004) 29 European Law Review, p. 461; A. Somek, 
“Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship”, (2007) 32 European 
Law Review, p. 787. I am immensely grateful to each of these authors for their 
insights. 
31 Both Dougan (2006) and Somek (2007) confirm — each in their own way — that the 
ECJ has moved beyond simple notions of reciprocity to justify its creation of 
European solidarity. In Somek, this idea is to be found in the notion that European 
solidarity is a “miracle” drawn forth by virtue of empathetic empirical observation; 
within Dougan, the constitutional review of the actions of the Council, a European 
figure, provides us with a distinct European (i.e., not nationally reciprocal) form of 
solidarity. 
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personalised need situation of a non-European subject is conjoined 
with the modern legal instrument of human rights, in order to recall, 
and, importantly, to juridify the pre-modern emotions of universal 
empathy and brotherhood. By the same token, a once technical 
yardstick of procedural legal review, “proportionality”, is 
transformed into a far more indistinct realm of substantive 
adjudication, open to an emotionally-founded interposito auctoritas, 
within which a “miracle” of European solidarity is born – a miracle of 
unbounded love32 – as the ECJ forensically interrogates the wants of 
individual citizens, requiring the national solidarity collective to be 
prised open in response to, and in sympathy with, the facts of the 
individualised situational context. 
 
The notable degree of comment, controversy and puzzlement about 
the ECJ’s jurisprudence on Union citizenship is thus explained:33 a 
post- and pre-modern process whereby the identity of European 
citizens and, thus, Europe itself, is negotiated in reflexive 
confrontation (or emotional reflex) with a concrete other, is not easily 
explained in formal legal categories; still less is it easily recognised 
within a proceduralist legal paradigm — how can a collective 
national expression of shared love ever be “proportionally” balanced 
against the “miracle” of universal and unbounded solidarity? Instead, 
European legal evolution is lead by the emotions of European judges. 
Nonetheless, the pre-/post-modern stripping away of the history and 
geography of Europe, and the pragmatic juridical preparedness to 
consider each individual in his or her situational context, not only 
seems to echo and to embody the political/constitutional aspirations 
of the Union to give normative voice to identity-oriented concepts of 
citizenship, particularly in the sphere of non-discrimination,34 but 
also, it might be argued, furnishes Union citizenship with an 
inspirational quality to match the antagonistically reconciling history 
of industrial citizenship. Following the judicial execution of nation 
and history in Europe, has European citizenship, finally and, indeed, 
                                                 
32 Somek (2007) recalling Unger’s description of social solidarity as an irrational act of 
collective love: Law in Modern Society, (New York and London: Free Press, 1975). 
33 See, in particular, Somek’s musings on the complex differences in the treatment of 
students, pensioners and what-have-you (2007). 
34 And here, the reference is to Articles 141 and 13 EC Treaty and the Union’s 
seeming desire to extend its highly successful sex equality provisions to cover fields 
of race, religion, age, disability and gender. 
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remarkably, overcome the destructive problems of spatiality, 
temporality and exclusion? 
4. Union Citizenship Fallito (1): Nation and History 
Bite Back 
Hans Lindahl has reminded us of just how powerful Arendt’s 
concept of spatiality is.35 The notion of space is: 
 
[N]ot merely a geographical term. It relates not so much, and 
not primarily, to a piece of land as to the space between 
individuals in a group whose members are bound to, and at the 
same time separated and protected from, each other by all 
kinds of relationships, based on a common language, religion, a 
common history, customs, and laws. 
 
Writing against the post-war backdrop of Europe’s proven moral 
turpitude, its utter failure to secure the most basic of rights of the 
millions of murdered dead, who had seen their citizenship and 
concomitant protection negated, its continuing complicity in the mass 
displacement of the millions of individuals who had found 
themselves on the wrong side of re-drawn borders, Arendt’s 
sorrowful observation that “[F]reedom, where it existed as tangible 
reality, has always been spatially limited”,36 her assertion that human 
security can only be found within time and place, was no 
intentionalist statement of sovereign exclusion. Instead, it was a 
highly ambivalent recognition that freedom is only ever secured 
within a substantive realm of collective nation and history — which 
contemporaneously and inexorably imperils freedom — and it is this 
ambivalence which has likewise led Hans Lindahl to conclude that, 
with its constitution of a legal space of European values, the EU has 
also re-asserted, with all its negative connotations, a place of 
European nation and history, a European place of exclusion. 
 
In other words, and for all the brave efforts of the ECJ, a curiously 
differentiated European regime, whereby Union citizens are afforded 
                                                 
35 Hannah Arendt (1963), Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 
(Penguin: London, 1994), p.262. See, also, Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958), p.52. Cited by Lindahl (2007). 
36 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, (London: Penguin Classics,1990) 
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rights, third country nationals are afforded limited recognition,37 and 
asylum-seekers are subject to a common framework of control,38 does 
not end exclusion in Europe, but rather re-inforces it within a binary 
legal code, whereby the “legally-resident” take their stratified place 
within a European space, which protects individual Europeans, one 
from the other, and Europeans from the other, so that “the illegal”, 
both within Europe and without, are left bereft, knocking at the 
firmly closed doors of recognition and solidarity. The European other 
dies daily in the waters of the Mediterranean, just as the draft 
European Constitution promises its citizens “an area of freedom, 
security and justice without internal frontiers” (Article 3(2)). 
Spatiality and temporality inexorably return to haunt Europe and, 
with them, the pressing questions of which are the narratives of 
history, and which are the narratives of nation, that are unfolding 
within our common realm of legal place? We have already observed 
the ECJ’s liberating “blindness” to history and to nation within its 
jurisprudence, but we must now ask, by means of disruptive eversion 
(Umstülpung), whether blindness is, itself, only a mask for the 
construction of a sanitised narrative of European history, for the 
assertion of a European nation that ignores the antagonisms that exist 
between individual Europeans and between Europeans and their 
other; antagonisms that must, nevertheless, be revealed and 
reconciled (also within European citizenship) if Europe is to endure 
and not merely to founder within the empty promises of the ius 
publicum europaeum, and its simple veneer of occidental rationalism.39 
 
The deconstructive quest for this veiled narrative of history and 
nation focuses on two cases that may, initially, seem quirkily 
distanced from one another: the case of Lechourito, on the one hand, 
where the ECJ held that a 1943 retaliatory massacre committed by 
German armed forces within Greece did not fall within the ratione 
materiae of the 1968 Brussels Convention, since the massacre 
concerned the exercise of public, rather than civil, powers;40 and the 
                                                 
37 As family members under Directive 2004/38 and long term residents under the 
Long Term Residents Directive 2003/109EC. 
38 See, C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), for comprehensive details on the disturbing differentiated 
categorisation of individuals in Europe. 
39 The echo of Carl Schmitt is wholly intentional, see C. Schmitt (1932), Der Begriff des 
Politischen, (Berlin: Dunker & Humblodt, 2001). 
40 Case C-292/05 Lechouritou v Germany [2007] OJ C82/85. 
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case of Commission v Austria, on the other, where the “open-door” 
policy of university entry within Austria, which guarantees 
university admission to all Austrians holding a high school diploma, 
regardless of grade, was held to be indirectly discriminatory against 
non-Austrian EU-nationals, who were required to qualify themselves 
for admission in-line with their own national practices.41 What, then, 
unites these utterly disparate cases? The answer is the potential for 
the recognition of emotion and irrationality within European law, for 
the acknowledgment of uncomfortable history and acts of social love 
within the ius europaeum. As Carol Lyon notes, above all, in her 
treatment of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomner’s sensitive 
efforts to address “the other country of [Europe’s] past”,42 Lechouritou 
concerned memories of European trauma that will not die, and, 
further, implicates the European Court in an act of “listening rather 
than answering”,43 of responding empathetically to enduring human 
emotion rather than immediate legal right. By the same token, as Alex 
Somek asserts,44 the facts of Austria v Commission also encompass a 
measure of irrationality, or social love, a diffuse but collective 
decision that “everyone who has made it through school [should be] 
rewarded with a fresh start”;45 a measure of national empathy, with 
very real socially redistributive consequences, which closes the space 
of Austrian education to non-Austrians, just as it makes inclusive 
reparation for jointly-experienced memories of adolescent self-
discovery and academic under-achievement. 
 
As noted, within the legal technical term of proportionality – at least, 
as it applies to reciprocity between schemes of social assistance – the 
ECJ has opened up potential for itself to respond to the facts of 
European integration within an emotionally-founded interposito 
auctoritas. The robed, if not be-wigged, European Justice is 
undoubtedly, and perhaps sometimes usefully so, judge-king46 within 
                                                 
41 Case C-147/03 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria 
[2005] ECR I-5969. 
42 Carol Lyons, “The persistence of memory: the Lechouritou case and history before 
the European Court of Justice”, (2007) 32 European Law Review, p. 563. 
43 Ibid., 
44 Somek, note 30 supra. 
45 Somek also notes the potentially regressive social impacts of the decision: Are 
those failing to obtain a grammar school education (typically, from the less-
advantaged Austrian classes) to be excluded from Austrian educational life? 
46 E. Ehrlich, (reprint from 1903), Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft, 
(Aalen: Scientia, 1987). 
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Europe, with the freedom to adapt the normative framework of 
European law to the factual demands thrown up by integration 
processes, in line with his or her own emotional processes of 
recognition and empathy. But what of the European judge-king’s 
preparedness to respond to the emotions and irrationalities of the 
European publics? Here, however, a façade of occidental rationalism 
is decisively re-established within the law as: 1) in Lechouritou, the 
Court perhaps takes the Advocate General’s exhortation to exercise 
its judicial role in a “restrained” manner – that is, “without 
sentiment” – too much to heart, dismissing the AG’s opinion in its 
entirety and treating the matter before it solely within the rationality 
language of the self-referential jurisdiction of civil matters;47 and 2) all 
issues of emotional solidarity with the under-achieving teenager of 
our pasts are simply swept aside as the Court “gives Austria the 
unsolicited [but brutally rational] advice to establish ‘entry 
examinations or the requirement of a minimal qualification to avoid 
the system’s collapse’”.48 
 
History and nation are, indeed, dead within the minds of the ECJ as 
reparation in its historical and cultural contexts is not even addressed 
within the language of the Court, much less allowed to contaminate 
the implementation of European law. Or is it? Certainly, in terms of 
Arendt’s eternally ambivalent notion of spatiality, Lechouritou’s utter 
failure to re-focus European minds – however symbolically – on the 
other of our own bloody past, must be decried as an instance of 
historical blindness, which inevitably contributes to the process 
whereby the modern European mind is stripped of empathy for, and 
inured to, the sufferings of the European other that languishes 
nightly in Mediterranean death-traps, or daily in the asylum 
detention-centres that ∗border∗ our “area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers”. At the same time, however, the 
language of legal rationality must also be recognised to be a re-
assertion and affirmation of the emotionally-denuded narrative of 
occidental rationalism that has, ever since the Enlightenment, 
presented and justified European expansion and self-profligation 
upon the world stage within an argument of evolutionary superiority 
and logical inevitability: a history of logical rationalism, which 
swamps and displaces a bloody history of slavery and European 
                                                 
47 Lyons, note 42 supra. 
48 Somek, note 30 supra. 
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colonial expansion – as well as, continuing post-colonial dominance – 
relieving us of our enduring historical responsibility for the European 
other; and – once again in Arendt’s terms – which disguises and 
neuters the antagonistic class relations that lie behind our 
constitutional frameworks of civic, social and political rights, voiding 
our memories of feudal, bourgeois and industrial conflagration and 
laying us open to the rational colonisation and perversion of a ius 
publicum europaeum, which, through its self-referential placement in a 
sphere beyond politics (and emotional history), undermines its own 
socially-reconciling promise.49 
5. Union Citizenship Fallito (2): Class Bites Back 
5.1. The Empirical Traces of Class Exclusion 
Returning, then, to our notion of industrial citizenship, the case of 
Commission v Austria may also be treated in explicitly class-oriented 
terms. For all of Somek’s doubts about the socially-regressive impact 
of the legislation in question – which rewards a per se middle class 
failure to achieve outstanding results within the Austrian system of 
grammar schools with a university education – the refusal to 
establish an exclusionary numerus clausus within continental 
universities has generally been motivated by corrective concern about 
the stubborn persistence of structural class inequalities within the 
education system. Seen in this light, ECJ’s jurisprudence might 
accordingly be regarded as rewarding the middle class success of 
Polish, Portuguese and Greek students at the price of the working-
class failure of their Austrian counterparts. This, in its turn, raises the 
highly uncomfortable question of whether processes of European 
integration have – in fact, rather than in the esoteric terms of 
allocational economic theory – been detrimental to the interests of a 
European working class. 
 
                                                 
49 The initial congruence between Arendt’s (that is, our heroine’s) negative 
evaluation of European republicanism and Schmitt’s (our universal fiend’s) dismissal 
of plural constitutional settlement is one that disturbs many a political theorist. 
However, Schmitt’s binary friend-enemy distinction, which justifies the sovereign 
colonisation of political power must be starkly contrasted, in its theoretical-political 
impact, with Arendt’s spatial ambivalence and consequential recognition of the 
normative primacy of enduring antagonism. 
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Arendt herself was highly pessimistic:50 the predominantly economic 
nature of the founding European Treaties would only aggravate the 
inherent failings of the European, rather than the American, 
republican revolution – namely, its tendency to subdue the 
confrontational class politics that was deemed to have to have 
explosively expressed and, thus, ended itself within the revolutionary 
moment, its promotion of a history-denying, history-displacing and 
history-creating rationality, as well as its assertion of a self-deluding, 
normative narrative of evolutionary progress.51 A European working-
class might only forge a Europe that would be responsive to its needs 
were it to end the constitutionally-conditioned bourgeois monopoly 
over European (non-) politics. However, that was then, and now is 
now, and, furthermore, the past thirty years of European integration 
have been wholly dominated by a normative-descriptive narrative of 
the telos of European integration, which has no room for class 
analyses or, indeed, for any empirical analysis at all.52 Is it now at all 
possible to ascertain properly the differentiated class impact of 
processes of European integration? 
 
Certainly, the traces of a differentiated class impact can be identified 
within the very dissimilar self-perceptions of European identity 
maintained by different social classes within Europe, and which, 
more particularly, have recently been so identified by the American 
sociologist, Neil Fligstein, in his timely book, Euro-clash.53 For Euro-
clash read “a clash of European social classes” and an embarrassment 
for European politicians and academics alike: Why has it taken an 
American to reveal the obvious to us, that, as a simple matter of 
course, an integration process, which is primarily economically-
driven, is perceived to be of great benefit to a small élite of Europeans 
                                                 
50 Her general concerns about the European constitutional settlement are explicitly 
related to the European Communities in M. Walzer, Exodus und Revolution, 
(Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbücher, 1995). 
51 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution: the European republic was beholden to European 
rationalism rather than pragmatic politics. 
52 See M. Everson and J. Eisner (2007), Chapter 2, note 5 supra; G. Majone, Dilemmas of 
European Integration, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): the point being that, in 
its efforts simultaneously to describe and legitimate European processes of 
integration, European scholarship has often failed to take proper empirical note of 
what is happening in a real world of European integration, fatally pre-empting any 
systematic empirical analysis as facts are viewed through normative lenses. 
53 Fligstein, Euro-clash: the EU, European identity and the future of Europe, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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(10-15%) who will accordingly give it their full support at all times, is 
thought to be of occasional benefit to a middle group (40-50%), whose 
“European-ness” is, by the same token, necessarily contingent, but is, 
likewise perceived as a very real threat to a final set of Europeans (40-
50%), who remain inexorably trapped within national paradigms of 
consciousness and self-protection.54 
 
Fligstein accordingly presents us with the shocking, but, surely, not 
too surprising fact that socio-economic variables furnish us with an 
exact prediction of the degrees of European identity formation 
amongst European individuals.55 Persons will identify themselves as 
more or less European in direct correlation to their mobility, levels of 
civic association (business, professional, NGO-related, tourism-
related, etc.), levels of education and levels of (higher) cultural 
interaction. At one level, this seems a self-obvious conclusion, 
dictated to us by common sense, but does Fligstein, the empirical 
sociologist, tell us more? Does he tell us whether this brave new 
European world of re-invigorated class and differentiated identities is 
merely a matter of perception or, by stark contrast, is one of brutal 
fact? 
 
Fligstein’s orienting thesis is taken from Karl Deutsch and is, thus, 
also flavoured by centuries of European history (of class struggle and 
nation formation). Reviewing the wide range of sociological theories, 
historically centred on the nation state, which help to explain why 
groups of individuals with very divergent life experiences, as well as 
interests, are prepared to give their undivided loyalty to one political-
legal entity, Fligstein plumps for Deutsch’s exhortation that: 
 
the historical ‘trick’ to the rise of a nation state will be to find a 
horizontal solidarity for the existing [class] stratification and a 
rationale that using a state apparatus to protect the nation 
makes sense.56  
 
In Arendt’s politically-centred view, both Deutsch and Fligstein may 
initially appear to be a mite cynical within a Bismarkian semantic: 
identity, loyalty and the feeling that the search for a common fate is 
                                                 
54 Ibid., Chapter 8. 
55 Ibid., p. 140. 
56 Ibid., p. 130. 
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the best bet for self-protection (against forces both internal and 
external to the nation), are not to be won through the final 
overcoming of “stratification”, but are, instead, to be bought through 
the establishment of a common culture (through shared national 
institutions such as church, army and educational establishments), 
which, continuing stratification notwithstanding, give a diffuse sense 
of common purpose and protection. Nonetheless, to the degree that 
the various joint institutions of national life are themselves centres for 
the reproduction and the reconciliation of the antagonistic class 
politics that simultaneously undermine and build the nation, which 
are the institutions of European life that might permit the 
reproduction and the reconciliation of a purging European class 
conflict? 
 
And it is here that Fligstein begins to sketch out a reality — not a 
perception – of European life that segregates European classes and 
denies them access to antagonistically-reconciling politics. European 
integration is now, and has always been, a response to economic 
realities; in a first integrationist wave, with an eye to the need to 
rebuild the shattered economies of European nation states (and 
empires); and, in a second stage, as an answer to the pressures of 
globalisation and the need to reform (protect) European economies, 
in order to meet the competitive pressures of a global market. In turn, 
however, economic processes of integration within the European 
market are themselves, and also give rise to, specific “fields of 
interaction” between individual Europeans,57 which then determine 
the make-up of a European society, and also create opportunities for, 
and place constraints upon, European politics. 
 
This process of economically-bounded interaction should never be 
mistaken for integrative “spill-over”. Quite to the contrary: taking 
care empirically to dissect the exact nature of economic integration, 
globalisation, social interaction and political constraints/ 
opportunities, Fligstein demonstrates that integration has not evenly 
and smoothly diffused its impact across the whole of a European 
society. Instead, the initial process of integration, though often 
blocked by nationally-oriented Member States, nevertheless gave 
birth to powerful economic élites, with lobbying capacities at 
European level. By the same token, globalisation pressures and 
                                                 
57 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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economic reforms have likewise enabled Europeanised élites to 
strengthen their presence within the higher – ownership – strata of 
the increasingly integrated European market. In socio-economic 
terms, the élite or ownership class now experiences a daily reality of 
Europeanisation within the workplace and within social life. Equally, 
the European élite has long found its political voice in Brussels, 
perceives Europeanisation to be in its interests (i.e., to act as a 
bulwark against globalisation), and will, therefore, place political 
pressure upon Member State governments to deepen the integration 
process at both national and European levels, no matter how resistant 
such governments may be. By contrast, at national level, political 
pressure – the need constantly to re-assert the core measure of 
national life – has also determined that national frameworks of 
property and labour law have been maintained and that market 
integration, in wide-scale industrial sectors, such as defence and 
telecommunications, has been effected, not through the establishment 
of conspicuously European firms, but through mergers, joint ventures 
and jointly-owned subsidiaries; an integration model that leaves the 
concrete impression that economic life is still national and not 
European in nature (ironically, even where ownership is American).58 
This, in turn, determines that the mass of industrial workers 
experience their daily lives wholly within the national context. In 
contrast to a middle class, which may have a more diffused 
understanding of Europeanisation processes, and which, at the very 
least, experiences Europeanisation – and, importantly, interacts with 
other Europeans – through the benefits of culturally-oriented tourism 
(i.e., not mass package tourism), a working class is never socialised 
within joint institutions of European life. 
 
The site of politics for the European working class is, primarily, a 
national one. Furthermore, at national level, the European working 
class confronts a national political leadership, which is itself beholden 
to the Europeanised interests of an ownership élite, and which is also 
uncertain of the degree of nationalised support that it will receive 
from a mass of middle-class workers, whose political sentiments 
often prove to be as unpredictable as their partially-Europeanised 
daily life. In political terms, then, the European working-class is 
doubly excluded from reconciling process of antagonistic European 
                                                 
58 The one exception being the UK, where ownership passes easily to non-UK 
companies. Equally, the UK labour market is heavily Europeanised. 
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class expression, on the one hand, as they neither experience a site or 
institution of joint European political interaction, and, on the other, 
since they might never win the undivided (national) attentions of 
their own political leaders. 
5.2. The legal Consolidation of Class Exclusion 
To the degree that economic processes of European integration have 
isolated the working-classes of Europe within national paradigms of 
protective politics, where they cannot but fight, the one against the 
other, rather than join together to contest bourgeois economic might, 
recent non-votes against the draft European Constitution or draft 
Treaty of Lisbon are even less to be dismissed as the result of the 
European populace’s unfortunate ignorance about, and lacking 
understanding of, the workings of European institutions. Instead, 
hostility is a highly rational phenomenon, both amongst the social 
class to whom integration is most threatening and amongst the better 
placed group of “occasional” Europeans, whose support is given 
either to the nation state, or to the EU, in line with a considered 
calculation as to which body is better placed to provide social 
cohesion at any one time. Indeed, the “no” vote was potentially the 
only site of European politics within which class antagonisms might, 
at least, be jointly aired. 
 
Given this conclusion, the analysis now finally returns to its starting 
point in order to ask whether adjudicative European law — the 
confounding Janus that engages in acts of emotional irrationality, just 
as it draws a veil of rationalism over its activities — has made its own 
particular contribution to the exclusion of the common European 
man from the core sites of antagonistic European class conflict; 
whether it, too, and not just a diffuse process of economic 
differentiation, is actively engaged in the bourgeois colonisation of the 
normative framework of European law, a process of colonisation, 
which, by means of its negation of the European nation and its 
history of class struggle, has undermined the core of European 
citizenship? The response to this question, however, is found 
relatively easily, and must now be a resounding “yes”. 
 
The recent European cases of Viking, Laval and Rüffert have thus 
become pivotal within this context,59 not simply since they have, 
                                                 
59 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s 
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quite remarkably, rejected the warnings given by Marx and, more 
recently, by Polanyi,60 about the dire consequences of forcing a 
working-class into wage competition with itself – and that in the 
name of “social justice”,61 but rather, since they have also, with the 
aid of our old adjudicative friend “proportionality”, once again 
excluded a European working-class from any possible site of political 
contestation, within which its antagonistic interests might be 
presented and asserted. The adjudicative interplay between a Posted 
Workers Directive,62 purportedly introduced by the Council in order 
to regulate potential social dumping within the European market, 
and European rights of establishment and service-provision, as well 
as the primary provisions of European state aid law have thus led in 
European law to: 1) the creation of an absolute judicial prohibition 
against an international seaman’s strike (and all international 
solidarity strikes) called in solidaristic opposition to the re-flagging of 
a vessel, in order to allow for the hiring of cheaper foreign labour 
(Viking); 2) the imposition of a judicial value of “proportionality” 
upon all national strikes called in defence of local bargaining 
agreements (Viking and Laval); and 3) the establishment of a final 
prohibition on the democratically-legitimated enforcement of all local 
bargaining agreements, as local and national authorities are 
precluded by the provisions of the state aid law from tailoring their 
tenders to respect such agreements, and Article 3(1) of the Posted 
Workers Directive is deemed to give European protection only to 
universal provisions of national labour law, such as minimum wage 
requirements, working hour legislation and health and safety 
regulation, which apply to all workers in a Member State (Laval and 
Rüffert). 
 
Not surprisingly, such judgements have drawn a host of outraged 
comment from commentators, not least since the European Court 
appears thus to have drawn a coach and horses through the social 
constitutional settlements of countries, such as Sweden, which, 
                                                                                                                   
Union v. Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti (Judgment of 11 December 2007; 
Case C-341/05); Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, avd. 1, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (Judgment 
of 18 December 2007); Case C-346/06, Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk Rüffert v. Land 
Niedersachsen (Judgment of 3 April 2008). 
60 Karl Polanyi (1944), The Great Transformation, (New York: Beacon Press, 2001). 
61 See below. 
62 Directive 96/71/EC, OJ L 18/1996, 1. 
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historically, have not maintained minimum wage legislation, but 
have, instead, reconciled antagonistic class struggle by means of 
governmental enforcement of union-employer negotiated-bargaining 
agreements. At this one level, the ECJ would thus seem to have 
confirmed that the corporatist model of economic organisation within 
Europe is dead, and declared – the somewhat untimely – sovereignty 
of an Anglo-Saxon model of universal welfare provision.63 However, 
the interventionist impact of the Court just as surely extends far 
beyond the misconceived negative constitutional juxtaposition of the 
Anglo-Saxon model with continental models of social organisation, in 
order to effect the bourgeois colonisation of the framework of 
European law, instead. 
 
The clear, but shocking, historical analogy is the case of Lochner v New 
York, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1905,64 whereby the 
democratic right of the state of New York to set its own working 
conditions (including the rights of workers to strike) was overturned 
with reference to the US Constitution’s absolute guarantee for 
property. Presented by the majority of the Court as a formalistic 
inevitability, driven simply by the hierarchical precedence of the 
Constitution over state legislation, the cracked veneer of formalist 
rationality within the Court was, nonetheless, readily exposed, as the 
dissenting Judge, Justice Holmes, laconically observed that the 
democratic right of the states to legislate in this area was guaranteed 
also by the Constitution.65 The bourgeois sentiments of the US 
Supreme Court are readily identified; and so, too, are the bourgeois 
sentiments of European judge-kings who, once again, engage in an 
ill-advised, emotionally-driven auctoritas interposito, giving voice to 
their own perceptions of the social justice due to Eastern European 
workers, but, at the same time, denying the European working-class 
as a whole the opportunity to assert its antagonistic interests against a 
bourgeois European economy. The ECJ need not have decided as it 
did. 
 
Eastern enlargement and the failure of Western Europe to afford a 
measure of democratically-legitimated redistributive justice to its 
                                                 
63 See the relevant references in, Ch. Joerges and F. Rödl, “Informal Politics, 
Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections after the 
Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval”, (2009) 15 European Law Journal, pp. 1-19. 
64 Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
65 Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905. 
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recently-liberated eastern cousins is the backdrop against which the 
cases were decided, and it is also the backdrop against which the 
formalistically-flavoured choice of the Court to assert – under the veil 
of occidental rationalism – the hierarchical precedence of Articles 43, 
49 and 87 EC Treaty above the constitutional traditions and 
democratic processes of the Member States was taken. For all his talk 
of the creation of a European social constitution, the measure of AG 
Maduro’s notion of social justice in modern Europe is to be found in 
his promotion of social constitutionalism within a dominant 
European economic model of “allocative efficiency”; an ill-timed and 
emotional auctoritas interposito, which reacts to the clearly 
disadvantaged position of Eastern European workers with a notion of 
“social justice” that will see them work for less than western workers, 
and western workers denied access to their own jobs. Worse still, this 
false individual sentiment affects the Court as a whole, as the useful 
precedents of a series of social insurance cases are rejected,66 and the 
hands of national courts are tied, as proportionality becomes the 
impossible yardstick against which social antagonism must be 
measured. 
 
Within the social insurance cases – primarily concerning professional 
“trade agreements”, rather than the industrial bargaining agreements 
commonly concluded by the mass trades union movement – the core 
decision was one that such restrictive practices were per se legitimate 
mechanisms of social policy, and might only be reviewed under the 
European competition regime (Article 81 EC), with an eye to a 
procedural principle of proportionality, whereby such private 
arrangements would be reviewed by national courts in order to 
ensure that they were fair and not abusive in their composition and 
rates.67 Such a procedural resolution was also conceivable in the case 
of collective bargaining agreements; here, however, the formula is 
reversed. Collective bargaining agreements are per se restrictions on 
European rights; strikes will be contested in national courts to 
ascertain whether they are proportionate with those rights, in their 
substance, and not in their conduct. 
                                                 
66 Joined Cases Poucet and Pistre C-180/98 to C-184/98 [2000] ECR I-6451; Joined 
Cases Albany C-115/97, C-117/97, C-210/97, [1999] ECR I-6025 and [1999] ECR I-
6121; Joined Cases, Pavel Pavlov, C-180/98 to C-184/98 [2000]. 
67 See, M. Everson, “Social Pluralism and the European Court of Justice. A Court 
between a Rock and a Hard Place”, (2003) 8 The Journal of Legislative Studies, pp. 98-
116. 
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And, thus, false sentiment is unveiled as bourgeois might. A strike, the 
withdrawal of labour, is never substantively proportionate. Certainly, 
it may be illegally conducted, and, here, proportionality may have a 
real legal meaning, allowing courts to review whether strike votes 
were properly held. Beyond that, however, the strike is an irrational 
and disproportionate act, a concrete political expression of 
antagonistic class conflict, a modern continuation of the struggle that 
creates and undermines both our market and our state, a necessary 
site of reconciling conflict between antagonistic European classes, and 
a necessary site of conflict that the European Court has decisively 
foreclosed. 
6. The Responsibilities of Legal Method in 
European Law 
The consequences of the bourgeois colonisation of European law 
under current conditions of extreme economic decline are potentially 
catastrophic and may lead us blindly into a revolution ending in the 
very destruction of Europe. Wildcat strikes within the UK against 
contracted labour from other European states, the prospect that 
continental unions will take legal action to ask their constitutional 
courts to set European law aside, are all the more shocking for the 
manner in which they have been represented within both the national 
and the European media.68 In a highly unfortunate clash between 
identity-based notions of citizenship and industrial conceptions of the 
citizen, workers are dismissed as “xenophobic” and “racist”, are 
denied political voice as the mere representatives of the dinosaur of 
industrial self-interest. Contracted workers are viewed as the victims 
of the strikers, rather than as the victims of a bourgeois European 
economy, which has no proper redistributive provisions. Worker is 
set against worker as national governments, in thrall to the interests 
of the European ownership élite, are deaf to their protests; worker is 
set against worker as national courts are closed to them as sites of 
political contestation. The worker is eradicated from the stage of 
                                                 
68 The Times Comment (30 January 2009): “For many, complaints about foreign 
workers coming here and taking their jobs are disturbingly reminiscent of the 
atmosphere whipped up in Britain’s cities during the 1960s and 1970s, when the 
backlash against Commonwealth immigration was reflected both in the ballot box — 
in support for extreme right-wing parties — and, in many cases, in street violence. As 




European politics and becomes easy prey for extremist organisers 
both from the left and from the right. 
 
The time then has surely come to end the complacency of a European 
scholarship, which has lauded processes of supposed deliberation 
within, say, the European Convention and Open Method of Co-
ordination, has been blind to the real assertion of social interest 
within Europe, dismissing no-votes as being reflective of the 
ignorance of individual Europeans and has thus located itself within 
a European élite69 that is inured to the social and political aspirations 
of the European people. Surely the time has now come to develop a 
European legal method, which is founded within history, sensitive to 
the dangers posed by a judge-king, and which is never fooled or 
perverted by a lure of European élitism? Or, has it not, by stark 
contrast, been there all the time? We are fortunate to have 
experienced this legal scholarship from the very outset. In his time at 
the European University Institute, European Christian Joerges has 
not only reminded us constantly about the ambivalence of the judge-
king,70 however well-intentioned he or she may be, he has also 
written repeatedly on the need to celebrate lawyers who have fought 
against – at great personal cost – the very real dangers of occidental 
rationalism, and its collapse, within the ius publicum europaeum.71 He 
has not only repeatedly stressed the vital importance of the 
maintenance – within a conflict of laws logic – of the core of the 
national social settlement,72 he has also powerfully intervened to 
                                                 
69 Fligstein highlights the role of the European academic in the creation of the 
European élite (Fligstein 2008), Chapter 6. 
70 In an excellent, if very difficult, seminar on legal theory. 
71 “History as Non-History: Divergencies and Time Lags between Friedrich Kessler 
and German Jurisprudence”, (1994) 42 American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 163-
193; “Geschichte als Nicht-Geschichte: Unterschiede und Ungleichzeitigkeiten 
zwischen Friedrich Kessler und der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft”, in: Marcus 
Lutter, Ernst C. Stiefel and Michael H. Hoeflich (eds), Der Einfluß deutschsprachiger 
Emigranten auf die Rechtsentwicklung in den USA und in Deutschland, (Tübingen: Mohr 
& Siebeck, 1993), pp. 221-253. 
72 Christian Joerges, “What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A 
Melancholic Eulogy”, (2005) 30 European Law Review, pp. 461-48; “Rethinking 
European Law’s Supremacy: A Plea for a Supranational Conflict of Laws”, in: Beate 
Kohler Koch and Berthold Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the 
European Union, (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), pp. 311-327; and 
Jürgen Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political 
Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, 
pp. 273-299. 
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oppose the forces of blind economic rationality that are now 
threatening the very future of Europe.73 And, finally, with his 
historical sensitivity for the failings of the classical European nation 
state within all of its myriad legal settlements, he has just as surely 
primed us to maintain, at all times, our core humanity and empathy 
for the European other.74 
                                                 
73 Ch. Joerges, “The ‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?”, in: Lars 
Magnusson and Bo Stråth (eds), A European Social Citizenship? Preconditions for Future 
Policies in Historical Light, (Brussels: Lang, 2005), pp. 125-158; Christian Joerges and 
Florian Rödl, “The ‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?”, EUI 
Working Paper Law No. 2004/8; Ch. Joerges and F. Rödl, “Informal Politics, 
Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections after the 
Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval”, (2009) 15 European Law Journal, pp. 1-19. 
74 Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl (eds), Law, Democracy and 
Solidarity in a Post-national Union, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 
especially, “Working through ‘Bitter Experiences’ towards Constitutionalisation: A 
Critique on the Disregard for History in European Constitutional Theory”, pp. 175-
192); Ch. Joerges and Navraj S. Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The 
Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2003); Ch. Joerges, “Continuities and Discontinuities in German 
Legal Thought, The Darker Side of a Pluralist Heritage: Anti-liberal Traditions in 
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Chapter 7  
About Deliberative Supra-nationalism, 





1. “Comitology is Our Hero!” 
“Comitology is our hero!” This exclamation was frequently heard in 
many rooms of the Villa Schifanoia and at conferences held at the 
European University Institute and elsewhere during the 1990s, when 
I did my PhD thesis under the supervision of Christian Joerges. With 
this, Christian Joerges wanted to underline the important role that 
comitology played in the European integration process, and he 
praised it for its deliberative interaction and the emergence of a esprit 
de corps in the committee system, arguing that it “had achieved a 
change for the better, silently and behind the backs of the officially 
accountable actors”.1 While comitology had long been discussed in 
the institutions since the 1960s, it had also long been ignored by 
academic literature. Even at its inception, comitology was already an 
issue of legal and institutional dispute between the institutions. It 
was argued that it detracted from the Commission’s independent 
right of decision and thus also from the Parliament’s right of control, 
and, ultimately, that it distorted the EU’s institutional balance of 
powers. In particular, the Parliament was very keen to fight for more 
                                                 
1 Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative 
Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, (1997) 3 European Law 
Journal (ELJ), p. 299. 
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insight and control of comitology, referring to its obscure and 
undemocratic character and demanding that it be treated on an equal 
footing with the Council, where powers had been delegated by the 
European Parliament and Council to the Commission under co-
decision. 
 
It was only in the 1990s that researchers, in particular Christian 
Joerges,2 started to address this “low politics” of the European Union3 
concerning the preparation, shaping and implementation of decisions 
by comitology committees. In particular, the Bremen project led by 
Christian Joerges, which studied the comitology in the practice of risk 
regulation in the internal market,4 revealed important insights into 
                                                 
2 To be sure also G. Schaefer examined this topic; see R. Pedler and G. Schaefer, (eds), 
Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political 
Process, (Maastricht: EIPA, 1996). See, for the work by Christian Joerges, for example, 
Ch. Joerges, “Social Regulation by the Community: the Case of Foodstuffs”, in: F. 
Snyder (ed), A Regulatory Framework for Foodstuffs in the Internal Market, EUI Working 
Paper LAW 94/4 (European University Institute, Florence, 1994), pp. 50-56; Ch. 
Joerges, “Die Beurteilung der Sicherheit technischer Konsumgüter und der 
Gesundheitrisiken von Lebensmitteln in der Praxis des europäischen 
Ausschußwesens (‘Komitologie’)”, 95/1 ZERP-Diskussionspapier (1995); Ch. Joerges, 
“Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the European Court of Justice: Legal 
Frameworks for Denationalised Governance Structures”, in: Ch. Joerges, K.-H. 
Ladeur and E. Vos (eds), Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-
Making. National Traditions and European Innovations, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), 
pp. 295-323; Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to 
Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, (1997) 3 
ELJ, pp. 273-299; Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, “Transforming strategic interaction into 
deliberative problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuff sector”, (1997) 4 
Journal of European Public Policy, p. 609; Ch. Joerges and E. Vos, EU Committees: Social 
Regulation, Law and Politics, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999); Ch. Joerges and J. Falke, 
(eds), Das Ausschußwesen der Europäischen Union – Praxis der Risikoregulierung im 
Binnenmarkt und ihre rechtliche Verfassung, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000); Ch. Joerges, 
“Comitology and the European model? Towards a Recht-Fertigungs-Recht in the 
Europeanisation Process”, in: E.O. Eriksen, Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, (eds), European 
Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisation, (Oslo, Arena Report, 2003); 
Ch. Joerges, “Deliberative Political Processes Revisited: What Have we Learnt About 
the Legitimacy of Supranational Decision-Making”, (2006) 44 Journal of Common 
Market Studies, p. 779; Ch. Joerges, “Reconceptualising the Supremacy of European 
Law: A Plea for a Supranational Conflict of Laws”, in: B. Kohler-Koch and B. 
Rittberger, (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, (Lanham 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), p. 311. 
3 T. Christiansen and T. Larsson, “Introduction: the role of committee in the policy 
process of the European Union”, in: T. Christiansen and T. Larsson, (eds), The Role of 
Committees in the EU Policy-Process, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), p. 1. 
4 Joerges 1995, see note 2 supra; Joerges and Falke 2000, see note 2 supra. 
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the practical operation of comitology, and demonstrated its enormous 
impact upon EU decision-making. Upon the basis of an empirical 
study in the food sector, Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer 
explained that: 
 
[T]he Commission had accepted this co-operative arrangement 
because it needed the resources of national administrators in 
order to perform the function which the ‘implementation’ of 
Community law required. The Member States accepted it 
because they hoped to supervise the control of the 
Commission’s practices. No principal and no agent had 
planned to establish the type of deliberative problem-solving 
that we had observed and described.5 
 
They claimed that the establishment of non-hierarchical governance 
structures needs to be understood as an indispensable pre-requisite 
for the functioning of the common market. This type of governance 
will depend upon persuasion, argument and discursive processes, 
rather than on command, control and/or strategic action.6 It “rejects 
the idea of supra-national central implementation machinery headed 
by the Commission, and thus directly forces national governments 
into a co-operative venture”.7 Comitology, then, in their view, was 
the normatively imperfect institutionalisation of co-operative 
problem-solving. 
 
This “deliberative supra-nationalism”, as they termed it, needed a 
“constitutionalisation” of comitology, an improved legal framework 
that would stabilise the deliberative potential of comitology 
governance. With this, they tried to offer an alternative to the vision 
of a European “regulatory state”, and the resort to independent 
agencies as advanced by Giandomenico Majone. This novel and 
challenging analysis of comitology, viewing committees as 
deliberative bodies that would not be confined purely to 
implementation issues, radically changed the traditional vision of 
comitology as being an instrument of intergovernmental control, 
generally held in the hands of the main institutional actors, the 
Council, the Parliament and the Commission. 
                                                 
5 Joerges 2006, see note 2 supra, p. 785. 




Not surprisingly, Christian Joerges’ analysis had, and still has, an 
enormous impact on academic research, which started to debate the 
“good” and the “bad” of comitology in this new light. Many authors 
were particularly sceptical of the attempt to build a theoretical 
justification for a positive assessment of comitology, as a forum for 
“deliberative politics”, as a form of “deliberative supra-nationalism”, 
thus enhancing legitimacy.8 
 
In addition, others also criticised the claims of the democratic 
character of comitology, and accused “deliberative supra-
nationalism” to favour a traditionally technocratic model of policy 
consultation that would not place European governance in line with 
the normative criteria of theories of deliberative democracy.9 Other 
analyses, while acknowledging that committees may well contribute 
to the erosion of the crude pursuit of national interests and thus 
promote “deliberative problem-solving” in European governance, 
distinguish committees with formally weak powers (advisory) and 
committees with far-reaching powers (regulatory). They reveal, upon 
the basis of an empirical study in the field of the environment, that 
the latter type of committee is much more based upon “power-based 
pursuit of parochial interests”, rather than on promoting deliberative 
consensus-building.10 Others again, although critical about the 
empirical underpinning of the theory, strongly supported the need 
for the Member States to participate in the implementing phase of EU 
decision-making through deliberative interaction,11 confirmed that 
this mechanism makes the action of the Commission more 
democratic and “closer to the citizen”,12 and viewed it as 
                                                 
8 See, for example, B. Kohler-Koch, “Die Europäisierung nationaler Demokratien. 
Verschleiß eines europäischen Kulturerbes?” in: M. Greven (ed), Demokratie – eine 
Kultur des Westens? (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1998), p. 277 et seq. 
9 R. Schmalz-Bruns, “Deliberative Supranationalismus: Demokratisches Regieren 
jenseits des Nationalstaates”, (1999) 6 Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, p. 185. 
J.H.H. Weiler, “Epilogue”, in: Ch. Joerges and E. Vos, (eds), EU Committees: Social 
Regulation, Law and Politics, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), p. 338 and p. 340. 
10 See, for example, T. Gehring, “Arguing, Bargaining and Functional Differentiation 
of Decision-making. The Role of Committees in European Environmental Process 
Regulation”, in: Ch. Joerges and E. Vos, (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law 
and Politics, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), p. 206. 
11 E. Vos, “The rise of committees”, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, p. 230. 
12 K. Lenaerts and A. Verhoeven, “Towards a legal Framework for Executive Rule-
making in the EU? The Contribution of the New Comitology Decision”, (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review, p. 664. 
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complementing the limited staff resources in the Commission.13 As 
they are composed of both bureaucrats and national representatives 
at the same time, committees have been consideredas co-ordinating 
bodies which act between supra-national and national, and 
governmental and social, actors, and may (although not always) 
voice national viewpoints.14 
 
Faced with these criticisms, Christian Joerges has defended15 and 
further explained deliberative supra-nationalism as being understood 
as a “conflict-of-laws methodology”, which is about “the recognition 
of foreign law, the adaptation of domestic law to the co-operative 
needs and legal commitments and principles furthering co-operative 
problem-solving”.16 He distinguished two types of deliberative 
supra-nationalism: DSN I, which is “a law of conflicts mediation”, 
and DSN II, which is “a law that responds to the apparently 
irresistible transformation of institutionalised government into 
transnational governance arrangements”.17 It is the latter type that 
this article discusses, with a focus upon the comitology that Christian 
Joerges considers as being an (imperfect) example of this. It will share 
some new insights and developments that have taken place in the 
food sector – the cradle of Christian Joerges’ analysis in the pre-BSE 
era – and examine whether and to what extent these developments 
and new institutional arrangements fit with Christian Joerges’ model. 
 
2. DSN II, Comitology and Foodstuffs 
2.1. Comitology as a Co-operative System 
When looking at the practice of comitology, we may observe that, 
over the years, the decision-making involving comitology led to a 
more consensual and problem-solving approach to decision-making 
between the Commission and the committees.18 When looking at the 
                                                 
13 L. Allio, “The Case for Comitology Reform: Efficiency, Transparency, 
Accountability”, in: L. Allio and G. Durand, (eds), From Legislation to Implementation: 
the Future of EU Decision-making, (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2003), p. 39. 
14 E. Vos, “The role of Comitology in European Governance”, in: D. Curtin and R. 
Wessel, (eds), Good Governance and the European Union-Concept, implications and 
applications, (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005), p. 107. 
15 See, for example, Ch. Joerges, “Deliberative Supra-nationalism, Two Defences”, 
(2002) 8 ELJ, p. 133. 
16 Joerges 2006, see note 2 supra, p. 802. See, also, Joerges 2007, see note 2 supra. 
17 Joerges 2007, see note 2 supra, p. 322. 
18 See, for example, COM(2001) 783 final, p. 7. 
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figures presented by the European Commission, it appears that only 
a few draft decisions are submitted to the Council, under the 
regulatory committee procedure.19 These data clearly indicate the 
great importance of committee-based decision-making. Moreover, 
recent empirical analysis confirms the picture that emerged from the 
empirical research carried out by Christian Joerges and others, 
namely, that of a more deliberative process. According to these 
findings, the comitology system “instead of being exclusive and 
manipulated by a few, […] seems to be more inclusive and focused 
on finding solutions through reasoning not bargaining, at least when 
compared with many national governments”.20 It is concluded that: 
 
[T]his is a system which uses socialisation as an important tool 
in making politicians, experts and interest representatives from 
different nations agree on issues of common interest.21 
 
In comitology committees, so this study argues, the expertise of the 
Commission, often supported by outside expertise through interest 
groups and consultancies, is merged with the know-how of 
theexperts of the Member States. In this manner, the comitology 
system enables the Commission and Member States to manage the 
extremely complex system of agriculture efficiently. Other 
comitology committees confront difficult and technical issues in long 
and tedious negotiations, which are not time-efficient but are 
                                                 
19 For 2006, for example, the data produced by the Commission reveal that the 
number of favourable opinions delivered by regulatory and management committees 
amounted to 2,933 (compared with 2,582 in 2005), the number of cases in which no 
opinion could be obtained or an opinion was absent, amounted to 129. No 
unfavourable opinions were reported. Of the 3,061 draft decisions submitted to the 
committees, only 6 were referred to the Council under the regulatory committee 
procedure. In these cases, no opinion could be reached by the relevant committees on 
waste, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the Generalised System of 
Preferences (trade). See the Commission of the European Communities, Report from 
the Commission on the Working of Committees During 2006, COM(2007) 842 final, 20 
December 2007, pp. 6-7. See, also, the List of Comitology Committees assisting the 
Commission of the European Communities, February 2008, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/docs/comitology_committees_en
.pdf. 
20 T. Christiansen, T. Larsson and G.F. Schaefer, “Conclusion”, in: T. Christiansen and 
T. Larsson, (eds), The Role of Committees in the EU Policy-Process, (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2007), p. 271. 
21 Ibid. 
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consensus-efficient.22 Practice, moreover, demonstrates that 
comitology may be extremely important, as it allows national 
positions also to be taken into account in the implementing phase in 
order to ensure the proper enforcement of, and compliance with, EU 
decisions. Striving for more effective decision-making and better 
policies would thus require the Member States to be consulted in the 
implementing phase.23 This is clearly demonstrated by the recent 
empirical study which finds that the comitology committees 
contribute effectively to improving the implementation and 
application process of EC law in, and through, the Member States. 
Without the comitology system, the current implementation and 
application deficits would be much worse.24 
2.2. The Food Sector 
For the field of foodstuffs, a slightly different picture emerges. It was 
this field that was the origin of Christian Joerges’ analysis in the pre-
BSE era. Today, more than ten years after the outbreak of the BSE 
crisis, the refurbished Standing Committee on the Food Chain and 
Animal Health absorbs the formerly existing Standing Committee on 
Foodstuffs and other standing committees, whilst the Scientific 
Committee for Food has been absorbed into the newly created 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). A few observations based 
upon a recent small-scale empirical study25 seem to suggest that, in 
this domain, this “normatively imperfect institutionalisation of co-
operative problem-solving” as Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer 
proclaimed in the pre-BSE era,26 is “losing ground”, and, indeed, 
challenges the concept of deliberative supra-nationalism. 
 
Firstly, the research revealed that, today within the framework of the 
Standing Committee, there seems to be less deliberation and more 
bargaining and negotiation around representative interests than 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 265. 
23 See note 14 supra. 
24 Christiansen, Larsson and Schaefer, see note 20 supra, p. 265. 
25 For the purpose of this study, 13 persons were interviewed, of whom 9 were from 
DG SANCO of the Commission, 1 from the EFSA and 3 from stakeholder 
associations. Of the 13 interviewees, 4 were female. Both senior managers and desk 
officials were interviewed. The interviews took place between April and July 2005. 
See E. Vos and F. Wendler, “Food Safety Regulation at the EU Level”, in: E. Vos and 
F. Wendler (eds), Food Safety Regulation in Europe. A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2006), pp. 65-138, at 116-131. 
26 Joerges and Neyer 1997, see note 1 supra. 
208 Vos
 
Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer observed in the pre-BSE era.27 In 
view of the highly political and politicised character of food issues in 
the aftermath of BSE, particularly with regard to GM issues, this may 
not come as a real surprise.28 In this manner, it is felt by various 
Commission officials who were interviewed that Committee 
members consult more often with their national ministries, and that, 
in some politically very sensitive areas, such as GM food or 
contaminants, some members tend to come to meetings with clear 
instructions from “home” and/or have clearly defined positions to 
defend. As a consequence, the meetings of the Standing Committee 
deliberately start in the morning so as to give members the 
opportunity to obtain feedback from the Member States and to allow 
the Commission to alter its proposal by the evening, thereby 
enhancing the possibility of reaching agreement on the measure in 
question.29 This practice seems to be in contrast with the pre-BSE 
practice of the former Standing Committee on Foodstuffs, in which 
members appeared to be free to discuss solutions without any 
ministerial backing and with a formal vote rarely being taken.30 
 
Secondly, discussions with stakeholders no longer take place within 
the comitology setting. Although the Commission had already 
created an Advisory Committee on Foodstuffs in the 1970s, 
composed of various stakeholder representatives, this Committee 
was no longer consulted in the 1980s. In the post-BSE era, in an 
attempt to overcome the crisis of confidence in EU risk regulation and 
to compensate for the closed science- and policy-making within the 
Standing Committee and EFSA’s scientific Committee and Panels, we 
can observe the creation of separate platforms by both the 
Commission and the EFSA, on order to discuss more policy-oriented 
issues for the Commission and more science-oriented issues for EFSA 
with the stakeholders. As a result, today, discussions with the 
stakeholders take place separately with the EFSA and the 
Commission,31 outside of the context of comitology. 
                                                 
27 Gehring observed this situation of bargaining to take place in the area of 
environmental policy in the 1990s, See T. Gehring, note 10 supra. 
28 See P. Dabrowska, EU Governance of GMOs, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 
2009). 
29 See Vos and Wendler, note 25 supra. 
30 Joerges and Neyer 1997, see note 1 supra. 
31 Commission/EFSA representatives may, nevertheless, attend meetings of the 
EFSA’s Stakeholder Platform/the Commission’s Advisory Group on the Food Chain 
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Thirdly, we can observe an increasing scientification of food safety 
regulation and the Europeanisation of science in the field of 
foodstuffs, which seem to give Member States less influence within 
the context of comitology than was the case in the pre-BSE era. This is 
exemplified by the intensification of the relationship between the 
Commission and the EFSA, to the detriment of the relationship 
between the Commission and the national representatives within the 
Standing Committee. In this manner, there are the first indications 
that, at least for priority-setting, the Commission prefers to consult 
the EFSA first, instead of asking the Member States for advice within 
the framework of comitology, which was the general practice before 
the EFSA was created. Discussions on this topic now seem to take 
place in the comitology setting only at a second stage.32 
 
Figure 7.1  Interplay of various actors within the field of food safety 
regulation in the post-BSE era. 
 
These findings, nevertheless, do not encroach upon Christian Joerges’ 
view that comitology is key to the co-ordination of viewpoints 
between the Commission and the Member States, and that it also 
operates as a conflict-of-laws rule between the EU and the Member 
                                                                                                                   
and Animal Health. 





State level in this field.33 The empirical study indeed confirms that 
comitology is an essential and indispensable element of food 
regulation. The Commission officials of DG SANCO who were 
interviewed were all very much aware of the importance of 
collaboration with, and approval by, the Member States for their draft 
decisions within the framework of the Standing Committee, and that 
they are willing to compromise, albeit not at any cost. Moreover, 
national representatives were viewed as being more “EU-minded”, 
or, to express it differently, more “compromise-oriented” than before. 
Furthermore, all interviewees favoured the comitology procedure 
above the normal legislative, co-decision procedure. Among some 
officials, it was felt that there was “no alternative” to the comitology 
procedure; indeed, one EFSA official considered it even to be the 
“most democratic procedure”.34 
 
What these developments do show, however, is that the current 
practical reality is more diverse and complex than the model that 
Christian Joerges suggests (see Figure 1). Social pluralist interests are 
discussed outside the framework of the Standing Committee with 
either the Commission or the EFSA separately, without Member 
States representatives being present.35 In view of the mere one-sided 
communication channel within the Commission’s stakeholder setting, 
stakeholder representatives themselves ask to be included in the 
meetings of the Standing Committee as it is precisely there that the 
decisions are being taken. Quite revolutionarily, DG SANCO seems 
to be willing to accommodate such wishes, and it would seem that it 
intends to encourage discussions between the chairs of the different 
sections of the Standing Committee, the Advisory Group on the 
Animal Food Chain and Plant Health and other stakeholders with the 
DG SANCO representatives,36 thereby establishing the first step 
                                                 
33 Joerges 2007, see note 2 supra. 
34 Vos and Wendler, see note 25 supra, p. 129. 
35 The stakeholders interviewed considered the Stakeholder Consultative Platform of 
EFSA to be very open, quite interactive and truly involving stakeholders in the 
choice of subjects for consultation. In contrast, the Commission’s Advisory Group 
was seen mainly as a communication and information channel for the Commission to 
the stakeholders, without offering stakeholders the possibility of influencing the 
debate or exchanging opinions . F. Wendler and E. Vos, “Stakeholder Involvement in 
EU Food Safety Governance: Towards a More Open and Structured Approach?”, 
Working Paper for Subproject 5 of the SAFE FOODS Project (Maastricht 2008). 
36 Conclusions and Actions following DG SANCO 2006 Peer Review Group on 
Stakeholder Involvement, Healthy Democracy, February 2007. See  
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towards the creation of a public sphere on comitology, in which 
interested parties can voice concerns and exchange ideas with both 
Commission and Member State officials; this is, indeed, a 
development which would point towards Christian Joerges’ model. 
 
Yet, it is the third development, that of science and rationality being 
considered as a panacea to restore and secure public faith in the 
credibility of risk regulation, which seems to be the most important 
challenge to deliberative supra-nationalism. Undoubtedly, the role of 
science and the importance for a (regulatory administrative) 
committee, entrusted with the task of adapting directives to technical 
progress, in order to ensure expert advice was already recognised by 
Christian Joerges in the 1990s.37 Thus, the European Court’s judgment 
in the Angelopharm case was another “hero” of Christian Joerges, as it 
would transform the use of expert advice into a legal duty, and non-
compliance with this duty would become a per se incorrect exercise of 
discretion in decision-making.38 Yet, post-BSE, the pressures for the 
scientification of politics have become irresistible, not only due to the 
revelations by the Medina Ortega Report that the scientists on the 
scientific committees dealing with beef (in particular, the Scientific 
Veterinary Committee) had been put under a great deal of political 
pressure, and that the responsibilities for science and politics had 
been blurred,39 but also due to global pressures for the liberalisation 
of trade regimes. So, we witnessed the move of science and the 
responsibility for scientific advice away from the framework(s) of the 
Commssion and the committee to independent agencies, in the case 
of food, the EFSA. This agency plays, as we have observed above, an 
increasingly important role in Community decision-making, with the 
Commission, as a “blind driver” becoming increasingly dependent on 
the EFSA, as the “‘directions-giving passenger”.40 Unsurprisingly, 
                                                                                                                   
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/Documents/stakeholders_en.pdf. The 
first meeting was planned to take place in November 2007. 
37 Joerges 1997, see note 2 supra. 
38 Joerges 1999, see note 2 supra. See, however, the critical remarks by K.St.C. Bradley, 
“Institutional Aspects of Comitology: Scenes from the Cutting Room Floor”, in: Ch. 
Joerges and E. Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 1999). 
39 European Parliament Final BSE Inquiry Report, Rapporteur Manuel Medina Ortega, 
A4-0020/97/A, 1997. 
40 During one of the interviews, a Commission official depicted the relationship 
between the Commission and the EFSA as two people driving a car: a blind driver 
(the Commission) and a directions-giving passenger (EFSA). See Vos and Wendler, 
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therefore, the Commission has always followed the scientific 
opinions of theEFSA. Another indication of EFSA’s growing 
importance is the Commission’s attitude to make use of the scientific 
opinions of EFSA in order to defend its own position within the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) at international level.41 At 
the same time, we can also observe increasing influence of science in 
the setting of the Standing Committee. For example, meetings of the 
(various sections of the) Standing Committee are regularly attended 
by EFSA officials, whilst it is no secret that, especially in debates on 
the authorisation of GMOs, both Member States and the Commission 
harness themselves with science-based arguments.42 In the latter 
context, it is the Member States that are more often unwilling to 
adhere to the opinions of the EFSA, and tend to rely on their own, 
“nationally produced” science. 
 
This development of scientification of politics and thus de-
politicisation, leads paradoxically to the politicisation of science.43 
This can and, indeed, might lead to obscure and insensitive decision-
making with the simple application of science to complex social 
relations, which might, furthermore, also deny its own normative 
underpinnings or commitment to positive values such as human 
health.44 This is particularly problematical where decision-making in 
situations of uncertainty involving human health and/or the 
environment may, and often must also, be political in nature. These 
are the challenges that deliberative supra-nationalism would still 
need to deal with and which require further clarification and 
conceptualisation by Christian Joerges. 
                                                                                                                   
note 25 supra, p. 122. 
41 See M. Masson-Matthee, The Codex Alimentarius Commission and its Standards, (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007). 
42 See, for the discussion held in the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and 
Animal Health Section: Genetically Modified Food And Feed and Environmental 
Risk, at  
http://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/regulatory/scfcah/modif_genet/index_en.h
tm. 
43 See P. Weingart, “Scientific expertise and political accountability: Paradoxes of 
science in politics”, (1999) 26 Science and Public Policy, pp. 151-161. 
44 M. Everson and E. Vos, “The Scientification of Politics and the Politicisation of 
Science”, in: M. Everson and E. Vos (eds), Uncertain Risks Regulated, 
(Abingdon/New York: Routledge/Cavendish Publishing, 2009), pp. 1-17. 
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3. Concluding Remarks: Another Hero 
This article was about Christian Joerges and his heroes. It celebrated 
the intellectual curiosity of a very special person. In my presentation 
at the workshop celebrating Christian’s farewell from the European 
University Institute in September 2007 in Florence, I tried to 
demonstrate that it is not surprising that it was Christian Joerges who 
developed the concept of deliberative supra-nationalism, striving for 
the conceptualisation of the “unitas in diversitate” formula, with 
comitology as an example of this; for this would actually be inherent 











    
    
 
 
    
Figure 7.2  United in Diversity: Comitology 




The many faces of Christian Joerges 
On a more serious note, I have tried in this chapter to sketch the 
challenges with which the EU is faced, specifically in the food sector, 
but also more generally. I have argued that, first and foremost, the 
more global development of the scientification of politics and the 
politicisation of science requires further clarification and 
conceptualisation by deliberative supra-nationalism. 
 
The discussions during the workshop and the articles in this book 
make it clear that Christian Joerges’ work has had, and still has, an 
enormous impact on academic research and writing, not to mention 
institutional practice. It was foremost thanks to the work of Christian 
that we observe a clear shift away from a more traditional 
understanding of comitology as purely a mechanism of 
intergovernmental control in the 1970s, to a vision of comitology as 
more deliberative, problem-solving fora in the 1990s, which is still the 
prevailing opinion in the 2000s. Christian Joerges is an extraordinary 
man who has had both the ability and the patience to inspire not only 
his Ph.D researchers but also many other academics and 
practitioners. It is therefore safe to conclude that it is not comitology 
but Christian Joerges, who is our hero! Thank you, Christian. 
 
Chapter 8  
The Significance of General Administrative 
Law for European Administrative Law 
 
Karl-Heinz Ladeur 




1. The Development of a “Europeanised General 
Administrative Law” 
1.1. Learning Processes between General and Specific 
Administrative Law on the National Plane 
It is common knowledge that the europeanisation of German 
administrative law has not only fundamentally re-modelled the 
content of administrative law, but has also buffeted national 
administrative law with several shockwaves, as well as putting its 
institutions under pressure to conform,1 a pressure which also 
                                                 
∗ Translation by Rory S. Brown. 
1 See, from the almost countless contributions, only E. Schmidt-Aßmann, 
“Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht in europäischer Perspektive”, (2000) 54 ZÖR, p. 159; 
ibid., “Einleitende Problemskizze”, in: W. Hoffmann-Riem/idem., (ed), Strukturen des 
europäischen Veraltungsrechts, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), p. 9; J. Schwarze (ed), 
Administrative Law Under European Influence, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996); S. 
Kadelbach, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht unter europäischem Einfluß, (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1999); idem., “Administrative Law and the Law of a Europeanized Administration”, 
in: Ch. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), p. 167; for a comparative law perspective, see J. Bell, 
“Public Law in Europe: Caught Between the National, the Sub-national and the 
European?”, in: M. van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 259, especially, p. 265 et seq.; K.-H. Ladeur (ed), 
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threatens their formative culture and their capacity to review.2 Other 
metamorphoses have occurred at a more pedestrian pace through 
extensions to already existing systems and have only incrementally 
led to the development of new forms or procedural structures. This is 
true, for instance, in planning proceedings3 and in the new dogmatics 
of balancing, which have gradually emancipated themselves from the 
classic discretionary credo and have developed the new logic of the 
procedurally staggered decision.4 
 
Similarly, in the administrative law of risk,5 which, first, unsure of 
itself, provoked a limitless expansion of the procedural rationality 
behind the reason for decisions, until new procedural elements 
seeped through, which, again, adjusted the relation between 
information, external expertise,6 and the specific rationality of 
administrative decision-making (“Concept”).7 
 
The overcoming of this development of the dogmatics of 
administrative law has allowed the mutual observation and analysis 
of particular adminstrative law in the medium of the “ordering idea” 
of general administrative law, and, obversely, its “preservation” in 
the differentiation of its systematic performance in the scrutiny of 
particular “reference areas”.8 This term “reference area” (used with 
                                                                                                                   
The Europeanisation of Administrative Law, (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002). 
2 See, on civil law, J. Smits, “The Europeanisation of National Legal Systems: Some 
Consequences for Legal Thinking in Civil Law Countries”, in: M. van Hoecke (ed), 
(note 1 supra), p. 229 and 237. 
3 See, only, W. Hoppe, C. Bönker and S. Grotefels, Öffentliches Baurecht, (Munich: 
Beck, 3rd ed., 2004), § 7; and, going further, M. Pöcker, “Irritationen einer Grundlage 
des Rechtssystems. Die Problematik des Verhältnisses von materiellem Recht und 
Verfahrensrecht bei Planungsentscheidungen”, (2003) 56 DÖV, p. 980; for a European 
perspective, see J.B. Auby, “The Influence of European Law on Planning”, (1998) 4 
EPL, p. 45. 
4 See Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 1 supra), “Problemskizze”, S. 36 and 37.. 
5 See A. Scherzberg, “Risiko als Rechtsproblem”, (1993) 84 VerwAch, p. 484; O. 
Lepsius/idem,, “Risikoverwaltungsrecht – Ermöglichung oder Begrenzung von 
Innovationen?”, (2004) 63 VVDStRL, p. 214 and 264; and, generally, P. Th. Stoll, 
Sicherheit als Aufgabe von Staat und Gesellschaft, (Tübingen: Mohr, 2003). 
6 A. Voßkuhle, Sachverständige Beratung des Staates, in: HbStR Bd. III, 3. Aufl., § 43.; 
P. Scholl, Der private Sachverständige im Verwaltungsrecht, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2005). 
7 See BVerwGE 69, 37, 45. 
8 Schmidt-Aßmann, ibid., Kap. 1, Tz. 12f.; idem, Aufgaben und Perspektiven 
verwaltungsrechtlicher Forschung. Aufsätze 1975 – 2005, (Tübingen: Mohr, 2006), S. 384, 
398; idem., S. Dagron, “Deutsches und französisches Verwaltungsrecht im Vergleich 
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justifiable frequency) takes the necessity of the dynamic development 
of general administrative law and its ineluctable dependency on 
various trends into consideration: general administrative law creates 
no rigid hierarchy to guide particular administrative law and remains 
untouched by the “application” of the latter in specific substantive 
cases. For its part, it is dependent on the observation of 
administrative legal practice for the variation of its terminology in the 
stabilisation of its general structures. Individual tasks make different 
demands on the system formation, and, thus, must leave an imprint.9 
The status of particular fields of substantive administrative law as 
“reference areas” expresses the anti-social aspect of the normative 
performance of administrative law, and its corresponding 
disjointedness and dissimilarity: general administrative law does not 
employ the generalisable forms that generate themselves from 
specific administrative fields, but, instead, distinguishes between the 
reference areas that produce the guiding ideas and others that are 
fitted to these ideas, or, alternatively, their semantic existence takes 
up only a peripheral role, i.e., cannot generalise, that is, direct 
performance.10 The concept of the “reference area” facilitates an 
aperture for the observation of the temporal and physical dynamics 
of the changes. Not least, the increasing special legislation throws 
doubt on the leading role of classic police and regulatory law. 
 
In particular, the result-orientation, thrown into relief by the focus of 
general administrative law on the administrative act,11 has been 
altered, amongst other things, through the ascent of the procedural 
dimension, the differentiation of new forms of administrative 
authorisations, the opening of the process to the variations of the 
“external” participation, and the increased usage of experts.12 
                                                                                                                   
ihrer Ordnungsideen”, appears in: (2007) 67 ZaöRV, Ms., p. 3 and 6. 
9 See C. Bumke, “Die Entwicklung der verwaltungsrechtswissenschaftlichen 
Methodik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, in: E. Schmidt-Aßmann and W. 
Hoffmann-Riem (eds), Methoden der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2004), p. 73 and 109. 
10 Schmidt-Aßman, (note 8 supra), “Ordnungsidee”, Kap. 1 Tz. 12f. 
11 See O. Mayer, “Zur Lehre vom öffentlichen Vertrage”, (1890) 5 AöR, p. 3; for 
criticism, see P. Laband, “Rezension”, (1910) 26 AöR, p. 365. 
12 See, generally, on the development of German administrative law in the post-war 
period, R. Wahl, Herausforderungen und Antworten. Das öffentliche Recht der letzten fünf 
Jahrzehnte, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006); see, also, G. de Cananea, “Beyond the State: The 
Europeanisation and Globalisation of Procedural Administrative Law”, (2004) 10 
EPL, p. 563. 
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The europeanisation of national general adminstrative law seems to 
come about in quite a different fashion: the europeanisation of the 
particular national administrative fields (environmental law, for 
example) came about through the alteration of norms (through 
adaptation to guidelines13), and, in this way, indirectly necessitated 
the faster growth of the formative systemic and normative function of 
general administrative law.14 Thus, for several years, the shockwave 
has directly – without any form of mediation by a specific legal field – 
hit general administrative law, and, above all, suffused with the 
dictate of guaranteeing “effet utile”15 for specific European 
administrative law, we see the formative effect of the dogma of 
general administrative law: here, it is no longer about evaluating new 
systemic forms of the particular administrative laws upon the basis of 
their performance or their capacity to conform; instead, it is to ensure 
the partially stabilised statutory forms (and contrarily), that the 
achievement of the aims of particular European administrative laws 
are not hampered by the structural demands of general national 
administrative law. This novel challenge is especially clear in the 
application of the prescriptions of general administrative law to the 
withdrawal of administrative acts contrary to EC law:16 with regard 
to the effet utile, it is a concern of the ECJ, that, without a European 
competence for general procedural administrative law, not simply its 
interpretation in special circumstances, only a particular result will be 
                                                 
13 The methods of the conforming interpretation also belong to this normative effect; 
see H.D. Jarass, “Richtlinienkonforme Interpretation nationalen Rechts or EG-
rechtskonforme Auslegung nationalen Rechts”, (1991) 26 EuR, p. 211; G. Ress, “Die 
richtlinienkonforme ‘Interpretation’ innerstaatlichen Rechts”, (1994) 47 DÖV, p. 489. 
14 See R. Wahl, “Die zweite Phase des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland. Die 
Europäisierung des öffentlichen Rechts”, (1999) 38 Der Staat, p. 495. 
15 See EuGH/ECJ Slg. 1990, I-2433 (Factortame); Slg. 2001, I-3541 (Commission v 
Netherlands); Slg. 1998, I-4767 (Ölmühle Hamburg); R. Streinz, Europarecht, 
(Heidelberg: Müller, 7th ed., 2005), Rn. 797. 
16 See, from the expansive literature, D. Scheuing, “Europäisierung des 
Verwaltungsrechts. Zum mitgliedstaatlichen Verwaltungsvollzug des EG-Rechts am 
Beispiel der Rückforderung gemeinschaftsrechtswidriger Beihilfen”, (2001) 34 Die 
Verwaltung, p. 107; D. Hanf, “Vertrauensschutz bei der Rücknahme rechtswidriger 
Verwaltungsakte als neuer Prüfstein für das Kooperationsverhältnis zwischen EuGH 
und BverfG”, (1999) 59 ZaöRV, p. 51; J. Suerbaum, “Die Europäisierung des 
nationalen Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts am Beispiel der Rückforderung 
gemeinschaftsrechtswidriger staatlicher Beihilfen”, (2000) 91 VerwArch, p. 169; S. 
Schonberg, “Legal Certainty and Revocation of Administrative Decisions: A 
Comparative Study of English, French and EC-Law”, Yearbook of Eur. Law 2000, p. 257 
and p. 297: as to the conflict with English law; BVerwG, (1999) 129 BayVBl, p. 22. 
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pre-determined without a European competence for general 
procedural administrative law. To this extent, effet utile is more apt 
than the German expression “Effektivität”, which does not adequately 
convey the purely pragmatic orientation, developed in the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ: it is irrelevant whether or not the 
“effect/benefit” is achieved through the non-implementation or the 
reconstruction of a norm of general administrative law. 
Consequently, EC law intervenes in a far stronger and seismic 
manner in national administrative law than the legal principle of 
consistent interpretation in national law, a principle, which in 
Germany, as in Italy, conveys the duty to interpret laws in line with 
the constitution. A similar phenomenon can be observed in civil law, 
where the implementation of European prescriptions in particular 
instances overplays the norms of the BGB (the German Civil Code) 
and even here, only mandates a certain “effect/benefit”, without 
providing a certain form.17 In any event, for the time being, one 
cannot say, either of administrative law or of civil law, that a separate 
general part of a European or civil law is developing; instead, it 
seems that the effect of particular law on the general law is purely 
disruptive. 
1.2. Disruption through European Law? 
On closer inspection, it can be seen, at least for administrative law, 
that the expectation of guaranteed effet utile is not so destructive for 
national general administrative law as it first might seem. 
Correspondingly, the legal position no longer proves to be so clear, 
that, for instance, §48 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (VwVfG; Code of 
Administrative Procedure) is valid in its original form for the not yet 
europeanised administrative law, whilst, for the europeanised law, 
“hindrances” are simply moved aside. The contours of a new 
European general administrative law can much more easily be 
recognised in that a pluralisation of public law is taking place; the 
same can be said for procedural administrative law.18 When one 
considers, in the “purely German” legal situation of a judicial review 
(and the administrative law claim) involving a third party, in which 
                                                 
17 See C. Schmid, “The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law Court: A 
Methodological Comparison”, Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik, DP 4/2006; J. 
Smits, (note 2 supra), National Legal Systems. 
18 See, on this fundamentally, as to the concept of protecting the third party, M. 
Schmidt-Preuß, “Kollidierende Privatinteressen im Verwaltungsrecht”, (1992), (Berlin: 
Duncker and Humblot, 2nd ed., 2005). 
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an administrative act has affected legally protected interests, it 
becomes clear, that the staying power in the triangular relationship is 
limited if the third party is not participating in the proceedings and 
the administrative act has not been communicated to him. Also, in 
this case, the addressee might have to anticipate certiorari in review 
proceedings or a court’s decision long after the administrative act.19 
Similarly, there are competing relationships of public interest through 
various German sovereigns: contestations by municipalities of the 
administrative measures of other municipalities,20 or other counties 
or institutions of the counties against one another (the Radio case),21 
are not rare in the concatenated legal order of the Bundesrepublik. 
Here, again, we are met with the phenomenon of the pluralisation of 
public interests, which can also affect private belief in the staying 
power of an administrative order. The effet utile jurisprudence 
strengthens the position of the competing public and private interests 
in a procedure. One can, in this procedural format, draw a parallel to 
legal procedural protection: the Commission also has the capacity to 
bring claims against a Member State, for example, pursuant to Article 
227 EEC, because of the awarding of a subsidy contrary to European 
law in a contractual dispute before the ECJ. 22 In this case – leaving 
                                                 
19 Par. 80a VwGO reacted to this; note the expansion of third party rights onto 
material or procedural law fundaments endangering the position of subjectively 
public law in German administrative law? See, also, S. Hölscheidt, “Abschied vom 
subjektiv-öffentlichen Recht? Zu Wandlungen der Verwaltungsrechtsdogmatik unter 
Einfluss des Gemeinschaftsrechts”, (2001) 36 EuR, p. 376; M. Ruffert, “Dogmatik und 
Praxis des subjektiv-öffentlichen Rechts unter dem Einfluß des 
Gemeinschaftsrechts”, (1998) 113 DVBl, p. 69; see, on the expansion of the 
associative/group claim, H.J. Koch, “Die Verbandsklage im Umweltrecht”, (2007) 26 
NVwZ, p. 369. 
20 See, on inter-municipal claims, BVerwG, (2006) 26 UPR, p. 216. 
21 BVerwG, (1999) 113 DVBl , p. 615 (Claims between counties in a radio conflict). 
22 See E. Schmidt-Aßmann, “Einleitung”, in: idem./B. Schöndorf-Haubold (ed), Der 
Europäische Verwaltungsverbund, (Tübingen: Mohr, 2005), p. 1, 10 and 20; the diffuse 
extension of subjective rights for purposes of compensation of community 
supervision is, from the point of view of system building, not unthinkable; see, 
critically, C.D. Classen, “der Einzelne als Instrument zur Durchsetzung von 
Gemeinschaftsrecht?”, (2007) 88 VerwAch, 645; see, also, Ruffert (note 19 supra), 
“Dogmatik und Praxis; Hölscheidt”, (note 19 supra), “Abschied vom subjektiv-
öffentlichen Recht?” The pure instrumentalisation for community supervision 
destroys the dogmatic rationality of the construction of individual terms in 
contextual relation: in the future, the only valid question is: To what end the 
community? That this is the central question, to which the ECJ orientates itself in the 
jurisprudence, is supported in a particularly spectacular case by K. Hailbronner, 
“‘Gatoussi/Stadt Rüsselsheim’ – ein neuer Schritt des EuGH zur Entmündigung der 
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the constellation of review proceedings aside – it would not seem 
plausible that the Member State could deploy the argument that the 
protection of the trust of the German citizenry could hinder the 
rescinding of an ultra vires administrative order if this argument were 
not available in proceedings before a German administrative court to 
a private party (for whom the administrative order has not come into 
force). An intermediary conclusion, in the light of the above 
considerations, is that it seems doubtful as to whether the formula of 
effet utile used by the ECJ, which national law must ensure the smooth 
reception of particular European administrative law, is beneficial for 
the development of a Europeanised general administrative law. It is, 
however, thoroughly compatible with a europeanised general 
administrative law. Here, we have a new perspective which can be 
fruitful when it comes to outlining the staying power of an 
administrative order based upon European administrative law: less 
conceptual limits should be set by the thought of the redemption of 
legitimate expectations than by the pluralisation of public interests,23 
which are not only German interests. In the case of a subsidy contrary 
to European law, both the interest of the other Member States and the 
collective private interest of the affected branch of business are the 
subject of a German decision.24 Moreover, at a secondary level, the 
protection of legitimate expectations is also limited: in proceedings, 
with the submissions of third parties affected by the administrative 
order, one cannot assume that their rights will be considered valid by 
the court, nor, conversely, of the inconsequentiality of the failure to 
observe competing plural public interests. Also involved here is a 
capitulatory (not only in terms of the factual “pressure to ensure 
effectiveness”) interpretation of the meaning of the period in § 48 
Abs. 4 VwVfG.25 Basically, one cannot rely on the protective effect of 
the expiration date for the withdrawal of transgressive administrative 
acts, because other bearers of public interests (Member States) could 
not use the period of gestation for themselves. 
                                                                                                                   
Mitgliedstaaten?”, (2007) 26 NVwZ, p. 415 – zu ECJ, (2007) 26 NVwZ, p. 430). The ECJ 
tends, with its “effet utile”-jurisprudence, to change the principle of individual 
authorisation on its head, whenever it is useful to the EC, which is almost always. 
23 See, also, Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 22 supra) “Einleitung”, p. 7. 
24 See Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 1 supra), “Problemskizze”; zur Pluralisierung des 
europäisierten Rechtsverhältnisses”, p. 32 and 37. 
25 See ECJ, (1998) 16 NVwZ, p. 833; S. Müller-Franken, “Gemeinschaftsrechtliche 
Fristenhemmung, richtlinienkonforme Auslegung und Bestandkraft von 
Verwaltungsakten”, (1998) 113 DVBl, p. 758. 
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2. Europeanised Administrative Law as a 
Consequence of the Pluralisation of the Public 
Interest 
2.1. Does the Principle of Effet Utile make the General 
Administrative Law a Quantité Négligeable? 
If one accepts this notion of European general administrative law, a 
notion stemming from the relativisation of staying power, one can, on 
the other hand, not bear the recourse of the ECJ to the facticity of the 
effet utile. At this point, the reflexive and observatory capacity of the 
general administrative law must be specified and be used for the 
legal differentiation of protection. That national general 
administrative law must support the application of the particular 
European administrative law is one thing, that this must happen 
limitlessly and quite without consideration from the point of view of 
the protection of legitimate expectations is quite another. Here, 
proceeding from the acknowledgment of pluralised public interests, 
we must distinguish between certain interests, which can be 
permanently damaged by the guarantee of legitimate expectations 
favourable to private third parties: this is valid fundamentally in 
situations of transgressive subsidies, which distort the market. 
 
The supposed visibility of the pluralisation of public interests, in a 
European legal order which comprises, in the narrow sense, both 
European law and national law, speaks for the consideration of the 
weight of these interests. However, this can be seen in certain 
administrative orders, which only have an indirect and distant effect 
on both the internal market and the competing private and public 
interests of other Member States. This would be the case for pollution 
licences contrary to EC law, or, for instance, water allowances, if the 
state’s own population would be harmed. In such cases, the plurality 
of the potentially affected interests is not recognisable for the citizens 
of a Member State, because the assignment of the legal prescription is 
not transparent: for a company, too, it is also not easy to differentiate 
between German and European norms, whilst subsidies with 
potentially distorting effects on the internal market are easily 
spotted.26 In these constellations, the transgression must be 
                                                 
26 Here, the third party protection of individuals is deployed domestically to ensure 
“effet utile”. So, when the term is not used here, the concern is the same “interest in 
efficacy”; ECJ v. 7.1.2004 201/02, (2005) 27 NuR, p. 517, (obligation to carry out 
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sanctioned. Here, a process for breach of contract and, if applicable, 
the imposition of a fine against the state violating EC law, would be 
the suitable sanction; however, no theoretically satisfactory answer to 
the foregoing reflections has been provided. Nevertheless, in this 
connexion, a statement can be developed as to the formulation of 
europeanised general administrative law in the multilevel system of 
the legal order: a general administrative law of the European 
Community can, pursuant to the above discussions, be based upon 
the specific administrative law and, conversely, not upon the 
subordination to the interest in building unity at central level. In this 
respect, we must be mindful that the general administrative law, even 
in a europeanised legal order, sought for possible transfers out of the 
“reference areas” (of the particular European administrative law and 
of the law of the Member States).27 This might well be different for the 
area of the general administrative law of the self-standing 
administration of the EC. Here, it might well come to a juxtaposition 
of the competence to select the applicable general law of the EC, 
which, however, already, due to the various legal traditions of the 
Member States, cannot convert the general administrative law of the 
Member States into a congruent body, like the administrative process 
laws of the country and counties in Germany. A europeanised 
general administrative law cannot, paradoxically, be “European law” 
in the narrow sense.28 This is decisively ruled out by the limited 
authorisation of primary law. This might seem to be a deficiency of 
European law, and the Commission, as well as the Court, seem to 
allow themselves, respectively, to be swayed by this assumption in 
their fundamentally political strategy or in individual decisions. More 
                                                                                                                   
environmental impact assessment protects individual interests), but an attempted 
systematisation is not recognisable. 
27 Correctly, the lack of cases and the consequent learning difficulties of EC law is 
noted in the English administrative law literature; see C. Harlow, “Changing the 
Mindset: The Place of Theory in English Administrative Law”, (1994) 14 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, p. 429 (a critique of J. Schwarze’s “European Administrative 
Law”); A. Tomkins, “Of Institutions and Individuals: The Enforcement of EC-Law”, 
in: P. Craig and R. Rawlings (eds), Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 273, who notes how little consideration the ECJ pays to the 
particularities of English law (“Factortame”), even if it complies with EC law in its 
own forms. 
28 See Schmidt-Aßmann/Dagron, (note 1 supra), Deutsches und französisches Recht, 
Ms. p. 2; zum Privarecht Ch. Joerges, “European Law as Conflict of Laws”, in: 
idem./J. Neyer, “Deliberative Supranationalism” Revisited”, EUI-WP Law 2006/20, 
p. 15 and 23. 
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recent decisions of the ECJ must beg the question, given the limited 
competence of the EC in civil or administrative law, of whether it 
should, through penetratingly formulated factual pressures to 
conform, create a unified, general part of the law in the Member 
States. The guidelines to ensure effet utile can also be interpreted in 
this manner. Thereby, one loses focus of the peculiarity of the conflict 
between particular European law and national general administrative 
law. Ultimately, there is a problem here, structurally very different to 
a “vertical” conflict between different laws on the same subject, 
which can be overcome with the devices of “primacy”29 of European 
law or the duty of consistent construction.30 
2.2. The Standardisation of General Administrative Law 
without an “Ordering Principle”? 
Frequently in its jurisprudence, the ECJ has expressly encouraged 
Commission legislation on the procedural law of the Member States – 
without success.31 Earlier, the ECJ recognised the autonomy of the 
Member States in the area of administrative procedure.32 However, 
later, in the judgments on effet utile, this principle is not mentioned 
even once. An English observer of this development correctly 
referred to the tense relationship between the use of administrative 
procedures for an efficient rule, which supports European law and its 
implementation in the practice of the administrative law of the 
Member States, and “individual enforcement”, which aims at effet 
utile. In the Factortame case,33 the Commission had already 
successfully used the former method to implement a new rule against 
Great Britain. It required absolutely no direct measures to ensure the 
effet utile in this instance. A. Tomkins correctly noted that, thereby, 
the fruitfulness of the self- and foreign observation of the general 
administrative law in the Member States was blocked. It would have 
been more productive, to insist more strongly on the stimulus for the 
formulation of rules for “good practices of administration”.34 In the 
German literature, the homogenisation of the administrative law 
                                                 
29 Streinz, (note 15 supra), Europarecht, Rn. 200. 
30 See note 14 supra. 
31 A. Arnull, The EU and Its Court of Justice, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), p. 51; Tomkins, (note 27 supra), “Of Institutions”, p. 273 and 282. 
32 ECJ, Rep. 1973, 1039. 
33 See. ECJRep. 1990, I-2433 (Factortame); Slg. 2001, I-3541 (Commission v Netherlands); 
Slg. 1998, I-4767 (Ölmühle Hamburg); Streinz, (note 15 supra), Europarecht, Rn. 797. 
34 Tomkins, (note 27 supra), “Of Institutions”, p. 273 et seq. 
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system of the Member States is much more strongly emphasised, on 
the basis of a “shared stock of administrative law rules” in the 
Member States as well as in the EC.35 Methodically, it is anything but 
self-explanatory that a stock of “administrative law precepts” can be 
extricated from the laws of the Member States, which not only 
structures the domestic legal order but also effects (or should effect), 
in exchange with the other legal orders, a standardisation measure.36 
The position of normativity in this interpretation is unclear. English 
authors, in particular, have criticised this concept of the development 
of a common European administrative law, since it is obviously (and 
especially) incompatible with English law.37 Incidentally, the 
literature in Germany is dominated by the understanding of a 
“europeanised general administrative law” as a medium of moulding 
the national general administrative law to the expectation of the 
European institutions through the harmonisation of the particular 
administrative laws, without thereby taking into account the 
independence of an “ordering principle” of a European general 
administrative law. Correctly, E. Schmidt-Aβmann sees this 
differently. He understands effet utile jurisprudence in the sense of a 
“duty to optimise”, but at the same time, points out both the value of 
the variety of manifestations of European administrations, and the 
meaning of co-operation in a polycentric order of networks.38 Besides, 
he correctly alludes to the limitations of the principle, for no 
orientation can be gained from the notion of completing the 
standardisation of an order. 
2.3. The EC as an Association of States and the Need 
for a Novel Law of Conflicts 
The peculiarity of the construction of an “association of states” is 
marked by the many different forms of conflict between national and 
supranational law; there is no general equalising formula available, 
such as recourse to the unity of the legal order or, as in a state, the 
integrative effect of a constitution. This constellation is thrown into 
                                                 
35 J. Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2nd ed., 2005), S. 
XLVIII; emphasising more strongly the plurality of laws, Schmidt-Aßmann/Dagron, 
(note 8 supra), “Deutsches und französisches Verwaltungsrecht”, Ms. p. 3; ibid., (note 
22 supra), “Einleitung”, p. 7; ibid., (note 1 supra), “Problemskizze”, p. 30. 
36 Schwarze, ibid., p. CXIII. 
37 Harlow (note 27 supra), “Changing the Mindset”, p. 429; Tomkins, (note 27 supra), 
“Of Institutions”, p. 273 et seq. 
38 Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 1 supra), “Problemskizze”, p. 30 and 37. 
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relief where European competition law meets with national 
broadcasting law.39 This conflict can, of course, happen in a purely 
national context, but the division of authority at national level, for 
example, in Germany, proceeds from the demarcation of subjects of 
competence, whilst, in the EC, to a great extent, the competences are 
determined by the goals of the internal market, raising the question, of 
whether organisations and activities such as radio can be designated 
as economic activity and regulated as such. Christian Joerges and 
Christoph Schmid40 suggested the description “diagonal” for such 
conflicts, which expresses the particularity of conflicts in the EC. 
Here, neither the classic international private law, nor the conflicts 
provisions of administrative law for territorially-determined 
“horizontal” conflicts (and thereby its logic of referral) suffice. 
Equally insufficient are the rules of primacy for constitutional law (in 
Germany, pursuant to Article 31 GG) and the rules of the EC for 
“vertical” conflicts. What is needed here are rules (nevertheless, to be 
thought of as conflicts laws) of mutual agreement and co-operation, 
which must be determined by individual cases and not by stable 
demarcations.41 This arrangement of the conflict type as “diagonal” 
proves itself, even given the persistent limits to the staying power of 
bureaucratic acts in European administrative law, to be compatible: 
here, we may also speak of a limited overlap between general 
national administrative law and particular European administrative 
law, not that this problem can be solved by a simple rule of primacy. 
In truth, the duty to ensure effet utile is derived from the principle of 
co-operation (Article 10 ECT).42 The substance of this is not in a 
                                                 
39 See K.-H. Ladeur, “Die Kooperation von europäischem Kartellrecht und 
mitgliedstaatlichem Rundfunkrecht”, (2000) 50 WuW, p. 965. 
40 Joerges, (note 28 supra), “Supranationalism”, p. 26; ibid., “The Impact of European 
Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions”, (1997) 4 European Law Journal, 
p. 374; C. Schmid, “Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition 
Law and National Regulation: A Conflict of Laws Construction of the Dispute of 
Book Price-Fixing”, (2000) 8 European Review of Private Law, p. 155. 
41 Traditional conflicts law and public and private law is orientated towards it; see C. 
Ohler, Die Kollisionsordnung des allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts. Strukturen des deutschen 
internationalen Verwaltungsrecht, (Tübingen: Mohr, 2005); as to private law, R. 
Michaels, “EU-Law as Private Internatioanl Law? Reconceptualizing the Country of 
Origin-Principle as vested-Rights-Theory”, (2006) 2 Journal of Private International 
Law, p. 195 and 211; R. Wai, “Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a 
Contested Global Society”, (2007) 47 Harvard International Law Journal, p. 471 and 472; 
Ch. Joerges, “Europarecht als Kollisionsrecht neuen Typs”, in: (2007) FS E. Rehbinder, 
p. 717. 
42 See Th. Oppermann, Europarecht, (Munich: Beck, 3rd ed., 2005), Rn. 243. 
General administrative law and the EU 227
 
purely instrumental duty of the effective implementation of the 
particular European administrative law, with the help of the national 
general administrative law and its forms and procedures; instead, it 
aims, correctly understood, to make the general forms of civil and 
administrative law (potentially also criminal law in the future) 
permeable for the fulfilment of the peculiarities of a multipolar legal 
order, which in the use and development of institutions of general 
administrative law that may not ignore, in the interpretation of 
“public interest”, the realisation of the interests of the EC and other 
Member States or of the citizens of these states. An expectation of co-
operation also points in the other direction, thanks to the “diagonal 
character of the collision”, so that no primacy in favour of one or the 
other legal system is foreseen.43 The expectation of co-operation is not 
to be understood as unidirectional; therefore, effet utile cannot simply 
be aimed at the setting aside of rules regarding the potency of 
administrative acts. The principle of the limited authority of a 
decision-maker may not be evaded by the usage of effet utile. 
 
The protection of legitimate expectations is a valid base for general 
administrative law, which falls within the governing competence of 
the Member States, provided that the connected expectations of 
specific European administrative law are co-ordinated. In this field of 
co-operative co-ordination of the legitimate expectations of the 
implementation of EC law, and equally legitimate considerations 
regarding the preservation of the “ordering principle” of the 
particular national administrative law, there is a need for the 
development of related decision-making, evidentiary and balancing 
rules, about which the ECJ has said very little of any use.44 This finds 
frequent expression in the literature on European Law, in which, 
systematically, three categories of general administrative law in the 
stratified European system are differentiated: general administrative 
law of the EC, national general administrative law of the Member 
                                                 
43 See K.-H. Ladeur, (note 39 supra), “Kooperation von europäischem Kartellrecht 
und mitgliedstaatlichem Rundfunkrecht”. 
44 See, on the meaning of learning in the general administrative law in case material, 
Harlow, (note 27 supra) Changing the Mindset; on learning through the development 
of “ordering ideas” through the exchange of ideas between general and particular 
administrative law, Schmidt-Aßmann/Dagron, (note 8 supra) “Deutsches und 
französisches Verwaltungsrecht”, Ms. S. 3, 6, 22. 
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States, and Europeanised national administrative law, which serves 
the implementation of particular European administrative law.45 
 
This tendency to a schematic differentiation possibly hangs together 
with (a previously very productive), but, recently, an increasingly 
disruptive, amount of implicit options for the consolidation of the 
supremacy of European law with the help of systematic measures in 
national law.46 Certainly, the increasing penetration of particular 
European administrative law (and similarly civil law) in the general 
legal structures of the Member States is causing collateral damage, 
which is increasingly difficult to manage. An example from civil law 
is provided by the expanding interpretation of the Product Liability 
Directive as a comprehensive rule for all claims for damages caused by 
products in the sense intended by the directive;47 thus, all possible 
national rules expanding or extending liability are excluded from 
usage in cases with a European element,48 whilst they, 
simultaneously, still apply to factual situations which fall exclusively 
within the scope of national law. This is the case, even though this 
potential for an expansive understanding of the directive was not 
conceived of at its inception.49 The ECJ should, in civil law as in 
public law, observe much more attentively and further the 
productive side of the multipolar European legal order, and, thereby, 
rely, for its part, on material and procedural law co-operation from 
the legal orders and judiciaries of the Member States.50 In this context, 
we should be mindful, above all, that the Europeanisation of law, 
because of its penetration into national legal orders, whose 
embedment in a substantial practice, in particular, due to decisions in 
a multiplicity of cases and the experience gained from them, is an 
interruption, without European law having to hand a corresponding 
                                                 
45 See Kadelbach, (note 1 supra), Administrative Law. 
46 See K.-H. Ladeur, “Richterrecht und Dogmatik – eine verfehlte Konfrontation?”, 
(1996) 79 KritV, p. 77. 
47 ECJ, Rep. 2002, I-3901 (González-Sanchez); Schmid, (note 17 supra), “The ECJ as a 
Constitutional and a Private Law Court”, p. 22 et seq. 
48 Joerges, (note 41 supra), “Europarecht als Kollisionsrecht”, p. 736 m.w.N. 
49 See, also, Schmid, (note 17 supra), “The ECJ as Constitutional and Private Law 
Court”. 
50 See K.-H. Ladeur, “Methodology and European Law – Can Methodology Change 
so as to Cope with the Multiplicity of Law?”, in: van Hoecke (ed), (note 1 supra), p. 
207; idem, “Flexibility and Cooperative, The Coordination of European Member 
States’ Laws”, in: G. de Burca and J. Scott (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU: From 
Uniformity to Flexibility?, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 284 et seq. 
General administrative law and the EU 229
 
infrastructure gathered from the knowledge of cases, procedures, and 
patterns of expectation, normative priority, and cognitive, evidentiary 
and suppositive rules.51 The EC, due to its size and the plethora of 
political, cultural and legal traditions and experiences, can never 
meaningfully pursue the goal of becoming a European “superstate”.52 
The ECJ seems to ignore this in its over-estimation of the unity of law 
as a canon of construction,53 which threatens to undermine the 
boundaries dividing responsibility. 
 
Based upon the contemplation of the existence of administrative 
orders in a europeanised administrative law, a preliminary 
conclusion might be that a general European administrative law 
cannot be conceptualised according to the unity-building pattern of 
the systematic and reflexive traditions of national general 
administrative law. It must be developed in the sense of the aperture 
of the national general administrative law to the heteronomous legal 
relationships in a multipolar European legal system. In this sense, a 
europeanised general administrative law must observe conflict of 
laws principles and take a co-operative stance towards the 
permissiveness of national law for the realisation of the law or 
interests of the supranational and national levels. Such a law of 
conflicts no longer follows classic laws of ranking, but is, instead, 
orientated by the permeability of the legal orders and its disposition 
should be co-operative.54 
 
The various conceptual approaches to business in the Member States 
are only partly a problem for the functioning of the Community, in so 
                                                 
51 See, on the necessity of learning; Schmidt-Aßmann and Dagron, (note 8 supra), 
“Deutsches und französisches verwaltungsrecht”, Ms. S. 22; in an English 
perspective Harlow, (note 27 supra), “Changing the Mindset”; Tomkins, (note 27 
supra), “Of Institutions”. 
52 On this danger, see J.J. Rosa, Le second XXe siècle, (Paris: Grasset, 2000). 
53 See Schmid, (note 17 supra), “The ECJ as a Constitutional and a Private Law 
Court”, S. 25. 
54 See, especially, Michaels, (note 41 supra) “EU Law as Private International Law”, p. 
212 and 232; see, also, critically as to superficial expectations of convergence towards 
Member State law; P. Legrand, “Against a European Civil Code”, (1997) 68 Modern 
Law Review, p. 40 and 45 et seq.; idem, “European Legal Systems are not converging”, 
(1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 45 and 92; for the opposite 
position, see K.P. Sommermann, “Konvergenzen im Verwaltungsverfahrens- und 
Verwaltungsprozessrecht der europäischen Staaten”, (2002) 55 DÖV, p. 133; J. 
Schwarze, “The Convergence of the Administrative Laws of the EU Member States”, 
(1998) 4 EPL, p. 191. 
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far as it could restrict transnational trade in services and goods 
through stabilisation with the help of the respective national laws. 
 
However great the necessity to harmonise in particular cases becomes 
in the light of these competing practical interests, the variety of the 
cognitive processes must, in any case, also be seen as an expression of 
a distributed experimentation of self-organised “practical 
communities” and/or the state administration, and, thus, as an 
element of the dynamic and of the productive comparison over 
national borders, be valued and practically harnessed. Whether one 
can describe the discursive, confrontational, standardising and 
conforming processes, structured through comitology as 
“supranational deliberation”,55 might, due to the smoothing with the 
respective national practice and its functionally-leaning selectivity 
(also, therefore, the exclusion of other possibilities) seem doubtful. 
The cognitive rules do not derive their legitimacy from the force of 
the “arguments” used in their particular field, but from their 
“preservation” in practice, which can (and should) only partially be 
understood or reflected upon “discursively”. Precisely as to the 
peculiar rationality of the “preservation”56 in practice, and the 
comparison of the different logics of the generation and the 
stabilisation of trade-related knowledge operating with a mixture of 
know-how and uncertainty allows for the organisation of productive 
competition between institutions. Not least, this occurs in comitology; 
therefore, it must be considered a thoroughly successful element of 




                                                 
55 See Joerges, Supranationalism, in: idem., Neyer, (note 28 supra). 
56 For European law, Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 8 supra), Aufgaben, p. 398; this fits 
nicely with the Anglo-American legacy of European law based upon practical 
experience; see O.W. Holmes, The Common Law, (London/New York: Macmillan, 
1881), p. 1: “The life of law has not been logic; it has been experience.” 
57 See, on the concept, C. Möllers, “Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept”, 
(2006) 43 CMLR, p. 313; A. Gatto, “Governance in the European Union – A Legal 
Perspective”, (2006) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law, p. 487. 
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3. Forms of a General Administrative Law of Open 
Government 
3.1.  EC Law as Conflicts Law: Transnational 
Administrative Acts 
A further important building-block of a general European 
administrative law is the transnational administrative act.58 The legal 
effect of the duty of mutual “recognition” of product licences, which 
goes back to the Cassis case, has, justifiably, been described as a 
“transnational administrative act”. Whilst the effect of civil law 
outside of the borders of the state has long been recognised, because 
it was considered “apolitical”,59 until a few years ago, the recognition 
of the legal meaning of the transnational factual effect of a granting of 
a licence was contended,60 because of the perceived necessity of 
restricting the validity of administrative acts territorially. The 
recognition of the factual transnational effects of an administrative act 
was, however, only one step on the way towards a transnational 
administrative act, of which we can only speak when its effects 
become “de-territorialised”. With the Cassis decision of the ECJ,61 this 
possibility was integrated into the form of European administrative 
law.62 Thereby, the legal power of administrative orders was 
stretched over the borders of the state. As is well known, a pre-
requisite for this is the existence of European substantive law 
demands on the decisions of national authorities and their concrete 
application in national administrative procedures. This extension of 
validity, as it is understood, is, logically, compensated by the 
possibility, under certain conditions (safety considerations), to refuse 
to recognise its effect; the case is then brought before the 
Commission.63 Thereby, a third state has the possibility of influencing 
the administrative decision also in the Member State where it was 
taken. Here, we are concerned not only with the participatory rights 
of another Member State, which protects its own, but also with the 
                                                 
58 M. Ruffert, “Der transnationale Verwaltungsakt”, (2001) 34 Die Verwaltung, p. 453; 
Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 8 supra) Aufgaben, p. 408 et seq. 
59 Michaels, (note 41 supra), EU Law as Private International Law, p. 232 et seq. 
60 BVerwGE 75, 285 (Emsland). 
61 ECJ, Rep. 1979, 649; 1987, 1227 (Reinheitsgebot); see, also, Streinz, (note 15 supra), 
Rn. 672 at 687. 
62 See, in detail, H.C. Röhl, Akkreditierung und Zertifizierung im 
Produktsicherheitsrecht, Zur Entwicklung einer neuen europäischen 
Verwaltungsstruktur, (Berlin: Springer, 2000). 
63 See Streinz, ( note 15 supra), Rn. 731 et seq. 
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interest of the EC, while, in the case of the limitation of the effect of 
administrative acts, the initiative, at the same time, also comes from 
the Commission. The crystallisation of safety standards is exemplary: 
here, the competition of rules and institutions takes the place of a 
unified definition of the public interest. This would seem sensible, 
since it can be assumed that, in Europe, the development of legal 
principles and standards is so far advanced that, what for one state, 
for example, is not dangerous, must also be accepted as such in 
another, while citizens can bring their preferences to bear in the 
selection of products. Here, it is problematical that a generalisable 
logic of forms of European administrative law has faded into 
obscurity behind the pragmatic goal-setting of a European 
standardisation of mandates for Member States, particularly in 
product safety law.64 In addition, the Commission clearly regards 
these variants of Europeanisation as a “second best” strategy, given 
that the “full harmonisation” (through European Standards) seems to 
be too difficult or impossible.65 The dominance of the standardisation 
of practice has, in the field of the vision of the European institutions, 
obscured the necessity of the development of a distinguished theory 
of forms of transnational administrative acts. 
3.2.  A New Supervisory Law for the Delimitation of 
Divergences amongst the Association of States 
A differentiated approach to the theoretical construction of the 
transnational administrative act and its cross-border effects could 
now, beyond the “central perspective” of the European institutions, 
much more strongly accentuate the various paths of development 
and the diverse bundles of interests of the Member States,66 which, in 
part, are not different from those interests, which, for example, in the 
case of subsidies, restrict legal effects in the case of illegality. This, 
                                                 
64 See, on the current discussion on comitology, Ch. Joerges and E. Vos (eds), EU-
Committees – Social Regulation, Law and Politics, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999); see, 
also, Schmidt-Aßmann/Dagron, (note 8 supra), “Deutsches und französisches 
Verwaltungsrecht”, Ms. p. 17. 
65 See European Governance. White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council. COM (2001) 428 final, S. 29s.; see, also, die kritischen Beiträge in: Ch. 
Joerges, Y. Mény and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), A Critical Appraisal of the Commission 
White Paper on European Governance, EUI-Jean-Monnet WP 6/2001. 
66 K.-H. Ladeur and R. Prelle, “Environmental Assessment and Judicial Approaches 
to Legal Errors: A European and Comparative Analysis”, (2001) 13 Journal of 
Environmental Law, p. 185. 
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however, relates to the possibility of intervention of the EC 
institutions in national administrative law, whereas here, we are 
concerned with the heteronomous interests of Member States, which 
frequently diverge from the concerned interests of other Member 
States. The issuance of quasi-administrative “certificates” (for 
example, in social law, the recognition as an employer),67 or reports 
from state educational institutions or similar, which could be a risk to 
the public interests of another state, which does not need to be taken 
into consideration in the state where the act was performed (other 
than for security questions that concern citizens and foreigners) but 
can be entirely externalised, also needs to be viewed in a similar 
fashion. Here, it would seem necessary to build an equivalent to the 
hierarchical oversight in the structure of authority in the state into 
transnational administrative law: in the absence of transparency, this 
cannot be achieved for a single administrative act (as in the case of 
security issues). In the case of transnational processes with built-in 
divergences of the interests of the decision-making and the affected 
state, the Commission should provide for transnational oversight,68 
for example, with spot tests, which, without systematic checking of 
the interests of the affected states, might, possibly, not come to 
fruition. A diffusion of the oversight function in various legal 
institutions which were developed for other tasks, is, however, not 
acceptable. 
 
Here, it is clear that European administrative law needs 
administrative oversight that corresponds to its heteronomous 
decision-making and procedural structure, so that transnational 
administrative acts can be theoretically ordered and practically 
utilised. This is hampered, as mentioned earlier, by the strong 
orientation of the EC institutions to their own interests.69 This 
defective perspective towards system development and the neglect of 
                                                 
67 See, generally, on the difficulty of calculating the role of the social law 
jurisprudence; W. Frenz, “Grenzüberschreitende medizinische Leistungen und 
Grundfreiheiten im Spiegel der EuGH-Rechtsprechung”, (2004) 23 MedR, p. 296; M. 
Wollenschläger and S. Grimm, “Die Auswirkungen der Rechtsprechung des EuGH 
auf das nationale Sozialrecht”, (2004) 18 ZIAS, p. 335. 
68 See, on oversight, also, Schmidt-Aßmann, (supra, note 22 supra), “Einleitung”, p. 10 
and 20. 
69 See, on the meeting of multiple organisational principles in the European 
administrative co-operation, Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 8 supra), Aufgaben, S. 411 et 
seq.¸ idem./Dagron, (note 8 supra), “Deutsches und französisches Verwaltungsrecht”, 
Ms. p. 7. 
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the particularities of the pluralisation of the public interest in a 
heteronomous association of states,70 in which EC institutions may 
only sparingly use the means of supranational legislation and 
decision-making for the achievement of European interests, reveals 
itself particularly clearly in the erratic interventions of the ECJ in 
social law. That there may be good grounds in social law strictly to 
attend to the territorial radius of the legal relationships and to put the 
unifying interests of the EC on a back burner is not seriously 
entertained. Consequently, the complex calculation of contributions 
and expectations of benefits, which takes place at national level, is 
plunged into greater uncertainty. In addition, europeanised 
telecommunications law has introduced a new variant of the ex ante 
participation of authorities of other Member States in state 
administrative law processes.71 The national regulating body (NRB) is 
obliged to consider, as far as possible, the stances of other regulating 
bodies. This is an intensive form of mutual binding, which is strongly 
influenced by the position of the Commission. Lastly, this variant of a 
European administration is geared towards a relatively unified 
decision-making practice, and can, therefore, not be informative for a 
multipolar European administration, however it might seem at first 
sight. 
3.3. Mutual Learning inside a Pluralised Administrative 
Legal Order 
A further variant of the pluralisation of the particular European 
administrative law (for example, environmental law) comes about, in 
that new particular procedural elements (ennvironmental impact 
assessmen) become connected to procedural ideas and conceptions of 
legal protection or control standards. Thus, the meaning of 
connecting procedural challenges with the acceptance of a causality 
of mistakes for the result of decisions is different in the individual 
Member States.72 Here, too, the fluctuation of the possibilities that 
                                                 
70 BVerfGE 89, 155, 182ss.; Schmidt-Aßmann/Dagron, (note 8 supra), “Deutsches und 
französisches Verwaltungsrecht”, Ms. p. 7. 
71 See H.H. Trute, Der europäische Regulierungsverbund in der Telekommunikation – ein 
neues Modell europäisierter Verwaltung, FS Selmer, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), 
p. 565; G. Britz, “Vom Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund zum 
Regulierungsverbund?”, (2006) 41 EuR, p. 41; K.-H. Ladeur and C. Möllers, “Der 
europäische Regulierungsverbund der Telekommunikation im deutschen 
Verwaltungsrecht”, (2005) 109 DVBl, p. 525. 
72 Ladeur and Prelle, (note 66 supra), Environmental Assessment. 
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arise out of different national procedural conceptions should not be 
seen as immediately problematical. This would be a one-sided 
viewpoint, neglectful of the value of a multipolar administration and 
its law. Primarily, it would be necessary, more closely to observe the 
various legal forms (perhaps through combinations of alternative 
institutional elements and their functional equivalents) anchored in 
the administrative law of the Member States, and not to restrict 
ourselves to a unified model. A Europeanised general administrative 
law would have to permit differences and would have to observe and 
evaluate their factual meaning retrospectively for the (legal) 
protection of interests. Should the occasion arise, a second step 
towards the harmonisation of implementation forms would be 
beneficial for a pluralised European administrative law. A 
Europeanised general administrative law must calibrate its 
theoretical constructions not only to tolerate the varieties of 
connections between European and national general administrative 
law, but also to generate a comparative perspective of the possible 
learning opportunities in a multipolar legal order.73 Above all, in the 
Europeanised administration, the value of the conformity of decisions 
in Europe is not to be over-estimated, when we must also calculate 
that the standardised law could block the development of practical 
experience, without knowing whether this can be compensated on 
the European plane. An evening out of the practical losses of 
experimental knowledge “from below”74 can hardly be achieved at 
the level of European institutions. Here, too, we can see the necessity 
to facilitate structural learning processes in the individual outposts of 
the administrative networks in Europe. According to the logic of 
multipolar thinking,75 the European institutions could, upon the basis 
of these experiences, in the learning processes and the experiences 
collected at the level of Member States play an important moderating 
role, without being able to propagate or implement a standardised 
general European administrative law. For this variant of learning in a 
multipolar network, the procedural norms could also be made 
fruitful: this? process not only serves European administrative law 
                                                 
73 Fundamentally, see C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, Learning from Differentiation: The 
New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, available at: 
www.2.law.columbia.edu/sabel; see, also, L. Krämer, “Differentiation in the EU 
Environmental Policy”, (2000) 9 European Environmental Law Review, p. 133. 
74 Their value is rightly highlighted by Harlow, (note 27 supra), “Changing the 
Mindset”. 
75 Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 1 supra), “Problemskizze”, p. 32 and 37. 
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primarily pursuant to the old understanding of law as a guarantee of 
correctness, but also, and, indeed, precisely, the aperture of decision-
making processes allows for a structured observation of 
administrations through EC institutions. The practice of the ECJ 
seems to tend to the application of administrative procedural law, 
without reference to an overarching “ordering idea”, so that an effet 
utile can be aimed at. 
3.4. Differentiation through the Europeanisation of 
Administrative Law. The Example of the Precautionary 
Principle 
The jurisprudence of the ECJ, biased towards the primacy of the goals 
and interests of the EC, has far-reaching effects on the flexibility of 
general administrative law, in particular, on the (pre-)structuring of 
the room for manoeuvre in national administrations. This goes 
against the grain for a flexible administration, and its inclusion in 
private-public networks as well as the necessity of a transfer from an 
isolated decision-making practice to more complex decision-making 
strategies. So, in Germany, a requirement for the erection of a 
structure-building “concept”76 to shape the “precaution” in 
environmental law has developed in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court, and the proportionality of the measures is 
made concrete through their relationship to a long term and 
discerning, differentiating strategy, for example, the reduction of the 
burden on the environment by using particular materials. The ECJ, in 
contrast, in Pfizer,77 held that the precautionary bans of materials (in 
particular, penicillin in animal medicine) were permissible, even 
without such procedural rules, which make transparency and 
understanding possible. Indeed, a scientific explanation, which in the 
case of uncertainty on the part of the state (not uncommon when it 
comes to precautionary measures) does not impede the adoption of 
the measure. This would have been a combination which the ECJ 
could have reached for a comparative analysis of the various 
strategies of the Member States, potentially to accept a spectrum of 
variant concepts and to tie this comparison back into general 
                                                 
76 BVerwGE 69, 37; see K.-H. Ladeur, “The Introduction of the Precautionary 
Principle into EC Law - A Pyrrhic Victory for Environmental and Public Health 
Law?”, (2003) 40 CMLR, p. 1455; for a critique, see S. Wolf, “Risk Regulation, Higher 
Rationality and the Death of Judicial Self-Restraint”, (2004) 41 CMLR, p. 1125. 
77 ECJ, Rep. 2002, I-3305. 
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administrative law. Instead, the Court took a blinkered view and left 
the Member States discretion, without making any gains for a general 
administrative law. In the case of Altmark-Trans,78 the ECJ, in contrast, 
when faced with the question of the boundaries of the 
implementation of public aid (with a view to avoiding unlicenced 
aid) formulated a universal procedural structuring through 
guidelines for the criteria for justifications, which not only shapes the 
area of national discretion, but also aims for an increase in 
transparency within a transnational network of administrations. 
 
4. The “Ordering Idea” of a “Conflicts Law” 
Reconstruction of a Europeanised General 
Administrative Law 
4.1. A Practical Example for a Productive Irritation of the 
German Adminstrative Law through European 
“Influence” 
That the co-operative factor of the europeanisation process is not 
sufficiently observed, or institutionally and theoretically shored up, is 
the result of the tendency of the EC institutions, described above, in 
particular, the ECJ and the Commission, to measure the 
administrative law of the Member States primarily by way of the 
unquestioned notion of the “efficiency” of the supranational level of 
the European multilevel system. This also find expression in that the 
subsidiarity principle is prescribed in a one-dimensional manner, 
which is exclusively orientated towards the unified implementation 
of EC law, and disregards the practical possibilities of the variety and 
the learning in a legal order, which is understood as being 
decentralised.79 The subsidiarity principle has, in the practice of the 
supranational institutions of the EC, practically reversed itself; it has 
been transformed into a presumptive rule for the effet utile of a 
uniformity of EC law. Thereby, on the side of the Member States, the 
potentiality of a process of development of general administrative 
law based upon transnational exchange is only seldom harnessed. 
 
                                                 
78 ECJ, Rep. 2003, I-7747. 
79 See the sharp but direct criticism of the interpretation of the subsidiarity principle 
by the Commission; G. Davies, “Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, at the Wrong Place, at 
the Wrong Time”, (2006) 43 CMLR, p. 63. 
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In particular, the German administrative law, has, in the last decades, 
changed, in a productive way, through the introduction of new 
procedural elements from the legal systems of other Member States, 
although theoretically, it finds itself in a defensive position vis-à-vis 
an open, plural procedural concept, whose forms (likewise returning 
to European influences), especially in telecommunications law (for 
example, the “notice and comment” procedure before the issuance of 
a regulatory administrative act), are also deployed, whose 
performance, however, has yet to bear fruit, and is, instead, 
barricaded in a form of “service after prescription” against the 
“foreign” European demands: for example, (on the initiative of VG 
Köln) requests for preliminary decisions, which turn on the 
“protection of third parties” in procedural norms of the TKG (and its 
interpretation, consistent with law).80 
 
The development of the procedural rationality of the europeanised 
administrative law, has not yet taken the step towards the brink of a 
new procedural conception, which would be orientated towards the 
model of “open governance”81 both in a transnational and a 
community dimension. 
 
Therein lies a task for a general administrative law, which is 
incrementally building itself into both the picture of and the 
foundations of variety, which could work in opposition to the 
increasingly visible centralising tendency of EC law in recent years. 
The dimension of procedure of europeanised administrative law will 
be technocratically curtailed if it is tied to the easing in the 
“oversight” of the EC Commission over the implementation of EC 
law in the Member States. It must be unfolded much more 
pronouncedly in its horizontal and heteronomous dimension, which, 
in the transnational opening for the interests of other Member States, 
is facilitated in the iterative formulation of plural public interests and 
in the mutual observation of administrative strategies, especially in 
complex types of task (for example, in planning and environmental 
law, in telecommunications law, but also in social law). 
 
                                                 
80 VG Köln, (2007) 9 MMR, p. 203. 
81 U. Di Fabio, Das Recht offener Staaten – Grundlinien einer Staats- und Rechtstheorie, 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1998); E. Schmidt-Aßmann, “Die Herausforderung der 
Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft durch die Internationalisierung der 
Verwaltungsbeziehungen”, (2006) 43 Der Staat, p. 315, at 326. 
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It is hardly productive for the development of a “relational 
rationality” of the law of a European multilevel system, if, at the 
supranational level of the community, a narrowing begins, in which 
the multipolarity and multi-dimensionality of the European legal 
system are only viewed as a danger to the effectiveness of the 
transformation of particular European administrative law in the 
national administrative law, and the inquiry is reduced to which 
variations in the laws of the Member States seem to be “just about” 
acceptable. A europeanised general administrative law can be neither 
European (in the institutional sense) alone, because it does not belong 
to the competences of the EC, nor a pure national general 
administrative law, which merely becomes adjusted to the 
idiosyncracies of the “transformation” of the particular European 
administrative law only upon the basis of effectiveness. In the light of 
procedural law alone, it can only be understood as a project to be 
realised co-operatively,82 which, at a minimum, partially follows the 
multipolar logic of “conflicts law”, but, at the same time, with mutual 
references between the legal orders in the search of linkages, 
overcomes the danger of frustrating itself and others, ever hearkening 
to a logic of experimentation and observation.83 Such a development 
is only imaginable in a perspectival crossover, in which must begin 
primarily at the level of the Member States, where the general 
administrative law will keep its seat. Secondarily, also at European 
level, the limitation, namely, the fixation on the national achievement 
of effet utile, must be overcome. Instead, it is better to ask how a plural 
network of European law, europeanised administrative law and 
transnational connections between domestic legal orders can be 
generated.84 Here, the ECJ can play a particular role of moderation. 
Unfortunately, in this regard, scepticism is shown, because the Court 
shows little feeling for the notion that the unity of law and of legal 
application is far too blunt an instrument for such a complex polity as 
the EC, and that, obversely, the acceptance of a differentiated legal 
order is not only a second best model, but that the ideal of a 
“complete harmony” or a statistical alignment of supranational and 
national orders must be abandoned. 
                                                 
82 See Schmidt-Aßmann/Dagron, (note 8 supra), “Deutsches und französisches 
Verwaltungsrecht”. 
83 Sabel and Zeitlin, (note 73 supra), “Learning from Differentiation”; Ladeur, (note 50 
supra), “Methodology”. 
84 See Schmidt-Aßmann, (note 1 supra), “Problemskizze”, p. 30. 
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4.2. The Organisation of “Information Networks” as an 
“Ordering Idea” of a Europeanised Administrative Law 
E. Schmidt-Aßmann has frequently, and justifiably, emphasised that 
all administration of communal space is based upon “information 
networks”.85 This is true not only for the europeanised 
administration, but is especially so in its case. Here, a small historical 
reminiscence might be in order, noting the ascent of the general 
administrative law in Germany towards the end of the Nineteenth 
century. The centring of German administrative law on the 
“administrative act” as an expression of the sovereignty of the state 
(O. Mayer) has been frequently drawn out of its historical context, in 
which it is paradoxically evaluated by virtue of its distance from the 
time-honoured “state scientific”, purposive orientation.86 The 
administrative order, which emerges from “state science” 
(“Staatswissenschaft”), and which emphasises the single decision as 
the system-constructing moment, is related to the autonomy of the 
administrative system (outside of these purposes) and constitutes 
therewith a new perspective on decision-making, which allows for 
the self-generation of connecting compulsions and possibilities 
through the processing of cases and from decision to decision. 
 
From this perspective, it is no coincidence that C.F. Gerber87 
conceived of the administrative act as a “declaration of intent” of the 
state, which thereby (not only in the foreground) sought a connection 
to civil law. Similarly to private law, which is based upon 
declarations of intent, the modern administrative law, with its 
orientation on the ”administrative act” as its most important 
building-block, releases a forward-looking decision-making process, 
which, through the selectivity of the case orientation and the 
acceptance of the pressure to decide, was intended to promote the 
self-generation of an entire infrastructure of knowledge-, 
presumptive- and evidentiary rules as well as compatible community 
experiences and expectations, which allow the intrinsic rationality of 
the administrative act to ripen. It is against this backdrop that the 
                                                 
85 Schmidt and Aßmann, (note 22 supra), “Einleitung”, p. 22. 
86 M. Bohlender, “Metamorphosen des Gemeinwohls. Von der Herrschaft guter 
polizey zur Regierung durch Freiheit und Sicherheit”, in: H. Münkler and H. Bluhm 
(eds), Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn. Historische Semantiken politischer Leitbegriffe, (Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 2001), p. 247. 
87 C.F. von Gerber, System des Deutschen Privatrechts, (7th ed.), (Jena: Mauke,1860). 
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efforts of states to develop the cognitive infrastructure of society, the 
collection of knowledge, the standardisation of norms, the exchange 
of experience between the domestic regions, and the development of 
schools and universities, are to be understood; not only as a service to 
the community, but as a self-service, towards which the dynamic 
administration beyond stable purposes was directed. Such an 
intrinsic rationality of the administration could only come about in 
co-ordination with the cognitive rationality of a dynamic social 
knowledge base. That social knowledge system has, with 
technological progress and the science based- (high-) technology, 
fundamentally changed, and has required new state initiatives of 
systematisation and standardisation pursuant to a new structuring 
paradigm. While earlier knowledge was empirical, bound to large 
“practice communities” and continually developed by them, the 
knowledge in the industrial society is strongly dynamised:88 The 
progress of knowledge advances unevenly and gives rise to 
corresponding “professional societies”, which, for example, as a 
society of engineers or other professionals can formulate a 
“technological class”, which is no longer identical to the “generally 
acknowledged rules” of the profession. In the post-modern society 
another fragmentation of knowledge generation comes about, which 
is driven by project based “epistemic communities”. These orientate 
themselves more towards strategic goals, while the earlier 
“knowledge communities” (for example, engineers such as the VDI) 
aimed towards the continuing progress of the general stocks of 
knowledge.89 
 
In the past, the state itself was always concerned that knowledge 
must be extended, generalised, stabilised, and distributed so that it 
can be useful for those other than the “discoverer” – and this also 
means access for the state and its decision-making practice. Not only 
for this reason, but also for this reason, the stocks of knowledge also 
have a rule-like, practical character. In a European multilevel system, 
a multipolar processing of knowledge is required, which can be 
shored up by the transnational co-operation between legal orders. 
                                                 
88 See M. Več, Recht und Normierung in der industriellen Revolution. Neue 
Strukturen der Normsetzung in Völkerrecht, staatlicher Gesetzgebung und 
gesellschaftlicher Selbstnormierung, (Frankfurt aM: Klostermann, 2006). 
89 See M. Gensollen, “Economie non rivale et communautés d’information”, (2004) 
124 Réseaux, p. 141; idem, “Biens informationnels et communautés médiatisées”, 




In this perspective, a general European administrative law cannot 
exist under the dominance of common European administrative 
precepts, which inform the administration of the EC Institutions and 
are then passed on to the Member States, and which are distilled from 
the varied national legal orders. A general European administrative 
law must be construed as a new species of “conflicts law”, which 
renders the national, transnational and supranational components of 
law permeable to one another, and opens them up for co-operation. 
Within the association of states thatforms the EC, the intrinsic 
rationality of national administrative law must not (only) be 
preserved because of the division of competences between the EC 
and the Member States. The European administrative legal order 
must be polycentric and be serviceable for the co-ordination of unity 
and plurality, and the ordering of the general administrative law of 
the domestic orders, instead of putting it under the pressure of the 
effet utile. 
 
Chapter 9  
Formalisation or De-formalisation through 
Governance?  
 
Poul F. Kjaer 





Christian Joerges has forcefully argued that the “turn to governance” 
of the European Union (EU) implies a move towards de-
juridification.2 Following Joerges, especially the Open Method of Co-
ordination (OMC) introduces a break with traditional forms of 
legally-mediated political decision-making because the production of 
political decisions within the framework of the OMC does not imply 
a simultaneous reference to legal procedures, obligations and 
sanctions. Hence, the OMC, at least potentially, threatens to 
undermine the functional synthesis (Funktionssynthese) between law 
and politics, which has been celebrated as one of the key 
achievements of modernity.3 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the conference Law and Society in 
the 21st Century: Transformations, Resistances, Futures, Berlin, 25–28 July 2007. I would 
like to thank the participants of the relevant session for useful comments and 
discussion. Responsibility remains with the author. 
2 Christian Joerges: Integration durch Entrechtlichung? Ein Zwischenruf, ZERP-
Diskussionspapier 1, 2007. 
3 Jürgen Habermas: Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts 




Today, different versions of the OMC are applied within a wide 
range of policy areas of the EU. One group of policy areas shares the 
feature that public involvement at EU level is a relatively new 
phenomenon. This, for example, is the case for employment policy 
and policies related to the information society. Another cluster of 
policy areas share the feature that they do not fall under the 
Community Method (CM) while, at the same time, they possess 
strong interdependencies with other EU policy areas which are 
themselves subject to the CM. The prime example here is the co-
ordination of the economic policies of the Member States (MS) and 
their relation to European monetary policy. A third group consists of 
social policy (pensions and social inclusion), and research and 
technological development. One shared characteristic of these areas is 
that earlier attempts to transfer competences from the MS to the EU 
failed. As a result of this failure, the OMC was introduced as a 
substitute for increased competence transfers.4 
 
The latter group is particular interesting, because EU/EC policies 
within these policy areas have been in place for several decades. 
Moreover, within R & D policy, OMC-like methods such as 
institutionalised mutual observation and benchmarking had been in 
place for several decades prior to the official adoption of the OMC as 
a policy tool within the EU. Hence, this chapter reconstructs the 
evolution of the OMC in R & D. The reconstruction illustrates that 
soft law is, by no means, a new phenomenon within the context of 
European integration.5 Moreover, due to the considerable policy 
efforts within the area of R & D, both before and after the 
introduction of the OMC, the analysis is capable of assessing the 
“added value” which has emerged from the introduction of the OMC. 
The findings indicate that the “direct effect” of the OMC is rather 
limited. Extrapolating from the example of R & D, it can, however, be 
argued that the OMC contributes to a systematisation, intensification 
and professionalisation of already existing modes of “pre-integration 
activities”, understood as the kind of policy activities which were 
unfolded prior to formal competence transfers throughout the history 
                                                 
4 Susana Borrás and Kerstin Jacobsson: “The open method of co-ordination and new 
governance patterns in the EU”, (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 185-
208, at. 191. 
5 David M. Trubek and Louise G. Trubek: “Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of 
Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination”, (2005) 11 European 
Law Journal, pp. 343-364. 
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of the integration process. OMC processes contribute to the 
construction of a “common basis” which can potentially serve as a 
structural basis for competence transfers at a later date. In contrast to 
Joerges’ argument concerning a move towards de-juridification 
through the OMC, it is therefore possible to view OMC processes as a 
structural condition for the transfer of legal competences at a later 
date, thereby somewhat dissolving the distinction between 
formalised and de-formalised governance which Joerges departs 
from. 
2. The Expansion of Knowledge 
R & D policy is linked to profound societal changes, as also expressed 
in fashionable terms such as the “information society” and the 
“knowledge society”. The term “information society” implies that it 
is possible to observe a tendency towards increased temporalisation, 
in the sense that the time-interval occurring between the 
introductions of distinctions is being continually reduced. In concrete, 
this means that the time that products, scientific knowledge, news, 
legal regulations, political decisions and other manifestations of social 
operations remain relevant is being continuously diminished because 
the pace with which they are being replaced is accelerating.6 That is, 
of course, not a new phenomenon, as increased temporalisation has 
been a key characteristic of modernity since Kant’s praise of the 
emerging modern states ability to pursue constant reform.7 In this 
sense, we are merely experiencing an intensification of distinct 
modern processes. The increased temporalisation does, however, 
mean that all parts of society are faced with an increased demand for 
continued change and adaptation. Hence, the related term of 
“knowledge society” implies that the constant and systematic ability 
to produce new knowledge and, in particular, the ability proactively 
to use such knowledge in the development of products, decisions, 
regulations and so forth, is a key characteristic of present day society. 
But knowledge is not only being used proactively to “drive 
development forward”, it is also being deployed reactively in order 
to enable adequate responses to new knowledge which are produced 
                                                 
6 Niklas Luhmann: Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie, (Frankfurt aM: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984), p. 253; Niklas Luhmann: “Die Knappheit der Zeit und die 
Vordringichkeit des Befristeten“, pp. 143-164, in: Niklas Luhmann: Politische 
Plannung, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971). 




in other spheres of society. For example, public authorities are 
continuously faced with a demand to develop new knowledge in 
order to maintain their ability to assess the risks involved in relation 
to the introduction of new products on the market.8 Products which 
are themselves the consequence of the transformation of new 
knowledge into new products. As a consequence hereof the ongoing 
transformation processes implies a move towards an increase in the 
societal relevance of structures with strong cognitive features, such as 
science, technology and the economy in relation to normatively-based 
structures, such as law, politics and moral forms of communication.9 
 
This development means, for example, that political decision-making, 
legal judgments, the interpretation of events by the media, product 
development and so forth, are increasingly relying upon scientific 
knowledge and upon the advice of experts.10 The “competitive 
advantage” of private and public organisations as well as cities, states 
and regions such as Europe is, therefore, increasingly dependent on 
the existence of well-developed research environments just as the 
strategic fostering of such environments is becoming an increasingly 
important activity of public organisations. 
3. The Evolution of European Science Co-
operation 
The evolution of R & D policies in the EU is very much a reflection of 
the general development towards an increased reliance on 
knowledge in radicalised modernity. European co-operation in the 
broader realm of science is however having a long history which goes 
beyond the present focus on R & D as well as beyond cooperation 
within the framework of the community and the Union. The 
European Nuclear Research Centre (CERN) was founded in 1953 on 
the basis of an intergovernmental convention. The European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) was launched with the second Treaty 
of Rome in parallel with the EEC in 1957. In 1962, the European 
                                                 
8 For example, within the area of risk regulation. See Poul Kjaer: “Rationality within 
REACH? On Functional Differentiation as the Structural Foundation of Legitimacy in 
European Chemicals Regulation”, EUI Working Papers (Law), nr. 18, 2007. 
9 Niklas Luhmann: Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie, (Frankfurt aM: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984), p. 436. 
10 Helmut Schelsky: Die Soziologen und das Recht. Abhandlungen und Vorträge zur 
Soziologie von Recht, Institution und Planung, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1980). 
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Southern Observatory (ESO) and in 1964 The European Molecular 
Biology Organisation (EMBO) was established upon the basis of 
intergovernmental agreements. As early as in 1965 the EEC, under 
the impression that a “technology gap” existed vis-à-vis the United 
States, set up a committee to deal with research, science and 
technology policy, and the impact of the foreseen internal market on 
these policy areas. The committee was charged with a systematic 
comparison of national research activities and proposed stronger co-
ordination in a whole range of research areas.11 In 1967, the Institut 
Laue-Langevin (ILL), a European neuron science institute, was set up 
and in 1971 an intergovernmental framework for European Co-
operation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research (COST) was 
established. COST was originally initiated by the EEC, but most 
Western European countries were included. In 1972, the Heads of 
State and Government of the European Community (EC) expressed 
their support for an increase in the co-ordination of national research 
policies. The European University Institute (EUI) was established the 
same year. In 1973, the Commission established the Directorate 
General for Research, Science and Education. In addition, the 1973 
Action Programme of the Commission for the first time called for a 
harmonisation of national procedures on R & D funding, as well as 
for a systematic exchange of information between the MS in the area 
of R & D. These objectives were formulated under the first 
Commissioner of Research, Ralf Dahrendorf, who also launched the 
concept of a “single European science area”, which should be 
achieved through the lowering of national barriers within the area of 
science and research.12 As a part of these efforts, CREST (Committee 
on Science and Technical Research) was established in 1974. CREST is 
a consultative body of the Commission, which consists of MS 
representatives who monitor R & D polices within the MS, and serves 
as a platform the development of common approaches. In addition, 
                                                 
11 Thomas Banchoff: “The Politics of the European Research Area”, ACES Working 
Paper. 2002, 3, p. 7; Yoshiko Okubo, Alvaro de Miranda and Peter Senker: European 
Scientific Co-operation and its significance for new EU Member States, Paper prepared for 
the 5th Triple Helix Conference, Turin, Italy, 18-21 May 2005, p. 3; Pierre Papon: 
“L´Europe de la researche: une réponse aux defies de l’avenir”, (2006) 12 Revue 
D´histoire de L´integration Européenne, pp. 11-26, at 14; Josephine Anne Stein: “Science, 
Technology and European foreign policy: European integration, global interaction”, 
(2002) 29 Science and Public Policy, pp.463-475. 
12 Thomas Banchoff: “The Politics of the European Research Area”, ACES Working 
Paper, 2002, 3, p. 8. 
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and on the suggestion of the Commission, the European Science 
Foundation was established in 1974 as an umbrella structure for 
national research organisations. However, none of these initiatives 
were greeted with much enthusiasm by the MS and they did not 
significantly transform the national R & D systems just as no major 
move towards integration of those systems took place. 
Notwithstanding this, Intergovernmental co-operation continued to 
expand with the creation of the European Molecular Biology 
Laboratory (EMBL) in 1974 and the European Space Agency (ESA)13 
in 1975. 
 
In the 1980s, EUREKA, an intergovernmental programme for 
technological development was launched. In addition, the 
Community changed its strategy with the launching of founding 
schemes such as ESPRIT and RACE. These programmes were aimed 
at strengthening Europe’s position within specific research areas by 
mobilising increased founding. An additional objective was to 
minimise the “technology gap” between the different Member States. 
Later on, these programmes were incorporated in the framework 
programmes (FP), which the Community has maintained and 
continuously expanded since 1984. The development of the FPs was 
strengthened with the SEA which, in 1987, under the condition of 
unanimity in the Council, granted the Community the competence to 
co-ordinate national R & D policies.14 Today, the FP is the third 
largest budget item of the EU after the Common Agricultural Policy 
and the Structural Funds. 
 
In the early 1990s, the Commission re-launched the idea of a common 
European science area. But, again, the attempt ran aground because 
of reluctance on the part of the Member States and the failure of the 
Commission to ensure backing from other players such as industry 
and the national research communities.15 In 1993, the Treaty of 
Maastricht introduced co-decision within the area of R & D, but 
maintained the unanimity requirement in the Council. Hence, the 
decisional procedures became more complex because the number of 
                                                 
13 The ESA was a merger of the European Launch Development Organisation 
(ELDO) and the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) which both were 
established in 1964. 
14 Single European Act: Title VI (Articles 130f-130q). 
15 Thomas Banchoff: “Institutions, Inertia and European Union Research Policy”, 
(2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 1–21. 
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institutional actors was increased at the same time as the existing 
barriers to decision-making in the Council were maintained. With the 
entering into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the Council 
switched to Qualified-Majority Voting (QMV) on R & D just as the 
development of an R & D policy was made an objective of the 
Union.16 In parallel to the gradual communitarisation of R & D policy, 
intergovernmental cooperation kept expanding in the area of basic 
science, through, for example, the establishment of the European 
Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) in 1988. 
4. The European Research Area 
In January 2000, the Commission, under the label European Research 
Area (ERA) made a new attempt.17 This time, the plan was endorsed 
by the European Council at the by now famous Lisbon summit in 
March 2000, where it was made into a cornerstone of the Lisbon 
Process with its strategic objective of revitalising Europe through a 
transformation of its economy into a “knowledge based” economy.18 
 
In the academic literature, the new offensive has been presented as 
being based upon a “whole new vision”.19 The ideas presented were, 
however, virtually identical to those presented 30 years before, in so 
far as the focus was on the establishment of a “common research 
space” through the increased mobility of researchers, the increased 
linking of national research communities, common projects and the 
establishment of common laboratories in specific fields.20 In fact, the 
                                                 
16 Chapter XVIII (Articles 163-173) of the Treaty of the European Union; Gérard 
Boussuat: “Les coopérations européennes pour la researche scientifique et 
technique”, 2006, 12, Revue D´histoire de L´integration Européenne, pp 5-10. 
17 Commission of the European Communities: Communication from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions. Towards a European Research Area, Com, 18 January, 2000. 
18 Presidency Conclusion: Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000. 
19 For such an historical unfounded perspective see Álvaro de Elera: “The European 
Research Area: On the Way Towards a European Scientific Community?”, (2006) 12 
European Law Journal, pp. 559-574, at 563; Robert Kaiser and Heiko Prange: “A New 
Concept of Deepening European Integration? The European Research Area and the 
Emerging Role of Policy Co-ordination in a Multi-level Governance System”, 2005, 3, 
3, Comparative European Politics, pp. 289-306. 
20 Commission of the European Communities (2000): Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. Towards a European Research Area. Com (2000) 6, 18 
January, p. 8; Michel André: “L’espace européen de la recherche: historie d’une 
idée”, (2006) 12 Revue D’Histoire De L’Integration Européenne, pp. 131-150, at 133. 
250 Kjaer
 
only difference to the earlier attempts seems to be in the framing of 
the proposal. The Commission aligned itself with the fashionable 
concept of the “knowledge society” just as it followed the general 
trend towards an increased embeddedness of public activities in 
economic semantics.21 Hence, the Commission this time called for the 
creation of a “common market” for R & D, rather than for a common 
science area. The explicit objective was to achieve for the area of R & 
D what the SEA had achieved for the economic area. The principles of 
the Internal Market concerning free movement, non-discrimination 
and so forth, thus served as the role model for the ERA approach 
developed by the Commission. In addition, the change of focus from 
basic research towards innovation enabled the Commission to 
highlight the explicit economic gains which potentially can be 
derived from a stronger research policy.22 
 
Moreover, the new framing of the old approach found support 
because it corresponded with ongoing reform efforts in the leading 
Member States, thereby creating compatibility between the Member 
States and European perspectives.23 In addition, the ever increasing 
internationalisation of science and research started to have profound 
effects, thereby creating structural conditions which increased the 
receptibility for the Commission proposals among Member State 
governments and other stakeholders. But the Commission was not 
only riding on a wave of profound structural changes within the area 
of science and research, it was also acting as a central entrepreneur 
within the broader realm of the internationalisation processes, in so 
far as it, since the introduction of the Framework Programmes in the 
mid-1980s, has systematically used the funding programmes to open 
up national R & D environments. Hence, with the support of the 
European Parliament (EP), the Commission deployed its classic 
strategy for circumventing opposition from Member State 
governments by systematically linking up with “lower level” 
organisations and thereby transforming them into advocates of 
increased Europeanisation. For example, the number of research 
institutions which acted as partners in the FP was increased from 
                                                 
21 Poul Kjaer: “Post-Hegelian Networks”, in: Marc Amstutz and Gunther Teubner: 
Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
forthcoming 2009). 
22 This approach has also been coined a “From invention to invoice” policy. 
23 Thomas Banchoff: “The Politics of the European Research Area”, ACES Working 
Paper, 3, 2002, p. 11. 
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13,000 to 18,000 between 1987 and 1994,24 thereby creating 
increasingly dense European networks. In addition, the Commission 
systematically promoted the establishment of European associations 
and Brussels-based representation offices within the area of science 
and R & D. This semantic turn from science to R & D also served to 
ensure full support from European business associations, which 
again exercised considerable pressure on Member State governments. 
 
The efforts of the Commission in relation to the European Research 
Area has, moreover, been complemented by the increased 
expectations created through the massive increase in available 
funding of the 7th Framework Programme (2007-13) when compared 
with earlier Framework Programmes. In institutional terms, the 
Framework Programme has also been stabilised through the 
establishment of the European Research Council (ERC), which will 
act as a permanent funding agency, which, between 2007 and 2013 
alone, will hand out 7.5 billion euro to specific projects (compared to 
4 billion euro under the previous framework programme).25 
Furthermore, the outsourcing of funding activities to the ECR means 
that DG Research, which, in the 1980s and 1990s, was bogged down 
by the strong emphasis on the rather technocratic administration of 
the Framework Programme(s), can increasingly devote its attention to 
the strategic objective of building the European Research Area. With 
the launching of the Galileo satellite navigation project in 2003, and 
the signing of the Treaty establishing the International Thermo-
nuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in 2006 between China, the EU, 
India, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States, the EU made 
a decisive move towards replacing the Member States as the key 
player in relation to the establishment of new research infrastructure 
and facilities. 
5. The OMC in Research and Development 
The adoption of the ERA concept at Lisbon also signalled the 
introduction of the OMC within the area of R & D. The Lisbon 
summit initiated the deployment of OMC tools in order to ensure the 
realisation of the European Research Area through the benchmarking 
                                                 
24 Thomas Banchoff: “The Politics of the European Research Area”, ACES Working 
Paper, 3, 2002, p. 18. 




of national practices, the facilitation of the cross-border mobility of 
researchers and the improvement of research infrastructures. In 
addition, it was agreed at the Barcelona summit in March 2002 that 
all Member States should increase R & D spending from an average 
of 1.9% of GNP in 2000 (EU 15) to 3% of GNP by 2010 and that the 
process towards the realisation of this objective also should be 
achieved with OMC methods. 
 
At the organisational level, these ambitious targets were followed up 
by a merger of the three Council configurations for the Internal 
Market, Industry, and Research into a single Competitiveness 
configuration in 2002, thereby strengthening the economic framing of 
R & D policy. Hence, the Council chose to emphasise i) human 
resources, ii) investment productivity, iii) impact on competitiveness, 
and iv) impact on employment in their attempt to concretise the 
process. Under these headings, the first OMC cycle within R & D was 
carried out from 2000 to 2003. The main focus was on the 
development of indicators with which national performance in R & D 
could be assessed. A high level working group with Member State 
representatives was entrusted with this task. For each of the four 
themes, five indicators were selected. Fifteen of the twenty indicators 
already existed within EUROSTAT or the OECD, and thus the 
process only added five additional indicators to an already well-
established system. This was followed up by the establishment of five 
expert groups, which were respectively charged with the task of i) 
defining good practices, ii) the way they had been achieved, iii) the 
potential for transferring such practices from one Member State to 
other Member States, and iv) the development of policy 
recommendations. These groups mainly consisted of academics, who 
were partly appointed by the Commission and partly by the Member 
States. Officially, the Member State representatives did not act as 
national representatives. 
 
The second cycle started with the 2002 agreement that R & D 
spending should be increased to 3% of GNP by 2010. The task of 
carrying out the OMC processes was outsourced to CREST. As noted, 
CREST is an advisory committee under the Commission consisting of 
Member State representatives, which was established in 1974 with the 
task of assisting the Commission in its efforts to co-ordinate national 
R & D policies. Thus, in practice, CREST serves as a structural 
coupling between Member State authorities as well as between 
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Member State authorities and the Commission, since its function is to 
increase the reflexivity of these structures by increasing the level of 
mutual observation. Under the auspices of CREST, five working 
groups were established, which continue to follow the development 
towards the 3% target. 
 
A third cycle was started in mid-2006. The main focus of this cycle 
remains the 3% target. In addition, it has been proposed that the cycle 
should involve areas such as “globalisation and R & D” and the use 
of structural funds to support this research.26 In the attempt to 
concretise the further work, the Commission adopted a Green Paper 
entitled “The European Research Area: New Perspectives”,27 in the 
spring of 2007. 
 
Apart from the merger of the council configurations, the evolution of 
the OMC within the area of R & D indicates that it is difficult to 
identify institutional innovations which can be said to be specific to 
the OMC. This is also being confirmed through the actual use of 
OMC tools. The Commission foresaw the deployment of the OMC 
within five areas: i) the “3-percent action plan”, ii) human resources 
and mobility, iii) science and society, iv) networking of national 
research programmes, and v) research infrastructure.28 In practice, 
however, OMC tools have been deployed in other areas as well, just 
as some of the five areas have only experienced a partial deployment 
of OMC instruments. 
 
In addition, the overall objective concerning the establishment of the 
European Research Area is more than 30 years old. The introduction 
of the OMC has, therefore, merely led to a new framing of already 
                                                 
26 Presidency Conclusions: Conference on “Improving Research Policies in Europe 
through the Open Method of Co-ordination”, Brussels, 18 May 2006, p. 3; Improving 
Research Policies through the Open Method of Co-ordination, Speech by European 
Commissioner for Science and Research Janez Potočnik (SPEECH /06/311), 
European Commission conference on the open method of coordination in research, 
Brussels, 18 May 2006. 
27 Commission of the European Communities: The European Research Area: New 
Perspectives, COM (2007) 161 final. 
28 Draft Summary Conclusions of the 288th meeting of the Scientific and Technical 
Research Committee (CREST) held in Iraklion, Greece, 27-28 March 2003. CREST 
1203/2003, p. 7, and Åse Gornitzka (2005): ”Coordinating policies for a “Europe of 
Knowledge”. Emerging practices of the “Open Method of Co-ordination” in 
education and research, Arena Working Paper, 16, p. 23. 
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existing activities and efforts. The outsourcing of the OMC processes 
to CREST confirms this, in so far as CREST has been carrying out 
OMC-like processes for the last 30 years. When the fact that the 
Commission and the OECD have systematically tried to benchmark 
best practises and to achieve convergence between national research 
systems since the 1960s, it is difficult to see what all the hype is about 
in relation to the OMC. The OMC in R & D amounts to little more 
than an attempt to breathe new life into old, and not particularly 
dynamic, structures. However, such attempts to establish increased 
momentum were already apparent in the launching of the idea of a 
European Science Area and CREST in the mid-1970s, in the launching 
of the Framework Programme(s) in the mid-1980s, and in the attempt 
to re-launch the idea of a common European Science Area in the early 
1990s. These attempts, however, all ran out steam after a short period. 
6. The Function of the OMC 
The insight that the deployment of OMC instruments is not a new 
phenomenon within the context of the European integration 
processes makes it questionable to claim that the OMC is a “new 
mode of governance”29. In addition, the modest results which have 
been achieved with such tools to date make the claim that such 
instruments possesses the potential to radically increase the problem-
solving capacity of the EU and to act as a real alternative to the 
classical community method implausible. Chalmers and Lodge, in 
relation to the deployment of the OMC within the area of the 
European Employment Strategy, go so far as to claim that the OMC is 
nothing but a rhetorical trick, which was invented within the context 
of the EMU in order to assert the claim that the EU was not heedless 
of the social consequences of monetary union.30 
 
                                                 
29 Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (2007): Learning from Difference: The 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, European 
Governance Papers, No C-07-02 ( http://www.connex-
network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf); Maria Joao Rodrigues: 
European Policies for a Knowledge Economy, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2003). 
30 Damian Chalmers and Martin Lodge: “The Open Method of Co-ordination and the 
European Welfare State”, ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, 
Discussion Paper No. 11, June 2003, The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, (http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/pdf/Disspaper11.pdf), 5 January 
2005. 
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Another and somewhat more positive possibility is to view the 
introduction of the OMC as a systematisation, intensification and 
professionalisation of “pre-integration” processes. Systematisation, 
because it frames the already ongoing soft law activities and links 
them to the overall policy objectives of the EU; intensification, 
because it increases the level of mutual observation between the 
Member States, and hence increases the reflexivity of their 
administrations, and professionalisation, because it somewhat 
formalises the already existing instruments and procedures for “soft” 
policy-making. Hence, as long as the OMC is not used as a substitute 
for the Community Method, it increases, rather than decreases, the 
formalisation of policy-making, just as it increases the possibility of 
exercising critique in so far as it renders the existing structures more 
visible. 
 
The introduction of the OMC should thus be understood as a 
strengthening of the kind of policy conduct which tends to takes 
place prior to formal transfers of competences. As is well-known, one 
of the reasons for the emergence of the OMC was the desire of the 
Member States to prevent further transfers of competence to the EU 
level. Nonetheless, the OMC is de facto “uploading” a number of 
policy areas which were not subject to common European approaches 
before the launching of the OMC.31 Good examples of this are 
unemployment and social exclusion policies. In addition, OMC 
instruments are mainly deployed within policy areas that fall outside 
the Community Method or where the Community only have 
supportive or complementary competences vis-à-vis the Member 
States. Furthermore, one common feature of the policy areas in which 
OMC tools have been deployed is that they are characterised by 
substantial divergences in their organisation across the Member 
States. Additionally, the specific ways in which these policy areas are 
organised, and the policy objectives that they embody, are, within 
national political discourses, often considered as constituent of the 
inner core of Member State national identities, expressing essential 
characteristics of these nations. Such idealisations can, of course, be 
easily dismissed with the observation that these regimes are 
evolutionary phenomena resulting from contingent and 
                                                 
31 Bent Greve and Susana Borrás: “Concluding remarks: New method or just cheap 
talk?”, (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 329-336. 
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uncontrollable processes.32 In terms of political realities, nationally-
embedded regimes are, however, linked to both substantial socio-
economic interests and to strong ideological and emotional forces, 
making attempts to increase EU competences within such areas 
extremely difficult. It is against this background – large differences in 
organisational mode and policy objectives, and high levels of political 
sensitivity – that the deployment of the OMC should be understood. 
It is a subtle instrument, applied to achieve convergence between 
policy objectives and organisational modes in policy areas in which 
the political resistance and practical difficulties that stand in the way 
of harmonisation are substantial. From this perspective, and to the 
extent that it succeeds in terms of output, the OMC could provide a 
structural basis for increased integration through competence 
transfers at a later date. Political sensitivities might gradually be 
overcome by intensive communicative exchanges taking place at EU 
level, if these can provoke a change of perspective among the key 
actors and public opinion in favour of EU involvement in the areas in 
question. Systematic comparisons and evaluations can, moreover, be 
seen as reflexivity-increasing instruments that break down national 
myths concerning the superiority of national policy regimes when 
compared with other regimes, and hence reduce resistance to 
common European approaches.33 To the extent that convergence 
between the different ways of prioritising and organising relevant 
policy areas is achieved, this is likely to provide a structural basis 
which will facilitate actual harmonisation. Hence, the particularity of 
the method lies in its focus which is to construct common European 
“universes” or discourses within areas in which such discourses have 
not existed so far. This also means that the OMC’s actual impact 
remains difficult to assess. The OMC is not intended to produce 
“real” decisions, but to ensure the continued transformation of 
discursive structures. The main outcome of OMC processes is a 
common language, in the form of key concepts, classifications, 
indicators and a common knowledge base, which is followed up by 
                                                 
32 Niklas Luhmann: “Wohlfahrtsstaat zwischen Evolution und Rationalität”, pp. 26–
40, in: Peter Koslowski et al., (ed), Chancen und Grenzen des Sozialstaats, (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1983). 
33 Stijn Smismans: “Reflexive law in support of directly deliberative poliarchy: 
Reflexive-deliberative polyarchy as a normative frame for the OMC”, pp. 99–144, in: 
Olivier De Schutter and Simon Deakin (eds): Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the 
Open Co-ordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe?, 
(Brussels: Bryant, 2005). 
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strategic diffusion of knowledge and evaluation of results.34 Hence, 
the OMC processes can also be described as being oriented towards 
the establishment of discursive hegemony and the “voluntary” 
internalisation of preferences and norms associated with these 
models amongst relevant actors in the Member States.35 In other 
words, and bearing in mind that the vast majority of policy areas in 
which it is applied have only recently been “uploaded” to European 
level, the OMC can be characterised as an instrument for 
“entrepreneurial discourse building”. It is a method which creates 
common European universes within policy areas which until now 
have been dominated by separate, nationally embedded discourses. 
From the Brussels perspective, the OMC has, therefore, become an 
instrument that can be used to create new “fields of action”. Hence, in 
so far as integration is narrowly defined as a conveying of legal 
competences to the EC institutions, the OMC can thus be 
characterised as “pre-integration” tool, which constructs a “common 
basis” within policy areas where such a basis did not previously exist. 
 
Within the area of R & D, the kinds of efforts described above have 
been unfolding for many years. However, no major breakthrough in 
terms of legal integration has occurred to date. Hence, the use of 
OMC instruments in order to pave the way for “real” integration has 
so far only been a very modest success. Viewed over the long period, 
the area over R & D has, however, experienced a slow but steady 
increase in the level of Europeanisation. This increase might lead to 
significant changes in the preferences of Member State actors further 
down the road, and hence ensure their backing for a major integrative 
initiative through increased transfer of competences and the 
construction of an adequate constitutional framework for the area of 
R & D. 
                                                 
34 Kerstin Jacobsson: “Soft Regulation and the Subtle Transformation of States: The 
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Chapter 10  
The Corporate Codes of Multinationals 
Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate 
Governance and Co-determination 
Gunther Teubner 




German co-determination is one of the casualties of globalisation.1  
Thirty years ago, the battle for union participation in corporate 
boards seemed to come to a conciliatory conclusion in the historic 
compromise of the German co-determination law. In the meantime, 
the power ratios might well have altered to such an extent that the 
shareholders can celebrate a clear victory, whilst the trade unions are 
left to fight retreating battles. In company law, co-determination is 
being usurped by corporate governance. 
 
Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that the self-same 
globalisation process, which pushed the German form of co-
determination onto the back foot, contemporaneously forced a large 
number of multinationals to develop new forms of company 
constitutions, at a safe distance from the crossfire of corporate 
governance and co-determination.2 The corporate codes of 
multinationals are directed neither at the interests of their 
shareholders, nor at the participation of the trade unions. These codes 
                                                 
1 Translated from the German by Rory Stephen Brown. I would like to thank Anna 
Beckers for her help in preparing this article. 
2 See C. Scherrer and T. Greven, Global Rules for Trade: Codes of Conduct, Social 
Labelling, Workers’ Rights Clauses, (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2001). 
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are different instances of corporate social responsibility with a 
potential that is hard to gauge. 
 
The corporate codes of multinationals react to both new perils in the 
working environment and the disappearance of traditional actors due 
to the globalisation process: the worldwide inter-linking of markets, 
capital, and production facilitate a slackening of working conditions 
in developing countries and endanger the social achievements in 
developed industrial states, a situation in no way ameliorated by 
nation states policies. Hopes that traditional international 
organisations (particularly the International Labour Organisation) 
would come to rescue, have been disappointed because, although 
binding, their founding inter-state treaties are unenforceable. 
Similarly, social clauses in international trade contracts promise little. 
A strategy in which the pressure amassed by worldwide social 
conflicts, protest movements, domestic courts, non-governmental and 
international organisations, coerces multinationals into adopting 
codes of conduct in which they assume an obligation to uphold social 
standards, is more likely to succeed.3 A committed advocate of 
industrial democracy observes, in the relative success of the corporate 
code, 
 
[…] the inexorable result of the shift of power subsequent to 
globalisation. Neither states nor international organisations can 
notably limit the room for manoeuvre enjoyed by 
multinationals. The latter insist upon their freedoms, 
                                                 
3 S. Picciotto, “Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business”, 
(2003) 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p. 131, at 139; V. Haufler, A Public Role 
for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy, (Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001); C.M. Dickerson, “Transnational 
Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the Playing Field For Developing 
Workers”, (2001) 53 Florida Law Review, p. 611; H. Arthurs, “Private Ordering and 
Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of 
Labour Market Regulation”, in: J. Conaghan, R.M. Fischl and K. Klare (eds), Labour 
Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 471; O. Boiral, “The Certification of Corporate Conduct: 
Issues and Prospects”, (2003) 142 International Labour Review, p. 317; R. Jenkins “The 
Political Economy of Codes of Conduct”, in: R. Jenkins, R. Pearson and G. Seyfang 
(eds), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy, 
(London: Earthscan, 2002), p. 13; M. Posner and J. Nolan, “Can Codes of Conduct 
Play a Role in Promoting Workers’ Rights?” in: R.J. Flanagan and W.B. Gould IV 
(eds), International Labor Standards: Globalization, Trade, and Public Policy, (Stanford: 
Stanford Law and Policy, 2003), p. 207. 
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guaranteed by the principle of voluntarism, and employ them 
to draft their own normative registers. Even when these rules 
do not correspond to the traditional notion of law, they are 
norms for which respect is a legitimate expectation. It is 
imperative, therefore, that “soft law” does not remain merely 
cosmetic. If NGOs, the media, and perhaps also trade unions, 
intensify their efforts to promote an international consciousness 
which reflects the global civil society of the future in the world 
of work, then we may set our hopes high.4 
 
This view is primarily interested in political strategies and their 
results. Legal aspects of the codes of conduct appear only at the 
periphery; that is to say, these codes occupy a juridical “no-man’s 
land”. As soft law, they are not enforceable; instead, they morally 
oblige companies. Everything depends on political relationships, 
namely, the pressure exerted by the leading actors and the 
mobilisation of the public.5 It would seem salutary, to ponder as to 
whether or not legal phenomena manifest themselves within 
corporate codes, which not only alter the gravitas of the law-giving 
institutions, but also, by dint of their juridical positivity, have a 
knock-on effect on political and economic relationships. The thesis 
proposed here is that corporate codes are emergent legal phenomena 
in the constitutionalisation of private governance regimes. Unlike 
when they were first spawned, they are no longer mere public 
relations strategies; instead, they have matured into genuine civil 
constitutions – in the fashion of constitutional pluralism. In what 
follows, five observable trends will be sketched in support of this 
contention: (1) Juridification; (2) Constitutionalisation; (3) 
Judicialisation; (4) Hybridisation; and (5) Intermeshing. 
 
1. Private Juridification: Corporate Codes as Law 
without the State 
By simply describing corporate codes as soft law, one sidesteps 
categorising them as law or non-law. Mindful of the grave 
consequences of this categorisation, such a sidestep is inadvisable. 
Corporate codes beg the same question as lex mercatoria, internet law 
                                                 
4 M. Weiss, “Gefangen im globalen Wettbewerb: Chancen und Grenzen des 
Arbeitsrecht: Internationale Organisationen, staatliche Eigeninteressen und 




and other global regimes in which private actors make rules, the 
binding nature of which is not guaranteed by state power, yet which 
display a high normative efficacy. Are we considering social norms or 
real law? For the time-being, the conclusion that we are experiencing 
real law has been arrived at in various vehicles of social and legal 
theory: legal pluralism,6 post-modern governance,7 social fields,8 
systems,9 and soft-law.10 
 
What we are observing here is the emergence of a legal discourse of 
global dimensions, the boundaries of which are drawn by the binary 
code of legal and illegal, and which self-perpetuates by recycling 
symbolic global (not national) validity. The first criterion, binary 
code, distinguishes global law from economic and other social 
processes. The second criterion, global validity, differentiates 
between national and international legal phenomena. Both criteria are 
instruments of second order observation. Thereby, law observes its 
own operations in the environs of national legal orders and global 
social systems. 
 
Corporate codes call for differentiation. Not every formalised 
statement of corporate social responsibility by a multinational can be 
attributed legal character. Only when particular conditions are 
fulfilled can we talk of law in the real sense. To date, Martin Herberg 
has undertaken the most detailed examination of the necessary 
normative structures,11 and asserts that it is the interplay between 
                                                 
6 J. Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism”, (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism, p. 1; S.E. 
Merry, “Legal Pluralism”, (1988) 22 Law and Society Review, p. 869; H. Peterson and H. 
Zahle, Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1995). 
7 G. Stoker, “Governance as Theory”, (1998) 155 International Social Science Journal, p. 
17. 
8 P. Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Theory of the Juridical Field”, (1987) 38 
Hastings Law Journal, p. 808. 
9 G. Teubner (ed), Global Law Without A State, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997); J. Priban 
and D. Nelken, Law’s New Boundaries: The Consequences of Legal Autopoiesis, 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2001); G.-P. Calliess, Grenzüberschreitenden 
Verbraucherverträge, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), at 176 et seq. 
10 S. Sciarra, “Social Values and the Multiple Sources of European Law”, (1995) 1 
European Law Journal, p. 60; A.E. Boyle, “Some Reflections on the Relationship of 
Treaties and Soft Law”, (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 901. 
11 M. Herberg, “Private Authority, Global Governance, and the Law. The Case of 
Environmental Self-Regulation in Multinational Enterprises”, in: G. Winter (ed), 
Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change. Perspectives from Science, 
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three levels of norms that transforms the codes into genuine laws. 
Hence, codes of conduct take on legal character if: 
 
• first, at the upper level, firm-specific self-commitments and 
guidelines exist, under conditions of increasing legal porosity; 
they are an important means for development of trust and for 
the discovery of legitimacy; 
• second, at the central level, activities of the internal regulatory 
and executive organs work, partially and variably, as advisers, 
investigators and enforcers, and frequently as developers of 
valid norms; 
• third, at the lower level, concrete technical and organisational 
rules exist, which, so to say, identify the operative core of the 
regulatory organs; they comprise duties and tasks, which one 
could not cast in this concrete form from the guidelines, and 
which, at times, take on the format of implicit basic rules and 
indices of normality. 
 
Herberg thus puts forward a catalogue of additional features upon 
which the legal character of a code is contingent. It must: be an inter-
linking bundle of inter-related norms, rules and procedures (which 
typically also includes very concrete guidelines for specific 
situations), clearly distinguish between permissible and 
impermissible practices, and give its addressees a reliable means of 
orientation. An additional indicator is the component of factual 
efficacy, which comes to being, partially, by dint of the internal 
binding and persuasive force of the rules, and partially through 
instruments of surveillance and enforcement. One fundamental 
definitional pre-requisite is the development of specific, 
distinguishable organs whose central task is the maintenance and 
further advancement of the normative order. 
 
                                                                                                                   
Sociology and the Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 149; idem, 
Globalisierung und private Selbstregulierung, (Frankfurt aM: Campus, 2007); idem, 
“Erzeugen multinationale Unternehmen ihr eigenes Umweltrecht? Bausteine zu einer 
Theorie transnationaler Regulative”, in: G. Winter (ed), Die Umweltverantwortung 
multinationaler Konzerne. Selbststeuerung und Recht bei Auslandsdirektinvestitionen, 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 73. These studies are primarily concerned with 




To be sure, a clear legal theoretical orientation can only be developed 
if one can trace these combinations of features back to “secondary 
norm-formation processes”. Contrary to several sociological or 
economic formulations, not every norm formation or “private 
ordering” is law. The indifference with regard to the legal proprium, 
which such theories exhibit, would be fatal to any socio-legal or 
doctrinal analysis, which per force concerns itself with the internal 
rationality and normativity of law.12 In order to avoid the 
misunderstandings about a system-theoretical approach, it must be 
stressed that the usage of the binary code is insufficient for the 
identification of law. The institutionalisation of processes of 
secondary norm-formation is decisive. This not only recalls Herbert 
Hart’s definition of law as the unity of primary and secondary 
norms,13 but also goes beyond it, since it replaces structural with 
operational orientation. Only when institutional arrangements which 
systematically subordinate the first order observations to the second 
order observation of a legal code exist, can we speak of autonomous 
law (with or without the involvement of the state). A “global law 
without a state” should not yet be assumed upon the basis that non-
state institutions judge behaviour pursuant to the normative code, 
but, rather, that it may be acknowledged only when processes which 
observe these judicial functions under the binary legal code have 
been institutionalised. Only then do corporate codes satisfy the 
structural pre-requisites of a transnational law outside of state law. 
 
Transnational law describes a third category of an autonomous 
legal system that goes beyond the traditional categories of 
national and international law. It is created and developed 
through the legislative powers of a global civil society and 
based upon general legal principles and their crystallisation in 
civil practice. Private conflict resolvers are responsible for its 
                                                 
12 J. Griffiths (supra note 6), at 1 et seq., in his description of legal pluralism as a 
plethora of systems of “social control”, is rather insensitive with respect to the legal 
proprium. As to the indifference of economic analysis of “private ordering”, see A. 
Aviram, “A Network Effects Analysis of Private Ordering”, (2003) 80 Berkeley 
Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series 5, available at: 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/. 
13 For the parallel attempt to Kelsen’s ideas on customary international law and the 
Grundnorm, see A. Fischer-Lescano, “Monismus, Dualismus? – Pluralismus. 
Selbstbestimmung des Weltrechts bei Hans Kelsen und Niklas Luhmann”, in: H. 
Brunkhorst and R. Voigt (eds), Rechts-staat: Staat, internationale Gemeinschaft und 
Völkerrecht bei Hans Kelsen, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, forthcoming 2009). 
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usage, interpretation and furtherance, and a codification – if 
one appears at all – will appear in the form of general principles 
and rules, standard contract forms, or codes of conduct, which 
are established by private standardising institutions.14 
 
To stress this point again, in order for private ordering to qualify as 
genuine law, it is not sufficient that the pertinent behavioural rules 
are alloyed to the notion of legal or illegal. Instead, the rules must 
themselves be subjugated to a process, in which they are judged 
according to the legal code. This reflexive process requires certain 
institutional precautions, in particular, the development of actors or 
instances, who or which are responsible for the establishment, 
modification, interpretation and implementation of the primary norm 
formation. Fundamental to this is the growth of the central level of 
internal control and implementation organs, which mediates between 
the two other normative levels, thusly grounding the legal character 
of the corporate code. 
 
A more exacting determination of whether corporate codes constitute 
law, the question of whether such self-curtailments qualify can be 
supported by two perspectives. From the outside, the code appears to 
be a contractual obligation or a unilateral public declaration, 
designed to transform political statements into binding legal form. 
From the inside, the code seems to be a corporate act, through which 
associative rules become binding for the organs of the company, in an 
internal relationship to the organs and the shareholders as well as in a 
labour law relation to the workers. The interplay between the 
company law rules and the external efficacy of these rules does merit 
further examination. It is worthwhile drawing a parallel here 
between the interplay of international law covenants and unilateral 
governmental declarations, and the effect of the former on laws of the 
constitutional variety in the domestic legal order. It should, therefore, 
become clear that these norms, pursuant to their double-
juridification, have binding legal force. Moreover, according to the 
                                                 
14 G.-P. Calliess, “Transnationales Verbrauchervertragsrecht”, (2004) 68 Rabels 
Zeitschrift, p. 244, at 254 et seq.; for the terminological history of transnational law, see 
H.H. Koh, “Transnational Legal Process”, (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review, p. 181; see, 
further, F. Hanschmann, “Theorie transnationaler Rechtsprozesse”, in: S. Buckel, R. 
Christensen and A. Fischer-Lescano (eds), Neue Theorien des Rechts, (Stuttgart: Lucius 
and Lucius, 2006), p. 235; P. Schiff Berman, “From International Law to Law and 
Globalization”, (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p. 458. 
268 Teubner
 
argument here, they represent genuine legal norms in both the 
sociological and the juridical sense. 
 
2. Civic Constitutionalisation: Elements of a 
Communal Constitution 
Even more astonishing than their qualification as law in the formal 
sense, is the peculiar constitutional element exhibited by such private 
codifications of corporate rules. The reflexive legal standardisation, 
which takes place at the central level, substantiates the transposition 
of the corporate code from social norms into legal norms, without, 
however, stricto sensu, representing a constitutionalisation. This 
occurs only when the reflexive processes in the organisations are 
appended to reflexive legal processes – in other words, when inter-
systemic linking institutions tie together secondary rule-making in 
the law with fundamental, rational principles of the organisation.15 
This is based upon a constitutional concept which is not limited to 
nation states constitutions, but which, instead requires that, under 
particular historical conditions, even non-state civic orders give birth 
to autonomous constitutionalisation. The positivisation of 
constitutional norms moves from the global political level to various 
social sectors, which, in parallel to political constitutions, produce 
their own constitutions of civil society.16 Pursuant to the concept of 
                                                 
15 See, further, on these processes of auto-constitutionalisation: G. Teubner, “Globale 
Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie”, (2003) 63 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, p. 1; A. Fischer-Lescano 
and G. Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts, (Frankfurt 
aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006), at 53 et seq. 
16 As to the concept of “societal constitutionalism” in social theory, see D. Sciulli, 
Theory of Societal Constitutionalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), at 
21 et seq.; idem, Corporate Power in Civil Society: An Application of Societal 
Constitutionalism, (New York: New York University Press, 2001), at 131 et seq.; G. 
Teubner (supra note 15), at 1 et seq.; on plural constitutionalism, see N. Walker, “The 
Idea of Constitutional Pluralism”, (2002) 65 Modern Law Review, p. 317; C. Walter, 
“Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance: Possibilities for and Limits to the 
Development of an International Constitutional Law”, (2001) 44 German Yearbook of 
International Law, p. 170; A. Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Die Geltungsbegründung 
der Menschenrechte, (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2005), at 247 et seq.; H. Brunkhorst, 
Solidarität. Von der Bürgerfreundschaft zur globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft, (Frankfurt aM: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2002), at 203 et seq.; G.-P. Calliess, “Reflexive Transnational Law: 
The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private Law”, (2002) 24 
Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie, p. 185; T. Cottier and M. Hertig, “The Prospects of 21st 
Century Constitutionalism”, (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 261; 
H. Schepel, “Constituting Private Governance Regimes: Standards Bodies in 
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constitutional pluralism, one can speak of a constitution of a 
community outside of the domestic context, when the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
 
(i) the development of an explicit constitutional discourse and 
constitutional self-consciousness; (ii) a claim to foundational 
legal authority, or sovereignty, whereas sovereignty is not 
viewed as absolute; (iii) the delineation of a sphere of 
competences; (iv) the existence of an organ internal to the polity 
with interpretative autonomy with regard to the meaning and 
the scope of the competences; (v) the existence of an 
institutional structure to govern the polity; (vi) rights and 
obligations of citizenship, understood in a broad sense; and (vii) 
specification of the terms of representation of the citizens in the 
polity.17 
 
The expressions “polity”, “governing”, and “representation” may not 
be understood in the narrow sense of an institutionalised political 
system, but may, instead, also denote an “unpolitical” civic 
manifestation, be it economic, scientific, educational, health-related, 
artistic or sporting, in which the global constitutionalisation process 
takes place.18 
                                                                                                                   
American Law”, in: Ch. Joerges and G. Teubner (eds), Constitutionalism and 
Transnational Governance, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 161; C. Scott and R. Wai, 
“Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human 
Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational ‘Private’ Litigation”, in: 
Ch. Joerges, I.-J. Sand and G. Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and 
Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 287. On a global economic 
constitution, see H. Arthurs and R. Kreklewich, “Law, Legal Institutions, and the 
Legal Profession in the New Economy”, (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, p. 1, at 4; 
D.Z. Cass, “The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-
Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade”, 
(2001) 12 European Journal of International Law, p. 39, at 40 et seq.; R. de Lange, 
“Divergence, Fragmentation, and Pluralism. Notes on Polycentricity and Unity in 
Law”, in: H. Petersen and H. Zahle (eds), Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of 
Pluralism in Law, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), p. 103, at 112 et seq. 
17 N. Walker, “The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key”, in: G. de 
Burca and J. Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO. Legal and Constitutional Issues, (London: 
Hart Publishing, 2001), p. 31, at 33. 
18 This receives special emphasis in D. Sciulli (supra note 16, 1992) at 21 et seq.; G. 
Teubner (supra note 15), at 1 et seq.; H. Brunkhorst (supra note 16), at 203 et seq.; A. 
Fischer-Lescano (supra note 16), at 195 et seq.; Ch. Joerges, H. Schepel and E. Vos, 
“The Law’s Problems with the Involvement of Non-Governmental Actors in 
Europe’s Legislative Processes: The Case of Standardisation under the ‘New 
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Therefore, an autonomous, non-state, non-political, civic 
constitutionalisation of multinationals takes place if reflexive social 
processes, which concern the relationship of the multinational in its 
various environs, are interwoven with reflexive legal processes. 
Under these conditions, it makes sense to speak of elements of a 
genuine constitution in the corporate codes of multinationals. We can 
observe the typical components of a constitution: regulations about 
the establishment and functioning of decision-making processes 
(organisational and procedural rules), and the codification of the 
boundaries of the organisation in relation to individual freedoms and 
civil liberties (basic rights). 
 
The norms of the upper level of the codes are orientated towards 
precisely these conditions. They concern the underlying decision-
making processes of the multinational, which pertain to the 
organisation’s relationship to its employees, whose rights it respects. 
The guidelines at this upper level are the genuine constitutional 
norms of the multinationals. By dint of their structure, these 
directives are neither substantive rules, such as the standards at the 
lower level, nor mere procedural norms such as those at the central 
level. Instead, they are explicit superior norms of the company 
constitution, which are formulated as general principles, and serve 
both as the departure point for internal norm-generation and as the 
yardsticks of the internal and external reviews. 
 
To speak of the “limits on power” due to the external effects of 
organisational action, as Herberg does, is not idle, but is too close to 
conceptions of the division of powers in a state constitution.19 It 
would be more accurate to speak not only of the curtailments of 
freedom in situations in which economic power relations manifest 
themselves, but also, more comprehensively, of externally imposed 
self-restraint of the organisational matrix, due to its negative 
externalities.20 The problem centres on the negative externalities of 
the profit principle, the chosen production technologies, and the 
formal organisation. We are not concerned here with a transfer of the 
                                                                                                                   
Approach’”, in European University Institute (eds), EUI Working Papers No. 99/9 
(San Domenico: Badia Fiesolana, 1999), 1 et seq.; L. Scott and R. Wai (supra note 16), at 
287 et seq. 
19 M. Herberg (supra note 11). 
20 For more details, see G. Teubner, "The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights 
Violations by ‘Private’ Transnational Actors", (2006) 69 Modern Law Review, p. 327. 
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rights of basic national law as a result of the exercise of power by 
societal actors, but, instead, with basic rights, which actively oppose 
the external effects of such pursuits. The constitutional question of 
globalised civic sectors is thoroughly reminiscent of the constitutional 
question of the nation state of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
 
3. International Judicialisation: Corporate Codes in 
Conflict with State Laws 
The juridification and constitutionalisation of multinationals through 
corporate codes are instances of independent law-formation, and 
therefore have little to do with national or international politics and 
law. Corporate codes produce global laws and global constitutions 
without a state. In the light of globalisation’s tendency? to 
differentiate between politics and law more than in the nation-state, 
the relation of these corporate codes to national and international 
law, on the one hand, and to national and international politics, on 
the other, need to be discussed separately. 
 
One important condition for the success of corporate codes is their 
interaction with national legal systems. The effectuation of this 
interaction should be one of the most important tasks. But these 
efforts come up against the tough and enduring resistance of 
multinationals, which jealously guard their “sovereignty” over their 
corporate codes, and which are fain to avoid judicial reviews. For the 
implementation success of codes of conduct, their judicialisation in 
the national legal order will be one of the most important pre-
requisites.21 At the same time, it should be clear that their reception in 
national law is not a condition of the legal character or binding effect 
of the codes. Both are produced by the juridification and the 
constitutionalising processes in the company, and also in interactions 
with actors external to it. 
 
It should be equally apparent that this interaction with state law does 
not signify the transformation of a legal register of civil society into 
domestic law. The corporate codes are neither prescribed by national 
legislation, nor adopted, nor integrated. More pertinent is the notion 
                                                 
21 See the conclusions drawn by R. Zimmer from an empirical study of corporate 
codes in Salvador: R. Zimmer, “Menschenrechte der Arbeiterinnen werden häufig 




of conflict of laws: the autonomous legal orders of the multinationals 
collide with national and international laws. In this collision between 
autonomous legal orders, both undergo a deep process of change. In 
the event, corporate codes are not subordinated to domestic law, nor 
is domestic law ousted by the codes, rather there is a reciprocal 
reconstruction of the state law in the corporate code and vice versa. 
Existing conflicts law is not equipped for such transnational and 
trans-institutional collisions. The problems arising here can be 
overcome through a new law of conflicts, which, unlike the 
traditional territorial jurisdictional predicates of international private 
law, locates itself in a plurality of national, international and 
corporate legal systems.22 From the offset, a substantive law approach 
would be preferable, which, by virtue of the transnational and trans-
institutional collisions, makes it impossible to refer the conflict 
exclusively to one of the colliding legal orders. Here, we are 
concerned with regime-transcending legal conflicts, with effects in 
both legal orders. The only escape route in such a case of inter-regime 
conflict would be for the tribunal concerned to develop its own 
substantive norms. Mindful of the “domestic” and the “foreign” legal 
order, and with one eye on the third order, trans-institutional 
substantive norms, following the fashion of an asymmetrical law-
mélange, could be formed. The goal would be that, in such conflicts, 
organisational, international and national norms could jostle for 
position. The challenge for the relevant national, international and 
“private” conflict resolution tribunals is to approach the quandary in 
such a manner that they distil the pertinent laws from the territorial, 
organisational or institutional legal context, and creatively combine 
them to form genuine transnational norms. Each tribunal per force 
“legislates” from its own perspective, and no hierarchy of tribunals 
exists to rank their efforts. Thus, the most pressing task might be the 
organisation of mutual awareness and reciprocal acknowledgement 
between decentralised tribunals. 
 
                                                 
22 With regard to these new conflicts, see A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner (supra 
note 15); P. Schiff Berman (supra note 14); R. Michaels, “The Re-State-ment of Non-
State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal 
Pluralism”, (2005) 51 Wayne Law Review, p. 1209. 
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4. Regulatory Hybridisation: The Mixing of Private 
and Public Policy 
Similar to the importance of their co-ordination with the global legal 
system, the success of corporate codes depends on their interaction 
with political regulatory bodies. A great deal hinges on whether or 
not political pressure leads to the subjection of autonomous corporate 
codes to external regulatory impulses. Here, again, collective actors 
outside the company – NGOs, trade unions, media, international 
organisations and administrative agencies – play a decisive role, in 
offsetting the closure tendencies of the company both in terms of the 
formulation of the code and also its implementation and future 
development. 
 
As to the relationship between corporate codes and political 
normative orders, the question is not of a simple re-integration of 
private rules into political-state norms. The comprehensive 
transformation of purely voluntary codes into state-regulated and 
state-implemented registers is neither probable nor desirable. Instead, 
the hybridisation of the corporate codes is a developmental trend, in 
which the autonomy of the codes is preserved, but in which state 
agencies and international organisations are involved to the extent 
that they contribute to the delineation of the borders of the private 
code and to its implementation and regulation. Only by a complex of 
strategies and only with co-operation, will multinationals, 
international organisations, state governments, employers’ 
syndicates, trade unions, and NGOs be able to approach the goal of 
the worldwide establishment of employees’ rights – not only on 
paper but also in practice. In fact, mutual agreement between the 
various actors will be crucial. 
 
5. Inter-organisational Co-operation: The 
Extension of the Corporate Codes into Production 
Networks 
That corporate codes only work as the internal self-regulation of a 
single multinational and do not control the entire value-creating 
chain of production and distribution represents a grave flaw. 
Consequently, the key players in an industry boast relatively high 
labour law standards, whilst the working conditions in peripheral 
companies are significantly worse. Recently, a trend that counters 
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these tendencies has been observable: the emergence of inter-
company networks as an extension of the corporate code onto an 
entire production network. Global commodity chains have 
developed, which constitute neither market relationships nor 
integrated multinationals.23 Instead, what we can observe are 
networks of independent companies, which have generated their 
own governance structures. Two types may be distinguished: 
producer-driven and buyer-driven chains. The nerve centre of the 
network lies either in the ambit of manufacture or in the domain of 
consumption. 
 
For corporate codes, it is important that the organisational features of 
the network offer certain advantages, making it possible to extend the 
reach of the code to several inter-linking companies.24 The over-
reaching governance structures of the network facilitate – in spite of 
the independence of nodal companies – the centralising function of 
the codes as well as their unified validity in the total production 
chain. The role of the network’s nerve centre, whose considerable 
influence on the other parts of the network promotes the universal 
usage of the code, is of imperative importance. Moreover, we can 
observe an interplay between factors internal to companies and inter-
organisational features. Control and implementation structures 
developed in the nerve centre, for example, a social responsibility 
task force or a responsible officer, spread through the network to the 
other companies and facilitate the co-ordination of the various 
internal corporate codes. 
 
Only when these five elements – private juridification, civic 
constitutionalism, international judicialisation, regulatory 
hybridisation and inter-organisational networks – emerge 
simultaneously in the future, might we be justified in making 
cautiously optimistic prognoses for corporate codes. Finally, their 
success depends on a combination of political and legal 
constellations, which, on the one hand, allows pressure from external 
actors – that is to say, from NGOs, trade unions, media, international 
organisations, and domestic organs – to be effective, and, on the 
                                                 
23 G. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz, Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1994). 
24 See, for more proofs, M. Fichter and J. Sydow, “Using Networks Toward Global 
Labor Standards? Organizing Social Responsibility in Global Production Chains”, 
(2002) 9 Industrielle Beziehungen, p. 357. 
Beyond corporate governance 275
 
other, give impetus to a juridification of the civic norms and their 
interaction with state law so that the codes constitute, not a corporate 
fad, but permanent valid law which generates durable legal 
institutions, and which guarantees the preservation of high labour 
law standards. As demonstrated by recent empirical studies, the 
juridification of corporate codes, i.e., their metamorphosis into 
concrete rights, the transgression of which entails damages or other 
sanctions, represents a crucial condition to their success.25 
                                                 
25 R. Zimmer (supra note 21). 
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In recent years, the modernist idea that constitutional modes of 
government are for states, and for states alone, has been the subject 
both of sustained challenge and of strong defence. Anticipating our 
definitional discussion, we can comprehend the challenge to a state-
centred constitutionalism, and the response to that challenge, as 
having both material and ideational dimensions. It refers, first, to the 
development, beyond the states, of certain levels of decision-making 
capacity that are normally associated with the demand for 
constitutional governance, as well as to certain types of transnational 
regulatory institutions and practices – from the emergence of charters 
of rights and strong regimes of judicial review to the elaboration of 
inter-institutional checks and balances, and developed systems of 
political accountability – that are normally associated with the supply 
of constitutional governance. These developments in both supply and 
demand may be found (i) in regional organisations such as the 
European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade 
Association (NAFTA), (ii) in functional organisations as diverse in 
their remit and in their pedigree (public or private) as the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Internet Corporation of Assigned 
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Names and Numbers (ICANN), as well as (iii) under the general 
global umbrella of the UN Charter and institutions or the international 
legal framework more generally.1 The challenge to a state-centred 
constitutionalism refers, secondly, to the increasing tendency for such 
existing post-state policy capacities and related regulatory 
institutions and practices to be conceptualized in explicitly 
constitutional terms, as well as to the growth in “constitutional” 
imagination or sponsorship of alternative post-state regulatory 
institutions and practices. 
 
The present chapter has three aims. It asks, first, why taking the idea 
and associated ethos and methods of constitutionalism “beyond the 
state” might be viewed as a significant and controversial innovation, 
and thus be in need of explanation and justification. This requires us 
to engage in some detail with the definition of constitutionalism as 
well as with the contestation surrounding that definition. Secondly, 
taking account of the various arguments that lie behind these 
definitional differences, the chapter attempts to develop a scheme for 
understanding certain key features of constitutionalism in general, 
and of its post-state development in particular, which is sufficiently 
inclusive to command broad agreement. Thirdly, and bringing the 
concerns of the first two sections together, it seeks to identify the key 
current tensions – or antinomies – surrounding the growth of post-
state constitutionalism with a view to indicating what is at stake in 
the future career of this concept. 
2. The Statist Legacy and the Problem of Definition 
Given the considerable prima facie evidence that the demand for and 
supply of constitutional governance is increasingly moving beyond 
the state, why does such an extension of the proper domain of 
constitutionalism meet with strong resistance? We can identify four 
kinds of objections which, sometimes cumulatively, are levelled 
against taking constitutionalism beyond the state, each referring to a 
different way in which constitutionalism is implicated or invoked in 
                                                 
1 For reasons of space, the present article does not consider the related trend towards 
sub-state constitutionalism. See, for example, Tierney (2004). See N. Walker, “The 
Idea of Constitutional Pluralism”, (2002) 65 Modern Law Review, pp. 317-59, and B. 
Fassbender “‘We the Peoples of the United Nations’: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form in International Law”, in: M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds), The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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contemporary social and political relations. Constitutionalism beyond 
the state may be rejected or challenged as inappropriate, as 
inconceivable, as improbable or as illegitimate. Let us briefly examine 
these four “i”s in turn. 
 
The argument from inappropriateness refers to the way in which 
constitutional techniques and values are invoked as a form of 
normative resource in law-mediated endeavours to articulate values 
and objectives relevant to “good government” and to supply the 
institutional technology to achieve these values and objectives. From 
this perspective, it may be argued that, as the solutions provided 
within the normative arsenal of modern constitutionalism are 
historically tailored to the problems of states, then, notwithstanding 
the superficial familiarity of the regulatory techniques that have 
developed in the post-state domain, such solutions may remain 
appropriate and relevant only, or mainly, to the problems of states.2 
For instance, the historical preoccupation of modern constitutions 
with the separation of powers, with the independence of the 
judiciary, with institutional checks and balances more generally, with 
the federal dispersal of power and with government-constraining 
Bills of Rights, may be viewed not as universal precepts and 
techniques of good government, but as being directed against the 
dangers of tyranny or the arbitrariness associated with the 
concentration of political power, in the particular case of the modern 
state, with its claim to the monopoly of legitimate authority over 
discrete territorial populations.3 Conversely, this same unique 
concentration of power in the state also points to the scale and depth 
of its positive responsibility as the primary point of political 
initiative. In so doing, it focuses attention on the importance of 
ensuring against decision-making gridlock (through aspects of intra 
or inter-institutional balance and co-operation, such as majoritarian 
voting rules or co-decision devices) or against decision-taking 
inflexibility and unresponsiveness (through various methods of 
executive empowerment, such as expansive prerogative powers in 
the British example, or the development of the “political questions” 
doctrine in the example of the United States and other documentary 
                                                 
2 See, for example, G. Majone, “Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity”, 
(2002) 8 European Law Journal, pp. 319-45. 




constitutional traditions). In either case, the particular – and 
sometimes conflicting – imperatives of constraint and empowerment, 
and the mechanisms appropriate to their pursuit and reconciliation, 
are arguably peculiar to the modern state and to its highly privileged 
place as an exclusive or dominant repository of legal authority and 
political power in the global configuration. As such, these 
mechanisms are not directly relevant to any other type of entity with 
a less comprehensive depth and range of capability and 
responsibility. 
 
The argument from inconceivability takes the case from 
inappropriateness a stage further. It holds not only that the tool-box of 
state constitutionalism is ill-suited or less appropriate to any other 
endeavour, but that the very idea of taking constitutionalism beyond 
the state – considered as anything more than a loose analogy to 
convey a continuing general commitment to “good government”– is a 
kind of “category error”.4 The invocation of the ideas and practices of 
constitutionalism involves a distinctive way of thinking about the 
world – an epistemic horizon and political imaginary that pre-supposes 
and refers to the particular form of the state. Various features of the 
modern state and its constitutional representation characterise and 
reflect this very particular political imaginary. These include not only 
the idea of a “sovereign” and so autonomous, self-contained and 
internally–integrated legal and political order, but also the notion that 
for each sovereign political order there is a distinct “society” or 
“demos”, as well as a dedicated collective agency – whether “nation”, 
“people” or even the “state” itself which is, or should be, imputed to 
be the ultimate authors of that order. On such a view, if these 
background ideas of sovereign or autonomous system, distinct 
society and dedicated collective agency are not in place, as arguably 
they are not unless in the presence of the modern state, then we 
cannot meaningfully characterise any candidate normative and/or 
institutional design as constitutional. 
 
The argument from improbability refers to the way in which 
constitutionalism is implicated in existing relations of authority. Any 
constitutional order is not just the articulation of a way of thinking 
about the world, but also a framework for the organisation and 
application of political power. And since the actually existing 
                                                 
4 See A. Moravcsik, “A Category Error”, (2005) Prospect, July pp. 22-26, at 25. 
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constitutional orders tend be centred on the state, the “state system”5 
has long served as a mechanism of authoritative pre-emption to 
frustrate the pursuit of non-state constitutional initiatives, or, at least, 
ensuring that such initiatives remain within the delegated authority 
of states. In this way, the established Westphalian configuration of 
mutually exclusive states with mutually exclusive domains of 
constitutional authority, joined by an essentially state-parasitic 
framework of international law conceived of as a set of agreements 
between sovereigns, serves continuously to reproduce itself and to 
repress or marginalise any challenge to its domination. 
 
The argument from illegitimacy, finally, concerns the manner in which 
constitutionalism is frequently invoked as an ideological claim, as a 
way of adding or detracting symbolic value from an actual or 
projected state of affairs upon the basis of its supposedly 
“constitutional” or “unconstitutional” qualities. The case here is a 
straightforwardly consequential one. If constitutionalism, on one or 
more of the three grounds considered above, can only be properly 
conceived of as a matter of, and for, the state, then any attempt to 
assume the mantle of constitutionalism beyond the state is by 
necessary inference illegitimate. If a claim of constitutional status is 
made on behalf of an entity or a set of regulatory practices in 
circumstances in which the tools are inappropriate to the problem, or 
in which the requisite underlying belief system is not in place, or in 
which the necessary “de facto” authority is absent, then that claim 
becomes an empty or misleading one.6 
 
If we ask how the defenders of constitutionalism beyond the state 
respond to these sceptical perspectives, we can begin to appreciate 
that the key differences and points of disputation are conceptual, 
rather than empirical. There is no compelling “fact of the matter” or 
even a persuasive body of evidence available to settle the argument 
between the sceptics and defenders of constitutionalism beyond the 
state. Instead, definitional issues and the underlying differences of 
                                                 
5 See R. Falk, The Study of Future Worlds, (New York: Free Press, 1975). 
6 See J. Klabbers, “Constitutionalism Lite”, (2004) 1 International Organizations Law 
Review, pp. 31-58, D. Grimm, “The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization”, 
(2005) 12 Constellations, pp. 447-63, and J.H.H. Weiler, “In Defence of the Status Quo: 
Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg”, in: J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds), European 
Constitutionalism beyond the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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perspective that they expose are pivotal. We can demonstrate this by 
re-examining each sceptical perspective in turn. 
 
The argument from inappropriateness claims that the tools of 
constitutionalism are the wrong type for non-state polity problems, 
and, in so doing, treats constitutionalism as an instrument of 
regulatory design. The critique of this position would begin by re-
iterating that the very similarity of many non-state regulatory 
instruments to the state model suggests that, at least, some of the 
techniques of prudential reasoning and design associated with 
constitutional statecraft are relevant to other types of political 
arrangement with more limited concentrations of political power. But 
this immediately raises the question of whether the definition of 
constitutionalism can properly admit of degrees, particularly in the 
light of the sceptics’ epistemic claim, with its all-or-nothing threshold 
qualification. 
 
According to this epistemic claim, the constitutional way of 
addressing the world is inconceivable other than in the context of the 
state, and thus treats constitutionalism as a limited and limiting 
situation and perspective from which to imagine the world. The 
critique of this position would begin by questioning whether those 
supposedly limited and limiting pre-suppositions of the 
constitutional imaginary – the ideas of autonomous system, distinct 
society and dedicated collective agency – must, indeed, be tied to the 
state, or whether they may possess a broader significance. Again, this 
is, in the end, an open conceptual question, rather than one of 
incontrovertible empirical fact or of essential definition. Although the 
relevant rhetoric of sceptical argumentation often suggests otherwise, 
the core ideas of system, society and dedicated collective agency 
posses neither the rigidity of meaning, nor do states possess the 
uniform distinctiveness of empirical characteristics relative to any 
such rigid meanings, that would be necessary to close down debate.7 
What is more, even if the relevant conceptual and empirical 
arguments do stack up against an expansive understanding of the 
non-state range of application of some or all of these core ideas, then 
this simply returns us to the prior definitional question considered 
                                                 
7 On the temptations and frequent tendencies towards state-centred essentialism in 
the academic and political debate over the constitutional status of the EU, see J.H.H. 
Weiler, op. cit., note 6 supra, p. 199; ch.10. 
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above – whether we are simply stuck with the inimaginability of 
post-state constitutionalism under a pure, all-or-nothing conception, 
or whether we may still contemplate its moderate incidence under a 
more-or-less conception. 
 
The argument from improbability claims that there is no state-
independent source of power that is able to assume the mantle of 
constitutionalism, and, in so doing, it treats constitutional authority 
as a brute question of social and political power. The critique of this 
position would begin by re-iterating that, despite the historical 
dominance of state-based constitutionalism, there is increasing 
evidence of constitutional development at non-state sites. But this 
again immediately begs the definitional question of what actually 
counts as constitutional development? Does it include “subjective” 
claims, as in the ideological register, or must it refer only to actual or 
projected states of affairs – to “objective” measures and conditions – 
under the normative and epistemic registers? 
 
If, lastly, we revisit the argument from illegitimacy, the contention that 
the discursive claim of constitutional character and status is not 
justified in any post-state context treats constitutionalism as a “speech 
act” or rhetorical claim, and, in this case, as a quite unsubstantiated 
one. Yet, the critique of this position would again begin by asserting 
that there is, by now, ample emergent evidence of 
constitutionalisation under the other three registers to rebut the 
charge that such a rhetorical claim is empty. And, to the extent that 
the “objective” evidence of the appropriateness of the so-called 
constitutional measures and the conceivability of the so-called 
constitutional pre-conditions does not convince, a broader critique of 
the argument from illegitimacy would ask whether and why the 
imaginative prospect and projection of constitutionalism should, in 
any case, be entirely in thrall to constitutionalism’s achievements in 
modern history, rather than be considered as a self-standing and 
open-textured feature of the constitutional enterprise. 
 
This encounter with constitutionalism’s “politics of definition”8 helps 
to clarify what is at stake in the endorsement or otherwise of each or 
any of the four critical perspectives, and indicates how we might set 
                                                 
8 See G. Anderson, Constitutional Rights after Globalization, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005), Chapter 6. 
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about developing a more inclusive scheme to steer our substantive 
discussion of post-state constitutionalism. To begin with, patently, 
the definition of constitutionalism and the question of whether and to 
what extent constitutionalism might extend to the post-state context 
is both controversial and complex. Such controversy and complexity 
indicates the need, as a basic orienting premise, to contemplate the 
potential range of constitutionalism in open-ended terms so as to 
avoid the premature exclusion of the possibility of post-state 
constitutionalism by definitional fiat. 
 
Secondly, and in the spirit of that open-ended brief, we should be 
careful not to settle a priori the question of whether constitutionalism 
beyond the state may be understood in more-or-less, incremental 
terms, or whether it needs to be judged in all-or-nothing, holistic 
terms. To this end, it is helpful to think of how we might approach 
constitutionalism as something that can be parsed or disaggregated 
into its component parts or dimensions in such a way that, on the one 
hand, we, at least, possess the tools to comprehend it as a matter of 
degree and partial realisation, without, on the other hand, denying 
the possible significance of the pattern of combination of these 
dimensions and so the potential force of the holistic argument. 
 
But, how, thirdly, should such a parsing exercise proceed? What key 
dimensions of constitutionalism can serve as a broadly endorsed 
checklist for its post-state variant, and how should we think of the 
relationship between these dimensions? To answer this question, we 
must appreciate that, what underlies the significance of 
constitutionalism for both the sceptics and the promoters of post-state 
constitutionalism alike in each of the four arenas of contestation is its 
character as a special form of practical reasoning pitched at a general 
or “meta” level of social and political organisation. That is to say, if 
practical reasoning, in general, is about deciding upon how to act in a 
context of practical choice, the special type of practical reason 
associated with constitutionalism is concerned with the deepest and 
most collectively implicated questions of “how to decide how to 
decide” how to act. Whether it be understood as a set of normative 
resources, an epistemic horizon, a locus-specific authoritative force, 
or an ideological claim, constitutionalism is concerned, in the 
broadest possible sense, with the question of how we can, and how we 
should, approach the practical puzzle of developing, refining and 
interpreting the appropriate terms of governance of collective action. 
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Accordingly, constitutionalism conceived of as this special form of 
practical reasoning must always strike a balance between the “can” 
and the “ought”. One the one hand, it is not a purely idealistic 
discourse, concerned to name and pursue certain ends regardless of 
whether these ends are ones that are broadly endorsed or (relatedly) 
feasible to achieve. This caution pushes us towards the conventional 
and the historical as indicators of, and controls upon, what 
constitutes a plausible political enterprise, and thus to the 
identification of certain dimensions of constitutionalism in objective 
terms as socially realised, and, it follows, in the modern age primarily 
state-situated or, at least, state-rooted forms of organisation and 
practice. Yet, we cannot, on the other hand, defer entirely to modern 
history and convention and to their “externally” verifiable record. 
The “ought” dimension of practical reasoning always also suggests 
either an endorsement of, or a critical rejection of, existing practice, 
and, if the latter, the possibility of the revision of the ethical core of 
constitutionalism in the light of past experience and the novelty of the 
practical context – most notably, for present purposes, the 
transnational context. This brings back in the subjective and 
evaluative dimension – the importance of the “internal” construal of 
“external” developments in constitutional terms – and the idea of 
constitutionalism as an ethical discourse under a constant process of 
re-imagining and reconstruction. And, indeed, in the final analysis, 
the proposition that the constitutional imagination can escape the 
extensive legacy of modern history and the modern state is not 
simply a matter of theoretical faith. The fact (to be developed below) 
that constitutionalism also has a pre-modern history – a phase that 
pre-dated the development of the modern state as the exclusive 
vehicle of the constitutional ambition to provide an active and 
comprehensive design or blueprint for the proper government of a 
clearly demarcated society – suggests that, if there was nothing 
inevitable or essential about the relationship between 
constitutionalism and statehood in the past,9 therefore, there cannot 
be in the future, either. 
                                                 
9 In an influential article, while not seeking to deny that the idea of constitution has a 
distinctive pre-modern history going back at least to the Latin constitutio, G. Sartori, 
“Constitutionalism: a preliminary discussion”, (1962) 56 American Political Science 
Review, pp. 853-64, dismisses the relevance of the early notion to modern debate. He 
argues that the modern sense of constitutionalism is about the control of power 
(jurisdictio) in the modern state, whereas the ancient sense was concerned simply 
with power’s efficient exercise (gubernaculum) in the emerging political forms of the 
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In a nutshell, in our parsing of constitutionalism as a multi-
dimensional form of practical reasoning, precisely because it is a form 
of practical reasoning constitutionalism in general, and in post-state 
constitutionalism in particular, must tread a line between two 
precipices. It must avoid the twin dangers of the solipsism of 
excessive idealism (on the subjective side) and the apologetics or 
fatalism of excessive conventionalism (on the objective side), and, in 
so doing, employ each dimension to modify the other. 
3. The Frames of Transnational Constitutionalism 
A scheme that addresses the two large methodological tensions 
identified above – the more-or less versus all-or–nothing question 
and the balance between objective and subjective factors – while 
respecting both the resilient floor of shared understanding of our 
master concept and its semantic roots, is suggested by thinking about 
the different dimensions of constitutionalism as a series of reinforcing 
frames. The idea of constitutionalism as a framing mechanism 
resonates closely with a minimum shared sense of constitutionalism 
as a special species of meta-level practical reasoning – as something 
concerned with the very framework within which, and in accordance 
with which, we engage in collective forms of practical reasoning. 
Furthermore, the idea of constitutionalism as a framing mechanism is 
already present in the etymological roots of the constitutional idea. It 
is visible in the early shift from the literal reference to the 
composition and health of the human organism to the metaphor of 
the “body politic” – first, in the tradition of ancient constitutionalism 
conceived of as a descriptor of the already “constituted” polity, and 
only gradually augmented by a sense of active prescription and 
projection of its “good working order”.10 In the modern state tradition 
                                                                                                                   
classical age – a quite different, and, in some respects, opposing idea. However, as G. 
Maddox persuasively responds, in “A Note on the Meaning of ‘Constitution’”, (1982) 
76 The American Political Science Review, pp. 805-809, that such a stipulative definition 
suggests the kind of critic-centred, rather than use-centred, approach that Sartori 
himself is at pains to deny, and ignores the fact that modern constitutionalism is an 
evolution from ancient constitutionalism, rather than a radical departure. In 
particular, neither ancient nor modern constitutionalism, for all their different 
emphases, focus upon either gubernaculum or jurisdictio in isolation. Instead, in their 
common basic emphasis upon the reduction of power to a legal form, both ancient 
and modern modes have been concerned with the balance between these two 
properties. See, also, C. McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern, revd. edition, 
(Ithaca: Cornell, 1947). 
10 See D. Grimm, note 6 supra. 
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in which this shift found its mature expression, five forms of 
constitutional, and, indeed, “constitutive” framing of the polity have 
tended, albeit with highly uneven application and variable success, to 
take hold and to converge. These are juridical, political-institutional, 
self-authorising, social and discursive frames.11 
 
What typically counts, as constitutional in terms of the juridical frame 
is the idea of a mature rule-based or legal order – one that reaches or 
aspires to a certain standard both of the independent efficacy and of 
the virtue that we associate with legal “orderliness”. What typically 
counts as constitutional in political-institutional terms is the presence 
of a set of organs of government that provide an effective instrument 
of rule across a broad jurisdictional scope for a distinctive polity as 
well as seeking a fair form of internal balance between interests and 
functions. What typically counts as constitutional in self-authorising 
terms is that the legal and political-institutional complex may 
plausibly be attributed to some pouvoir constituant that is both original 
to, and distinctive of, that polity, and is also qualified to claim a 
legitimate pedigree or authorial title. What typically counts as 
constitutional in social terms is a community sufficiently integrated to 
be the subject of legal regulation and institutional action that is both 
plausibly effective in terms of collective implementation and 
compliance, and capable of locating and tracking some meaningful 
sense of that community’s common good. And finally, what typically 
counts as constitutional in discursive terms is both the balance of the 
existing ideological power struggle and the ongoing normative 
“battle of ideas” entailed in the labelling of certain phenomena or 
prospects under the binary logic of constitutional/unconstitutional, 
with all that that implies in terms of the “constitutional” status and 
worthiness of the phenomena so framed. 
 
How does this approach allow us to handle the two large 
methodological question of post-state constitutionalism that we have 
identified without prejudice? In the first place, with regard to the 
“more-or-less” versus “all-or-nothing” question, the basic criterion of 
internal distinction permits access to both readings. The possibility of 
an incremental reading is retained through the basic idea of the 
                                                 
11 See N. Walker, “European Constitutionalism in the State Constitutional Tradition”, 
in: J. Holder, C. O’Cinneide and C. Campbell-Holt (eds), (2006) 59 Current Legal 
Problems, pp. 51-89. 
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separability of the frames, a notion vindicated by the fact that in the 
state tradition the layering of the frames has tended to follow a 
historical trajectory of re-inforcement. This has involved the overall 
structure being reinforced by the later addition of the self-authorising 
and social frames to the original juridical and political-institutional 
frames, with the increasing resonance of the discursive frame 
reflecting and re-inforcing this gradual thickening.12 Equally, the 
possibility of a holistic reading is kept open by the very structure of 
the framing idea. If we recall the epistemic basis of the holistic 
critique of post-state constitutionalism, it is found in the ideas of 
autonomous system, dedicated collective agency and distinct society. 
In each case, there is an explicit fit with one or more of our defining 
constitutional frames – autonomous system to the juridical and the 
political-institutional, dedicated collective agency to the self-
authorising and distinct society to the social. Indeed, each of the three 
epistemic preconditions pre-supposes the very idea of integrity and 
boundedness implicit in the very notion of a frame. If, then, the 
framing notion captures both the shared affinity of the various 
epistemic pre-conditions with the roots of the constitutional idea and 
the basis upon which these preconditions complement one another, 
then that same framing notion poses a difficult challenge to those 
who would seek to disaggregate that constitutional form into its 
component parts and treat no part or combination as indispensable. 
 
In the second place, with regard to the tension between objective and 
subjective, fact and value, apology and utopia, here the substantive 
content of the categories supplied by the framing criterion seeks to 
reflect and maintain the appropriate balance. Most obviously, the 
idea of a separate discursive register – a domain of “constitution talk” 
– provides an explicitly subjective frame to correct for the objectivity 
of the other four frames. In addition, even the objective frames must 
be understood as a mixture of fact and value, with the idea of the 
“good working order” of the legal, political-institutional, self-
authorising and social frames of the constitution suggesting in each 




                                                 
12 See note 11 supra. 
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4. The Five Frames Considered 
Let us now look at these five framing dimensions in turn. To begin 
with legal order, this refers to the circumstances under which we may 
conceive of a certain domain of law qua legal order – as something 
systemic and self-contained.13 The fine details may be viewed 
differently across jurisprudential schools, but the very idea of legal 
order is commonly understood as a necessary incident, or, at least, a 
pre-condition, of any constitutional system. Legal order involves a 
cluster of interconnected factors; in particular, self-ordering, self-
interpretation self-extension, self-amendment, self-enforcement and 
self-discipline. The quality of self-ordering refers to the capacity of a 
legal system to reach and regulate all matters within its domain or 
jurisdiction, typically through its successful embedding of certain 
law-making “secondary” norms as a means to generate and validate a 
comprehensive body of “primary” norms.14 The quality of self-
interpretation refers to the capacity of some organ or organs internal 
to the legal order, typically the adjudicative organ, to have the final 
word with regard to the meaning and purpose of its own norms. The 
quality of self-extension refers to the capacity of a legal system to 
decide the extent of its own jurisdiction – often known as kompetenz-
kompetenz.15 The quality of self-amendment refers to the existence of a 
mechanism for changing the normative content of the legal order, 
which is provided for in terms of that order and which empowers 
organs internal to that order as the agents of the process of 
amendment. The quality of self-enforcement refers to the capacity of 
the legal order, through the development of a body of procedural law 
and associated sanctions, to provide for the application and 
implementation of its own norms. The quality of self-discipline refers 
to the positively evaluative and aspirational dimension of “legal 
order”, for which the first five dimensions provide a necessary, albeit 
insufficient platform. Once the legal order reaches a certain threshold 
of certainty and reliability in its production and of 
comprehensiveness in its coverage of its primary norms (self-
ordering), once it has reached a certain threshold of effectiveness in its 
                                                 
13 See J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980). 
14 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 
Chapter 5. 
15 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), Chapter 9. 
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rules of standing, justiciability and liability (self-enforcement), once it 
has obtained the capacity to adjust or “correct” its own normative 
structure, and provided it can guarantee sufficient autonomy from 
external influences in these systemic endeavours (self-amendment, self-
interpretation and self-extension), it is then in a position to achieve two 
related aspects of self-discipline. In the first place, it can offer a certain 
level of generality and predictability in the treatment of those who 
are subject to its norms, and, in so doing, help cultivate a system-
constraining cultural presumption against arbitrary rule. Secondly, 
and more specifically, the consolidation of a legal order with mature 
claims to autonomy, comprehensiveness and effectiveness provides 
the opportunity and helps generate the expectation that even the 
institutional or governmental actors internal to the legal order need 
not, and should not, escape the discipline of legal restraint in 
accordance with that mature order. Indeed, these two core ideas – of 
the “rule of law, not man” and of a “government limited by law”,16 – 
provide a key element of all Western legal traditions, whether they be 
couched in the language of “rule of law”, or état de droit or Rechtstaat, 
and thus supply a cornerstone of constitutionalism understood as a 
value-based discourse. 
 
Whereas this first building block of modern constitutionalism can be 
traced back to the Roman roots of civilian law, even though its “rule 
of law” characteristics developed later, the second feature was one of 
the distinctively novel features of the modern state as it emerged as a 
new form of political domination in continental Europe in response to 
the confessional civil wars of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries. 
What we are concerned with here is the establishment and 
maintenance of a comprehensive political-institutional framework 
understood as a system of specialised political rule. This is a 
development that achieved an early stylistic maturity in the form of 
the French and American documentary Constitutions of the late 
Eighteenth century. For such a system, neither its title to rule, nor its 
ongoing purpose flows from prior and fixed economic or status 
attributes, or concerns (of the type that, in the constitutional thought 
of classical and mediaeval polities, tend to exclude some actors from 
the polity, or grade and degrade them within it), or from some notion 
of traditional or divine order external to the system itself (as in pre-
                                                 
16 See B. Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapter 9. 
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modern constellations of political power generally). Instead, 
authority rests upon a putative idea of the individual as the basic unit 
of society and as the (presumptively equal) source of moral agency, 
with the very idea of a political domain built upon, and dedicated to, 
that secular premise – one that develops its own authoritative 
yardsticks for conflict-resolution and its own mechanisms for 
collective decision making.17 
 
This development speaks to a new stage in the differentiation of 
social forms, one in which there is, for the first time, a separate sphere 
of the public and the political, which, in its operative logic, is 
distinctive both from the society over which it rules and from some 
notion of transcendental order. Such a specialised system has the 
dual attributes of immanence and self-limitation. On the one hand, it 
purports to be self-legitimating. The justification of the continuing 
claim to authority of the autonomous political domain and of the 
higher order rules through which that authority is inscribed rests not 
upon the external force and discipline of a metaphysical or a reified-
through-tradition “order of things”, but upon the operation of the 
political domain itself and the secular interests that it serves. On the 
other hand, as the flip-side of this, there emerges a general sphere of 
purely private action and freedom that lies beyond either the 
autonomous domain of politics or the now redundant special mixed 
regimes of public and private rights and obligations based upon prior 
forms of privilege or natural order.18 The regulatory structures of the 
new specialist political order echo its distinctive attributes. Positively, 
and reflecting the quality of immanence, they take the form of third 
order institutional rules and capacities for making (legislature), 
administering (executive) and adjudicating (judiciary) the second-
order “legal system” norms through which the co-ordination of first-
order action and the resolution of first-order disagreement within a 
population is secured. Negatively, and reflecting the quality of self-
limitation, they take the form of checks and balances and monitoring 
mechanisms – of constitutionalism as “limited government” – aimed 
at protecting a separate sphere of private individual or group 
                                                 
17 See I. Loader and N. Walker, Civilizing Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), Chapter 2, and M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 3. 
18 See D. Grimm, note 6 supra, pp 452-3, and J. Habermas, “Constitutional 
Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles”, (2001) 28 Political 
Theory, pp. 766-81. 
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freedom, one which is safe from incursions at the third order level of 
public authority or infraction at the second order level of the 
substantive norms of the legal system. 
 
The idea of a specialised system of political rule also carries with it 
certain assumptions about the kind and intensity of normative 
concern properly considered to be constitutional. There are again two 
aspects to this, which mirror those affecting the institutional 
dimension. On the one hand, there is the idea of the normative 
system providing a “comprehensive blueprint for social life”19 – of 
recognising no externally imposed substantive limits to its capacity to 
regulate each and every areas of social policy with which it may be 
concerned, and to do so in a “joined-up” manner. On the other hand, 
there is the recognition of an internally imposed constraint – the 
protection of the very sphere of private autonomy which underpins 
the idea of a secular political order in the first place. In turn, this 
entails formal or informal catalogues of individual rights – 
constitutionalism as fundamental rights protection – to add substance 
to the institutional or structural checks referred to above. 
 
The institutionalisation of a separate and specialist sphere of political 
contestation and decision and a correspondingly broad and deep 
political jurisdiction stands in a close relationship to the legal order 
dimension already considered. Indeed, it is this basic relationship 
that Luhmann20 had in mind when he talked about the constitution as 
operating within both legal and political systems and providing a 
mechanism for their linking, or “structural coupling”, with the 
institutions of the political system both dependent upon – 
“instituted” under – a legal pedigree and implicated as key agents in 
the processes of self-ordering, self-interpretation, self-extension, self-
amendment, self-enforcement and self-discipline through which the 
legal order is sustained and developed. However, the idea of a 
specialised political system, still less that of an autonomous legal 
order, does not necessarily imply, within the third framing register of 
constitutionalism, a type of authorisation that claims either a 
democratic founding or a continuing democratic warrant. Instead, the 
                                                 
19 See C. Tomuschat, “Internation Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve 
of a New Century, General Course on Public International Law”, (2001) 281 Recueil 
des Cours de l’Académie de droit international, p. 63. 
20 See N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993). 
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operational autonomy, specialist nature and expansive normative 
scope of the political sphere may be consistent with a set of 
arrangements in which the original authorisation comes from beyond 
the system, as in many of the subaltern constitutions of imperial 
systems:21 or in which the original authorisation is located within the 
system, but is presented as a “top-down” monarchical or aristocratic 
grant or bequest, rather than a “bottom-up” popular claim.22 
 
So, the autonomy and capaciousness of the political sphere need not 
imply that all those affected by the operation of the system 
participate or are represented in its institution or even in its 
subsequent homologation. It need imply merely that, within the third 
framing register, an understanding of political title should prevail, 
whether this be presented in terms of raison d’état or salus populi or 
some other version of the collective good which is adequate to the 
constitutional polity’s claim and character, within the second framing 
register, as a special and encompassing sphere of political action – 
one in which there is no transcendental or otherwise overriding 
external justification, and in which there is freedom from special 
social or economic interests. However, the specialised system of 
political rule, just because it introduces the idea of a sphere of 
authority that must construct itself and provide for its own secular 
justification, cannot indefinitely avoid the very question of “how to 
decide how to decide”, nor its even more starkly indeterminate 
derivative – “who decides who decides”23 – that it brings into sharp 
relief for the first time. Therefore, at least in the developing state 
tradition, constitutionalism tends to be a precarious achievement 
unless and until it is joined by a claim of collective self-authorisation. 
 
Within constitutional thought in the state tradition, then, this third 
authorising frame gradually comes to be conceived in terms of the 
idea of constituent power, or the ultimate sovereignty of the people.24 
                                                 
21 See K.C. Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1960), and P. Oliver, The Constitution of Independence, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) 
22 As in many of the constitutions octroyées of the Nineteenth century (for example, the 
French Charters of 1814 and 1830, the Italian Statuto Albertino of 1848). 
23 See M. Maduro, “Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as good as it gets?”, 
in: J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind, op. cit., note 6 supra. 
24 See A.Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignity, Democracy and the Constituent Power”, 
(2005) 12 Constellations, pp. 223-244. 
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Again, the documentary form that stands at the centre of modern 
state constitutionalism directly engages this dimension, with the 
canonical text typically claiming to be not only for the people but also 
of the people, and its drafting procedures – typically through the 
involvement of constituent assemblies and popular conventions – 
dramatising a commitment to substantiate the claim of popular 
authorship.25 So prevalent, indeed, is the ethic of democratic pedigree 
in modern state constitutionalism – of democracy as a meta-value in 
terms of which other governance values are understood and 
articulated26 – that debate tends to centre not on the question of its 
appropriateness, but only on the adequacy of its instantiation. This 
may manifest itself in the critique of those constitutional settlements 
that lack a founding documentary episode, or, at least, a plausible 
narrative of subsequent popular homologation,27 or in the claim that 
the constitution has betrayed its popular foundations, or in the 
criticism that, for all its derivative concern with democracy in the 
everyday framework of government, the constitution is not 
autochthonous, but, instead, remains dependent upon the 
“constituted” power of another polity or polities. 
 
Modern (state) constitutionalism is not only about the generation 
through an act and continuing promise of democratic self-
authorisation of the wherewithal for the operation of a self-sufficient 
legal order underpinned by its own institutional complex and 
normatively expansive framework of secular political rule. Alongside 
these normative or juridical forms, given the increased emphasis 
upon the prescriptive over the descriptive work of the constitution 
that the idea of an autonomous and self-authorising political sphere 
inevitably brings, the modern state constitution also either pre-
supposes or promises (and typically both), as a fourth framing 
achievement, a degree of societal integration on the part of the 
constituency in whose name it is promulgated and to whom it is 
directed.28 Unless there is already in place some sense of common 
cause to endorse those interests or ideals that the constitutional text 
                                                 
25 See A. Arato, Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy, (Lanham MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2000). 
26 See J. Dunn, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy, (London: Atlantic, 
2005). 
27 See A. Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005). 
28 See D. Grimm, “Integration by Constitution”, (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, pp. 191-210. 
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has identified as being well-served by being put in common, and to 
affirm and so vindicate the capability of the institutional means that 
the constitution deems instrumental to the pursuit of these common 
interests or ideals, then the constitution conceived of as a project of 
political community is in danger of remaining a dead letter. What this 
prior propensity to put things in common or basic sense of political 
community amounts to is an issue of much controversy, and in any 
event is something better conceived of as a matter of degree. As a 
basic minimum, however, it refers to a sense of common attachment 
or common predicament within the putative demos sufficient to 
manifest itself in three inter-related forms. It should be sufficient to 
ensure that most members demonstrates the minimum level of 
sustained mutual respect and concern required to reach and to 
adhere to collective outcomes that may work against their immediate 
interests in terms of the distribution of common resources and risks. 
Reciprocally, it should be sufficient to ensure that each is prepared to 
trust the others in order to participate in the common business of 
dispute-resolution, decision-making and rule-following on these 
same “other-respecting” terms. Finally, this web of mutual respect 
and trust should be strong enough to sustain a political culture that, 
just because of the accomplishment of its core common commitment, 
can acknowledge and accept difference beyond this core 
commitment.29 
 
However, simply because it cannot supply the necessary social 
supports of respect and concern, trust and mutual toleration merely 
through normative enunciation does not mean that the constitution is 
incapable of influencing the measure of social integration necessary 
to its effective application and must passively presuppose the prior 
existence of the requisite measure of social integration. To begin with, 
its normative framework of political rule seeks to provide a settled 
template for living together in circumstances free from despotism or 
intractable conflict, and, to that extent, offers an incentive to all who 
are attracted by such a template to secure the floor of common 
commitment necessary for its effective implementation. Secondly, the 
act of making the constitution may have a mobilisation dividend that 
goes beyond agreement upon the particular text in question. The 
                                                 
29 See M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 
and D. Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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value of the process is not exhausted by its textual product,30 but may 
extend to the generation or bolstering of just those forms of political 
identity necessary to the successful implementation of the text. 
Thirdly, as constitutions in the modern age are typically viewed as 
the expression and vindication of the constituent power of a 
“people”, the successful making of a constitution has come to assume 
a special symbolic significance as a totem of peoplehood. So 
powerful, indeed, is the chain of signification developed under the 
modern banner of popular, nation state constitutionalism, that, 
regardless of how it came into existence, the very fact that a 
constitution exists is typically understood and widely portrayed as 
testimony to the achievement, the sustenance, or – as in the case of 
the new Central and Eastern European States after 1989 – the 
restoration of political community. Fourthly, in so far as the 
constitution crystallises such general common ends or values as are 
the subject of agreement in the constitution-making moment and as 
may also be already present in the pre-constitutional ethical life of the 
relevant social constituency, it may have a “double 
institutionalisation” effect.31 The addition of the constitutional 
imprimatur may amplify the importance of, and the extent of, 
common subscription to these common values and ends, and in so 
framing and re-inforcing a common political vernacular, strengthen 
the societally-integrative relationship between that common political 
vernacular and mutual respect, concern, trust and tolerance which is 
indispensable to political community. Fifthly and lastly, we may look 
beyond the founding moment of the constitution to see how it can 
become an ongoing source of intensification of the social foundations 
necessary to its effective implementation. This operates in at least two 
ways. On the one hand, the constitution may function as a reminder 
of community. In so far as common political identity often develops 
alongside and feeds off the collective memorialisation of claimed 
common events, achievements and experiences, constitutional history 
provides one such stream of sanctified tradition. The constitution 
                                                 
30 See W. Sadurski, “Conclusions: On the Relevance ofInstitutions and the Centrality 
of Constitutions in Post-Communist Transitions”, in: J. Zielonka (ed), Democratic 
Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol 1 – Institutional Engineering, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, pp. 455-72. 
31 See P. Bohannan, “The Differing realms of law”, in: P. Bohannan (ed), Law and 
Warfare: Studies in the Antropology of Conflict, (New York: Natural History Press, 1967), 
p. 45. 
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may thus write itself into collective history.32 On the other hand, the 
constitution may provide a resilient but flexible structure for political-
ethical debate, an anchor for a continuing conversation about the 
meaning of political community that operates in a Janus-faced 
manner to strengthen that political community. Looking back, it 
supplies a token not only of the supposed depth and extension of 
common experience, but also of the weight of accumulated practical 
knowledge Looking forward, the constitution may be sufficiently 
open-ended and sufficiently understood as a work of trans-
generational authorship for its structures and values to be capable of 
being inflected in ways which retain the symbolic gravitas of 
accumulated wisdom, and, at the same time, are adaptable to 
contemporary forms of political vernacular and understandings of 
trust, solidarity and tolerance . In other words, the constitution may 
provide a repository, and thus a standing corroboration of the viable 
ethical threshold of political community, as well as a vehicle for its 
continuous adaptation.33 
 
Let us finally turn to “constitution talk” – and so to the discursive 
frame. Some aspects of this we have already considered under the 
“symbolic” aspect of the social dimension. Constitutional discourse is 
not unique in its reference to legal order, a specialised political 
system, extensive normative capacity, constituent power or political 
community, but it provides a unique imaginary frame in its potential 
to join these elements together in a singular discourse about a polity. 
That is to say, it is capable of proving an encompassing and self-
reflexive vocabulary for imagining the polity in political-ethical 
terms. Of course, “constitution talk” can also be used ideologically 
and strategically. As we have seen in our discussion of its societal 
dimension, such a socially resonant discourse is constantly invoked 
as a way of re-inforcing particular claims and judgements, whether 
positive or negative – constitutional or unconstitutional – about 
particular political acts or practices, or categories of political acts or 
practices. Indeed, its ethical centrality and its susceptibility to 
ideological exploitation and strategic manoeuvre are two sides of the 
same coin – accounting for the status of constitutionalism as a 
                                                 
32 See A. Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2002), p. 12. 
33 See J. Habermas, “On Law and Disagreement: Some Comments on ‘Interpretative 
Pluralism’”, (2003) 16 Ratio Juris, pp. 187-99. 
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“condensing symbol”34 to whose terms a whole series of debates 
about how we do, and how we should live together are continuously 
reduced. 
5. The Five Frames in Transnational Context 
We can observe the growth of all five constitutional frames in the 
post-state context. Undoubtedly the most developed, and best-known 
example of transnational constitutionalism is found in the European 
Union, a process which appeared to many to have reached its 
apotheosis with the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002-3 
and the signing of the EU Constitutional Treaty (CT) of 2004.35 
However, the prospect of a final constitutional settlement was 
subsequently thwarted by the “no” votes in the referendums in 
France and the Netherlands in 2005, which in turn led to the 
European Council’s decision to abandon the constitutional project 
and replace it with a traditional international convention in the form 
of the Treaty of Lisbon 2007. Despite these recent tribulations, the EU 
experiment as it has unfolded both before and after the 2004 
watershed has succeeded in registering across all five constitutional 
dimensions,36 although in no one register do its claims go 
unchallenged. 
 
The EU’s most venerable and still its most intense constitutional 
claim is in the juridical sphere. It is based upon a legal order with 
many of the attributes of autonomy. The so-called acquis 
communautaire – the accumulation of 50 years of law under the Treaty 
framework – provides the ample fruit of the doctrines of supremacy 
and direct effect, with their strong self-ordering, self-interpreting, 
self-extending and self-disciplining elements. At the same time, the 
overlap between the territorial and jurisdictional claims of the EU 
and its Member States means that none of these accomplishments go 
entirely uncontested by the states themselves. Furthermore, in the 
case of the attributes of self-amendment – given that the Member 
States remain the “Masters of the Treaties” and finally responsible for 
                                                 
34 See V. Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). 
35 See J. Ziller, The European Constitution, (Amsterdam: Lower, 2005). 
36 See N. Walker, note 11 supra, and idem, “‘Post-Constituent Constitutionalism.” The 
Case of the European Union”, in: M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
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their reform, and of self-enforcement – given the high reliance upon 
domestic legal systems for the implementation and application of EU 
law, the EU legal order remains in significant respects a dependent 
one. 
 
The EU also boasts its own specialised and increasingly well-
established political system – Council, Commission, European 
Parliament, European Court of Justice, etc. Today, that system 
embraces a very broad normative scope – much wider that its original 
market-making remit under the foundational Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
and, since 2000, incorporates a Charter of Rights. However, as with 
the legal system, the political system remains locked in a dual 
relationship of interdependence and competition with national 
systems. In many respects, moreover – in particular, with regard to 
popular support or recognition and with regard to decision-making 
capacity and the effective management of veto powers, these 
European institutions remain less potent than the national 
institutions with which they interlock.37 
 
Largely in response to perceived deficiencies in the political-
institutional system and (to a lesser extent) the legal system, the 
forming of a diversely representative Convention to provide the 
initial draft of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty signalled a concerted 
attempt on the part of integrationist interests to provide for the 
authority of the EU to be persuasively founded not just on the states 
but also directly on the “peoples” and “people” of Europe. The 
sponsors of the constitution sought, in other words, to assert a 
constituent power which was not simply derivative and aggregative 
of the constituent powers of its Member States. The Convention 
process and the promulgation of the Constitutional Treaty with its 
emphasis on common values, common citizenship, flags, anthems 
and other symbols of common attachment, was also clearly 
concerned with the mobilisation and amplification of the idea of a 
European-wide society to complement national political societies. 
And, finally, the same documentary constitutional process certainly 
stimulated the migration of transnational ‘constitution talk’ from the 
arcane world of European judges, Brussels élites and specialist 
university departments to much broader contexts of political 
                                                 
37 See F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effecive and Democratic?, (Oxford: Oxford 
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deliberation. By the same token, however, although the seriousness of 
the documentary constitutional attempt is a telling measure of the 
momentum that had developed around the idea of a “thicker” 
constitutional frame for the EU, its ultimate failure and the alacrity 
and eagerness with which European élites retuned to the “not the 
constitutional”38 alternative of an old-fashioned (and as yet not fully 
ratified) Reform Treaty at Lisbon, demonstrates a continuing skewing 
towards the “thinner” legal and political-institutional frames. 
 
Elsewhere, we see the same constitutionalising trend, if, as yet, much 
less fully developed, and with little attempt to move beyond a 
combination of the thin legal and political-institutional frames and 
the discursive frame. Still on the regional front, the continental 
human rights organisations, most prominently in the case of the 
Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights, have 
begun to attract “constitutionalising” claims, in particular, for the 
normative ambition and trumping (over domestic norms) qualities of 
their substantive human rights provision and their emergent sense of 
a continental “public order” and common societal standard.39 If we 
look at the functional organisations, the World Trade Organisation, to 
take the best-known example, has recently become the subject of an 
intense debate over its “constitutionalisation” in both academic, and, 
increasingly, in political, circles.40 Over the last 15 years, its legal 
order has become more robust, particularly through the 
strengthening of its judicial branch or Appellate Body, and through 
the widening of its normative remit from the confines of the 
predecessor GATT jurisdiction. More generally, its political 
architecture has become somewhat more independent of its member 
states, and its defence of certain individual rights – with a particular 
                                                 
38 See N. Walker, “Not the European Constitution”, (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, pp.135-141. 
39 See S. Greer, “Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 405-33. 
40 See J.L. Dunoff, “Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the 
Discipline of International Law”, (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law, pp. 
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emphasis on trading rights – against state and regional protectionist 
interests has become more robust and effective. Similar debates are 
taking place in a lower key elsewhere, not least with regard to the 
“civil constitutions” associated with traditionally non-state and non-
public sectors such as the internet and the organisation of sports.41 
 
At global level, the constitutional debate is less new, but its recent 
growth has arguably been more exponential than in any sector other 
than the EU. Since the Second World War and the birth of the UN 
Charter, there has been an intensified interest in the idea of the 
international legal and institutional order as a constitutional system, 
one which was never entirely extinguished by the realpolitik of the 
Cold War. Today, the combination, positively, of the post-war 
resilience of the UN and its institutions (as opposed to its inter-war 
League of Nations predecessor) and, negatively, of the new threats to 
any notion of a multilateral global order posed by American 
exceptionalism and neo-imperialism on the one hand and the rise of 
fundamentalist challenges to the pluralist premises of contemporary 
cosmopolitanism on the other, has created the conditions for a 
renewed interest in the discourse of constitutionalism. Jürgen 
Habermas is, perhaps, the most prominent thinker42 to have argued 
for a new overarching global authority, at least in certain narrow, but 
vital, areas of the global public good – war, security and human 
rights – organised around the reform of the UN in general, and its 
Security Council in particular. In so doing, he has built upon a 
significant tradition of (strongly German influenced) thinking on an 
idea of global constitutionalism pivoting upon the common interest 
of the “international community”43 and underwritten by those ius 
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations that emphasise universal 
values over multilateral or bilateral negotiations.44 What is perhaps 
                                                 
41 See G. Teubner and A. Fischer-Lescano, “Regime-Collisions: The Vain search for 
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most strikingly distinctive about this global strain of 
constitutionalism is the extent to which the discursive frame is to the 
fore. Whereas at every other post-state site including the EU,45 the 
constitutional idea – at least, in the early phase of its articulation – 
tends to follow from, and react to, events – to objective changes in the 
other constitutional frames, this priority has tended to be reversed at 
global level. Here, from the outset, constitutional discourse seems to 
have been more focused, on the one hand, upon a general 
reconceptualisation of an established legal and institutional domain 
(regardless of – or with less emphasis upon – changes in that 
domain), and, on the other, on the provision of a legitimating rhetoric 
for an explicit agenda of reform. 
6. The Antinomies of Transnational 
Constitutionalism 
In this final section, we pull together the strands of the conflicted 
career of constitutionalism beyond the state by examining three sets 
of interrelated oppositional forces, or antinomies, in the current 
moment of development. The first is between consolidation and 
contestation. The second is between diffusion and defusion. The third is 
between intensification and incoherence. In what sense are these 
properly conceived of as oppositional tensions? Are these tensions 
inescapable, and, if so, need they be unproductive? These are difficult 
questions, and matters of projection as much as current and historical 
analysis. All we can do is sketch the contours of each tension and 
draw some indicative conclusions. 
 
The most profound irony of transnational constitutionalism is that 
just at the moment of its consolidation in the legal (and to a lesser 
extent) political vernacular – when it has reached a point of 
discursive “no return”, it has also plumbed unprecedented depths of 
contestation. Again, the EU provides a key case in point. The political 
élites of the Member States may have been eager to re-embrace the 
familiar form of an international treaty after the documentary 
Constitution of 2004 became irretrievably bogged down in ratification 
difficulties, but it is hard to see the constitutional debate being quietly 
laid to rest in the longer-term. There is sufficient dissatisfaction with 
the classically indirect state-centred discourse of EU constitutionalism 
                                                 
45 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), Chapter 1 
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– one that continues to rely on the traditional tropes of national 
sovereignty, internationalism and state delegation as the standard 
structuring devices of regional political community notwithstanding 
the qualitative shift of political and economic power and of associated 
regulatory forms away from the state – to ensure that even if there is 
no consensus on the optimal “constitutional” form of a new order, a 
powerful critique of the anachronism of a purely state-centred 
“misframing”46 will remain within the political culture. 
 
But this discursive strengthening of constitutionalism remains 
problematical in at least two senses. First, while it may be potent 
enough to destabilise the state-centred view and challenge its 
presumptive authority, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty 
suggests that it does not carry sufficient momentum to resolve in an 
affirmative manner the second order debate about whether the EU 
should indeed have constitutional status. Instead, the view that 
“thick” documentary constitutions should remain an affair 
exclusively or primarily of states continues to hold significant sway. 
Secondly, there are those who believe, from the other flank, that the 
discourse of EU constitutionalism, far from being too heterodox a 
departure, may constitute an insufficiently radical break with the 
epistemic and normative properties of the Westphalian frame (Tully 
2007a, Watkins, 2005);47 that in borrowing from the state tradition it 
also endorses a set of assumptions about the autonomous, top-down, 
centralised, law-fetishising, self-contained, exclusionary and 
presumptively imperialising polity that has blighted that state 
tradition. 
 
And if the second-order debate – constitutional framing or not – 
remains unresolved – the danger is that we are left in a state of 
constitutional limbo. The inability to find a constitutional settlement 
is eloquent testimony to the problem of legitimising the post-national 
or supranational order, but the similar lack of consensus on the 
continuing adequacy of a non-constitutional settlement shows that 
there is no longer an uncontentious second-order statist default 
                                                 
46 See N. Fraser, “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World”, (2005) 36 New Left 
Review, pp. 69-88 
47 See J. Tully, “A New Kind of Europe? Democratic Integration in the European 
Union”, (2007) 10 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, pp. 71-
86, and S. Watkins, “Constitutional Tremors”, (2005) 33, New Left Review, pp. 5-21. 
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position, whatever the fate of particular constitutional initiatives.48 
And although the debate is not so well advanced anywhere else, 
arguably, we are approaching deep second-order contestation in 
other contexts, too – whether the WTO, the regional human rights 
organisations or, increasingly, the UN and the global order – with 
some criticizing constitutionalism as an illegitimate grab for power 
that properly should remain with the states,49 others treating 
constitutionalism as the key to breaking the Westphalian frame, and 
others still sharing the constitutionalists’ dissatisfaction with the 
status quo but inclined to view constitutionalism itself as the 
continuation of a familiar structure of power by other means. 
 
In turn, the exploration of the second-order debate reveals a more 
detailed level of contestation over the first-order meaning of 
constitutionalism in terms of the significance or otherwise of the 
dimensions set out earlier. In so doing, it demonstrates the resilience 
of the division between incremental and holistic understandings of 
constitutionalism. For some, the thick state-derivative frame, with all 
five dimensions in place, remains the non-negotiable sine qua non of 
constitutional status. Unless a polity boasts an autonomous legal 
order, a distinctive institutional architecture of legislative, executive 
and judicial powers and a wide normative ambit, a democratic 
founding and a resilient democratic pedigree, a political community 
of common attachment and commitment and a lively discourse of 
constitutional critique and self-interrogation, then it is at best a form 
of “constitutionalism-lite”50 and at worst a fraud. For others, a more 
selective approach to constitutional status should not be viewed 
pejoratively as constitutional defusion, but should instead be seen as 
the potentially healthy diffusion of the constitutional idea. So it may 
be argued that it is neither feasible nor necessary for many 
transnational organisations to have the democratic foundations or the 
level of societal integration or the broad normative scope of national 
constitutions. Some exponents of WTO constitutionalism, for 
example, concentrate largely on its capacity to offer secure forms of 
protection of the private sphere of economic rights.51 Some exponents 
                                                 
48 See N. Walker, “A Constitutional Reckoning”, (2006) 13 Constellations, pp. 140-150. 
49 See W. Schneiderman, “Constitution or Model Treaty? Struggling over the 
interpretive authority of NAFTA”, in: S. Choudhry (ed), The Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 294-315. 
50 See J. Klabbers, note 6 supra, Grimm, note 6 supra, and J.H.H. Weiler, note 6 supra. 
51 See E.-U. Petersmann, note 40 supra. 
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of the global constitutionalism of the UN concentrate on the universal 
and so polity- and society-unspecific claim of the UN legal order and 
political system.52 Some exponents of a relatively thin 
constitutionalism for the EU also concentrate on the virtue of its 
insulation from the policy inefficiencies and potential rights-abuses of 
a democratically volatile policy process,53 or on the compensating 
virtues of an “output legitimacy”54 garnered through the aggregate 
benefits of policy outcomes rather than the responsiveness of such 
policies to a full range of popular input. 
 
To complicate matters further, there are those both on the sceptical 
side and on the pro-constitutional side, who would draw a clear 
distinction between the constitutional requirements and potential of 
the “in-between” EU, with its more state-like capacity and regulatory 
structure, and those of other less mature post-national sites. On this 
view, the level of development of the EU uniquely allows of no half-
measures, but simply demands a thicker form of constitutional 
legitimation than other post-state sites. The prospect of this thicker 
form of legitimation is then either dismissed (by the sceptics) as 
simply implausible given the resilient location of political and social 
identity at the state level, thus throwing into doubt the general 
legitimacy of the EU in its current expansive form, or urged (by the 
enthusiasts) as a possibility born of necessity.55 
 
Regardless of differences both over the basis of the claims to the 
virtue of partial constitutionalism and over whether these partial 
claims should apply generally, or only, to the less mature post-
national sites, the argument typically runs that not only is it not 
plausible to look for full-pedigree constitutionalism at the post-
national level, but that we would not even like it if we found it; that 
the virtues of political community are not always reducible to 
democratic will and popular implementation, but can lie in certain 
matters of the right or the good being insulated from politics, in 
policy being developed by experts, or in rules being better 
                                                 
52 See B. Fassbender, “We the Peoples of the United Nations”: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form in International Law”, in: M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds), The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 269-290. 
53 See G. Majone, note 2 supra, and A. Moravcsik, note 4 supra. 
54 See F. Scharpf, note 37 supra. 
55 See N. Walker, note 11 supra. 
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implemented in interested and knowledgeable communities of 
practice.56 In this vein, we can see quite graphically how 
constitutionalism serves as a “subjective” and dynamically evolving 
register of debate about the optimal political resolution of collective 
action problems, rather than as an “objectively” decisive and 
unchanging resource in its resolution. 
 
This brings us to the final antinomy – between intensification and 
incoherence. The simultaneous development of various post-national 
constitutional initiatives both reflects and reinforces a very uneven 
and untidy global scenario of transnational legal relations. It 
announces or portends a multi-dimensional configuration of 
overlapping and variously and partially constitutionalised polities. 
This is quite different from the post-Westphalian world system of 
modernity – a one-dimensional system of mutually exclusive and 
uniformly and comprehensively constitutionalised polities. Clearly, 
this was always a stylisation, a template that operated within the 
imperial world centred on Western Europe rather than across 
imperial-subaltern relations.57 There was, nevertheless, a coherent 
imaginary of legal authority at work – a singular “order of orders”;58 
that divided the world into the domestic constitutional law of 
sovereigns (and, ideally, of democratically endorsed sovereigns) and 
international law (however unstable) between sovereigns. Every 
place on the Westphalian map, at least, in terms of its official legend, 
was the subject of a singular and determinate set of juridical relations. 
Legal pluralism was a purely external pressure – the occasional 
incursions of alternative regulatory logics, of local or trans-local 
customary law and the like. Under the new order, pluralism is 
internal – written into the emergent frame itself. We see this, for 
                                                 
56 See G. Majone, note 2 supra, Ch. Joerges, “What is left of the European 
Constitution? A melancholic eulogy”, (2005) 30 European Law Review, pp. 461-489, 
P. Mair, Democracy beyond Parties, (Paper 05-06, Center for the Study of Democracy, 
University of California, Irvine. Available at:  
http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/05-06, and P. Pettit, “Depoliticizing Democracy”, 
(2004) 17 Ratio Juris, pp. 52-65. 
57 See G. Anderson note 8 supra, and J. Tully, The Imperialism of Modern 
Constitutional Democracy”, in: M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 315-338. 
58 See N. Walker, “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: mapping the Global 
Disorder of Normative Orders”, (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law, pp 
273-296. 
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example, in the relations between state orders and the EU, or between 
the EU and the WTO, or, between state or regional bodies and 
various UN Charter organs and global treaty regimes.59 
 
The problem of incoherence, of there being opposite or unclear 
messages at work within the global juridical framework with its 
proliferation of authority sources, moreover, is not just one of the 
relational margins – of the occasional boundary dispute. For just as 
there is no agreement on the meaning of constitutionalism – diffuse 
or defused – or even on the justification, in principle, of its migration 
beyond the political agency of the state, so there is no meta-
agreement on how the various more or less agreed parts of the post-
Westphalian jigsaw should fit together. Rather, there are an 
increasing range of meta-agreements vying for ascendancy – a new 
“disorder of orders”.60 Can we imagine, as one such meta-agreement, 
a polyarchy of regions and strong states? Or can we imagine, with 
Habermas,61 a narrow and modest global peak, underpinned by new 
regional sites of “global domestic policy” and with the base 
continuing to be made up of states? Or must we fear the ersatz liberal 
internationalism of a world under the constitutional, as well as the 
military, shadow of American unipolarity? Or can we envisage a 
horizontal rather than a vertical principle of coherence, one based 
upon values other than hierarchy, as in some forms of “multi-level 
constitutionalism”,62 and, indeed, of many new forms of 
cosmopolitanism.63 And, if so, where is the guarantee of the genuine 
rather than hegemonic universality of the values?64 And if not, are we 
not simply left with a fragmented post-national legal order, where the 
attempt to track fugitive political power in post-national legal 
arrangements, leads – to embellish Michael Walzer’s famous phrase65 
– to countless “petty juridical fortresses”, with no principle of mutual 
coherence? Or does such a radical pluralism of overlapping polity 
                                                 
59 See M. Koskenniemi, “The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique 
and Politics”, (2007) 70 Modern Law Review, pp. 1-30. 
60 See N. Walker, note 58 supra. 
61 See J. Habermas, note 42 supra, at Chapter 8. 
62 See I. Pernice, “Multi-Level Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: 
Constitution-making Revisited?”, in: (1999) 36 Common Market Review, p. 703. 
63 See D. Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the 
Washington Consensus, (Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 2004). 
64 See M. Koskenniemi, note 59 supra. 
65 See M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A defence of pluralism and equality, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1983), p. 39. 
308 Walker
 
forms have the potential to provide its own power-levelling virtues?66 
Constitutionalism, including the relationship between state and 
transnational constitutionalism, clearly plays quite differently in the 
construction of these rival candidate meta-agreements. As we have 
seen most starkly in the case of the EU, on the one hand, and global 
constitutionalism, on the other, constitutional discourse in such 
conditions of deep uncertainty and incoherence becomes much more 
emphatically a question of imaginative and, more or less, persuasive 
projection – a gambit in the symbolic futures market, rather than a 
confident investment in established stock. 
 
Transnational constitutional discourse, in conclusion, appears to 
capture both the open-ended possibilities and the deracinated quality 
of the new political imaginary. Its authoritative, ideological, 
normative and epistemic power – its capacity to compel, to persuade, 
to intervene effectively and even to “make sense” – is rooted in its 
statist origins. Yet, transnational constitutionalism is increasingly 
attenuated from these roots, and is increasingly implicated in 
attempts to re-order an ever less settled map of transnational legal 
relations. At the same time, state-centred constitutionalism, while no 
longer hegemonic, provides a powerful continuing counterpoint to 
transnational constitutionalism at the authoritative and ideological 
level, one with the accumulation of practice and tradition very much 
on its side, as well as a distorting influence at the epistemic and even 
the normative level. If constitutionalism offers a route to a new state-
decentred framework of legal authority, it must perforce continue to 
contend with heavy traffic from the direction of the state. 
                                                 
66 See N. Krisch, “The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law”, (2006) 17 European 
Journal of International Law, pp. 247-278. 
 
Chapter 12  
Transnational Borrowing among Judges 
Towards a Common Core of European and 
Global Constitutional Law? 
Rainer Nickel 






The European Commission for Democracy through Law, better 
known as the Venice Commission, is the Council of Europe's 
advisory body on constitutional matters. Established in 1990, 
the commission has played a leading role in the adoption of 
constitutions that conform to the standards of Europe’s 
constitutional heritage. Initially conceived as a tool for 
emergency constitutional engineering, the commission has 
become an internationally recognised independent legal think-
tank. It contributes to the dissemination of the European 
constitutional heritage, based on the continent’s fundamental 
legal values while continuing to provide “constitutional first-
aid” to individual states. The Venice Commission also plays a 
unique and unrivalled role in crisis management and conflict 
prevention through constitution building and advice. The work 
of the European Commission for Democracy through Law aims 
at upholding the three underlying principles of Europe's 
constitutional heritage: democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law – the cornerstones of the Council of Europe. 
Accordingly, the Commission works in the following four key-
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areas: Constitutional assistance, elections and referendums, co-
operation with constitutional courts, and transnational studies, 
reports and seminars.1 
 
European and global constitutionalism is on the rise. This is valid in 
two respects: Firstly, we can observe an extensive, engaged and on-
going theoretical discussion in philosophy, political sciences and law 
about the promises and perils of the cosmopolitan ideal (mostly 
based upon I. Kant’s Zum Ewigen Frieden, 1795) and its practical 
implementation.2 Secondly, after its sweeping victory in the domestic 
realm, the idea and the concept of constitutionalism is more and more 
often applied to legal orders, arrangements and “condensed” treaty 
constellations beyond the nation state and its borders, sometimes 
cautiously,3 and sometimes vigorously.4 
 
                                                 
1 This self-description of the Venice Commission, or European Commission for 
Democracy through Law, can be found at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/presentation_E.asp?MenuL=E#1. The text 
suggests that European constitutionalism is a necessary and legitimate gift to 
mankind, embodied in “Europe’s constitutional heritage”, which consists of 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. This self-assured attitude may be 
taken as a clear sign of the short range of human memory. For a different account of 
the recent history of Europe, see Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, 
(London: William Heinemann, 2005), and for a profound historical-legal analysis of 
the European project Ch. Joerges and N. Singh Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law 
in Europe, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). – The Venice Commission is a sub-
commission of the Council of Europe (CoE), www.coe.int. It has nothing to do with 
the European Commission or the European Union. 
2 From the vast literature, see only J. Habermas, “Does the Constitutionalisation of 
International Law Still Have a Chance?”, in: ibid., The Divided West, (Cambridge MA: 
Polity Press, 2006), 115-193; H. Brunkhorst, Solidarity. From Civic Friendship to a Global 
Legal Community, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2005); J.L. Cohen, “Rethinking Human 
Rights, Democracy and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization”, (2008) 36 Political 
Theory, pp. 578-606; Bardo Fassbender, “The United Nation’s Charter as Constitution 
of the International Community”, (1997) 36 Columbia Journal Of Transnational Law, p. 
575; and the contributions to Vol 10 no 1 (2009) of the German Law Journal, 
www.germanlawjournal.com. 
3 For tentative explorations, see the contributions in: Ch. Joerges and E.-U. 
Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006). 
4 For a ‘constitutional’ understanding of WTO trade law, see E.-U. Petersmann, 
“Multilevel Trade Governance Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism”, in: C. Joerges 
and E.-U.Petersmann (eds), note 3 supra, pp. 5-57. 
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With the rise of supra- and trans-national constitutionalism comes a 
growing unease about its structures, actors, and effects.5 It raises 
numerous concerns about a biased and hegemonic project of 
constitutionalism, and the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law, with its seemingly self-assured, missionary attitude, 
may thus represent the spearhead of a Kantian movement that will 
sweep away local knowledge and “odd local details”,6 resulting 
finally in a uniform global constitutional law machinery. 
 
In the U.S., the idea of such a global constitutional compound has 
been greeted with deep scepticism by many politicians and legal 
scholars alike. The development towards a global understanding of 
contemporary international law as a kind of transnational7 
constitutional8 law in the making, a law which is supreme to 
domestic law, is despised and feared at the same time: for example, 
even the most cautious attempts to acknowledge “foreign“ 
constitutional law and practices as a source of inspiration, or 
guideline, for decisions on domestic constitutional issues have led to 
a heated debate about the legitimacy of such a practice in the United 
States. References to “foreign” legal positions and attitudes in a 
number of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases (Atkins v Virginia, Roper v 
Simmons, or Lawrence v Texas) have provoked sharp criticism from 
both inside and outside the Court.9 But also in other parts of the 
                                                 
5 See, for example, E.A. Young, “The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism”, (2003) 
38 Texas International Law Journal, p. 527. 
6 Günther Frankenberg, “Comparing Constitutions – Toward a Layered Narrative”, 
in: (2006) 4 I.CON , pp. 439-459, underlines the important function of historically 
determined “odd details” in national constitutional texts. 
7 Philip Jessup is said to have coined the idea of “transnational law”: “I shall use, 
instead of ‘international law’, the term ‘transnational law’ to include all law which 
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private 
international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such 
standard categories.” Philip Jessup, Transnational Law, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1956), p. 136. For a discussion of the term, see C. Scott, “‘Transnational Law’ as 
Proto Concept: Three Conceptions”, (2009) 10 German Law Journal, pp. 860-876, 
www.germanlawjournal.com. Scott calls transnational law “a kind of fuzzy or 
suggestive proto concept”. 
8 For an early account, see Eric Stein, “Lawyers, judges, and the making of a 
transnational Constitution”, (1981) 75 American Journal of International Law, pp. 1-27. 
9 See the recent debate between Posner and Sunstein and Rosencrantz: E.A. Posner 
and C.R. Sunstein, “The Law of Other States”, (2006) 59 Stanford Law Review, p. 131 
(defending the practice of references to other legal systems and their legal practices); 
N.Q. Rosencrantz, “Condorcet and the Constitution: A Response to The Law of Other 
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world, we can find reservations against a global legal order and 
accompanying concepts of human rights that are imposed upon, 
rather than independently established by, “third world” countries, 
such as India.10 Can we thus assume and hope that the U.S. (and its 
constitutional “originalists”) will defend national constitutionalism 
against the European Constitutionalist Empire? And what exactly are 
these mechanisms that promulgate and disseminate supra- and trans-
national constitutionalism? 
 
The central topic of this contribution is not simply the spread of 
constitutionalism as such (this has been commented upon 
abundantly11), but rather the mechanisms and consequences of an 
enhanced constitutional dialogue, and the emergence of a trans- and 
supranational constitutionalism as a discoursive practice. It will 
disregard difficult methodological questions of comparative law in 
general, questions such as whether legal transplants – the transfer of 
conceptual parts of one legal system into another legal system – are 
possible and useful, or whether, instead, they are undesirable and 
destructive, or the question of whether legal systems around the 
world converge or not. These are important issues, but the discussion 
of which often suffers from the normative bias of the authors (for or 
against cosmopolitanism),12 and they only have little to say about the 
actual mechanisms of existing constitutional discourse worlds. 
 
In this contribution, I will first characterise the U.S. discussion as a 
rather singular and deviant – and consequently, distracting – 
interlude (see Section 2). Most parts of the world, and especially the 
                                                                                                                   
States”, (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review, p. 1281; and Posner and Sunstein, “On 
Learning from Others”, (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review, p. 1309, responding to 
Rosencrantz’ critique. 
10 B.S. Chimni has stated that a “transnational capitalist class” is “in the process of 
congealing and establishing a global state”, “International Institutions Today: An 
Imperial Global State in the Making”, (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law, 
pp. 1-37, at 4. 
11 A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
diagnoses a “judicialisation” of politics. 
12 Compare P. Legrand, “On the Singularity of Law”, (2006) 47 Harvard Journal of 
International Law, pp 517-530 (denying any meaningful convergence and criticising a 
“fixation with monistic thought”, ibid., p. 522) and Alan Watson, Legal Transplants 
(Atlanta: Univ. of Georgia Press, 2nd ed. 1993 [1st ed. Edinburgh, 1974], who holds 
that “the transplanting of individual rules or of a large part of a legal system is 
extremely common” and that “transplanting is, in fact, the most fertile source of 
development”, p. 100. 
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European part of the world, have already moved on. A global 
practice of mutual observation, information, and strategic interaction, 
in short, of Comparative Constitutional Borrowing is well under way 
(Section 3). The result is a densely woven carpet of constitutionalism. 
European constitutionalism represents the most advanced practice in 
this regard; it has developed into a complex web of hierarchies and 
heterarchies (Section 4). This effect is reflected in both large and small 
cases, and they also reveal the paradoxes of this growing 
constitutionalisation (Section 5). In absence of clear hierarchies, 
supra- and trans-national constitutional conflicts cannot be resolved 
authoritatively and ex cathedra. A concept of “constitutional conflicts 
law” is needed. It should combine respect for the legal traditions 
which have grown over time, and to “odd” details contained in them, 
with a necessary sense of the promises of constitutionalism (Section 
6). 
 
2. The U.S. Sonderweg:                         
Parochialism, or the Fight against ‘Juristocracy’? 
The triumph of constitutionalism in the second half of the Twentieth 
century is already a common place, and the proliferation of 
constitutionalism in the new countries of the former Eastern Bloc has 
been thoroughly documented as well.13 What is new is a sense and a 
concept of similarity and comparability, of an iteration loop, of an 
ever-denser textual web of “higher law”, all of which is progressing 
on a regional and global scale. 
 
Two terminological caveats have to be mentioned here: The term 
“constitutionalism” is often used in this context in a modified sense. 
Firstly, it is uncoupled from its origin as a characteristic of a state 
constitution. The term “constitution”, as a foundational political 
document of a political community which is clearly defined by its 
borders, its members, and its state monopoly of power,14 has been de-
contextualised as well.15 As the “disaggregated state” (A.-M. 
                                                 
13 For an assessment of the role of constitutional courts in Central and Eastern 
Europe, see Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts. A Study of Constitutional Courts in 
Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe, 2nd. ed. (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2008). 
14 These are the three elements of Jellinek’s famous definition of statehood, G. 
Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre. (Berlin: Springer, 3rd ed. 1921), p. 394. 
15 See, for example, the discussion about a ‘constitutionalisation’ of the WTO: D. 
Cass, The Constitutionalisation of the WTO, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). - 
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Slaughter16) of the presence has moved away from this original 
concept of the Westphalian age, it is well-justified to speak about a 
supra- and trans-national “constitutionalisation”,17 notwithstanding 
this difference with the traditional nation-state constitutionalism. 
Secondly, “constitutionalism” is often used in contexts in which it 
basically means human rights adjudication. This signals a double 
reduction: constitutionalism is bared of the concept of democracy, 
and of the institutional arrangements of modern democratic nation-
states, including its system of a separation (or balance) of powers. 
These reductions pose additional challenges to the legitimacy of such 
an operation, but human rights or fundamental rights, and judicial 
review, are, nonetheless, essential elements of modern 
constitutionalism. As Stone Sweet18 correctly observes, discursive 
practices and techniques of constitutional adjudication come to 
structure the work of governments, parliaments, judges, and 
administrators, with constitutional courts as authoritative interpreters 
of the constitutional law, and especially of human rights provisions. 
On the supra- and trans-national level, the two other balancing 
factors of a democratic society under the rule of law, namely, 
democratic institutions and an executive which can be held 
accountable, are absent. Thus, courts move into the centre of 
constitutionalism. 
 
There are a number of reasons why we should fear global 
constitutionalism. Not long ago, Philipp Allott, in an article entitled 
“The Emerging International Aristocracy”, warned us that “we must 
face a new global social reality, the total social reality, a reality 
dominated by a new version of an age-old social phenomenon, an 
emerging international aristocracy, an oligarchy of oligarchies”, and 
that this new total social reality will entail “the end of democracy”.19 
                                                                                                                   
G. Teubner suggests an even wider concept: “Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives 
to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?”, in: Ch. Joerges, I.-J. Sand and G. Teubner 
(eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 
pp. 3-28. 
16 A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
17 J. Habermas, for example, uses the term to describe and to demand a 
transformation of international law: “Does the Constitutionalisation of International 
Law Still Have a Chance?”, in: J. Habermas, The Divided West, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2006), pp. 115-210. 
18 A. Stone Sweet, note 11 supra. 
19 Philip Allott, “The Emerging International Aristocracy”, (2003) 35 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, p. 309. 
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Allott refers to those actors that shape the juridification of 
transnational societal relations: government bureaucrats, private 
actors, and judges. A recent book by Ran Hirschl uses this train of 
thought for an even more drastic description of the constitutional 
review revolution after the Second World War; in Hirschl’s view, this 
trend culminates in a new class rule, a “juristocracy”.20 Thus, with 
global constitutionalism, we may reach an additional, new stage of 
oligarchism: a global constitutional juristocracy. 
 
There are, indeed, clear signs pointing at such a development. Two 
aspects may underline this presumption: firstly, we have already 
stated that an important global transformation has taken place after 
the Second World War; post-war and post-cold war developments 
have led to a worldwide expansion and deepening of judicial review 
in constitutional matters. Of the 191 member states of the UN, only 
five countries, a recent survey suggests,21 remain without a system of 
constitutional review, or of judicial review in a constitutional sense: 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in Europe, and Lesotho, 
Liberia, and Libya in Africa. It must be added, however, that the UK 
is well on its way to joining the Supreme Court club.22 Secondly, we 
can observe an ongoing proliferation of methods and techniques of 
                                                 
20 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). Hirschl argues 
from an anti-bourgeois perspective that bears resemblance to the classical Marxist 
critique of law as a mere Überbauphänomen. For an instructive discussion of 
materialistic approaches to and criticisms of International Law in general, and 
criticisms of post-national constitutionalism in particular (which are mainly of a 
fundamental nature), see S. Marks, “International Judicial Activism and the 
Commodity-Form Theory of International Law”, (2007) 18 European Journal of 
International Law, pp 199-211; and for a profound critique of Hirschl’s neoliberal- 
juristocracy- thesis, see M. Kende, Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds – South Africa 
and the United States, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 286 et seq. 
21 The author A. Mavčič has analysed and classified different models of constitutional 
review around the world. See the overview at 
http://www.concourts.net/tab/tab1.php?lng=en&stat=1&prt=0&srt=0. 
22 In 2004, the UK government has lodged an initiative to establish a US-style UK 
Supreme Court, see the contributions in Andrew LeSueur (ed), Building a New UK 
Supreme Court, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). The House of Lords has been 
renamed since then: The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was established in law 
by Part III of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. It will start work in October 2009. 
Although the old House of Lords as well as the new UK Supreme Court lack the 
power to nullify legislation, see Chapter 4 subsection 4 and 6 of the Human Rights 
Act of 1998, the introduction of the Human Rights Act has dramatically changed the 
legal landscape of the UK. 
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constitutionalism and constitutional review throughout the world. 
The Venice Commission is a major player and an excellent example 
for strategies of promoting both constitutionalism and, in particular, 
constitutional review managed by constitutional courts.23 It is an 
especially apt example because it actively promotes a distinct 
European way of constitutionalism and constitutional review – as 
became clear from the quotation at the beginning of this contribution. 
 
Thus, we must ask ourselves whether the conservative wing of the 
U.S. Supreme Court and its academic adherents is correct to reject 
any kind of involvement in a supra- and trans-national discourse on 
the shape, contents and limits of fundamental rights? A closer look at 
the controversy reveals that ideological reasons are the main driving 
forces behind the categorical rejection of any kind of transnational 
constitutional discourse, and not a more sophisticated legal 
philosophy which tries, for example, to preserve a legitimate legal 
pluralism. Susan Marks reports on a speech by Michael Chertoff, the 
former US Secretary of Homeland Security: 
 
On 17 November 2006 the United States Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Michael Chertoff, made a speech at the Annual Lawyers 
Convention of the Washington DC based Federalist Society, in which 
he addressed the subject of international law. [… H]e recalled the 
shift that had occurred in United States judicial policy since he first 
began his career in the 1970s. A backlash had occurred against the 
‘judicial activism’ of the 1960s and 1970s, and an ethos of ‘judicial 
restraint’ – a greater sensitivity to the limits of the judicial function, a 
more modest approach with respect to the decisions of 
democratically elected legislators – had come to prevail in the 
Supreme Court. Chertoff noted that this was in no small measure due 
to the efforts of people like the members of the Federalist Society, but 
he said there was no room for complacency, for now a new challenge 
                                                 
23 The author of this contribution has also took part in this enterprise (if only, in 
hindsight, somewhat unknowingly) as an agent of this form of constitutional 
promotion: 1998 in Yerevan and Vanadzor/Armenia (in the framework of the 
PHARE programme of the Council of Europe, on fundamental rights and their 
judicial protection), 2000 in Sarajevo (for the German Society for International Legal 
Co-operation, on procedural rules guiding the access to constitutional courts and the 
ECHR), 2001 in Albania (for the German Society for International Legal Co-
operation, on the ECHR and its procedural), 2001 and 2002 in the framework of the 
EU-China Legal Exchange Programme, 2002 in Hungary (on the ECJ). 
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had arisen which he invited his audience to confront. This was ‘the 
rise of an increasingly activist, left-wing and even elitist philosophy 
of law that is flourishing not in the United States but in foreign courts 
and in various international courts and bodies’. 
 
Chertoff gave the example of ‘passenger name record data’. In order 
to enhance its capacity to identify people entering the United States 
who have connections with terrorists, the Administration sought 
access to information provided to airline companies and travel 
agencies by passengers when they purchase air tickets (address, 
telephone number, credit card details, etc). In so far as the 
information would come from Europe, this had led to difficulties 
because certain members of the European Parliament had objected on 
privacy grounds. Chertoff reported that, in fact, these difficulties had 
been resolved satisfactorily. But he explained that the incident 
focused his attention on the extent to which ‘what happens in the 
world of international law and transnational law increasingly has an 
impact on my ability to do my job and the ability of the people who 
work in my department to do their jobs’.”24 
 
By identifying the transnational judicial discourse on fundamental 
rights as an offspring of a “left wing philosophy of law”, Chertoff 
reveals his ideological motives behind the rejection of any kind of 
“foreign” influence. This attitude is echoed in many contributions 
supporting a U.S.-centred legal discourse: transnational 
constitutionalism is identified with judicial activism, and this, in turn, 
is identified with a kind of left-wing rights activism.25 
 
The U.S. domestic disputes about “the laws of other states”, and 
whether these can be taken into account by the Supreme Court, or by 
the courts in general, end up in a methodological parochialism. There 
are convincing reasons for the assumption that international law and 
                                                 
24 M. Chertoff, Remarks at the Federalist Society's Annual Lawyers Convention, 17 
November 2006. The complete text of his speech can be found at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1163798467437.shtm. S. Marks, note 20 
supra, extensively reports about, and comments upon, Chertoff’s speech. 
25 Steven Calabresi is one of the most radical representative of this fraction, see S. 
Calabresi, “’A Shining City on a Hill’: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme 
Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law”, (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review, 




the legal practices of other states can represent a reasonable standard 
of societal development.26 If one is watching the world from “the 
shining city upon the hill” (Ronald Reagan/John Winthrop), 
however, it may be fruitless or even counter-productive to look 
closely into the valleys and gorges of global legal diversity, in search 
of common denominators or inspirations. Many, if not most, 
countries do not have such an elevated position; they believe in, and 
are bound by, transnational and supranational standards, and they 
sometimes even act accordingly. It is, therefore, safe to say that the 
sharp dispute about “the law of other states” says a lot about rifts in 
U.S. jurisprudence and academia, but not much about 
methodological issues of comparative constitutional borrowing. 
 
The ideological rift between the Scalia faction and the Breyer faction 
within the Supreme Court is situated along the lines of originalism 
and constitutional dynamism.27 In theoretical terms, it is a conflict 
about the methods of constitutional interpretation: the “originalist” 
position is grounded in a conscious defence of a U.S. Sonderweg, and 
its background philosophy reveals an almost religious belief in an 
American exceptionalism.28 No other jurisdiction seems to lay such 
an emphasis on the possibility of only one “correct”, sacred method 
of constitutional interpretation as the originalists in the U.S. do. To 
the contrary, methodological interpretative pluralism is the norm in 
many jurisdictions all over the world; for example, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court simply lacks factions which believe that 
certain interpretative techniques are illegitimate from the outset. The 
South African Constitution even requires that the South African 
                                                 
26 Harold Koh has convincingly argued that the legal system of the U.S. has always 
been oriented towards a kind of “standards of civilisation”, and that it has a strong 
universalist tradition: H. Koh, “International Law as Part of Our Law”, (2004) 98 
American Journal Of Internatiol Law, p. 43. 
27 A public dispute between the Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Breyer at 
the Washington College of Law at American University on 13 January 2005 laid these 
positions bare. A full transcript of the discussion can be found at: 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm. - “Originalists” 
hold that the U.S. constitution and its amendments should be interpreted along the 
lines of the “original” will or intention of the Founding Fathers, while the non-
originalists (which seem to form the Court’s majority at present) support a 
constitutional interpretation with regard to developing standards of the international 
community. For the latter, see the judgments in the following cases: Atkins v Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002), Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Lawrence v Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
28 S. Calabresi (note 25 supra) 
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courts, “when interpreting the Bill of Rights…may consider foreign 
law” (Article 36 of the 1994 Constitution of the South African 
Republic). This simply codifies what has become a global judicial 
practice: mutual observation and Comparative Constitutional 
Borrowing (CCB). 
 
The ideologically ossified U.S. discourse conceals another important 
facet of the emerging transnational legal discourse: it has developed – 
most notably after the end of the cold war – for precisely the opposite 
reason than simply to establish a single and uniform world order. 
Apart from obvious functional grounds of market effectiveness and 
stability, there is at least one decisive aspect of democracy that 
supports and potentially legitimates a co-operative creation of supra- 
and trans-national law: it has the potential to “compensate the 
shortcomings of constitutional nation-states” (Ch. Joerges)29 by 
forcing them to take the interests of the “others” into account.30 This 
still seems alien to democratic nationalists like Chertoff. His speech 
shows both a deep concern about being able “to do his job” when 
facing obstacles arising from “international law and transnational 
law”, but, at the same time, also shows a profound neglect towards 
the interests of others and the potentially harmful external effects of 
actions of the US government upon others. Chertoff finds it irritating 
that “some members of the European Parliament” should have a say 
in matters which he sees as purely domestic. These irritations, 
however, are a positive effect of supra- and trans-national 
constitutionalism, and not a flaw. 
 
Some proponents of American parochialism do not even see the 
obvious irony in their argumentation. McGinnes and Somin, for 
example, hail the democratic quality of “the superpower law of the 
US” and qualify international law as a kind of second-class law (“raw 
international law”) because of its democratic deficit. They overlook 
that domestic US law – due to its external effects, as in the case of 
passenger data transferred to US authorities mentioned by Chertoff – 
is well-able to affect the democratic processes in all other countries 
outside the U.S.: these persons might worry what their data 
                                                 
29 Ch. Joerges, “European Law as Conflicts of Law”, in: Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer, 
Deliberative supranationalism revisited, 20/2006 EUI Working Papers, Law, 21. 
30 For an extension of the concept of “otherness” in the context of the EU, see the 
contribution of A. Cebada Romero (Chapter 4 in this volume. 
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protection laws and rights are worth if one country can dictate all the 
conditions of the data transfer. According to McGinnes and Somin, 
however, the foreigners affected by US domestic law should not 
worry:  
 
Because of its structural position in the international system, the 
United States is likely to generate public goods, including good 
legal norms, for the rest of the world.31 
 
We hope so, but this is not the idea behind the concept of democratic 
self-government. 
 
However, the US Supreme Court has not followed the suggestions of 
the “originalists”. Instead of turning to judicial nationalism, it has 
perpetuated the internationalist tradition of US law and 
jurisprudence.32 This does not solve the potential problems of a global 
constitutional juristocracy, but it does re-inforce the insight that there 
is no way back to legal isolationism. As a consequence, we will have 
to analyse the structural change caused by the emergence of supra- 
and trans-national constitutionalism. For a start, we can state the fact 
that Comparative Constitutional Borrowing is based upon, and 
embedded in, the judicial culture of argumentation and justification. 
It is seen here as a practice, an existing discursive reality, and one that 
makes sense in the given context of constitutional adjudication. 
Therefore, the central issue is not whether or why constitutional 
courts should use CCB, but how they do it, and in which 
environment. 
 
3. The New Senator CLASS33 in Action 
Venice Commisions, Constitutional Court 
Conferences, and Global Constitutionalism 
Seminars 
In order to justify the claim that CCB is a discursive reality, one might 
turn to judicial decisions and count the number of cross-references, 
conceptual borrowings, or mutual citations. This approach, however, 
                                                 
31 J.O. McGinnis and I. Somin, “Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?”, 
(2007) 59 Stanford Law Review, pp. 1175-1247, at 1176. 
32 For a detailed account of this tradition, see H. Koh, note 26 supra. 
33 The “Senator Class” is Lufthansa’s highest frequent-flyer status. 
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will most probably lead only to disappointing results. It is rather rare 
that domestic constitutional courts, or supra- and trans-national 
courts, expressly refer to non-domestic legal material or decisions, 
even if these incidents appear to be on the rise.34 Constitutional courts 
are, after all, not an international law or a transnational 
constitutionalism seminar. Non-domestic legal material finds its way 
into court decisions in ways other than by direct quotations: 
preparatory opinions of the judges and legal advisors often contain 
such arguments, and the parties’ lawyers argue more and more 
frequently with non-domestic material, thus forcing the judges to 
react to it. 
 
A second, and better, way of measuring the extent of supra-and 
trans-national constitutionalist discourses than counting quotations 
might be to analyse which and how constitutional ideas migrate from 
one jurisdiction to another, or to supra- and trans-national 
constitutional arenas. This approach can certainly verify that 
constitutional arguments and principles do wander; they are taken 
up by other jurisdictions, and they are re-moulded into a fitting 
element or principle for purposes of domestic adjudication.35 A lot 
may be “lost in translation”, but there are certainly gains, too. What 
this approach cannot deliver, however, is an idea about how these 
arguments and principles make their way across jurisdictions – is 
there a master plan, or does it solely depend upon the language skills 
of the respective judges, or upon the degree to which decisions are 
translated into a widespread language, that concepts migrate? In 
                                                 
34 Two more recent examples from the German context are: (1) the Muslim butcher 
case, in which the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, FCC) 
approvingly cites the Austrian (!) Constitutional Court in order to re-inforce its 
argumentations:  
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20020115_1bvr178399en.html, paragraph 
37, and (2) the Treaty of Lisbon case, in which the FCC expressly refers to the ECJ 
decision in the Kadi case, albeit only in order to establish its own right to control 
whether an EU legal act is ultra vires:  
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html (according 
to the Court’s website a “preliminary English version”), paragraph 340. 
35 One prominent example is the principle of proportionality which has become a key 
element of EC/EU constitutional law (a “general principle of EC law”, in the 
wording of the ECJ): it is a modified version of the principle of proportionality which 
was created by the German FCC in its early jurisprudence and which has become a 
fundamental pillar of the whole legal system ever since. In turn, the origins of the 
“German” principle may be traced back to the “scrutiny”-jurisprudence and the 
various tests applied in this context by the US Supreme Court. 
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other words, it may just be pure chance that some ideas migrate and 
others do not. 
 
How, then, can CCB be measured, if not by a quantitative analyses or 
a scholarly reconstruction? I suggest that we take the incidents of 
cross-references between jurisdictions, and incidents of the migration 
of constitutional ideas, solely as indicators of an ongoing practice, but 
not as the practice itself. Instead, we should look behind the curtains 
and turn to the discursive worlds that link institutional actors (and not 
only analyse their products, the judgments). A stock-taking of 
constitutionalist activities beyond the domestic sphere reveals 
enormous activities in a variety of fields. Three major interfaces can 
be distinguished: the Council of Europe (CoE) as a politico-legal actor 
which promotes constitutionalism in Europe and beyond; various 
networks of constitutional courts, connecting the judges and re-
inforcing transnational dialogues; and academic support of these 
activities. 
3.1. The Council of Europe and its Venice Commission 
The Council of Europe (CoE), based in Strasbourg (France), now 
covers virtually the entire European continent, with its 47 member 
countries. It was founded on 5 May 1949 by 10 countries and is the 
political body of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). Its official objectives are: 
 
• to protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of 
law; 
• to promote awareness and encourage the development of 
Europe's cultural identity and diversity; 
• to find common solutions to the challenges facing European 
society; 
• to consolidate democratic stability in Europe by backing 
political, legislative and constitutional reform.36 
 
The CoE is quite an ambitious institution, with activities in fields 
such as human rights and legal affairs, democracy and political 
affairs, international law and terrorism, social cohesion, education, 
                                                 
36 The current Council of Europe’s political mandate was defined by the third 
Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Warsaw in May 2005. 
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culture and heritage, youth and sport.37 Currently, it holds special 
campaigns in the following fields: “Speak-out against 
discrimination”, “Europe against the death penalty”, “Building a 
Europe for and with children”, “Stop domestic violence”, and “Dosta! 
Fight prejudice towards Roma”. 
 
The Venice Commission was set up in 1990 by the CoE. Its original 
task was to accompany the transition of Eastern European countries 
from socialist to liberal-democratic societies. This included the 
enactment of new constitutions, and the new establishment of 
constitutional courts (or comprehensive institutional reforms of 
existing constitutional courts). After the transition phase of the 1990s, 
the Commission was renamed “The European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law”. It serves now as the Council of Europe’s 
advisory body on constitutional matters, and it calls itself “an 
internationally recognised independent legal think-tank”.38 Its reach 
is larger than the CoE itself: All 47 Council of Europe member states 
are members of the Venice Commission; in addition, Kyrgyzstan 
joined the commission in 2004, Chile in 2005, the Republic of Korea in 
2006, Morocco and Algeria in 2007, Israel and Tunisia in 2008, and 
Peru and Brazil in 2009. The Commission thus has 56 full members in 
all. Belarus is associate member, while Argentina, Canada, the Holy 
See, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the United States and Uruguay are 
observers. South Africa and Palestinian National Authority have a 
special co-operation status similar to that of the observers. The 
European Commission and OSCE/ODIHR participate in the plenary 
sessions of the Commission. 
 
It works in four key areas: constitutional assistance, elections and 
referendums, co-operation with constitutional courts, and 
transnational studies, reports and seminars. The Commission is 
composed of “independent experts who have achieved eminence 
through their experience in democratic institutions or by their 
contribution to the enhancement of law and political science” (Article 
2 of the revised Statute). The members are senior academics, 
particularly in the fields of constitutional or international law, 
supreme or constitutional court judges, or members of national 
                                                 





parliaments. Acting on the Commission in their individual capacity, 
the members are appointed for four years by the participating 
countries. 
 
The Venice Commission is buzzing with activities that revolve 
around constitutionalism. In 2002, it established the “Joint Council on 
Constitutional Justice”. On the basis of Article 3 of the revised Statute 
of the Commission, this body now comprises the liaisons officers 
from constitutional courts and equivalent bodies. The institution of a 
presidency of the Joint Council, representing the constitutional courts 
and the Sub-commission on Constitutional Justice respectively, 
further underlines that the participating constitutional courts play a 
major role in this co-operation. 
 
The following selection of events represents the typical routine work 
of the Commission; they are taken from its website agenda: 
 
• 18/06/2009 8th meeting of the Joint Council on 
Constitutional Justice (Tallinn); 
• 10/11/2008 Seminar on the occasion of the 5th Plenary of 
the UACCC Scientific Symposium on “Fair Trial” (Saana); 
• 30/10/2008  Colloquy on Constitutional Interpretation 
(Algiers); 
• 25/10/2008  Seminar on “Models of Constitutional 
Jurisdiction” (Ramallah); 
• 03/10/2008 XIII Yerevan International Conference on the 
Fundamental Constitutional Values and Public Practice 
(Yerevan); 
• 01/09/2008 International Symposium on the “Separation 
of Powers and Adjudication in the 21st Century” and 
“Preparatory Meeting for the World Conference on 
Constitutional Justice” (Seoul). 
 
It is needless to say that the meetings under the wings of the 
Commission provide for a dissemination of constitutionalism in 
every respect. The topics of its meetings and seminars range from 
single-country topics to the analysis of general constitutional 
principles and their application.39 
                                                 
39 For example, on 30 May 2007, it hosted the following event: “6e réunion du Conseil 




The CoE organises a considerable part of networking activities in the 
field of constitutionalism, but this is not the only forum of such a 
kind. The courts themselves have organised regular meetings in the 
framework of the “Conference of European Constitutional Courts” 
which was set up in 1972.40 As of 2008, it had 39 members. The 
conference holds meetings about every three years; for example, the 
last (XIII and XIV) meetings took place in Nicosia/Cyprus in 2006, 
and in Vilnius/Lithuania in 2008. 
 
Apart from these regular general meetings, all constitutional courts 
routinely visit each other, a practice which generates additional 
opportunities for exchanges about judicial review and constitutional 
adjudication.41 This dense carpet of mutual visits also includes the 
major supra- and trans-national judicial actors in Europe, namely, the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. 
What these numerous meetings and visits represent is not a 
“constitutionalism conspiracy”, but a practice of iteration and 
dialogical development of constitutionalism. The relationships 
between national, supranational and trannational courts in Europe 
are not free from tensions; on the contrary, conflicts between the ECJ, 
on the one hand, and a number of European constitutional courts, on 
the other, are legendary.42 The regular meetings and mutual visits of 
the constitutional courts, the ECJ, and the ECHR may, therefore, also 
serve as arenas in which conflicts about judgments and 
                                                                                                                   
proportionnalité’”. 
40 Additional information can be found at: http://www.confcoconsteu.org/, a 
website which was established by the organizers of the XII meeting in 2002, and at 
http://www.lrkt.lt/conference3.html, established by the organizers of the XIV 
meeting. 
41 According to the press releases website of the German FCC, for example, in July 
2009 a delegation of the FCC visited the constitutional courts of Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic, in June 2009 a delegation of the Hungarian constitutional court 
visited the FCC in Karlsruhe, in May 2009 a delegation of the FCC visited the 
Austrian constitutional court, and so on: http://www.bverfg.de/presse.html.  
42 The Maastricht decision of the German FCC has encouraged a number of other 
constitutional courts (of Italy and Spain, for example) to send out signals to the ECJ 
that they reserve themselves the right to declare EC/EU law unconstitutional. It is 
predictable that the 2009 decision on the Treaty of Lisbon (decision of 30 June 2009, 
Case no 2 BvE 2/08 and others) will have a similar effect as it contains the FCC’s 





disagreements about the interpretation of fundamental rights can be 
played out in the open (although not in public, as the meetings are 
not accessible to the general public, or to the press). 
 
Other arenas for such debates are law reviews and legal journals. 
Constitutional court judges and judges of the ECJ and the ECHR, and 
especially the Presidents of these institutions, regularly publish 
articles on the jurisprudence of their respective institutions. Present 
and former court presidents such as Jutta Limbach (German FCC), 
Luzius Wildhaber (ECHR), and Vassilios Skouris (ECJ), to name a 
few, have written numerous interventions in the on-going consensual 
and conflictual discourse about the European constitutional order. 
These articles touch upon issues such as the migration of 
constitutional ideas, the function of the ECHR and the ECJ, and the 
rising complexity of European fundamental rights adjudication. In 
addition, constitutional court justices explain their judgments in 
special fields, such as free speech, or use the forum of law journals to 
calm the waves after heated debates have erupted about certain 
judgments.43 
3.3. Academic Support 
A third, and closely connected, arena is legal academia. Legal 
research on supra- and trans-national constitutionalism has 
mushroomed in the last decades. Comparative law, once almost 
exclusively a domain of private law, has embraced constitutionalism, 
and more and more textbooks on comparative constitutional law 
have been published in recent years.44 European and U.S. law 
departments have created centres and institutes which are dedicated 
to the study of supra- and trans-national constitutionalism and its 
institutional embodiments, the courts.45 Their conferences and 
workshops provide for a proliferation and dissemination of the 
                                                 
43 W. Hoffmann-Riem, “Die Caroline II-Entscheidung des BVerfG- Ein 
Zwischenschritt bei der Konkretisierung des Kooperationsverhältnisses zwischen 
den verschiedenen betroffenen Gerichten”, (2009) 62 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 
pp. 20-26. The title hints at the dispute between the German FCC and the ECHR in 
the von Hannover case (Caroline von Monaco). 
44 One example is Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, Andras Sájo and Susanne Baer, 
Comparative Constitutionalism, (St. Paul: West Publishing, 2003). 
45 A non-representative enumeration includes: the European University Institute in 
Florence (www.eui.eu) as a unique research institution; the Centre for International 
Courts and Tribunals at the University College London; the Global Law School at 
New York University; the Yale Global Constitutionalism Seminar, and many others. 
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constitutionalism discourse. For example, The Hague Institute for the 
Internationalisation of Law (HiiL)46 initialised a conference in 2008 
with the title “Law of the Future – The Changing Role of Highest 
Courts in an Internationalising World”, in which the patterns and 
processes of global constitutionalism were analysed from many 
different angles. 
 
It is clear that these activities are based upon a consensus about the 
usefulness and meaningfulness of constitutional dialogues, even if 
fundamental differences in the conceptualisation and in theoretical 
approaches remain. Moreover, these parallel activities result in the 
establishment of a distinct knowledge network, a new discursive world 
in which the actors confirm and re-confirm their mutual 
understanding and interpretation of the “reality”, of legal texts, and 
of legal principles alike. 
 
These trends are echoed by observations from an international law 
perspective: while the influence of the Internatinal Court of Justice 
seems to vanish in the face of an ever-growing proliferation of courts 
and court-like institutions within self-contained regimes such as the 
WTO or the UNCLOS,47 the internal balances within international 
law are changing, too. Human rights law, which used to be just one 
of many sub-categories of international law, has been converted in 
recent decades into a different legal material, an ever denser web of 
texts and institutions; in short, it has moved from contractual consent 
to a constitution of a sort. Some scholars are already working on the 
establishment of a “World Court for Human Rights”.48 This is quite 
an ambitious project, given the fact that domestic and international 
human rights courts (constitutional courts, the ECHR, the Inter-
                                                 
46 http://www.hiil.org/. 
47 For a definition of “self-contained regimes” and a discussion about the 
phenomenon of fragmentation in international law, see “Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law”, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
A/CN.4/L.702, 18 July 2006. 
48 Research on the project of a World Court for Human Rights is financed by the 
“Swiss Initiative to Commemorate the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights”, see http://www.udhr60.ch/research.html. Two research 
projects, one led by M. Scheinin (see 
http://www.udhr60.ch/report/hrCourt_scheinin.pdf) and the other led by M. 
Nowak and J. Kozma (see http://www.udhr60.ch/report/hrCourt-Nowak0609.pdf) 
are already working on the topic. 
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American Court of Human Rights) all demand the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies before access will be granted. If the World Court 
for Human Rights applies this principle, claimants will have to have a 
robust health and a persistent character in order to survive the 
procedures. As human rights cases have often already toured for ten 
to fifteen years through the national courts before they arrive at 
international tribunals such as the ECtHR, and because the 
proceedings before these institutions tend to last another three to five 
years, pushing a case to the World Court will become a life-long task. 
Legal history tells us that such a kind of mega-institution will be 
overburdened, and most probably become insignificant or ineffective 
over time.49 This pessimistic outlook notwithstanding, the mere fact 
that such a court is on the agenda shows the eminent influence of the 
constitutionalism discourse. 
 
4. European Constitutionalism: From Borrowing 
and Lending to Hierarchisation? 
Even if a World Court for Human Rights is still far away, regional 
entities have already moved into the direction of supra- and trans-
national constitutional adjudication. The most advanced system is 
based in Europe: European Constitutionalism, which was initialised 
by the U.S. after the Second World War, and taken up by the Council 
of Europe, is nowadays already two steps ahead of the U.S. and its 
nervous discussion about transnational references in judgments: The 
European Union has established a superior legal order vis-à-vis its 
Member States, and the European Court of Human Rights has 
evolved into a very busy and active decision-making machinery in 
                                                 
49 A fitting example is the Reichskammergericht, the Imperial Chamber Court in 
Wetzlar. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation had established this 
institution in order to settle legal disputes within the Empire on a steadier basis. Its 
jurisdiction changed through the centuries, but most of the times comprised at least 
Germany, Belgium, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and parts of France and Italy. Access 
was granted also to individuals (subordinates, “Unterthanen”), and not only to 
members of the aristocratic élite. The Reichskammergerichtsordnung, the procedural 
order of the Court, even opened the appeals procedure for “arme partheien”, poor 
parties, who were granted legal aid in case they could not afford a lawyer. During 
the 300 years of its existence (from 1495 until 1806), about 80,000 appeals reached the 
Reichskammergericht. It was, however, also notorious for its sluggishness: the 
proceedings could last decades, and some of them lasted longer than a century. For 
its role in the development of a rule of law/Rechtsstaat concept, see Bernhard 
Diestelkamp, Reichskammergericht und Rechtsstaatsgedanke. Die Kameraljudikatur gegen 
die Kabinettsjustiz, (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1994). 
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the field of human rights interpretation. Both developments touch 
upon the nerve of domestic constitutional orders: They call the role 
and position of constitutional courts as the “guardians” of the 
respective national constitutional order radically into question, and 
they challenge the interpretative monopoly of the courts. 
 
Ever since the 1993 Maastricht judgment of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC), a nervous dialogue has been initiated 
across Europe, about constitutionalism and democracy, about the 
synchronicity of constitutional ideas, and about the relationship 
between the EU Member States’ constitutions and the EU 
“constitutional” structure. The originally bipolar structure of this 
judicial dialogue – if we reduce it to, for example, the relationship 
between the German FCC, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, the 
Italian Corte Constituzionale, and the ECJ, respectively – has turned 
into a multipolar structure in recent years, with the ECJ, and most 
recently the ECtHR, becoming increasingly important players in the 
field of constitutional law. In this multipolar context, explicit or 
implicit comparative constitutional borrowing is an inevitable 
consequence. 
 
However, as lawyers and judges across Europe learn more and more 
to use and apply the tools of referring to comparative constitutional 
arguments, new questions will arise: will the traditional 
constitutional structures that have grown in the European nation 
states fall victim to the ECJ and the ECHR jurisprudence? And from a 
perspective that is informed less by constitutional nationalism but 
more by democratic constitutionalism, one might ask: if there is such 
a thing as the “Common Core of European Constitutional Law in the 
Making”, does this leave any room for a thorough discussion of 
contested constitutional concepts such as the welfare state, public 
order, or “hard” cases in fundamental rights law? And finally, which 
methodology – beyond cherry-picking – is appropriate for the 
complex task of containing tendencies of “judicial imperialism”? 
 
Many judicial reactions to the ever-growing complexity of European 
constitutionalism are characterised by tactics of avoidance: instead of 
creating and staging open conflicts, constitutional courts tend to fire 
warning shots at the ECHR and the ECJ but stop short of an open rift. 
Judges of national courts as well as ECJ judges insist upon a co-
operative relationship between the ECJ and national constitutional 
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courts. These friendly gestures, however, cannot hide a growing 
uneasiness about a perceived erratic course of the ECJ50 and the 
undecided function of the ECHR as a supreme or constitutional court, 
an international instrument, or both.51 
 
Both the ECJ and the ECHR have been heavily criticised in recent 
times for their “intrusive” 52 and “too detailed”53 judgments. For 
example, the decision of the ECJ in the Mangold case and the decision 
of the ECHR in the von Hannover case have been greeted, almost 
unanimously, with severe criticism, and have caused even alarmist 
and angry comments in Germany. 54 The Taxquet decision of the 
ECHR on jury trials not only stirred emotions in Belgium, from where 
the case originated, but also in Norway, where the criminal court 
                                                 
50 See, for example, the critique of Ch. Schmid (Chapter 16 in this volume). 
51 For a detailed analysis, see A. Cebada Romero and Rainer Nickel, “El Tribunal 
Europeo de Derechos Humanos en una Europa Asimétrica: ¿Hacia el Pluralismo 
Constitutional?”, in: F. Aldecoa Luzárraga and P. A. Fernández Sánchez (eds), El 
Espacio Júridico Común Del Consejo de Europa, (Seville: Univ. of Seville press, 2009). 
The text is available at:  http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/l_Personal/wiss_Ass/nickel/Publikationen/index.html. 
52 Roman Herzog, the former German President, and former President of the Federal 
Constitutional Court as well as President of the Convention which drew up the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, demanded “Stop the ECJ” in an article written for 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Herzog found “adventurous legal constructs” in 
the judgments of the ECJ, and asked the FCC to take up again its watchdog function 
against “intrusions” of the ECJ: “Stoppt den EuGH”, FAZ, 08 September 2008. A 
counter-critique by Lenz lists all cases mentioned by Herzog and claims that Herzog 
does not accurately restate the facts and the reasoning of the ECJ: C.O. Lenz, 
“Anmerkungen zu den Fällen aus dem Aufsatz von Prof. Herzog ‘Stoppt den 
Europäischen Gerichtshof’ in der FAZ vom 8.9.2008”, Walter Hallstein Institut, WHI - 
Paper 1/09, www.whi-berlin.de/documents/whi-paper0109.pdf. 
53 Lord Hoffmann, one of the most prominent UK law lords, has publicly criticised 
the ECHR and its jurisprudence as “inconsistent”, that the court has “assumed power 
to legislate”, and that its decisions are too intrusive: “It has been unable to resist the 
temptation to aggrandise its jurisdiction and to impose uniform rules on Member 
States. It considers itself the equivalent of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
laying down a federal law of Europe”. Lord Hoffmann, “The Universality of Human 
Rights”, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, London, 19 March 2009, available at: 
http://www.jsboard.co.uk/downloads/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Univ
ersality_of_Human_Rights.doc, p. 14 and 21. See, also, the (critical) comment by Afua 
Hirsch: “Judges: can’t live with ‘em…”, The Guardian, 06 April 2009, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/apr/06/law-eu. 
54 See Herzog (note 52 supra). For an overview, see J. Wieland, “Der EuGH im 
Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Rechtsanwendung und Rechtsgestaltung”, in: (2009) 
62 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, pp. 1841-1845. 
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system shows similar features and where the fear is rising that the 
country will have to adopt a completely new system of criminal 
procedure prescribed by the ECHR.55 
 
European constitutionalism is messy. The function of its judicial 
actors is all but clear: Is the ECJ the Supreme Court and the 
constitutional court of the EU? Is the ECHR the constitutional court of 
the EU and of its Member States? Does an EU Member State like 
Germany or Spain now have three constitutional courts (i.e., courts 
that define the contents and range of fundamental rights) instead of 
one? Are the hierarchies established in one legal order (for example, 
the EU) binding upon other legal orders (for example, those of 
Germany or Spain), and, if so, to what extent? The latter question will 
most certainly be the subject of lively discussions in the years to 
come.56 “Conflict born of diversity will continue to characterise the 
process of European integration”,57 and, one may add, also the 
development of supra- and trans-national constitutionalism. What 
remains, however, is the fact that all of these courts are involved in 
the discoursive definition and re-definition of fundamental rights as 
“higher law”. 
5. Casework 
Verba docent, exempla trahunt: The practice of European 
Constitutionalism is most visible in cases in which two legal orders 
contain the same or similar legal guarantees, and in cases in which it 
is unclear whether a fundamental right expressly granted in one 
order is also part of the second order. In the following, I will present 
and discuss two representative cases in which such a doublement 
played a decisive role. 
5.1. The Omega Case (European Court of Justice) 
Does the EU legal order contain an individual right to human dignity, 
or a principle of human dignity? This was one of the leading 
questions in the Omega case.58 The Omega Company wanted to open 
                                                 
55 I.L. Backer, “Definition and Development of Human Rights in the International 
Context and Popular Sovereignty – A Comment”, presented at the UNIDEM Seminar 
Frankfurt am Main, 15-16 May 2009, p. 8, on file with author. 
56 The German FCC judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon (note 42 supra) has laid the 
groundwork for a renewed discussion about the constitutional limits of European 
integration, and it is quite predictable that other constitutional courts will follow suit. 
57 Ch. Joerges, in this volume, Chapter 19, sub Part IV.1. 
58 ECJ, Case C-36/02, judgment of 14 October 2004. 
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an amusement centre in which customers were invited to play 
“Gotcha”, an indoor game in which the participants shoot each other 
with weapons filled with ink bullets. The goal of the game is to hit the 
other players, and to bring them down. The city of Bonn in Germany 
issued an order prohibiting the game, arguing that the game 
threatened to violate the ordre publique (Öffentliche Ordnung) of the 
Federal Republic because it simulates acts of homicide, and that the 
prohibition order was necessary for the protection of human dignity, 
which is enshrined in Article 1 ch. 1 of the Grundgesetz (basic law). 
The case involved companies from other EU Member States, and was 
finally referred to the European Court of Justice. According to Article 
6.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union: 
 
[S]hall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, as general principles of Community law. 
 
Article 6.2 TEU, therefore, does not contain a collection of 
constitutional rights; it refers to the European Convention and the 
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States”, without 
any further explanation on how to find and extrapolate these 
common constitutional traditions. The ECJ held that the EU legal 
order does contain “respect for human dignity as a general principle 
of law”. The following are the key paragraphs of this decision: 
 
32. In this case, the competent authorities took the view that the 
activity concerned by the prohibition order was a threat to 
public policy by reason of the fact that, in accordance with the 
conception prevailing in public opinion, the commercial 
exploitation of games involving the simulated killing of human 
beings infringed a fundamental value enshrined in the national 
constitution, namely human dignity. According to the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the national courts which heard the 
case shared and confirmed the conception of the requirements 
for protecting human dignity on which the contested order is 
based, that conception therefore having to be regarded as in 




33. It should be recalled in that context that, according to settled 
case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of the 
general principles of law the observance of which the Court 
ensures, and that, for that purpose, the Court draws inspiration 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States and from the guidelines supplied by international 
treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or to which they are 
signatories. The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms has special significance in that respect 
[…]. 
 
34. As the Advocate General argues in paragraphs 82 to 91 of 
her Opinion, the Community legal order undeniably strives to 
ensure respect for human dignity as a general principle of law. 
There can therefore be no doubt that the objective of protecting 
human dignity is compatible with Community law, it being 
immaterial in that respect that, in Germany, the principle of 
respect for human dignity has a particular status as an 
independent fundamental right. 
 
35. Since both the Community and its Member States are 
required to respect fundamental rights, the protection of those 
rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a 
restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even 
under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as 
the freedom to provide services (see, in relation to the free 
movement of goods, Schmidberger, paragraph 74). 
 
36. However, measures which restrict the freedom to provide 
services may be justified on public policy grounds only if they 
are necessary for the protection of the interests which they are 
intended to guarantee and only in so far as those objectives 
cannot be attained by less restrictive measures (see, in relation 
to the free movement of capital, Église de Scientologie, 
paragraph 18). 
 
37. It is not indispensable in that respect for the restrictive 
measure issued by the authorities of a Member State to 
correspond to a conception shared by all Member States as 
regards the precise way in which the fundamental right or 
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legitimate interest in question is to be protected. Although, in 
paragraph 60 of Schindler, the Court referred to moral, 
religious or cultural considerations which lead all Member 
States to make the organisation of lotteries and other games 
with money subject to restrictions, it was not its intention, by 
mentioning that common conception, to formulate a general 
criterion for assessing the proportionality of any national 
measure which restricts the exercise of an economic activity. 
 
38. On the contrary, as is apparent from well-established case-
law subsequent to Schindler, the need for, and proportionality 
of, the provisions adopted are not excluded merely because one 
Member State has chosen a system of protection different from 
that adopted by another State […]. 
 
For these reasons, the Court confirmed the compatibility of the 
decisions of the German courts and the prohibition order of the City 
of Bonn with Community law. On the surface, this judgment seems to 
represents a wise decision for constitutional pluralism: According to 
the ECJ, there is no need for EU-wide common standards of judicial 
review regarding measures that are justified by reference to the 
protection of fundamental rights, such as human dignity. This allows 
for different standards of protection in the Member States; local 
knowledge and “odd details” of local constitutionalism are not 
disregarded, and forceful legal integration by means of a 
constitutionalism by stealth is avoided. On a second look, however, 
the decision adds another piece to the puzzle of European 
Constitutionalism. It states that the concept of human dignity – and 
its protection – represents a principle of European law in the sense of 
Article 6.2 TEU. It arrives at this conclusion without any research into 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States – and 
such an inquiry, had it been made, would have revealed that there is 
no such “common” tradition. Not all EU Member State constitutions 
contain a legal concept of human dignity which gurarantees it as an 
individual right, and to some – such as the UK – such a concept is 
completely alien to the legal system. Additionally, only few Member 
States would interpret the protection of human dignity in a way that 
it could also be used against its bearers (in the Omega case, the players 
of Gotcha). In the end, the ECJ created a “new” common 
constitutional concept in the name of constitutional pluralism. 
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5.2.  The Case Von Hannover v Germany (European 
Court of Human Rights) 
Another example for a creeping constitutionalisation of legal orders 
can be found in the Von Hannover v Germany decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights.59 This decision re-defined – and strained – 
the relationship between the German constitutional court and the 
ECHR. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights had, for a long time, 
only been an additional instrument of human rights protection in 
Germany (as in most of its European Member States). Due to the 
comprehensive guarantees of basic rights in the Grundgesetz from 
1949 and the active role of the FCC in the implementation of these 
rights in the German legal order, the 1950 Convention had a very 
limited significance in Germany. Only since the intensifying of the 
European integration in the 1990s and the introduction of a “new” 
ECHR through Protocol 11 to the Convention has it gained increasing 
importance in the national context. Three particular reasons can be 
identified for this development: access to the ECHR is much easier 
now than it was before 1998 when admissibility applications were 
first considered by the European Commission on Human Rights; a 
public relations offensive after 1998 increased awareness about the 
ECHR within the populations of the Member States; and finally, the 
number of contracting states of the Council of Europe has risen 
dramatically, so that nowadays 47 countries have signed the 
Convention, and the ECtHR’s 45 judges have to deal with tens of 
thousands of applications. According to recent statistical data, the 
backlog of cases is impressive: on 1 January 2009, approximately 
97,300 applications were pending before a decision body.60 Due to the 
large number of judgments delivered, the Court even had to establish 
an internal clearing-house in order to keep track of its own 
jurisprudence. 
 
                                                 
59 Case of Von Hannover v Germany, application no. 59320/00, judgment of 24 June 
2004. 





The Von Hannover judgment is remarkable because it reviews61 a 
“hard case” in the jurisprudence of the German FCC – and it rejects 
the FCC’s wider concept of freedom of the press in favour of the right 
to privacy of VIPs. The case dealt with the publication of secretly shot 
photos, all of them showing Caroline von Hannover, Princess of 
Monaco, in a variety of situations. Both courts had to balance the 
rights involved. The German FCC declined to differentiate between 
“useful” and “useless” information delivered by the press, and it also 
rejected the idea that pure entertainment in the tabloid press is not 
part of the general public and is not, therefore, protected by the 
freedom of the press.62 In contrast to this, the ECHR demands that 
photos and/or articles in the press need to contribute to a debate of 
general interest in order to survive the breach-of- privacy test: 
 
63. The Court considers that a fundamental distinction needs to 
be made between reporting facts – even controversial ones – 
capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society 
relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for 
example, and reporting details of the private life of an 
individual who, moreover, as in this case, does not exercise 
official functions. While in the former case the press exercises 
its vital role of ‘watchdog’ in a democracy by contributing to 
‘impart[ing] information and ideas on matters of public interest’ 
[…], it does not do so in the latter case. 
 
Following a stricter concept of the freedom of the press, as it is 
followed, for example, in France, the ECHR held that no watchdog 
function had been exercised in the case before it,63 and it declared that 
                                                 
61 Technically, however, the ECHR cannot “review” national law or national decision 
– it can only state a violation of convention rights and grant a just compensation, see 
Articles 41 and 46 of the Convention. 
62 See paragraphs 97-98 of the first decision in this matter which laid the 
constitutional ground for later decisions: FCC, judgment of 15 December 1999, Case 
no. 1 BvR 653/96, available in German at: 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs19991215_1bvr065396.html. The second 
decision was subject of the ECHR decision: FCC, judgment of 26 April 2001, case no. 
1 BvR 758/97 et al. An English translation can be found at: 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20010426_1bvr075897en.html. 
63 “The Court considers that the publication of the photos and articles in question, the 
sole purpose of which was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership 
regarding the details of the applicant’s private life, cannot be deemed to contribute to 
any debate of general interest to society despite the applicant being known to the 
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there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. With this 
decision, it materially re-defined the content of the right to freedom 
of the press for all 47 member states of the convention. 
 
The decision is an example of conflicting conceptual overlap, of a 
dedoublement: both the German constitution and the Convention 
contain a right to privacy and a guarantee of the freedom of the press. 
The obvious question in such a context – Who is the final arbiter? – 
can be answered easily: formally, the ECHR can only state a violation 
of convention rights and grant a just compensation, see Articles 41 
and 46 of the Convention, but it cannot overturn a domestic court 
decision. The legal situation, however, is far more complex than this. 
According to the jurisprudence of the FCC, courts are generally 
obliged to take the jurisprudence of the ECHR into account (whereby 
the term “generally” needed closer definition), and if a court 
disregards the reasonings of the ECHR, the claimant can successfully 
lodge a constitutional complaint: the neglect of ECHR decisions 
potentially constitutes, in itself, a violation of the Rechtsstaat/rule of 
law principle.64 In the Von Hannover case, later decisions both of the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) and the FCC integrated 
the ECHR position into their judgments, although not without 
adding certain nuances to their interpretation of the right to freedom 
of the press. 
 
The Von Hannover decisions, whose twists and turns cannot be fully 
explored here, confirm the thesis of an on-going constitutional 
discourse about the contents and limits of fundamental rights. 
Domestic courts, and constitutional constitutional courts, increasingly 
                                                                                                                   
public […]”, paragraph 65 of the judgment. 
64 This jurisprudence was expressly confirmed in the infamous Görgülü case, 
available in English at: 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html (judgment 
of 14 October 2004, case no. 2 BvR 1481/04). Mr Görgülü had successfully lodged a 
complaint according to Article 34 of the European Convention. The lower court 
ignored the decision of the ECHR in favour of Mr Görgülü, and the FCC delivered its 
judgment of 14 October 2004. In the following time, the lower court again ignored the 
ECHR jurisprudence, which led to another – successful – constitutional complaint: 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20050405_1bvr166404.html. The lower 
court still ignored the judgments of the ECHR and the FCC. In its decision on the 
third – successful – constitutional complaint of Mr Görgülü the FCC plainly accused 
the lower court of arbitrariness. Criminal proceedings against the judges of the lower 
court are pending. 
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apply the art of distinction, well-known to common law countries, in 
order to avoid head-on collisions with the ECHR. This tactic of 
avoidance represents a soft answer to the potential ambitions of the 
ECHR to become the constitutional court of Europe. 
 
6. Constitutional Conflicts Law 
What is left of the fear of a transnational constitutional juristocracy? 
Courts, it seems, are inevitably the central actors in the new 
transnational global society, and they inevitably foster a 
constitutionalisation of its legal order(s). The results are multiple 
legal regimes – and multiple regime-collisions of a growing 
complexity – with courts as gateways and interfaces. The European 
Union and the European Convention on Human Rights are but two 
of many such regimes that have left the traditional forms and 
procedures of traditional international law far behind. The WTO 
panels and its Appellate Body, the International Criminal Court, the 
dispute settlement system of NAFTA, the new MERCOSUR court, the 
International Court on the Laws of the Sea – all these judicative 
bodies constantly deliver decisions on conflicting legal orders, and 
this list of institutions can easily be prolonged. 
 
These institutions open up a common legal space, and – at least in 
Europe – they also open up a common constitutional space. This 
space, however, is characterised by diverse and overlapping 
constitutional regimes with diverse legal traditions and legal-political 
preferences. This diversity even appears within a single framework 
such as the European Convention of Human Rights. In addition, and 
for lack of clearly-defined hierarchies, even the instances of 
Comparative Constitutional Borrowing, and the constant iterations of 
constitutionalism as such, are too thin to produce a uniform, material 
“constitution”, a single common core of European constitutionalism. 
Details matter, and they resist uniformity. 
 
Constitutionalism nonetheless provides a meaningful frame of 
reference. The democratic deficit of trans- and supra-national 
constitutionalism, however, is obvious: in the national arena, 
constitutional courts are exposed to protest and criticism by the press 
and the general public at large. The courts are embedded in a 
conflictual, legal-political discourse about the contents and the limits 
of fundamental rights. No such “thick” public exists on the global 
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level, and not even on the European level can we find a comparable 
aggregation of public oversight and political control. Thus, as long as 
there are no easy solutions for the democracy problem at hand, 
constitutionalism itself has to be created and formed in a way that is 
conscious of these deficits. 
 
Constitutional authoritarianism is clearly not the answer to the 
problem of judicial disembeddedness, nor is it legal pluralism. While 
concepts of legal pluralism65 have aptly described and embraced the 
existence of such a variety of legal orders, their cognitive and 
explanatory force is rather limited as they cannot explain how 
conflicts between different legal orders can be properly defined, 
contextualised, and finally solved (or avoided). A “constitutional 
conflicts law” needs a more structured and procedural approach 
towards the problem of unity (of the fundamental ideas of a legal 
order) and diversity (of their concrete definition and application). 
 
The varieties of European constitutionalism in the European 
constitutional laboratory may provide some answers. The ECHR, for 
example, is constantly in a situation in which it needs to define the 
“European Public Order” embodied in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, while, at the same time, it has to pay its tribute to the 
national constitutional orders of the Member States. This constellation 
is tempting for a court with a tendency for judicial activism, and the 
court has, more than once in recent times, been accused of 
overstepping its territory. In its Bosphorus66 decision, however, the 
ECHR went down a different path: it had to define its role vis-à-vis 
the EC/EU legal order, and it came up with a distinctive and creative 
solution. It stated that the EC/EU legal order provides for a sufficient 
degree of legal protection, and that a complainant has to show that, in 
his or her case, this general level of protection has not been met. This 
hurdle, although not as steep as the Solange II admissibility hurdle set 
up by the German FCC in relation to constitutional oversight over 
EC/EU law,67 represents another possible path for a settlement of 
                                                 
65 For an overview, see N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism”, in: (2002) 
65 Modern Law Review, pp. 317-359. 
66 ECHR, Bosphorus Hava Yolları v. Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, judgment of 30 
June 2005, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
67 See BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986), Solange II: Constitutional complaints that are based 
upon a claim for the unconstitutionality of EC/EU law are inadmissible unless the 
complainant shows in a detailed analysis that the general level of human rights 
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conflicting constitutional orders: mutual recognition as the rule, 
stricter scrutiny as the exception. 
 
Such a mechanism, if further developed and cautiously applied, 
would combine respect for the legal traditions which have grown 
over long periods of time, and for local preferences and “odd details” 
with a necessary sense of the promises of constitutionalism. It may 
serve as one element of a future constitutional conflicts law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
protection within the EU has sunk below the general level of protection guaranteed 
by the German constitution. This Herculean task that has not been met in the last 23 
years since the judgment was handed down in 1986. - The latest judgment in EU 
matters, the Treaty of Lisbon decision (note 42 supra) expressly allows for complaints 
directed at EU legal acts which are ultra vires, but it has again confirmed the Solange II 
rationale with regard to constitutional rights protection. 
 
Chapter 13  
Regime-Collisions, Proceduralised Conflict 
of Laws and the Unity of the Law: On the 
Form of Constitutionalism Beyond the State 
Florian Rödl 




1. The “Conflict of Laws”-approach in 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State 
“Constitutionalism” has become one of the leading catchwords in 
legal theory. This is particularly true for reflections on processes of 
condensed juridification beyond the state.1 It seems common ground 
now that the concept of constitution is not necessarily bound to the 
concept of state.2 In other words, entities which are not states, but are 
condensed contractual regimes, are said to be able to have 
constitutions or may be constitutionalised. These entities are usually 
located at supra-state level and comprise a plurality of states, such as 
the United Nations, the European Union, or the World Trade 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the two collections by M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds), The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); Ch. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), 
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2006). 
2 See the paradigmatic titles of publications by A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, 
Principles of European Constitutional Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); Nicolaos 
Tsagourias, Transnational Constitutionalism: European and international models, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); H. Eberhard et al., Reflexionen zum 
Internationalen Verfassungsrecht, (Vienna: WUV-Univ.-Verlag, 2005). 
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Organisation.3 For many observers, this dissolution of the 
constitution from the state does not change much in the 
understanding of the concept of a constitution. Though not openly 
acknowledged, the underlying idea is that a constitution beyond the 
state is something quite similar to a state constitution; the only 
difference being the very fact that the entity with which the concept is 
linked is not a state. In particular, a constitution beyond the state also 
establishes a vertical hierarchy of legal norms, which subordinates 
the law of the state under the newly established supra-national 
constitutional law. 
 
Against this backdrop, the main focus in research is on how this 
vertical hierarchy is to be enforced. Only in rare cases, the focus is on 
how the basic principles enshrined in a modern state’s constitution, 
i.e., rule of law, democracy, solidarity can be transformed or 
preserved under the new circumstances.4 In contrast to this kind of – 
certainly widely differentiated – mainstream theory on 
constitutionalism beyond the state, there exists a different approach. 
It is the “conflict of laws” approach. This approach holds that to 
understand constitutionalism beyond the state in firm analogy to 
state constitutions is misleading. Instead, constitutionalisation 
beyond the state is a process of generating legal norms which are best 
understood against the backdrop of the legal discipline of conflict of 
laws. The proper discipline of conflict of laws tackles the problem of 
collisions of legal national orders, in which each strives for the 
application of its own particular norms to a given transnational legal 
relation. Hence, conflict of laws is a discipline which could not, and, 
indeed, did not start right away with an idea of vertical hierarchy. On 
the contrary, the problem of conflict of laws is, from its outset, a 
collision of legal norms of, by definition, the same status and dignity. 
                                                 
3 B. Fassbender, “The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community”, in: (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, pp. 529-620; J.H.H. 
Weiler and M. Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); E.-U, Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and WTO 
Law”, in: D.L.M. Kennedy and J.D. Southwick (eds), The Political Economy of 
International Trade Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 32-67. 
4 Ph. Allot, Towards the International Rule of Law, (London: Cameron May, 2007); R. 
Bellamy, Constitutionalism and Democracy, (Aldershot et al.: Ashgate, 2006); J. 
Habermas, “The Post-national Constellation and the Future of Democracy”, in: ibid., 
The Post-national Constellation, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001); E.O. Eriksen, Ch. 
Joerges and F. Rödl (eds), Law, Democracy and Solidarity in a Post-national Union, 
(London - New York: Routledge, 2008). 
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Corresponding to this, the main focus of the conflict of laws approach 
to constitutionalism beyond the state is concerned not with the 
establishing, justifying and enforcing vertical hierarchies, but with 
horizontal, diagonal and heterarchical relations between different 
national, supranational and functional legal orders. 
 
Gunter Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, on the one hand, and 
Christian Joerges, on the other, are important representatives of the 
conflict of laws approach. To present the two approaches by their 
labels, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano call for a “law of regime 
collisions”,5 while Joerges postulates a “proceduralised law of conflict 
of laws”.6 
 
This chapter will attempt to examine the two positions on a 
fundamental issue, namely, the issue of the unity of the law. For a 
long time, the problem of the unity of the law has functioned as a 
dividing line in the theory of conflict of laws.7 The hegemonic 
position in scholarship has moved from affirmation (universalism) to 
the rejection (particularism) of this very idea of the unity of the law. 
But there are doubts that the latter can continue to prevail in the era 
of globalisation which is accompanied by an increase and a 
consolidation of transnational law-mediated economic and social 
interaction.8 Hence, it seems worthwhile to examine more closely 
                                                 
5 A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des 
globalen Rechts, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006); ibid., “Regime-Collisions: The 
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law”, (2004) 25 Michigan 
Journal of International Law,pp. 999-1045. 
6 See, in particular, Ch. Joerges, “The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of 
Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline”, in: (2005) 24 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, pp. 149-196; ibid., “Constitutionalism in 
Postnational Constellations: Contrasting Social Regulation in the EU and in the 
WTO”, in: Ch. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 491-527; ibid., 
“Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy: A Plea for a Supranational Conflict of 
Laws”, in: B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy 
of the European Union, (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), pp. 311-327. 
7 A. Mills, “The Private History of International Law”, in: (2006) 55 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 1-50. 
8 On this, see F. Rödl, Weltbürgerliches Kollisionsrecht. Über die Form des 
Kollisionsrechts und seine Gestalt im Recht der Europäischen Union, Ph.D-thesis, 
Florence, 2008; G. Scherer, Das Internationale Privatrecht als globales System, Ph.D-




whether the new conflict of laws-approaches of Teubner and Fischer-
Lescano, and of Joerges draw from the universalist or from the 
particularist heritage of conflict of laws-theory. 
2. Universalism versus Particularism in Private 
International Law Theory 
Questions of form are always fundamental questions.9 The question 
of whether a conception of conflict of laws represents a universalist or 
a particularist approach refers to the form of (a conception of) conflict 
of laws. According to the universalist approach, conflict of laws is to 
be understood as a universal and uniform law which is common to 
all legal orders which are co-ordinated under the conflict rules 
provided. The particularist approach, in contrast, conceives conflict of 
law-rules as an intrinsic part of one of the concurring legal orders; 
there are as many sets of conflict rules as there are legal orders. It is 
only accidentally that these sets of conflict rules have the same 
content; they are, hence, essentially different. According to the 
particularist approach, each legal order provides comprehensive co-
ordination for all legal orders, but in a different way. 
 
While the universalist form was the guiding idea in classical thinking 
about conflicts of laws in the Nineteenth century, it is supported only 
by very few today. The form of conflict of laws which prevails both in 
theory and doctrine today (and which operates tellingly more and 
more as “private international law”) is, in turn, strongly particularist. 
2.1. Classical and Modern Universalism 
Classical universalism in conflict of laws is strongly linked with the 
name and writing of Friedrich Carl von Savigny.10 It was Savigny 
who propagated forcefully that conflict rules, which determine the 
national legal rules to apply to a transnational private legal 
relationship, had to be the same for, and common to, all nations. He 
formulated a guiding principle, which sounded like a version of 
Kant’s categorical imperative, for the searching of appropriate 
conflict rules for transnational legal relationships: 
 
                                                 
9 E. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, (Cambridge MA - London: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), p. 25 et seq. 
10 F.C. v. Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Vol. 8 (1849), (reprint: Aalen: 
VERLAG, 1981). 
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we have here always to ask ourselves whether such a rule is 
likely to be suited for incorporation into this law [on conflicts of 
local laws, F.R.] which is common to all nations.”11 
 
Savigny’s claim for the unity of the law of conflict of laws was 
conceptually connected with a second universalism. This was the 
idea of the universality of private legal status and relationship. 
Savigny thought that the canon of private legal states and 
relationships, i.e., capacity and corporation, contractual and non-
contractual obligations, property, family, succession, was not only 
empirically the same in all legal orders, but also, more importantly, 
that the national rules constituting these private legal status and 
relationships might differ in content but did not change their 
common essence. The respective essence of a private legal status or 
relationships remained the same, notwithstanding the particular legal 
and social circumstances in which they were embedded, and 
notwithstanding which particular state was involved in the 
transnational case.12 Upon the basis of this claim of a ubiquitous 
essence of private legal status and relationships, Savigny could 
conclude that the conflict rule to determine the law applicable to a 
transnational legal relationship, which is to be common to all nations, 
was to be found by way of close scrutiny of this very essence of the 
legal relationship. This led him to the famous methodological 
metaphor, cited to this day, that, in order to find the proper national 
legal order to be applied to a transnational private legal relationship, 
one had to look for the spatial “seat of a private legal relationship” 
(Sitz des Rechtsverhältnisses).13 In other words, each private legal status 
or relationship has a spatial “seat” in the world, which connects the 
legal relationship with a national legal order; for example, the “seat” 
of legal capacity is the person’s domicile, which leads to the 
application of the legal order of the nation in which the domicile is 
located, or, to give another example, the “seat” of a contract is its 
place of performance leading to that nation’s legal order where the 
place of performance is located. The seat of status or relationship 
must not be determined by reflecting on societal circumstances, but 
by inspection of the pure status or relationships as they are given in 
their essence. Hence, Savigny’s classical universalism resulted in a 
                                                 
11 F.C. v. Savigny, op. cit., 114. 
12 F. Rödl, op. cit., 72 et seq. 
13 F. C. v. Savigny, op. cit., 28. 
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small number of conflict rules which connected each private legal 
relation with the legal order of a certain state, and with the selfsame 
action established a universal order of jurisdiction to prescribe in 
private law. 
 
The second of Savigny’s universalist ideas, the idea of a universality 
of private legal relationships stripping them of their legal and societal 
embeddedness, lost its persuasive power in the Twentieth century. It 
was considered to represent an apolitical understanding of private 
law. Critical scholars put forward that private law was not an area 
distinct from public law, and, in particular, that it was equally 
saturated with public policy aspects, a fact which would not allow 
determining the jurisdiction of states in private law according to an 
alleged essence of private legal relationships. Instead, it was the often 
differing “governmental interest” of states which should determine 
the reach of domestic law in the transnational sphere.14 
 
However, this second of Savigny’s universalist ideas, which refers to 
the idea of the universality of private law relations, was often not 
properly distinguished from the first, the universalist idea of a unity 
of the law of conflict of laws. Thus, many saw the latter idea also hit 
by their criticism of Savigny’s a-political understanding of private 
law. But the two are actually independent. Thus, accepting that the 
content of private law rules which determine rights and duties in 
private legal relations depends from their social and legal 
embeddedness does not exclude the ideal of unity in conflict of laws. 
What it does exclude, is only that the law of conflict of laws takes the 
form which was propagated by Savigny, namely, a small number of 
multilateral rules. This position, although only rarely defended, can 
be called the modern universalism of conflict of laws.15 
 
Certainly, for both the classical and the modern versions of 
universalism, there is the problem of how this universal legal order 
for conflict of laws which preserves law’s unity can be 
conceptualised, given that there is no higher legal source from which 
the conflict rules could emanate. But this problem can be solved: One 
                                                 
14 B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, (Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 1963); Ch. Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts, (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter - Tübingen: Mohr, 1971). 
15 F. Rödl, op. cit., 80, 121 et seq. 
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has to understand all institutions, and in particular courts, which 
articulate conflict rules as participating in a common enterprise to 
articulate a common law of conflict of laws. 
 
Though the classical and the modern universalism are based upon 
different understandings of private legal relations and private law, 
the driving force behind the two universalisms is the same: it is the 
idea that law must be conceptualised as being submitted to the idea 
of its unity. This means that conflicts of legal orders, each 
concurrently striving for application on a given case, have to be 
subject to a legal solution of the conflict derived from a higher 
ranking order. Otherwise, there would be no valid law at all but only 
competing mental representations of law. And the prevalence of one 
representation over the other will depend on coincidental 
circumstances (i.e., the place of the court where the suit was first filed 
or where the first judgement was issued, the location of distrainable 
assets, etc.). In other words, whether one can have the idea of law at 
all, depends on the commitment to the idea of unity of (conflicts) 
law.16 
2.2. The Political Particularism prevailing today 
The doctrine of today’s discipline of Private International Law stands 
in sharp contrast to universalism.17 Its essential trait, also according to 
its self-understanding, is its deliberative particularism.18 This means 
that the law on conflict of laws is not part of a superior and unique 
legal order. On the contrary, the law of conflict of law is understood 
as a part of the same legal orders which are competing for application 
on a given case; thus, each legal order comprises particular conflict 
rules which can be, and often are, different from the conflict rules of 
the concurring legal orders. In other words, foreign legal orders and 
foreign private laws are not neglected, but their spatial reach is 
determined according to the prerogatives of the domestic legal order. 
One player in the jurisdictional conflict is, at the same time, the 
arbitrator of the selfsame conflict. In this way, Private International 
Law also subscribes to the context-dependence of private law rules, 
                                                 
16 F. Rödl, op. cit., 22 et seq. 
17 The main reference for the following is K. Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und Sachrecht. 
Standort und Methode des Internationalen Privatrechts, (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 
1981). 
18 See, for example, K. Schurig, op. cit., 295. 
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but it sacrifices, with the same action (as did most of the critics of 
Savigny), the idea of universalism in conflict of laws.19 
 
It is important to note the specific reason for the essentially anti-
universal attitude of today’s Private International Law. It is not that 
the doctrine thinks that a universal conflict of laws is unlikely or 
impossible to achieve. The reason is, instead, the partisan attitude of 
the discipline – although a common discipline in all legal orders – 
towards the domestic legal order. The grounding of this attitude is in 
core the understanding of sovereignty which underlies this legal 
order. The idea of sovereignty, which is not only the source for 
private law rules, but is also the source for private international law 
rules, excludes that it functions as a neutral arbitrator acting from a 
viewpoint superior to the concurring private laws. The state origin of 
private international law prevents it from performing a supra-state 
function. The idea of the sovereignty of states trumps the idea of the 
unity of the law.20 
3. The Form of Conflict of Laws in 
Constitutionalism beyond the State 
3.1.  Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s Law of Regime-
Collisions 
Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s approach starts with the assumption 
that, today, the sphere of international and transnational law is 
characterised by a pluralism of legal regimes, which have emerged as 
a supplement of the transnationalisation of functionally differentiated 
social systems.21 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner observe that each of 
these regimes claims legal and constitutional autonomy vis-à-vis other 
regimes and vis-à-vis state law. In many cases, the regimes’ claim for 
constitutional autonomy is directly manifested with the 
institutionalisation of a highest court, which is to adjudicate the legal 
disputes which arise from the regime’s own law with final 
                                                 
19 F. Rödl, op. cit., 91 et seq. 
20 Schurig denotes the predominant doctrine of private international law not a 
sovereigntist but an autonomist position (compare G. Kegel and K. Schurig, 
Internationales Privatrecht, ((Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004)), p. 186). This choice in wording 
is related to a tacit claim that private international law should actually not be formed 
by the states’ legislator but by the states’ courts, listening carefully to legal 
scholarship. 
21 A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen, op. cit., 23 et seq., 25 et seq. 
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authority.22 Presumably, it is this very claim of constitutional 
autonomy which justifies, according to Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 
the drawing of an analogy from the pluralism of functional legal 
regimes at international or at transnational level to the pluralism of 
national private laws which is the subject of traditional conflict of 
laws. A further exploration of this analogy leads Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner to their main thesis: the interaction or mediation between 
functional legal regimes should be submitted to a new paradigm 
delivered by conflict of laws.23 
 
As stated in the introduction, the following treatise focuses on the 
question of the form of the conflict of laws-paradigms which are put 
forward for understanding constitutionalism beyond the state. 
Hence, the question for the law of regime-collisions envisioned by 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner is precisely whether it is to be 
conceptualised as universal law or as particularistic law. 
3.1.1. Epistemically Grounded Particularism 
It is evident from Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s account that they 
perceive themselves as critical towards any kind of universalism in 
law and even of intellectual attempts to reconstruct universalism in 
law.24 For this reason, one is inclined to attribute a particularist 
approach to Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s law of regime-
collisions, which is the very same stance adopted by traditional 
private international law. 
 
It has been explained above that, for the doctrine of private 
international law, the reason to subscribe to particularism and to 
battle against theoretical attempts for universalism was the doctrine’s 
strong commitment to the concept of state sovereignty. The idea of 
state sovereignty, encompassing the authority to determine the law to 
be applied in transnational cases adjudicated by domestic courts, 
conflicted with the universalist idea of a conflicts law which was 
conceptualised as a neutral arbitrator between the competing claims 
of different states to apply their private laws in such cases. At this 
point, it seems worthwhile to question whether the analogy of states 
and functional regimes insinuated by Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 41 et seq. 
23 Ibid., 57 et seq. 
24 Ibid., 10 et seq., 24, 57, 170. 
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can be driven further, i.e., with regard to the adequate reason to be 
given against universalism and in favour of particularism. If their 
idea was, indeed, to exploit the said analogy even further, then the 
reasoning could go as follows: functional legal regimes – or maybe 
their underlying functional rationality25 – not only claim their legal 
and constitutional autonomy, but these claims are also normatively 
valid. Similar to the sovereignty-claim of the nation state, the 
autonomy-claim of the functional regime would encompass the right 
and the authority to determine the law to be applied to the cases 
adjudicated by the regime’s courts, contrary to the idea to subject the 
regimes to a kind of superseding and neutral conflict of laws-rules. In 
short, as is the case for the state sovereignty, the autonomy of regimes 
trumps the unity of law. 
 
There are indications that this is, indeed, the argument which Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner wish to advocate. More than once, the authors 
put forward that no functional rationality underlying the functional 
differentiation of international and transnational regimes should 
supersede or absorb other functional rationalities.26 This imperative 
of mutual respect between functional rationalities and their related 
legal regimes certainly sounds fine and looks attractive at first sight. 
But the foundation for this general claim has barely been explored by 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner. It is, however, difficult to see why this 
kind of suggestion does not commit them to the further idea that any 
functional rationality with its related legal regime is maintaining a 
kind of natural right to persist – maintaining as much autonomy as 
possible. Yet, such a strong essentialist claim for functional 
rationalities and related legal regimes could hardly be defended at 
all. In order not to stop the discussion at this point, it is, therefore, 
assumed that both the existence and the persistence of functionally 
differentiated international legal regimes have neither normative 
standing nor implication in the thinking of Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner. They might take this differentiation simply as a given; a 
given one has to cope with.27 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 25 et seq., 50. 
26 Ibid., 57 et seq., 89, 130, 170 et seq. 
27 N. Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1994), p. 344: “Man kehrt nicht ins Paradies zurück.” 
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But if this is true, then our original question remains unresolved: 
What is the foundation for Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s 
determined anti-universalism which is to characterise their idea of a 
law to mediate the legal collisions of functional legal regimes? 
Maybe, the reason is rather of epistemic provenance. A short version 
of such a probably long story could go as follows: there is no 
superseding legal order available which could provide a universal 
law for regime-collisions. Hence, only the parties of the collisions 
themselves – national legal orders in the case of collisions the private 
laws of nation states, functional regimes in the case of regime 
collisions – are able and competent to produce the solutions in, and 
with effect for, their respective jurisdiction. In this situation, it is 
impossible for these solutions, which are developed by each 
functional regime on its own account, to be understood as instances 
of a neutral and universal law of conflict of laws. The reason is 
epistemic in nature: a functional regime, even if it was normatively 
willing, is epistemically not able to articulate a neutral solution for 
two or even more concurring rationalities, one of which is 
represented by the adjudicating regime itself.28 Hence, the law of 
regime-collisions must be conceived as being particularistic, not due 
to the dignity of the regimes’ autonomies, but due to their epistemic 
capabilities. 
 
This epistemic claim is as equally strong as the normative claim 
considered above was. It can only be assumed that it roots in basic 
beliefs developed in systems theory. Leaving aside whether these 
beliefs can, indeed, be grounded, what is to be inferred from them is 
that, in contrast to the doctrine in private international law, the 
reason for particularism in the case of regime-collisions would not 
give normative support for the kind of partiality which is linked to 
the essential particularism in the case of private international law. But 
wth this move, the whole conceptual picture changes: State 
sovereignty denied any normative obligation to strive for the law’s 
unity in conflict of private laws. The functional differentiation 
underlying legal regimes, in turn, does not deny a normative 
obligation to strive for law’s unity, but makes it epistemically 
impossible for the unity of law ever to be achieved. This picture 
opens a conceptual option which is neither explicitly discussed nor 
rejected by Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, namely, that, for the law of 
                                                 
28 A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, op. cit., 61, 81, 86, 164. 
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regime collisions, the idea guiding each regime’s adjudication of 
regime-collisions might, indeed, be an idea of a universal law, but 
that, for reasons of epistemic constraints, a universal law idea will 
never be achieved in reality. For this tragic reason, the law of regime-
collisions will always remain particular. As a result, Fischer-Lescano 
and Teubner might like to argue that it is better and more sincere to 
admit this – in their view – undeniable epistemic fact. 
3.1.2. The Reason to Submit Regimes to Conflict Rules 
At this point, a new problem arises. If it is not normatively wrong, 
but epistemically impossible, for the functional regime to contribute 
to the articulation of a neutral and unitary law of regime-collisions – 
as is advocated by universalism in conflict of private laws – why is it 
then a regime’s obligation to reflect on “foreign”, i.e., on the law of 
other functional regimes at all? For a legal regime, as well as for a 
national legal order, the collision with the legal order of another 
regime or another state does not come naturally, nor does it occur by 
accident. It depends on the perception of these foreign legal orders as 
being similar to “the own” legal order. Only this condition of 
(mutual) acknowledgment between states or legal regimes leads to a 
collision of private laws or of regimes which can then, indeed, be 
represented not only from the exterior perspective of an observer but 
from the interior perspective of the state or regime. 
 
What, then, are the reasons for a functional regime to acknowledge 
other legal regimes as equals, so that the law of a foreign regime may, 
indeed, collide with the regime’s own law? Again, this problem is not 
systematically elaborated by Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, so that 
one has to try to trace their argument carefully from their rich general 
account. Again, it might help to resort again to the claims of the 
doctrine of private international law. The reason to submit the states’ 
private law rules to the conflict rules generated by private 
international law, which is prominently given by the doctrine for the 
case of conflicting private laws, is that it is, on the one hand, 
advantageous for the nation state to acknowledge foreign private law 
as law.29 But it must be assumed that Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 
would not resort to such an analogous claim. It is hardly convincing 
that functional regimes might draw similar advantages from the 
acknowledgement of their fellow regimes as nation states do with 
                                                 
29 K. Schurig, op. cit., 52. 
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regard to their fellow states. On the other hand, the doctrine of 
private international law submits that to acknowledge other states’ 
private law as the respective states’ own private law is a requirement 
of public international law. This argument does not seem to be 
reflected in the approach of Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, as they 
would deny the existence of any superseding, hierarchically highest 
public international law.30 
 
But there might be an alternative account which supports Fischer-
Lescano’s and Teubner’s idea of a law for regime-collisions which 
pre-supposes the (mutual) acknowledgement of legal regimes. It is 
quite evident that Fischer-Lescano and Teubner do not really feel the 
need to explain why regimes have to acknowledge their fellows as 
equals and therefore to submit their own norms to regime-collision 
rules at all. Instead, they suggest several times that all one can strive 
for today is a law for regime-collisions.31 But this proposition 
represents a valid reason for a law of regime-collisions only if one 
tacitly adds a further premise, namely, that the law’s unity remains 
the guiding ideal. If the unity of law was not the guiding ideal, the 
“all one can strive for” given as the reason for the obligation for 
regimes to submit to a law of regime-collision would lose its 
grounding function. As a result, it turns out that Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner do still, albeit tacitly, subscribe to the normative ideal of the 
unity of law, but they take this ideal to be unattainable given the 
functional differentiation of modern society. 
3.1.3. Really an Anti-Universalism? 
To repeat the form of the law of regime-collisions elaborated by 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner as it was reconstructed in the two 
preceding paragraphs: the guiding ideal is the unity of law, but due 
to the functional differentiation of the modern world, the ideal of 
unity can only be approached (but never reached) by a law of regime-
collisions; and, due to epistemic constraints of legal regimes, such a 
law of regime-collisions must be conceived as a particularistic law. 
Both suggestions support, independently of each other, the 
conclusion that the idea of a law of regime-collision stands in strong 
opposition to the idea of the unity of law, and, in this sense, also to 
universalism in conflict of laws. 
                                                 
30 A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, op. cit., 48. 
31 Ibid., 57, 170. 
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It is clear that one cannot start with an argument with the unity of 
law and end with its denial, and Fischer-Lescano and Teubner should 
feel uncomfortable with this conceptual situation. But the puzzle can 
be resolved, as the self-understanding of Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner as anti-universalists rests on two conceptual 
misunderstandings of their main suggestions, which have just been 
repeated. The first misunderstanding is that Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner reject the idea that the unity of law could result from a legal 
order rooted in a higher ranking source of law. But the – as such, 
convincing – rejection of this idea does not exclude the conceptual 
option to understand conflicts rules as an instrument pertaining the 
unity of law. The alternative understanding is just what universalism 
has argued in the case of conflict of private laws: the unity of law is 
still possible if all the institutions involved understand themselves to 
be participating in the articulation of a universal law for conflicts. 
Applied to the case of regime-collisions, the same thought would say 
that it is up to the regimes themselves to develop jointly such a legal 
system in order to resolve the jurisdictional conflicts between them. 
This common enterprise could not be secured by a superior law 
administered by a highest court, but only by way of submitting 
themselves to this enterprise. In conclusion, the opposition to an idea 
of conflict-rules derived from a higher source and administered by 
the highest court leaves the idea of the unity of law untouched. 
 
Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s second misunderstanding is that 
their doubts about the poor epistemic capacity of functional 
differentiated regimes would also support the suggestion that the 
idea of the unity of law had to be abandoned. Though each regime 
has to elaborate a law of regime-collision which resolves the 
jurisdictional conflicts between it and other functional legal regimes, 
the product will never be a shared and common law of regime-
collisions as this is impossible for epistemic reasons. 
 
At this point, it is useful to have a look to a parallel in philosophical 
epistemology: There are sceptical voices which claim that human 
beings actually do not share a common language, but that each and 
every human being has his or her own.32 This is so although the 
participants of linguistic communication usually believe that the 
                                                 
32 S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1982). 
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opposite is true. There are quite powerful arguments against this idea 
of “private language”.33 But in the given context, a rather different 
aspect is important: People behave in the same way, no matter 
whether the idea of a private language is true or false. They 
communicate as if they were sharing a common language and a 
common world, no matter whether this pre-supposition is factual or 
counter-factual.34 
 
This pragmatic perspective might be a vantage point to reconsider 
Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s caveat against the idea of unity: even 
if their epistemic claim were true, no practical difference would result 
from it. The courts of legal regimes would adjudicate on their 
jurisdictional conflicts as if they were articulating a common law in 
and for a common world. The suggestion that the aim of this practice 
is actually an illusion is a theoretical meta-comment by Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner in the sense that it is not meant to change this 
practice. This was different in the case of private international law: 
there, emphasis was put on the state’s sovereignty and thus the state 
was deliberately empowered to partisan decisions on the conflict of 
private legal orders. Such a partiality would go directly against 
Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s intentions. Their particularism has 
no normative backup and thus provides no support for partiality. But 
if the theoretical meta-comment of epistemically grounded 
particularism does not change the adjudicative practice and does not 
even aim at changing it, then it becomes unclear what the very 
significance and role of the meta-comment is in the whole debate. The 
practical significance of an imperative directed to functional legal 
regimes to “adjudicate working thereby on a shared and unitary law 
of regime-collisions” is equal to an imperative to “adjudicate as if you 
were working on a share and unitary law of regime-collisions”. One 
might, for reasons of simplicity, prefer the first version. 
 
3.2. Joerges’ Proceduralised Law of Conflict of Laws 
Joerges does not start his project with similar strong beliefs about the 
(functional differentiation of the) world as Fischer-Lescano and 
                                                 
33 J. McDowell, Wittgenstein on Following a Rule, in: Mind, Value and Reality, 
(Cambridge MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 221-262. 
34 It is telling that Fischer-Lescano’s and Teubner’s epistemic worry gets apparently 
lost when they describe the desirable interaction of courts: see A. Fischer-Lescano 
and G. Teubner, op. cit., 71, 121 et seq. 
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Teubner do. Nor does he share their deep epistemic worries. His 
version of the conflict of laws-paradigm starts from a different point 
which will be explained below. However, preliminarily, it should be 
stressed that what follows does not treat Joerges’ conflict of laws-
paradigm in its entirety. It might be known that Joerges latest 
version,35 which has been articulated for the European Union, 
distinguishes three dimensions of conflict constellations. The first 
dimension refers to conflicts between European norms, namely, the 
market freedoms and European competition law, and national norms 
which aim at a social embedding of the market. The second 
dimension refers to conflicts of regulatory rules, and of risk 
regulation in particular. The third dimension refers to conflicts 
between private or hybrid governance arrangements, as in the case of 
standardisation, with public law. The following account concentrates 
on the second dimension, which represents the essential form of 
Joerges’ paradigm, and is the one which comes closest to his general 
understanding of the conflict of laws-problem. The other two 
dimensions are deducted from this general form, reflecting particular 
circumstances. The first dimension reflects particular conditions of 
European integration; the third dimension reflects the normative 
asymmetry between private and public norms. 
3.2.1. The Reason to Submit Legal Orders to Conflict Rules 
The rationale underlying Joerges’ plea for conflict of laws is neither 
legal-theoretical, as in the case of classical or modern universalism in 
conflict of private laws, nor a tacit commitment to an ideal of 
universalism, which is lost in reality, as in the case of Fischer-Lescano 
and Teubner. Joerges’ argument is different. He argues that nation 
states engaged in a world economy and a world society produce 
external effects which may burden their neighbouring states and their 
populations, but that these neighbours and their concerns are not 
represented in the democratic procedures of the nation states.36 
Hence, the fundamental democratic principle that those affected by 
legal norms must have an equal say in their genesis is constantly 
violated in the post-national constellation. Due to this situation, 
nation states have to take foreign interests and concerns into account, 
                                                 
35 See Ch. Joerges and F. Rödl, “Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts II. Die 
kollisionsrechtliche Form einer legitimen Verfassung der post-nationalen 
Konstellation”, in: A. Fischer-Lescano et al. (eds), Soziologische Jurisprudenz, (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, forthcoming 2009), pp. 599-612. 
36 Ch. Joerges, Re-conceptualizing the Supremacy of European Law, op. cit., 317. 
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and the only mode with which to do this is by submitting their own 
law to conflict rules in order to mediate the conflict with laws of 
foreign states. Thus, Joerges’ call for a law for conflict of laws is not 
based upon the concept of law and its unity, but on the concept of 
democracy, instead. 
 
Certainly, one could think of an alternative: the unification of all 
peoples in a supranational, and, finally, in a world state which would 
then determine the law upon the basis of equal participatory rights of 
a world constituency. Joerges does not subscribe to this alternative, 
and his reasons are more pragmatic than conceptual. He has no 
conceptual objection against the idea of state-building at European or 
at world level. The only problem with these ideas is that they are 
unlikely to become a reality. And until then, one has to cope with the 
democracy-deficit of the nation state, anyway. This is why Joerges 
turns the omnipresent quest for the democratic legitimacy of the law 
of the multi-level system into a claim for a new law of conflict of 
laws.37 
3.2.2. A Plea against Judicial Dominance 
Joerges is not particularly concerned with the unity of law and legal 
universalism. The main concern which he stresses is that the 
generation of conflicts law is essentially not a case for the judiciary. A 
corresponding suggestion had once been submitted by Brainerd 
Currie even for conflict of laws for intra-federal conflicts in the Unites 
States.38 The argument was that conflict of jurisdictions could not be 
understood as an adjudicative question, i.e., a question of law 
application. With the establishing of his proceduralised conflict of 
laws-paradigm for multi-level governance regimes, Joerges has 
adopted and generalised Currie’s position. 
 
What Joerges wants, at least for many areas such as regulatory and 
distributive policies, is to see the making of the law of conflict of laws 
proceduralised. This means, in his understanding, that the making of 
the law of conflict of laws must be politicised and democratised. The 
                                                 
37 Ch. Joerges, Challenges of Europeanisation in the Realm of Private Law, op. cit., 
189. 
38 B. Currie, “The Constitution and Choice of Law. Governmental Interests and the 
Judicial Function”, in: ibid. Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, (Durham NC: 
Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 188-282, at272, often cited by Joerges, for example, 
in Re-conceptualizing the Supremacy of European Law, op. cit., 314. 
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reasons are twofold. First – as has just been explained – he shares the 
view that the spatial reach of national jurisdiction is, if there is no 
superior law, in most cases, not a legal question, or, more precisely, 
not a question for legal adjudication. It must be political actors who 
are posited in a position of democratic accountability who have to 
generate the necessary conflict rules.39 Second, to defer the making of 
conflict rules to the political process would lift the barriers which are 
enshrined into a pure judicial logic. 40 According to judicial logic, the 
solution of a conflicts case is usually restricted to the prevalence of 
either one or the other legal regime in a given case, or as a balancing 
of interests. Political proceduralisation, in contrast, would allow 
innovative solutions such as special substantive norms or default 
rules with exit options. 
 
As a result, Joerges calls for a “conflict of laws” approach to the 
phenomenon of constitutionalisation, but he is opposed to the idea 
that the necessary “conflict of law” rules should be coined 
exclusively, or even dominantly, by a community of courts.41 
3.2.3. Underlying Teleological Universalism 
Now, we should ask ourselves, how is Joerges’ position to be 
classified with a view to the dichotomy of universalism versus 
particularism? The answer, which will be tested here, is that Joerges’ 
thinking represents a teleological universalism. 
 
Joerges calls for an application of the conflict of laws-paradigm to 
multi-level governance regimes, such as the European Union or the 
World Trade Organisation. The question of whether this conflicts law 
has to be conceived of in terms of universalism or in terms of 
particularism has not been explicitly developed by him yet. However, 
it cannot call into question the fact that the conflict rules are not to be 
autonomously developed by the nation states themselves, as is 
suggested and defended by private international law. The conflict 
                                                 
39 Joerges, for example, in Re-conceptualizing the Supremacy of European Law, op. 
cit., 321 et seq. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See his rejection of the approach of A. Lowenfeld, the most important 
representatives of modern universalism in conflict of laws, in: Ch. Joerges, “Freier 
Handel mit riskanten Produkten? Die Erosion nationalstaatlichen und die Emergenz 
transnationalen Regierens”, in: St. Leibfried and M. Zürn (eds), Vom Wandel des 
Staates zur Staatlichkeit im Wandel, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006). 
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rules are to be developed in institutionalised political procedures in 
which representatives of the legal orders involved are present (or – 
even if only in rare and specific cases – also by supranational courts 
as the European Court of Justice42). In contrast to modern 
universalism in conflict of private laws, Joerges does not resort to an 
idea of a universal law of conflict of laws as a result of a common 
enterprise of autonomous courts which again cannot be secured by 
legal means. Instead, he works with the much straighter idea of 
supranational political (and only in rare cases, judicial) institutions. 
From this straight conception of a supranational institutionalisation 
of the making of conflict rules, one cannot but infer that he focuses on 
conflict of laws rules which are common to all the jurisdictions 
involved into their making. Because these conflict-rules must only be 
conceived as common to all the jurisdictions involved and not as the 
same for all kinds of conflict constellations, Joerges appears as a clear-
cut modern universalist.43 
 
However, there are reasons why this position, which has just been 
developed, is not easy to spot in Joerges’ work, and why even Joerges 
himself might not be satisfied with this account. The reason for this 
reluctance is connected to the answer which Joerges gives to a 
different problem: What happens if, in a given supranational context, 
there are no adequate fora established in which the relevant conflict of 
law rules can be developed in normatively valuable procedures. 
Joerges’ answer is that, until such fora have been generated, the courts 
are not supposed to develop conflict rules on their own by presenting 
them as a result of adjudication. This would contradict Joerges’ more 
fundamental claim against the a-political judicialisation of conflict of 
laws. According to Joerges, the courts are, in this situation, only 
called to exercise “comity”.44 But “comity”, in turn, is an important 
and influential concept in the history of private international law. It 
stands for the idea of benevolent acceptance of foreign law by 
domestic jurisdiction, and it is traditionally understood as the 
Gegenbegriff to the idea of a superior (legal) obligation to find a 
                                                 
42 Ch. Joerges, Re-conceptualizing the Supremacy of European Law, op. cit., 320 et 
seq. 
43 Joerges had advocated very early “vertical differentiations” in conflict rules 
depending from the parties involved: Ch. Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des 
Kollisionsrechts, op. cit., 157 et seq. 
44 Most extensively elaborated in: Ch. Joerges, “Constitutionalism in Postnational 
Constellations: Contrasting Social Regulation in the EU and in the WTO”, op. cit. 
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neutral solution for a given conflict of legal norms. Thus, in this 
context, Joerges appears as a clear-cut adherent of particularism, 
albeit of a friendly version. 
 
But this incidental turn to “comity” is literally a kind of “last resort”. 
It is suggested here that it should be read as an instance of a passing 
retardation of a historic-teleological development. “Comity” is to be 
exercised only until the adequate fora for a proceduralised generation 
of conflict rules are established. But due to the normative obligation 
to cope with the external effects of national democracies, there is also 
an obligation to develop more and more of these fora and 
procedures.45 This normatively-driven process will and, indeed, 
should one day lead to a universal, though differentiated, legal order 
for conflict of laws. But today we find ourselves far from this 
situation, and thus we have to accept the resulting normative 
shortcomings. This is what might be called Joerges’ teleological, in 
contrast to conceptual, universalism. 
4. Conclusion 
Both adherents of a conflict of laws paradigm in constitutionalism 
beyond the state which have been investigated in this paper, Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner, on the one hand, and Joerges, on the other, do 
not subscribe to the partisan particularism in the form that it is still 
defended by the doctrine of private international law. On the 
contrary, it could be demonstrated that both are adherents of the idea 
of the unity of law, and, with this, also of universalism, in the one 
case in a tacit, in the other case in a teleological, form. 
 
The chapter should end with an indication of why the idea of the 
unity of law deserves our particular interest, and why, therefore, all, 
and even mere tacit and mere teleological, attempts to retain the idea 
of the unity of law deserves our praise: Only by upholding the idea of 
the unity of law can any generation of legal norms be conceptualised 
as a democratic enterprise which includes all human beings as free 
and equal. 
                                                 
45 For a criticism of the validity of Joerges’ argument at this point, see F. Rödl, “There 
is no Legitimacy Beyond Democracy! – and its Consequences. A Few 
Recommendations for Rethinking European Law in Terms of Conflict of Laws”, in: 
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Christian Joerges has long been an authority on both European and 
private international law,1 but these distinct interests coincided in a 
discussion2 with other German jurists about the parallels between the 
two, which, for some time now, he has sought to bring to an English 
                                                 
1 Early contributions to these two canons include Ch. Joerges, “Internationales 
Privatrecht”, in: A. Görlitz (ed) Handlexikon zur Rechtswissenschaft, (Munich: 
Ehrenwirth, 1972), p. 188; Ch. Joerges, “The New Approach to Technical 
Harmonization and the Interests of Consumers: Reflections on the Necessities and 
Difficulties of a Europeanization of Product Safety Policy”, in: R. Bieber, R. 
Dehousse, J. Pinder and J. Weiler (eds) 1992: One European Market? A Critical Analysis 
of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), p. 157. 
2 See, for example, Ch. Joerges, “Die Europäisierung des Privatrechts als 
Rationalisierungsprozeß und als Streit der Disziplinen: Eine Analyse der Richtlinie 
über mißbräuchliche Klauseln Verbraucherverträgen” (1995) Zeitschrift für 
Europäisches Privatrecht, p. 181; J. Basedow, “Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der 
Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Binnenmarkt: favor offerentis” (1995) 59 Rabels 
Zeitshrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, p. 1; H. Sonnenberger, 
“Europarecht und Internationales Privatrecht” (1996) 118 Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, p. 3. 
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speaking audience.3 Just as the much older discipline of private 
international law is concerned with determining which legal system 
is to govern a dispute with links to more than one system – hence its 
synonym, “conflict of laws” – European law operates as a species of 
conflicts law by dealing with the omnipresent collisions that arise 
between the Member States’ distinct legal systems, as well as those 
that arise between them and the Community’s own supranational 
legal system. Like private international law, it offers a method for 
organising co-operation and accommodating difference between 
autonomous centres of law-production that, nevertheless, take one 
another’s claims to legitimacy seriously, whether because these 
claims are grounded in the origin of national law in equally 
democratically legitimated political processes, or of Community law 
in the Member States’ shared desire to integrate their markets and 
deal collectively with social policy issues that have exceeded their 
capacity for unilateral political action. 
 
As conflicts law, European law preserves the notion of respect for 
national sovereignty that harks back to the older Westphalian idea of 
the state,4 whilst supplementing that model, or even curing a defect 
in it, by ensuring that it is exercised in ways that take account of its 
impact beyond national borders in an increasingly inter-connected 
world. It does not replace national sovereignty, but operates 
alongside it by supplying a series of meta-norms that the Member 
States deem to be an acceptable basis for regulating (and ultimately 
resolving) conflicts that arise between their legal systems. This is 
perfectly expressed by the Community’s new motto, “United in 
diversity”,5 which calls for mutual respect between the Member 
States and the Community. The Community must respect the 
constitutional legitimacy of the Member States, whereas the Member 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Ch. Joerges, “The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: 
Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective” 
(1997) 3 Community Law Journal, p. 378, at 392; Ch. Joerges, “Re-Conceptualizing the 
Supremacy of European Law: A Plea for a Supranational Conflict of Laws”, in: B. 
Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Union (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), p. 311. 
4 The treaties of Osnabrück and Münster that established the Peace of Westphalia and 
ended Germany’s Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and 
Holland were signed in 1648 by Europe’s central powers at the first modern 
diplomatic congress, initiating a new order based upon the concept of national 
sovereignty. 
5 http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/index_en.htm. 
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States must temper the legal autonomy that this lends them by 
exercising it in ways that are as Community-friendly as possible, 
thereby respecting a European law that deserves their recognition 
because it was shaped by them so as to reflect their common concerns 
as well as their shared desire for integration. This compensatory 
function – civilising national sovereignty by checking the unilateral 
burdening of one state’s citizens by another’s – turns the 
Community’s democratic deficit on its head, because a state – 
arguably – does not act democratically if it passes laws with no heed 
to their effect on “foreign” citizens. This itself harks back to 
Immanuel Kant, who envisaged sovereign states co-existing 
peacefully with one another by committing themselves to behave as 
good republics, which meant undertaking to engage with one another 
as a federation; abiding by a “cosmopolitan law” that saw each treat 
the others’ citizens with “hospitality”.6 
 
If the Physicists’ Holy Grail is a Universal Theory of Everything, 
Joerges’ ambition for his theory of European law as conflicts law is, 
for scholars of European integration, scarcely less ambitious. Though 
the focus of this chapter is on how European law might be seen as 
accommodating difference by dealing with conflicts that arise 
between the Member States’ private law systems, especially those 
that touch on the common desire to integrate national markets, 
Joerges extends his conflicts law analogy to the idea that it might also 
be seen as organising co-operation on “diagonal conflicts”7 – or what 
he calls “functionally interwoven problem-constellations”8 – that 
arise because the necessary powers and resources for effective 
political action are diffused across a European level competent to 
regulate some dimensions of all manner of policy issues (the 
                                                 
6 I. Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, in: H. Reiss (ed) Kant: Political 
Writings, 2nd Edition, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), p. 93. See P. Eleftheriadis, “Cosmopolitan Law” (2003) 9 ELJ, p. 241; P. 
Eleftheriadis, “The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals” (2001) 7 CJEL, 
p. 21. 
7 C. Schmid, “Vertical and Diagonal Conflicts in the europeanisation Process”, in: Ch. 
Joerges and O. Gerstenberg (eds), Private Governance, Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Supranationalism, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1998). 
8 Ch. Joerges, “Re-Conceptualizing the Supremacy of European Law: A Plea for a 
Supranational Conflict of Laws”, in: B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger (eds), Debating 
the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2007), p. 311, at 316. 
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Community can rarely regulate comprehensively) and a national 
level competent to regulate others.9 Here, European law operates as a 
form of conflicts law by ensuring the numerous, semi-autonomous 
political and administrative actors that are involved at both levels 
look for solutions in deliberative modes of communication, based 
upon universal motivations (Jürgen Habermas’ famous “validity 
claims”).10 
 
The reservation addressed by this article is that the 
analogy/method’s conceptual promise may well obscure practical 
difficulties in its implementation. The question then becomes one of 
whether Joerges is entitled to respond in the same way as Kant did to 
Christian Garve’s criticism of his philosophy of ethics, as being fine in 
theory, but not in practice, by pointing out that this “old saying” is 
only so familiar because there is always a gap between theory and 
practice. Theory provides general rules, but cannot tell us how to 
apply them. For this, we need practical judgment, no matter how 
rigorous the theory. As Kant put it: 
 
the general rule must be supplemented by an act of judgement 
whereby the practitioner distinguishes instances where the rule 
applies from those where it does not … There are, for example, 
doctors and lawyers who did well during their schooling but 
who do not know how to act when asked to give advice.11 
 
Implementing the conflict of laws method depends a great deal on 
the Court of Justice’s practical judgement, which makes the follow up 
question – whether it is up to the task – particularly important. This 
chapter unpacks the idea of European law as conflicts law by using 
some theoretical insights on the nature of individual autonomy 
inspired by the work of Jürgen Habermas, to whom Joerges would be 
                                                 
9 Ch. Joerges, “The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist 
Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective” (1997) 3 
Community Law Journal, p. 378, at 398. 
10 Ch. Joerges, “Europeanization as Process: Thoughts on the Europeanization of 
Private Law” (2005) 11(1) European Public Law 63, 80; J. Neyer, “Discourse and Order 
in the EU: A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Governance”, (2003) 41 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, p. 687. 
11 I. Kant, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, But it Does Not 
Apply in Practice’”, in: H. Reiss (ed) Kant: Political Writings, 2nd Edition, trans. by 
H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 61. 
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the first to admit he owes a substantial intellectual debt. Then, 
focusing on European law’s interaction with national systems of 
private law and their distinct position on issues relating to how far 
freedom of contract serves individual autonomy, versus how far this 
depends on state intervention, the article examines whether the Court 
of Justice’s commitment to implementing a conflict of laws method 
shows adequate sensitivity towards the origin of national private law 
(and its resolution of such questions) in legitimacy-conferring 
national political processes, albeit with their tendency towards 
parochialism, which requires some checking. 
1. The Target of the Conflict of Laws Method 
The subject matter of any conflict of laws method is private law, but 
the nature of that private law has undergone significant historical 
change. Whilst private international law could traditionally respect 
national sovereignty by choosing which national system of private 
law was to govern a particular dispute, independently of that law’s 
substantive content, the more that social policy functions have been 
appended to private law, the more delicate that choice becomes, 
because a court applying a conflict of laws method will struggle to 
avoid stepping on political choices that have been incorporated into 
the systems of private law and that it must now choose between. 
From health and safety regulation to statutory rights for consumers 
and tenants, from rules on unfair terms in contracts to minimum 
wage legislation, from company law that closely regulates the 
organisation of firms by insisting on employee involvement in 
management decisions12 to public procurement law that determines 
the extent to which, and the mode in which, public services are 
contracted out (thereby expanding the territory in which private law 
plays a significant public role), private law has become an essential 
component of the social model. It is politicised, permeated by, and 
articulates the values of the society in which it operates and helps to 
constitute. 
 
Having recognised that markets are morally, socially and politically 
embedded13 – fragile institutions which do not, for instance, 
                                                 
12 Germany’s stake-holder (Mitbestimmung) model can be contrasted here with the 
Anglo-Saxon shareholder model. 
13 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992 (1944)). 
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automatically adjust supply and demand as flawlessly as some 
would have it – the state does not always uphold the sanctity of 
private agreements indifferently to their content, but breaks their 
seal; reaching into them to deal with their wider social implications. 
As such, the classical distinction no longer holds between a private 
law of non-instrumental (neutral) rules, which facilitates, but does 
not direct, what were seen as strictly private relations and a public 
law that, at least since the emergence of welfarism, has consisted 
predominantly of instrumental (purposive) rules that encode the 
legal claims that individuals might make against the state, and the 
state against them (thereby taking into account their material 
circumstances so as to achieve broader social objectives). No longer 
so neutral, private law has expanded into public law’s traditional 
territory by taking ever more account of the material circumstances in 
which it is used and the material consequences of that use, so that it 
can now be said to encompass a formal core of general (impersonal) 
rules, which are the instruments that the state makes available to 
individuals to structure their legal relations with one another, and a 
supplementary, but ever-growing, materialised periphery of “post-
classical”14 private law, whose rules govern specific legal relations 
into which the state deems it necessary to reach so as to further social 
policies that are inadequately served by leaving the parties to interact 
using the formal core alone. These “regulatory” interventions 
generally alter the balance of power in favour of the weaker partner, 
especially in consumer-business, landlord-tenant and employee-
employer relationships, which do not involve bargains between 
equals, which is the assumption underlying the formal core.15 
 
Though private law’s materialised periphery is distributional in 
purpose – it seeks a distribution of contractual rights and rewards 
different to that which might be expected from leaving individuals to 
negotiate the terms of their legal relations using the formal core alone 
– rules that belong unambiguously to its formal core, though not 
tailored to specific relationships, can still be profoundly distributional 
in consequence. For instance, the degree to which the formal core 
recognises a duty of good faith has consequences for the extent to 
                                                 
14 Ch. Joerges, “The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A 
Plea for a New Legal Discipline” (2004) 14 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, p. 149, at 150. 
15 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), pp. 726-70. 
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which contracting parties are expected to look out for one another, 
which, in turn, determines the balance that the formal core strikes 
between upholding the sanctity of contractual agreements and 
policing them to achieve “just” outcomes. The same applies to rules 
that determine when enrichments have been obtained so “unjustly” 
that they must be returned, or that allocate risks between individuals 
by determining how easy it is to establish tortious liability. As such, 
the distinction between the formal core and the materialised 
periphery is, in reality, not clear-cut; there being a continuum 
between formalised and materialised private law, so that some rules 
are more formal than material, and others are the other way around. 
What is significant is that the extent and mode of private law’s 
materialisation is shaped by society’s defining commitments. Design 
considerations as to when to surround private law’s formal core with 
a materialised periphery and when to leave individuals to interact 
using the formal core alone touch on profoundly political choices that 
concern the appropriateness of the state’s intervention in the market. 
 
Private law is not only political in theory, but is also the subject of 
real-world political debate. To take just a few examples with a 
European flavour: the Social Chapter attached to the Treaty of 
Maastricht sets out a number of measures supplementing private 
law’s materialised periphery (for example, on workers’ rights) and 
was at the centre stage in the UK’s 1997 general election because the 
incumbent Conservatives pledged to defend the opt-out which they 
had obtained six years previously, attacking the opposition Labour 
Party for its commitment to sign up because they claimed that this 
would herald a return to the industrial relations that had brought the 
country “to its knees” in the 1970s. Then, when Labour won and 
signed up, it still “allowed” individual workers to opt-out of their 
rights under the Working Time Directive, which itself became 
contentious in 2005 when the European Parliament voted to remove 
these individual opt-outs.16 Similarly, the French “Non” that killed off 
the Constitutional Treaty turned significantly on its perception in 
France as an “Anglo-Saxon” document; a charge levelled by those on 
the left who, mindful of the British attitude to the Social Chapter, 
alleged the Treaty threatened “social Europe” by entrenching de-
regulated, flexible capitalism, with diminished workers’ rights.17 
                                                 
16 The Times, 11 May 2005. 
17 The Economist, 18 April 2005. 
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Also resonant is the story of Margaret Thatcher’s gradual 
disenchantment with European integration, which is well-
documented, but merits retelling, because it brings into sharp relief 
the ideological battleground that cuts across debates on the subject of 
European integration as well as those on the appropriateness of state 
intervention in private legal relations. Discussions on the purpose of 
the Community (how far the Member States should integrate) 
intersect with those that concern when the state should intervene in 
private legal relations (how far we should regulate the market). 
Friedrich von Hayek, the economist and intellectual darling of the 
right – whose book, The Constitution of Liberty,18 Margaret Thatcher 
once held aloft to declare solemnly “this is what we believe”19 – 
bemoaned such interference (and the resulting politicisation of the 
economy) because he thought individuals better understood their 
own circumstances and should be free to take control of their lives by 
contracting as they saw fit. He would “liberate” them from state 
intervention with an economic constitution that barred state 
paternalism, which, to use the title of another of his books, marked 
only The Road to Serfdom.20 Indeed, Margaret Thatcher claimed, in her 
famous “Bruges Speech” in 1988, that the Community’s founding 
Treaty had originally been conceived as just such a “Charter for 
Economic Liberty” that had somehow become perverted.21 She had 
been an enthusiastic supporter of European integration as long as it 
appeared to implement von Hayek’s free market vision. So, as Leader 
of the Opposition, she had campaigned vigorously in the 1975 
referendum for the UK to remain in the Community (on one occasion 
sporting a jumper bearing the flags of each Member State that was 
hideous even by the standards of the time). Later, as Prime Minister, 
she celebrated the Single European Act (despite its extension of 
qualified-majority voting) as the culmination of the European project 
– a true free market without frontiers. However, many in Brussels, 
not least Jacques Delors, who, by then, had assumed the 
Commission’s helm, saw the Act as no more than a milestone on the 
                                                 
18 F. von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1960). 
19 J. Ranelagh, Thatcher’s People: An Insider’s Account of the Politics, the Power, and 
the Personalities, (London: Harper Collins, 1991). 
20 (London: Routledge, 1944) 
21 This is an idea not uncommon amongst some academics. See, for example, M. Streit 
and W. Mussler, “The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From 
‘Rome’ to ‘Maastricht’” (1995) 1 Community law Journal, p. 5. 
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road to social integration and, backed by François Mitterand and 
Helmut Kohl throughout his decade long tenure, Delors was able to 
push through an ambitious programme of harmonisation, which, to 
Thatcher’s consternation, took on an increasingly social (as opposed 
to purely economic) bent. So, even if (ignoring the glaring anomaly of 
the Common Agricultural Policy) the Community began as a purely 
market-making exercise, it has long-since moved on. 
 
So, whilst private law’s formal core remains resolutely national (in 
spite of influential calls for some form of European codification22) its 
materialised periphery is now, at least partially, European. 
Purporting to avoid trade distortions, the Community has selectively 
harmonised national private law with directives on employee 
working hours23 and consumer rights in relation to the sale of life 
assurance,24 financial services,25 timeshare property,26 consumer 
goods,27 product liability,28 unfair contractual terms,29 misleading 
advertising,30 telesales,31 doorstep selling,32 and e-commerce.33 These 
                                                 
22 See, for example, W. van Gerven, “Codifying European private law? Yes, if..!” 
(2002) 27 ELR, p. 156. 
23 Council Directive 93/104/EC, of 23 November 1993, concerning Certain Aspects of 
the Organisation of Working Time (OJ L 307/18). 
24 Parliament and Council Directive 2002/83/EC, of 5 November 2002, concerning 
Life Assurance (OJ L 345/1) 
25 Parliament and Council Directive 2002/65/EC, of 23 September 2002, concerning 
the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services, amending Council Directive 
90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (OJ L 271/16). 
26 Parliament and Council Directive 94/47/EC, of 26 October 1994, on the Protection 
of Purchasers in respect of certain aspects of Contracts relating to the Purchase of the 
Right to use Immovable Properties on a Timeshare Basis (OJ L 280/83). 
27 Parliament and Council Directive 1999/44/EC, of 25 May 1999, on certain aspects 
of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees (OJ L 171/12). 
28 Directive 85/374/EEC, of 25 July 1985, on the Approximation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions on the Member States concerning 
Liability for Defective Products (OJ L 397/54). 
29 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, of 5 April 1993, on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts (OJ L 95/29). 
30 Council Directive 84/450/EEC, of 10 September 1984, concerning Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising (OJ L 250/17) amended by Parliament and Council 
Directive 97/55/EC (OJ L 290/18). 
31 Parliament and Council Directive 97/7/EC, of 20 May 1997, on the Protection of 
Consumers in respect of Distance Contracts (OJ L 144/19) 
32 Council Directive 85/577/EEC, of 20 December 1985, on the Protection of 
Consumers in respect of Contracts negotiated away from Business Premises (OJ L 
372/31). 
33 Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31/EC, of 8 June 2000, on certain legal 
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European inroads into national private law set up common standards 
that permit the closer integration of national markets and partially 
shift private law-production to the European level. They grapple with 
precisely those asymmetries in private relationships that national 
private law either affirms or seeks to cure,34 and have similarly 
profound implications for the balance private law strikes between the 
competing rationalities of market and social spheres across a range of 
relationships that are crucial to any social model. 
2. Market Freedoms as Conflicts Law 
Alongside regulatory harmonisation, the other principal technique of 
European integration is the removal of barriers to trade through the 
market freedoms, which have an impact on national private law by 
framing the permitted domain and mode of operation of its 
materialised periphery; restricting how the Member States might go 
about identifying and correcting market failures and thereby 
impacting on the social space allocated to markets and that to private 
ordering.35 The market freedoms tend to have a formalising influence 
on national private law because they empower individuals to 
challenge those aspects of its materialised periphery that somehow 
hinder those freedoms’ exercise, even if only marginally,36 which, to 
the extent that the resulting erosion of that materialised periphery is 
not addressed at the European level with some form of regulatory 
harmonisation, means that private law’s formal core comes more into 
play. 
 
The Community’s impact on national systems of private law has 
occupied a number of commentators, amongst them Mattei, who 
argues that its interventions in complex areas of national private law 
have the potential to disrupt their systematic coherence.37 He fears 
that the market freedoms subject national private law to far-reaching 
disintegrative effects by driving regulatory competition that 
                                                                                                                   
aspects of Information Society Services, in particular, electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market (OJ L 178/1). 
34 Ch. Joerges, “The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist 
Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective” (1997) 3 
Community Law Journal, p. 378, at 392. 
35 Ibid., at 381. 
36 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Dassonville et al. [1974] ECR 837. 
37 U. Mattei, “Hard Code Now!” (2002) 2 Global Jurist Frontiers p. 1, available at: 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art1. 
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generates a race-to-the-bottom, leading inexorably to the erosion of 
private law’s materialised periphery. But, curiously, and echoing 
others who have put forward the Community as the saviour of social 
policies that nation states are struggling to maintain against the 
pressures that are exerted by global markets,38 he argues that we need 
more, not less, European law, and would comprehensively codify 
private law at the European level to guarantee the social dimension of 
European-style capitalism; incorporating (and presumably 
entrenching) private law’s materialised periphery, which would then 
be protected from these formalising pressures. 
 
Mattei’s warning that those who exploit their market freedoms to 
challenge rules that belong to national law’s materialised periphery 
risk formalising private law is illustrated well by the facts of Centros,39 
in which a Danish couple who wanted to import wine into Denmark 
opened a subsidiary at home, but established their company in the 
UK (a relatively simple process) in order to avoid having to deposit 
the large amount of share capital needed to register their company in 
Denmark. The Court of Justice held that the Danish authorities could 
not prevent the couple from doing this without infringing their 
market freedoms, which Steindorff laments as a significant step 
towards creating das Recht auf die günstigste Rechtsordnung40 – the right 
to the most favourable legal system – because it allows Community 
citizens to forum shop (to pick and choose amongst different private 
law systems), which, in turn, locks the Member State into a regulatory 
competition that ultimately forces each to down-grade the social 
protection offered by their private law’s materialised periphery in 
order to discourage businesses from uprooting to Member States 
operating more formalised systems. 
 
The stance one takes on whether this formalising influence is a good 
or bad thing depends upon whether one thinks private law should be 
more or less materialised; in other words, to what extent one thinks 
that the state should intervene in private relations to promote social 
                                                 
38 See, for example, A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, (London: 
Routledge, 1992); F.W. Scharpf, “Economic integration, democracy and the welfare 
state” (1997) 4 JEPP, p. 18; J. Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, (2001) 
11 New Left Review, p. 5. 
39 Case C-212/97, Centros v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459. 
40 E. Steindorff, “Centros und das Recht auf die günstigste Rechtsordnung”, (1999) 23 
Juristenzeitung, p. 1140. 
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policy objectives, and to what extent one thinks it should leave 
individuals to make their own arrangements. As such, those who 
favour less state intervention might celebrate any regulatory 
competition engendered by the market freedoms’ deployment to 
challenge national rules as exerting a modernising – by which they 
means formalising – influence on national private law.41 
 
Joerges’ characterisation of European law as conflicts law is more 
subtle than depicting it as the outcome of a clash between the 
ideologies of the free market and social justice. His support for the 
Court of Justice’s decision in Centros does not fit neatly into either 
anti- or pro-regulatory competition camps because he argues the 
case’s underlying message is more complex. His optimism is fuelled 
by his careful reading of the judgement, in which he notes the Court 
of Justice accepted that Denmark might still impose requirements 
that hinder its citizens’ market freedoms to prevent them “from 
attempting, undercover of the rights created by the Treaty, 
improperly to circumvent their national legislation”.42 The Court 
insisted only that Denmark set out good reasons for doing so. 
Denmark had to explain how its capital deposit rule served the 
declared objective of protecting creditors, thereby putting it under 
pressure to justify itself, just as Germany had more famously to 
justify why it had fixed the minimum alcohol content of fruit liquor.43  
 
On this account, the genius of European law lies in its subtle 
reconciliation of unity and diversity. National legal idiosyncrasy 
(diversity) is tolerated as long as it can be justified as having taken 
the Community interest (unity) into account. This involves a 
procedural, or methodological, approach to accommodating 
difference. So, when the Court of Justice famously declared the 
Community’s break with the old Westphalian model that considered 
individuals unworthy of legal empowerment under international 
law,44 it succeeded in harnessing the market freedoms (alongside 
                                                 
41 See, for example, S. Deakin, “Regulatory Competition versus Reflexive 
Harmonisation in European Company Law”, in: D. Esty and D. Geradin (eds), 
Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 190. 
42 Case C-212/97, Centros v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459, para. 24. 
43 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis 
de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. 
44 Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration 
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countless European regulations and directives) to secure indefeasible 
(generally economic) liberties for the Community’s citizens, which 
effectively extended to them the right to have their interests taken 
into account by “foreign” states. The market freedoms are enforced in 
such a way that they push national private law aside only if it cannot 
withstand scrutiny, thereby imposing a duty of justification on 
Member States, which requires them to consider broader Community 
interests when enacting their private law. They must take into 
account its impact on “foreign” interests; an impact that would 
otherwise receive little attention in the national law-making process. 
That means refraining from discriminating against “foreign” interests 
by respecting their market freedoms and only hindering them upon 
the basis of a properly grounded claim that invokes credible public 
health, morality, policy or security reasons,45 or, indeed, judicially 
recognised “mandatory requirement” of general public importance.46 
This demands that Member States recognise the efficacy of (i.e., 
apply) one another’s law and, if they are not so prepared, must be 
prepared to justify themselves. This “managed mutual recognition”47 
avoids, on the one hand, heavy-handed prescription of uniform 
(European) solutions to local, diverse and often complex problems, 
and, on the other hand, overly lax Community disciplining, which 
risks “a patchwork of particularistic deals and local privileges”.48 
 
So, for Joerges, Community citizens only have rights that are truly 
European if they can used them to hold their own national law up to 
comparison with that of another Member State, in which case, he 
argues, the disintegrative effects of European law might be embraced 
as an opportunity for exposing possibilities for inter-state learning.49 
He might, however, be claiming too much when he argues that 
                                                                                                                   
[1963] ECR 1, 12. 
45 Article 30 EC Treaty. 
46 Case 120/78, Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
47 K. Nikolaïde and S. Schmidt, “Mutual Recognition on Trial: The Long Road to 
Services Liberalisation”, (2007) 18 JEPP, p. 667. 
48 O. Gerstenberg, “Laws polyarchy: A comment on Cohen and Sabel”, (1997) 3 ELJ, 
p. 343, at 355. 
49 Ch. Joerges, “Europeanization as Process: Thoughts on the Europeanization of 
Private Law” (2005) 11 European Public Law, p. 63, at 64; Ch. Joerges, “Re-
Conceptualizing the Supremacy of European Law: A Plea for a Supranational 
Conflict of Laws”, in: B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic 




Centros – only tangentially about protecting “foreign” interests – 
transforms a market freedom into a right of political participation; 
this time not for “foreign” citizens, but for domestic citizens instead. 
The decision effectively forced the Danish government to justify its 
materialised private law more thoroughly to its own citizens, who 
were empowered to initiate a legal process in which they could 
eventually force their own government to justify why, in spite of their 
market freedoms, it prevented them from exercising rights that 
complied with the private law of another Member State. But, given 
that the government ultimately has to justify its private law to the 
satisfaction of the Court of Justice, this is an unusual right of political 
participation, which invites the Community’s unelected judiciary to 
assume a great deal of influence over the social policy content of 
national private law. This is especially true given that it is not 
particular shy in accepting jurisdiction. In Anomar,50 for instance, in 
which a Portuguese Gambling Machine Association challenged a 
Portuguese law requiring fruit machines to be sited in designated 
areas in casinos, the Court of Justice was happy to assume 
jurisdiction over the dispute upon the basis that, though apparently 
domestic, it had a European dimension because the restriction might 
have some (if limited) indirect potential to affect companies outside 
Portugal, thereby reserving to itself the right to test the social policy 
justification for the rule. 
3. Paradigms of Law 
Having defined private law and its meaning in the European context, 
described the politicisation of private law generally and unpacked 
Joerges’ reading of European law as conflicts law, the chapter now 
searches for a theoretical framework to draw these threads together, 
which it finds in Habermas’ work on the paradigms of law and their 
relationship to individual autonomy. Indeed, in its proceduralism, 
Joerges’ method is redolent of Habermas’ own escape from the same 
unsatisfactory free-market/social-justice dichotomy. 
 
Habermas describes three paradigms of law that correspond to three 
different notions of individual autonomy. Each starts from the idea 
that the state acts through the medium of law in order to secure the 
conditions necessary for individuals to be autonomous, but then 
differs in what it understands by that autonomy; each adopting a 
                                                 
50 Case C-6/01, Anomar v Estado Português [2003] ECR I-8621. 
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progressively richer definition which, in turn, reflects a different 
implicit image of society. The formal paradigm of law underpins a 
private law society of robust individuals (Margaret Thatcher’s 
“there’s no such thing as society” society). The material paradigm of 
law underpins a social market-economy of individuals who feel a 
strong sense of social solidarity towards one another. And the 
procedural paradigm of law underpins a society that is centred on the 
democratic meaning of its self-organisation, in which individuals are 
determined to govern themselves collectively. These paradigms are 
ideal types that should not be understood literally. They correspond 
to idealised stages in a society’s evolutionary development and 
supply useful explanatory tools for analysing Joerges’ reading of 
European law as conflicts law. 
3.1. The Formal Paradigm and the Private Law Society 
Barring the odd misanthrope or hermit, we spend most of our lives 
interacting with others and (excluding purely personal relationships 
or our dealings with the state) these interactions are facilitated, in one 
way or another, by private law. Free markets, in a form recognisable 
to us today, are not a natural (default) form of social organisation that 
apply in the absence of state intervention, but are, instead, an 
historical phenomenon that emerged in late mediaeval, early-modern 
Europe and depend a great deal on the state, which defines the 
property rights that form their subject matter, as well as the rules by 
which those property rights are to be exchanged and enforced 
(allowing the participants to deal voluntarily with one another). 
Constituted by the state, the freest of markets is counter-intuitively 
not that which would exist in the absence of state regulation – in a 
“state of nature” – but that which exists when the state enacts only 
those rules necessary to facilitate private voluntary exchanges. Under 
the formal paradigm of law, the state acts to guarantee the conditions 
pre-requisite to a free market; exerting its monopoly over the 
legitimate use of coercion to maintain the rule of law, which offsets 
the incentive to cheat on one another’s property rights or, indeed, the 
promises (contracts) made in relation to those rights. No more than a 
night-watchman that secures the necessary background conditions 
for private, voluntary transactions, it defines and protects the 
property rights that individuals exchange in pursuit of what they 
consider to be their own best interests and provides the legal 
instruments (private law) to effect those exchanges, whilst 
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maintaining a studied indifference (neutrality) as to how those rights 
and instruments are exploited.  
 
The Private Law Society conceives of individual autonomy in a 
purely formal, legalistic sense. It guarantees its citizens formal 
equality before the law – all are bound by, and can apply, the same 
abstract, general (impersonal) rules – and it does not step in to 
redress material inequalities that develop because, for instance, 
individuals possess differing capacities to exploit their formal 
equality. Indeed, for von Hayek, it is an anathema to the very idea of 
the rule of law for the state to legislate in any way that is directly 
aimed at particular individuals.51 The state maximises the legal 
freedoms of its citizens, but pays no heed to the practical constraints 
that they face in exercising them. 
 
Under the formal paradigm of law, the state exists to foster a 
Perfectly Competitive Market, which is (theoretically) an inevitable 
consequence of it defining property rights clearly so that their holders 
can transact voluntarily with one another (we assume, for these 
purposes, without cost and with sufficient information to make 
informed decisions). In these circumstances, right holders will 
continue to exchange until they reach a perfectly-efficient equilibrium 
in which all property is held by the persons who value it most 
(because they can, for instance, put it to the most productive use). 
Someone in possession of a right that another person values more 
highly will “sell” it for a price somewhere between their two 
(subjective) valuations. Provided the contents of the rights that they 
exchange are clearly defined,52 they will always trade to a Pareto-
efficient outcome, and this will occur regardless of initial allocation.53 
But, whilst all final allocations will lie on the Pareto-frontier,54 the 
initial allocation – whether, for example, to create a right to pollute or 
a right to clean air – will have an impact on the ultimate distribution 
of the collateral used to effect those exchanges. So, whilst the final 
outcome – that the factory continues to pollute, pollutes less, or does 
                                                 
51 F. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). 
52 Markets only function with well-defined property rights, which Hernando de Soto 
(The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else, 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000)) argues is what the developing world lacks. 
53 R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics, p. 1. 
54 H. Varian, Intermediate microeconomics: A modern approach, 5th Edition, (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), pp. 570-73. 
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not pollute at all – will reflect the value of the polluting activity versus 
how strongly those in the vicinity value the quality of the air they 
breathe, either the factory owner or the local population will have 
had to buy the other one out, enriching that other. Pareto-efficiency is 
about what is most efficient, not what is socially just. 
 
Under the formal paradigm, the state’s only conceivable 
interventions in the private, voluntary transactions that it exists to 
facilitate are to ensure that the free market remains competitive and 
failure-free. The justification for even this limited form of 
intervention is not, however, uncontroversial. It depends upon 
whether the state’s concern is to create a normative framework in 
which the free market might flourish, or to uphold contractual 
freedom. This does not always require the same thing. To reference a 
German debate: in 1897, with the doctrine of freedom of contract in 
the ascendency, the Reichsgericht legalised anti-competitive 
agreements,55 but, by the mid-Twentieth century, its decision was 
roundly criticised by an influential school of German economists and 
lawyers,56 who argued that the free market was paramount and that 
contractual freedom was merely instrumental and should give way 
whenever it failed to serve this end. In which case, the state would be 
justified in prohibiting anti-competitive agreements to prevent the 
concentration of market power (or, at least, its abuse), and in keeping 
the market failure-free if it observed that the costs incurred in 
effecting Pareto-efficient transactions were likely to be so prohibitive 
that they would prevent individuals from exchanging to an efficient 
outcome (which its intervention then aims to emulate). 
3.2. The Material Paradigm and the Social Market 
Economy 
The material paradigm of law starts from the position that 
pronounced material inequalities prevent individuals who lack 
resources, skills, knowledge or bargaining power from taking full 
advantage of their formal equality. The state recognises that the legal 
opportunities that individuals have to avail themselves of the private 
law instruments which it has made available to them in order to 
                                                 
55 RGZ. 38/155. 
56 See, for example, F. Bohm, “Das Reichsgericht und die Kartelle: Eine 
wirtschaftsverfassungsrechtliche Kritik an dem. Urteil des RG. vom 4. Februar 1897, 
RGZ. 38/155” (1948) 1 ORDO 197. 
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structure their legal relations with one another are worthless if they 
do not enjoy the real opportunity to make use of them. As the French 
novelist, Anatole France, caustically put it: 
 
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the 
poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal 
bread.57 
 
If autonomy is about enjoying the opportunity to develop our human 
capacities fully and freely in pursuit of our own good, why limit this 
to a theoretical (legal) opportunity when material inequalities 
constrain us just as much? So, for the economist Amartya Sen, a 
man’s well-being is not only a measure of his entitlement set – his 
‘overall command over things’ that takes into account all relevant 
rights and obligations vis-à-vis others and the state (‘the totality of 
things he can have by virtue of his rights’)58 – but also his capability to 
choose a life that he values, which is his opportunity (real freedom) to 
choose that combination of things he values being and doing; what 
Sen calls his “functionings”, which range from the basic, such as 
being adequately nourished, to complex personal states and 
activities, such as participating in the life of, and being respected by, 
his community. This ‘consequence-sensitive’ approach rejects 
‘outcome-independent’ approaches that attach little or no intrinsic 
moral relevance to the material outcome of a formal set of rights,59 on 
the basis that ‘major sources of unfreedom’ include: 
 
[P]overty as well as tyranny, poor economic 
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, 
and neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or 
overactivity of repressive states.60 
 
Under the material paradigm of law, the state uses law to secure the 
material conditions necessary for us to enjoy our legal equality as a 
                                                 
57 A. France, The Red Lily (Le Lys Rouge), (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1894 
(translated 1925)), Chapter 7. 
58 A. Sen, “The Right Not to be Hungry”, in: P. Alston and K. Tomaševski (eds.), The 
Right to Food, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), p. 72. 
59 A. Sen, “Rights and Capabilities”, in: A. Sen, Resources, Values and Development. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p. 307; A. Sen, On Ethics and Economics, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
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practical, as opposed to just a theoretical, opportunity. Whilst this 
most obviously involves addressing social and economic 
precariousness via the welfare state and direct re-distribution, it also 
involves transforming private law by surrounding its formal core 
with a materialised periphery that reaches into and re-balances 
specific private relationships (between employees and employers, 
landlords and tenants, consumers and businesses and so on) where 
“the idea of free negotiation is a myth” and the “bargain has lost its 
sanctity as an expression of individual will”.61 Private law thereby 
aims to avoid the exploitation of the weaker party in a way that is 
damaging to their individual autonomy. 
4. A Zero-Sum Game? 
The shift from Private Law Society to Social Market Economy centres 
on the question of the extent to which the state is capable of securing 
its citizens’ autonomy simply by protecting their property rights and 
supplying them with the legal (private law) mechanisms to exchange 
those rights to their mutual advantage, and to what extent it needs to 
be more proactive and secure the material conditions pre-requisite to 
them making real use of those rights. As a matter of historical record, 
an economically laissez-faire Nineteenth century gave way to a 
welfarist Twentieth century, which saw all European democracies 
shift their legal systems from a more formal to a more material 
orientation (at least until the resurgence of economic liberalism, with 
its intellectual basis in the Austrian and Chicago Schools and its 
political champions in Thatcher and Reagan). So, though variants of 
welfarism in Europe are nationally specific,62 all Member States 
combine formally orientated free markets with materially orientated 
social security programmes that re-distribute wealth and all this 
alongside social regulation that reaches into otherwise private legal 
relationships in order to achieve broader social policy objectives. 
 
Theoretically, when it comes to maximising individual autonomy, the 
practical issue becomes one of whether a given intrusion into a 
private relationship to promote greater material equality adequately 
compensates for the reduction in the parties’ formal equality to 
decide for themselves as to how they would like to order their 
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relationship (or, indeed, whether it sufficiently compensates the 
inevitable inefficiencies that result from moving away from a 
Perfectly Competitive Market in which individuals were free to 
transact voluntarily towards an efficient equilibrium). But there are 
also, however, important issues of principle: Jürgen Habermas and 
Isaiah Berlin have, in their different ways, pointed to the problem of 
explaining individual autonomy by using this formal-material 
dichotomy. Firstly, the dichotomy implies that there exists some 
perfect equilibrium between formal and material equality that will 
somehow optimise autonomy, but, in attempting to strike the 
appropriate balance, the state can end up threatening the very 
autonomy that it is seeking to promote. Habermas argues that the 
state thereby subjects individuals to a “violent abstraction” because 
its administrative apparatus intrudes into their previously privately 
ordered relations – the personal and intimate spheres of economic 
and social life that they had organised spontaneously amongst 
themselves – to impose upon them its own idea of what will further 
their autonomy; bringing its de-personalised, systematic power into 
their “life-world” in order to “colonise” or “juridify” it:63 
 
What is awarded to the state in capacities for social regulation 
seemingly must be taken, in the form of private autonomy … 
From this point of view, the state and private actors are 
involved in a zero-sum game – what the one gains in 
competence, the other loses.64 
 
Writing at the height of the Cold War, Berlin makes a similar point in 
seeking to show Western apologists for the dictatorial excesses of 
“communist” experiments in the East that freedom and equality are 
generally at odds. He argues that a state risks sliding into 
authoritarianism whenever it looks to further autonomy beyond 
securing a free area of action (respect for classic civil liberties and 
private property) in which individuals are free to transact voluntarily 
with one another.65 He distinguishes this “negative” notion of 
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freedom, denoting the absence of external constraint, coercion and 
interference – freedom from – from a “positive” notion of freedom – 
freedom to – which is similar to Habermas’ description of material 
equality; it being concerned with the real opportunities that 
individuals have to take control of their lives and to realise their 
fundamental purposes. Though he accepts both are legitimate 
concerns, he is concerned to keep them conceptually distinct: 
 
The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to 
participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled, 
may be as deep a wish as that of a free area for action, and 
perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for the same 
thing.66 
 
For him, any attempt by the state to promote the positive freedom of 
the individual (material equality) is a “monstrous impersonation” 
premised on the idea that we possess an “empirical” self (how we 
are) and a “real” self (how we should be) that somehow allows the 
state to claim that, when it imposes paternalistic limits on our 
(negative) freedoms to transact voluntarily with one another, it has 
not really reduced our freedom, even though our empirical selves feel 
its constraint, because it has only prevented us from acting against 
the interests of our real selves. Its claim is that it thereby increases our 
(positive) freedom by intervening in our legal relations to structure 
them in a way that we would have done ourselves were we as 
rational and wise as it, and understood our true interests as it does; 
we are coerced for our own sake because we cannot be trusted to read 
the small print and look after our own interests, but need protecting 
from ourselves and the unscrupulous landlords, employers and 
businesses that would otherwise dupe us into signing up to 
exploitative agreements. Berlin’s sarcastic description of this 
pretension is withering: 
 
[T]he rational ends of our true natures must coincide, or be 
made to coincide, however violently our poor, ignorant, desire-
ridden, passionate selves may cry out against this process.67 
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5. The Procedural Paradigm of Law and Public 
Autonomy 
The previous section revealed the fundamental problem lurking 
behind the state’s transition from securing nothing more than a free 
area of action, in which individuals are formally equal – free to 
transact with one another in any way they see fit – towards a focus on 
intervening in their relations to secure the material conditions that the 
state considers essential to them if they are to make real use of that 
formal freedom. But, whilst Berlin would not countenance such 
intervention at all, because it poses too great a threat to individual 
liberty, Habermas proposes a third legal paradigm to escape this 
unsatisfactory formal-material dichotomy and its zero-sum game. 
The procedural paradigm of law is both a buttress against the socially 
unattractive (atomistic) Private Law Society and a theoretical 
reference point (and elegant justification) for developing private 
law’s materialised periphery in a way that avoids the clumsy, 
overbearing intrusions of the state into our private legal relations that 
Berlin so abhors. Habermas argues that the threat state-paternalism 
poses to individual autonomy will be neutralised if it is steered by 
those subject to that very paternalism (at which point it is no longer 
appropriately so-called). 
 
Materialisation need not overburden (ask too much of) the law if 
those who are subject to its social policy prescriptions can steer their 
modality. The genius of democracy is that it uses indirect, procedural 
forms of legal programming, in which private law’s social policy 
content – its materialised periphery – is substantiated through the 
democratic process. For Habermas, both formal and material 
paradigms fail to consider the internal relation between law and 
political power, which is the primary focus of a procedural paradigm 
that takes their co-originality seriously.68 Resurrecting what Benjamin 
Constant once called the “liberty of the ancients” – citizens’ “active 
and constant participation in collective power”69 – and what 
Habermas now calls their public autonomy, he overcomes the 
disconnection with a concept of political power found in citizens’ 
capacity to use the power that arises from their “communicative 
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freedoms” to shape the laws that they must henceforth obey as legal 
persons. With a meaningful vote on competing (more, or less, 
materialised) political programmes, citizens become the co-authors of 
the social and economic order that they inhabit. 
 
The procedural paradigm ascribes a public, as well as a private, 
dimension to individual autonomy.70 Whilst individuals experience 
the private dimension as legal persons (addressees of the law), they 
experience the public dimension as citizens (co-authors of that law); a 
measure of their ability to use their communicative freedoms to 
participate in democratic will formation and thereby shape the 
mixture of formal and material opportunities that the state makes 
available to them as legal persons in order to structure their relations 
with one another. To focus exclusively on optimising individual 
private autonomy – leaving the state to determine how formalised or 
materialised the law should be – views individuals solely as legal 
subjects, with the state as the master of the zero sum game that 
Habermas seeks to avoid. 
 
If autonomy is about governing oneself, truly autonomous 
individuals are those who conduct the eternal dialectic between 
freedom (Habermas’ formal equality or Berlin’s negative freedom) 
and equality (Habermas’ material equality or Berlin’s positive 
freedom) for themselves. The procedural paradigm of law sees 
individuals as more than just legal persons (whether the Private Law 
Society’s market actors or the Social Market Economy’s welfare 
recipients) who utilise private law’s formal core, or rely upon its 
materialised periphery, in structuring their relations with one 
another. It understands them also as citizens who participate in 
determining the ways in which private law’s materialised periphery 
should supplement the formal core. They further their public 
autonomy by participating collectively in defining the balance that 
law strikes between formal and material equality (negative and 
positive freedom) so as to optimise their (collective) private 
autonomy: 
 
the vacant places of the economic man or welfare-client are 
occupied by a public of citizens who participate in political 
communication in order to articulate their wants and needs, to 
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give voice to their violated interests, and, above all, to clarify 
and settle the contested standards and criteria according to 
which equals are treated equally and unequals unequally.71 
 
Once set, that private law then shields their decentralised, self-
interested interaction in “morally neutralised spheres of action” in 
which they are free to use their ingenuity in “negotiating” the terms 
of their legal relations with one another strategically; deploying the 
mechanisms of the formal core (softened by the materialised 
periphery) with a view to maximising their own individual gain. 
However, the form that the materialised periphery takes is shaped 
non-strategically, with those subject to it as legal persons, interacting 
this time “communicatively”, as citizens; “making a public use of 
their reason”72 to deliberate with one another towards a mutual 
acceptance of the validity claims upon which that periphery’s rules 
are based.73 
 
The procedural paradigm of law is concerned less with the balance 
struck between formal and material law than the procedures through 
which that balance is struck. The focus is not on how formalised or 
materialised private law should be in order to maximise autonomy, 
but on the procedures used to make this determination. Did they 
involve all those addressed by the resulting law and were their 
interactions deliberative? Law is thereby made at a higher level of 
reflection, through forms of communication that guarantee the 
participants’ public autonomy, which is an idea captured by Amy 
Bartholomew as the reflexive continuation of the welfare state.74 This 
reconciliation of democracy and private autonomy goes to the very 
root of the tension between political modernity’s concern for 
collective self-determination and economic modernity’s concern for 
autonomous determination of the ways in which human needs are 
satisfied, such that: 
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the critical question is no longer the quantitative issue of how 
much state or how much market, but rather the qualitative 
issue of how and for what ends should markets and states be 
combined and what are the structures and practices in civil 
society that will sustain a productive synergy.75 
6. Public Autonomy and European law as Conflicts 
Law 
What was the purpose of this long detour? European law as conflicts 
law is archetypal of the procedural paradigm because its 
methodological approach focuses on how law is produced. It is 
emphatically not about affirming the supremacy of either national or 
European law, and thereby selecting an appropriate rule from 
amongst “a given set of ready-made responses”,76 but proposes, 
instead, a method for organising co-operation; “a discovery 
procedure of practice” that does not strive for a perfect (ever more 
comprehensive) body of substantive law, but, instead, supervises 
private law production in order to seek out flexible, procedural 
solutions to conflicts.77 
 
The method depends upon a “law of law production” that insists that 
the Community shows appropriate recognition for national law 
(because its democratic pedigree demands that respect) and that the 
Member States temper their legal autonomy when producing that 
law out of respect for a European law that disciplines their tendency 
to ignore externalities, thereby qualifying that law’s democratic 
pedigree. Applying the idea of individual public autonomy 
developed in the previous section, the test becomes one of whether 
this conflict of laws method succeeds at tying the production of 
private law (at national and European levels) more effectively to 
forms of communication that further the public autonomy of those 
subject to it. Does it keep open the channels through which their 
communicative power might shape its production? Key to answering 
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this question is the balance that any “law of law production” achieves 
between rendering national private law as compatible as possible 
with the Member States’ common concerns, as embodied in European 
law (unity), and the respect it shows for their legal autonomy 
(diversity). In particular, does it allow sufficient scope for national 
legal idiosyncrasies? To the extent that national political processes 
successfully tie private law production to their citizens’ 
communicative power, they will reflect citizens’ choices about the 
sort of protection that they require of private law’s materialised 
periphery, and when they wish to be left to organise their legal 
relations themselves. The counter-weight is the diminished capacity 
of non-constituents who are also affected by this materialised private 
law (and are equally entitled to have their public autonomy taken 
seriously) to shape that law’s content. 
 
Whilst the Community is primarily “an overarching market-
liberalising organisation”, the Member States are “the legitimate 
locus for the provision of social and political welfare”78 because they 
are (for the time-being) the uppermost level at which most Europeans 
feel a strong sense of solidarity towards one another, and can, 
therefore, function as a coherent political community capable of 
determining the social obligations that they wish to extend towards 
one another by calibrating their social security programmes, or 
setting the social policy content of their private law’s materialised 
periphery. Moreover, whilst national governments enjoy strong 
constitutional legitimacy, the Community possesses no such 
governmental hierarchy. Though the European Parliament has grown 
in stature, and in powers, the Community’s democratic linkages back 
to its citizens are still made primarily through national actors, 
whether via ministers in the Council that is co-responsible for 
enacting European law, or via government officials seconded to the 
“comitology” committees that oversee the Commission’s 
implementation of that law. The transfer of competencies to embellish 
private law’s materialised periphery at the European level are 
inevitably accompanied by the political contentions that go hand-in-
hand with this task. This then puts strains on these structures that 
extend also to any heavy Community disciplining of national private 
law by its free movement rules. The Member States’ strong mandates 
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for setting the materialised periphery of their private law, combined 
with the Community’s weak constitutional legitimacy, demands that 
the Community shows a great deal of toleration towards national 
legal idiosyncrasy because, as Joerges puts it: 
 
just as the incompleteness and imperfection of the European 
polity requires the recognition of spheres of regulatory 
autonomy, even those European frameworks and regulatory 
objectives which have prior and overwhelming consent, may 
not pre-empt the autonomous search for justice through private 
law at decentralized levels.79 
 
At the same time, Joerges, nevertheless, rightly identifies national 
parochialism – the “nation-state failure” – as the counter-weight to 
such toleration. In a familiar refrain, which he now acknowledges to 
be provocative, he points out that the democratic pedigree of national 
private law is not absolute because its extra-territorial effects mean 
“nationally organised constitutional states are becoming increasingly 
incapable of acting democratically”.80 Unchecked by European law, 
the materialised periphery of national private law fails to take 
adequate account of the concerns and interests of a relevant (affected) 
constituency beyond the national borders; it being enacted through 
political processes that are relatively indifferent to them.81 Just as 
Maduro and Weiler describe how the Court of Justice has found ways 
to identify national legal idiosyncrasies that have an impact on 
Community interests and reduce them to a civilised level,82 Joerges 
sets respect for national legal autonomy against the idea that it 
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should be exercised in as Community-friendly a way as possible, so 
as to respect a European law that gives voice to effected “foreign” 
interests by civilising the national tendency to parochialism.83 It does 
not force national private law to take on identical forms – whether 
through comprehensive codification or through far-reaching 
harmonisation of its materialised periphery – but ensures only that 
the Member State’s legal systems tessellate better; that differences in 
their private law are rendered as compatible as possible with one 
another. They are to enjoy the greatest degree of legal autonomy 
consistent with upholding the coherence of a European law whose 
rules and principles each Member State accepts as a legitimate basis 
for testing the materialised private law that impacts beyond its 
borders. They temper their legal autonomy out of recognition of their 
social and economic interdependence. 
 
But, whilst mediation between these two considerations sets up the 
problem well, in the sense that it is normatively coherent, the balance 
that Joerges seems to favour may end up neglecting individual public 
autonomy because it tips too far towards rendering national private 
law Community-compatible. In other words, it prioritises unity over 
diversity. National private law is grounded in national political 
processes, towards which individuals feel their strongest affinity. 
Frustrating though it can be for those, like Joerges, who are deeply 
committed to European integration, the locus of democratic 
legitimacy will remain (at least for the foreseeable future) with the 
Member States.84 As long as the extra-territorial effects of a given rule 
of materialised private law are limited, the Community must tolerate 
those idiosyncrasies because they stem from a political process that 
gave citizens their greatest influence over that law, which they are 
now to be subject to as legal persons. Moreover, it did so at a level at 
which they are comfortable extending social obligations towards one 
another, out of a shared sense of mutual solidarity.85 As such, 
national sovereignty (diversity), which expresses the capacity of a 
coherent (for the time-being, national) political community to govern 
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itself and thereby further its members’ public autonomy, might have 
to figure a little more heavily in the balance than Joerges allows for. 
 
Democracy is historically and socially embedded. There is nothing 
illogical in a proponent of European integration, who also has an 
over-riding commitment to democracy, desiring closer integration 
passionately, whilst at the same time still wanting it to proceed only 
at a pace with which his fellow citizens, who are not (yet) so 
convinced as him, are comfortable. This nuanced position is peculiar 
to a period of “revolutionary” (paradigm shift) constitutionalism, in 
which a political community is in the process of establishing itself 
and its members’ commitments to it remain equivocal, though 
unnecessary in a period of “normal” (puzzle-solving) 
constitutionalism, in which a mature political community has been 
established and its members (qua citizens) are unequivocally 
committed to taking decisions collectively upon a democratic basis, 
but are merely fine-tuning how they might do so more effectively, in 
which case engagement in the constitutional process can be more full-
blooded. On this account, European integration proceeds as a 
virtuous circle in which a nascent European political community 
grows organically from simple beginnings provided that the sum of 
the centrifugal forces is less than the sum of the centripetal forces. 
The process cannot be forced. Provided there is sufficient “we 
feeling” at a European level to ground (legitimate) those initial 
interactions, Europeans might move into an ever closer orbit – 
developing an ever-stronger “we feeling” that might legitimate ever-
more far-reaching collective action – simply because they grow 
accustomed to dealing with, and trusting, one another. 
7. Implementing the Conflict of Laws Method by 
Constitutionalising Private Law Production 
Implementing the conflict of laws method, the Court of Justice 
constitutionalises the production of national private law by enforcing 
a “law of law production” that disciplines the Member States to 
correct for their tendency to under-represent non-constituents.86 It 
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develops this “law of law production” on a case by case basis; a 
rolling project that, at any one time, is no more than an aggregation of 
all existing case law which, in one way or another, affects private law 
production at the national level. In shaping the contours of this 
judicial shadow, the Court proceeds experimentally, guided by what 
Joerges calls the “yardsticks and criteria with which governance 
arrangements must comply if they are to deserve recognition”.87 
Thus, whilst we cannot expect that it will “pro-actively construct a 
coherent transnational legal framework” that achieves some final, 
comprehensive, constitutionalisation of private law production, we 
can expect from it “normative coherence, or at least a degree of 
sensitivity where the constitutional elements of private law are at 
stake”.88 This means that it must pay special attention to the public 
dimension of individual autonomy and, more particularly, to how 
this is furthered through participation in political processes that 
connect citizens meaningfully to the private law that will so 
determine the bounds of their private autonomy as legal persons. It 
must aspire to solutions that are adequately sensitive to the reasons 
that Member States put forward for idiosyncrasies in their private 
law, whilst simultaneously putting those reasons under sufficient 
justificatory pressure to ensure that the internal market remains 
workable and that the broader Community interest is taken into 
account. This speaks in favour of deference towards national private 
law’s materialised periphery, unless the justifications for a Member 
State’s rules really do not stack up. But does the Court of Justice, as 
the gate-keeper that assesses this, meet this standard? 
 
Joerges assumes that individuals will only succeed in deploying this 
justificatory pressure through the Court of Justice to iron out wholly 
unjustifiable idiosyncrasies, but this depends on the level of scrutiny 
to which the Court subjects a Member State’s explanations for its 
materialised private law. Whilst too lax an approach would fail to 
correct the national tendency towards regulatory parochialism, an 
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overly zealous approach – intervening too readily in the materialised 
periphery of national private law – would devalue the participation 
of individuals in defining, though their national political process, the 
balance that private law strikes between formal and material equality; 
supplanting the public’s collective determination of what it considers 
best suited to furthering private autonomy with the Court of Justice’s 
own determination. Rule of the judge must never replace the rule of 
the people, but, in a number of instances, the Court of Justice comes 
close to overstepping this line. 
 
The Court of Justice outlawed German bans on labelling cosmetics 
“clinique” to protect consumers who might consider that they had 
medicinal properties,89 on labelling chocolate bars “10% extra” to 
protect consumers who might think that the size of the mark 
corresponded with the extra they were getting,90 and on advertising 
that used comparisons with former prices because these were difficult 
to check and might be misleading.91 It also outlawed Luxembourg’s 
ban on leafleting to advertise temporary price reductions to protect 
consumers from undue psychological pressure.92 Although it does 
not express itself in these terms, the Court implicitly came to its own 
conclusion about the level of protection that consumers needed – 
what was likely to further their private autonomy – which essentially 
put more faith than the German and Luxembourgeois governments 
did in consumers’ capacity to make careful choices in spite of these 
marketing techniques. But, although outlawing paternalistic 
regulation arguably demonstrates the Court’s respect for private 
autonomy – upon the basis that the sort of extra information that 
business was being prevented from supplying would have facilitated 
more informed consumer choices – it is also arguable that this is 
based upon a mistaken understanding of the relationship between 
advertising and individual autonomy. Advertising is no longer (if it 
ever was) about providing consumers with information about what is 
on offer in order to allow them to make informed choices. Consumers 
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are frequently vulnerable to clever (and sometimes not so clever) 
advertising that plays on precisely these susceptibilities, without 
which there would be little for a whole industry of advertising 
consultants, PR agents, brand advisors and spin doctors to work on. 
Pick up any marketing handbook and you will find terms such as 
Consumer Involvement Theory, Brand Personality and Emotional Selling 
Propositions, none of which have anything to do with informing 
consumers about what is on offer, and all of which are really about 
exploiting them in a way that arguably diminishes their autonomy. It 
is far from cynical to suggest that businesses might want to label 
cosmetics “clinique” in order to lend them an unjustified air of 
scientific and medical credibility; to over-size the marks on chocolate 
bars to exaggerate the extra they were offering, knowing some 
consumers would, indeed, be fooled, or to use time-limited offers and 
eye-catching price-comparisons, knowing that they are extremely 
alluring and likely to induce purchases that would otherwise not 
have been made.93 Indeed, it is a similar concern that underpins the 
Community’s own cooling-off period for contracts that consumers 
enter into on the doorstep after unsolicited approaches.94 It is, 
therefore, at least arguable that the German and Luxembourgeois 
governments were not infantilising their consumers in a manner that 
diminished their private autonomy, but were instead promoting the 
autonomy of at least their more gullible citizens by protecting them 
from exploitative marketing techniques. 
 
It is unnecessary to come to any conclusion on the matter to see that 
arguments can be adduced on either side with regard to what is most 
likely to promote the consumer’s autonomy. And, as such, bringing 
in the public dimension of individual autonomy, the Court of Justice 
might have been more deferential towards these rules of materialised 
private law in order to respect their origin in national political 
processes that are steered by the affected consumers, this time as 
voting citizens. The scope for disagreement over what rules were 
necessary to further consumer autonomy is precisely what speaks in 
favour of the very consumers whose autonomy was most at stake 
being left to shape the content of the rules as citizens. Though, of 
                                                 
93 See, for example, D. Ariely, Predictably Irrational, (London: Harper Collins, 2008) 
94 Article 5, Council Directive 85/577/EEC, of 20 December 1985, on the protection of 
consumers in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises (OJ L 
372/31). 
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course, this must be weighed against the extent to which the interests 
of stakeholders beyond Germany and Luxembourg (for example, 
businesses unable to re-use labels or advertising materials developed 
for other markets) were taken into account. All of this should 
demonstrate the practical difficulties in implementing a conflict of 
laws method. Any conceivable “law of law production” will struggle 
to provide clear-cut, uncontested answers to real-life conflicts, 
rendering it no more successful than subsidiarity (another 
notoriously difficult principle to apply in practice, despite its equally 
sound logic) at supplying a magic formula capable of showing, with 
any degree of precision, how to reconcile European integration 
(unity) and national sovereignty (diversity). So, even if Joerges 
succeeds in setting up the problem convincingly, he leaves significant 
practical difficulties in weighing up the considerations that he rightly 
identifies as relevant. The devil is in the detail, but, unfortunately, he 
offers little guidance on charting that detail, or even the relative 
importance of the two considerations. Many would agree that some 
sort of mediation along these lines is appropriate, but they would 
disagree on the weight to attach to each. Indeed, that disagreement 
runs along the same familiar fault line that separates Eurosceptics 
from Pro-Europeans. 
 
Unsurprisingly then, the Court of Justice also struggles to find a 
suitable balance along these lines. By way of example, the facts of 
María Sánchez95 would appear to have offered the Court a clear-cut 
case for weighing up the competing considerations in a particular 
way, because the extra-territorial effects of the materialised private 
law at stake were limited, or even non-existent: it had to resolve a 
conflict between Spanish tort law that imposed strict liability on a 
hospital that had allegedly infected a patient with Hepatitis C 
(requiring that she prove only that she had contracted the virus and 
there was a causal link to a blood transfusion provided by that 
hospital) and a Community directive96 that required she prove 
additionally that the hospital itself had produced the tainted blood 
(which she was unable to do). Although the directive contained 
crucial ambiguities that, arguably, left the Court with scope to decide 
                                                 
95 Case C-183/00, María Victoria González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana [2002] ECR 
I-3901. 
96 Council Directive 85/374/EEC, of 25 July 1985, on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning Liability 
for Defective Products (OJ L 210/29). 
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that the directive had not fully harmonised national tort law, and 
only prescribed a minimum standard of protection that Spanish tort 
law surpassed, it fixed on a phrase in the preamble in deciding that 
the directive had, indeed, pre-empted national law and that Spain 
was not entitled to maintain its more materialised private law.97 This 
solution, which allowed the hospital to deploy the directive to deny 
liability, fetishises unity – privileging it over diversity – by showing 
little respect for Spanish legal autonomy and for the social policy 
reasons that led it to adopt a strict liability regime. Had the Court of 
Justice interpreted the directive as setting out no more than a 
minimum standard, this would have done little to hinder free 
movement, but would still have respected the democratic pedigree of 
the strict liability rule. Its hierarchical affirmation of European law, 
instead, contributes little to the Europeanisation process, which 
should be about reconciling unity and diversity by accommodating 
difference between heterarchically-situated legal systems.98 The 
sovereignty of European law is purely an organising principle and 
not some generalisable expression of a genuine, monolithic hierarchy. 
National sovereignty remains an important value to be respected, so 
that, as long as it is exercised in a way that respects the shared desire 
for integration (which Spain’s strict liability rule did), the Court of 
Justice has no business interfering. 
 
In other cases, the Court of Justice has swung the other way and 
shown considerably more respect for national legal autonomy. So, in 
Keck,99 it famously upheld a French law prohibiting the sale of goods 
at a loss, which might have had the effect of driving existing 
competitors from the market and excluding the entry of new ones, 
and in the Sunday Trading cases,100 it accepted British laws restricting 
shop opening hours reflected “certain political and economic choices 
in so far as their purpose is to ensure that working and non-working 
hours are so arranged as to accord with national or regional socio-
                                                 
97 Case C-183/00, María Victoria González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana [2002] ECR 
I-3901, para. 30. 
98 Ch. Joerges, “Europeanization as Process: Thoughts on the Europeanization of 
Private Law” (2005) 11 European Public Law, p. 63, at 74. 
99 Joined Cases C-267-8/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] 
ECR I-6097. 
100 See, for example, Case 134/88, Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q [1989] ECR 765; 
Case C-169/91, Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v 
B&Q [1992] ECR I-239. 
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cultural characteristics”.101 Likewise, it accepted the Dutch 
justification for banning the “cold calling” of potential investors in a 
type of financial scheme that it considered to be “speculative” and 
“complex” upon the basis that the ban served to maintain the good 
reputation of Holland’s financial sector, which is an imperative 
reason of public interest capable of justifying restrictions on the 
freedom to provide financial services.102 Its scrutiny of the 
justification which a Member State puts forward for materialised 
private law can be detailed and thoughtful. So, for instance, it 
accepted that a French ban on the doorstep selling of educational 
material was proportionate because, even though a right of 
cancellation would normally suffice to protect consumers from ill-
considered doorstep purchases, the risks are heightened when 
educational material is sold in this way because, if the material turns 
out to be unsuitable or of low-quality, it might compromise their 
chances of obtaining further training, which, as the Court put it, is 
especially worrying because someone who buys such material “often 
belongs to a category of people who, for one reason or another, are 
behind with their education and are seeking to catch up”, which, in 
turn, makes them “particularly vulnerable when faced with salesmen 
of educational material who attempt to persuade them that, if they 
use that material, they will have better employment prospects”.103 
 
A common device that the Court of Justice employs is to confront a 
Member State’s justification for its materialised private law with the 
legal rationalities of those Member States that get along without any 
such law because they are happy to leave individuals to interact 
using private law’s formal core alone.104 This makes productive use of 
the Community’s legal diversity by encouraging the Member States 
to learn from one another. At other times, it directs its attention to the 
detailed factual background of the national rule’s promulgation. It 
was, for instance, astute in noting that the German ban on price-
comparisons followed pressure from retailers,105 which suggests that 
                                                 
101 Case 134/88, Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q [1989] ECR 765, para. 14. 
102 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141, para. 
44. 
103 Case 382/87, Buet and Educational Business Services v Ministère public [1989] 
ECR 1235, para. 13. 
104 See, for example, Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v Confédération du commerce 
luxembourgeois [1990] ECR I-667, para. 12. 
105 Case C-126/91, Schutzverbund gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v Yves Rocher 
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it was more about protecting business from exposure to increased 
competition than about furthering consumer autonomy, which itself 
indicates that, had the Court chosen, instead, to defer to the German 
rule, it would not necessarily have furthered German citizens’ public 
autonomy because the rule apparently stemmed from businesses 
“rent seeking” and not citizens’ influence over the political process. 
 
In some cases, the Court of Justice throws the final decision about the 
legality of a rule belonging to the materialised periphery of a Member 
State’s private law back to the national court that referred the 
question, along with guidance as to what it should take into account. 
It accepted, for instance, that Sweden could in principle justify 
restrictions on TV advertising aimed at children, but left it to the 
Swedish court to decide whether these restrictions were necessary, 
proportionate, and the least trade-restrictive means of satisfying their 
social policy objective.106 Similarly, when reviewing Germany’s ban 
on labelling eggs “six corn” laid by hens fed only 60% corn, it was 
explicit about why it decided to throw the final decision, as to 
whether this was “likely to mislead”,107 back to the German court: 
unlike in those cases in which it had outlawed of its own motion bans 
on time-limited offers, eye-catching price-comparisons, chocolate bars 
marked “10% extra” and cosmetics labelled “clinique”, the 
information available here was insufficient to come to a clear 
conclusion without sending the matter back to the referring court.108 
In truth, however, the evidence before it was no more conclusive here 
than in the earlier cases, and, arguably, it was, instead, taking a 
welcome step back. Its cautious, even modest, assessment of its own 
powers of appraisal restricted it to guiding the German court: it 
described the test as objective – the court was to work from “the 
presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably 
well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect”109 – and 
                                                                                                                   
[1993] ECR I-2361, para. 3. 
106 Joined Cases C-34-6/95, Konsumentombudsmannen v De Agostini Förlag [1997] ECR 
I-3843. 
107 Council Regulation EEC/1907/90, of 26 June 1990, on certain Marketing 
Standards for Eggs (OJ L 173/5), Article 10(2)(e), in C-210/96. 
108 Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt - 
Amt für Lebensmittelüberwachung [1998] ECR I-4657, para. 30. 
109 Ibid., para. 31. An additional concern here is the universality of this test. What if 
the materialised private law is designed to protect the ignorant, inattentive, reckless 
consumer, instead of the well-informed, observant, circumspect consumer? Is it 
appropriate for the Court to prohibit such protection? 
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recommended the court consult an expert report or consumer 
research poll.110 Certainly, if it is really going to exercise a 
rationalising influence on the materialised periphery of national 
private law, it makes sense that the acceptability of the justifications 
for that law should not turn on its conjecture as to what expectations a 
particular form of marketing will evoke in the average consumer. 
Instead, it should apply its justificatory pressure in a way that 
requires that law to stand up to scrutiny against properly informed 
evidence in an in-depth review that sometimes only the referring 
court will have the time to provide. 
 
In summary, there is evidence that the Court of Justice is showing a 
growing readiness to re-orientate what might be seen as its 
application of a conflict of laws method towards a concern for the 
legitimacy of national private law. Instead of prioritising European 
integration over national sovereignty, with a distinct bias towards 
uniform solutions that protect the internal market from the 
disintegrative effects of idiosyncratic national private law, the Court 
increasingly tolerates diversity provided that it is clearly not 
motivated by market protectionism. It thereby responds to a deeper 
constitutional shift in the Community towards decentralisation and 
flexibility, described variously as “differentiated integration”, 
“variable geometry”, a “multi-speed” or “two-tier” Europe, or a 
“Europe à la carte”, or of “concentric circles”. This might be attributed 
to a number of causes: (1) market integration is sufficiently well-
established now for the Community to indulge in a degree of legal 
diversity amongst its Member States; (2) uniformity is frequently 
inappropriate across 27 Member States, with often diverse social 
models; and (3) those driving the process have become increasingly 
sensitive to public disquiet about the legitimacy of the Community’s 
intrusions into national sovereignty. The shift has manifested itself in 
the Community’s growing use of minimum standards (as opposed to 
comprehensive harmonisation), the Treaty of Maastricht’s opt-outs 
on monetary union and the Social Chapter, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam’s incorporation of “closer co-operation” language that 
allows a group of Member States to progress towards unity at greater 
speed using co-operation agreements that can be enforced through 
                                                 
110 Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt - 
Amt für Lebensmittelüberwachung [1998] ECR I-4657, para. 37. 
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existing institutions111 (an option made easier by the Treaty of 
Nice112), and the Lisbon Agenda’s Open Method of Co-ordination. 
8. Conclusion 
Under conditions of mutual interdependence and the pressures of 
globalisation, the Community institutionalises a system of 
supranational governance that enables Member States to co-ordinate 
their responses to common problems by engaging in co-operative 
modes of problem-solving. Rather than comprehensively 
harmonising national private law, European law as conflicts law 
provides a framework – a procedural “law of law production” – that 
structures deliberation around issues that arise in a Community of 
diverse Member States that continue to treasure their national 
sovereignty, but are simultaneously committed to integrating with 
one another, at first economically, but now also (to a certain extent) 
socially. 
 
If law’s validity rests on how deliberatively it is produced, a “law of 
law production” must be about guiding all those who produce law, at 
whatever level, towards deliberative (and away from strategic) styles 
of political interaction. Those producing law at the national level 
must be disciplined to take into account its effects beyond the national 
borders and those who come together to produce law at the European 
level must be “civilised” by their exposure to a supranational arena 
that scrutinises the validity of their arguments. This puts “local 
problem-solving units” – the Member States, in particular – under 
pressure to operate non-strategically,113 which is what, in a nutshell, 
Joerges means by “deliberative supranationalism”. And Gerstenberg 
describes something very similar when he argues that the Court of 
Justice’s “core function” is to “redeem the mechanisms of 
transnational polyarchical problem-solving from the regulatory 
exclusivity of the nation state” by requiring them to provide 
justifications “vindicated before the forum of a European-wide public 
sphere”.114 If the Court is sufficiently inventive, not only might it 
                                                 
111 The procedures are set out in Articles 40 and 43-45 Treaty on European Union and 
in Article 11 EC Treaty. 
112 The veto of non-participating Member States was abolished and the minimum 
number of go-it-alone Member States changed from a majority to eight. 
113 O. Gerstenberg, “Laws polyarchy: A comment on Cohen and Sabel”, (1997) 3 ELJ, 
p. 343, at 355. 
114 Ibid., at 357. 
Reconciling European integration and national  sovereignty 399
 
reduce conflict between Member States by managing their legal 
diversity, to ensure the harmonious co-existence of parallel, 
heterachically-situated systems of private law that reflect often 
markedly different social models, but it might also allow them to 
make more productive use of their diversity by structuring the 
deliberation that surrounds private law production at both national 
and European levels so as to promote innovation and mutual 
learning. 
 
If the Court of Justice tests national private law against the market 
freedoms sympathetically – showing sufficient respect for that law’s 
origins in legitimacy-conferring national political processes – whilst, 
at the same time, taking into account concerns about the potential for 
parochialism, it might go a long way towards resolving conflicts 
between national systems of private law in a way that furthers 
individual autonomy, of both the private and of the public kind. If we 
see the market freedoms, as “a series of indeterminate provisions in 
search of substantive value” and around which we might argue how 
best to socialise the market, they might very well serve to “re-
establish definitive links between society, politics, and the market 
place”,115 but this demands that the Court recognise it has no business 
prioritising uniformity over diversity to iron out differences in the 
Member States’ distinct systems of private law and the distinct social 
models these reflect. As long as there is no appetite amongst the 
peoples of Europe for this degree of integration, these distinctions 
cannot legitimately be replaced (by judicial pronouncement, or 
otherwise) with a single, more or less materialised, system of 
European private law. The Court must therefore avoid choosing 
between the market freedoms and national social policy and require 
only that the Member States develop their social policies in ways that 
are as compatible as possible with these freedoms. Judicial restraint 
that respects the constitutional legitimacy of the social policy 
compromises incorporated into each Member State’s materialised 
private law is the order of the day. 
 
Implementing a conflict of laws method demands a great deal of 
practical judgement of the Court of Justice. This does not mean that it 
is not worth persevering with, only that the idea requires a lot more 
                                                 




fleshing out to work. Joerges’ notion of European law as conflicts law 
weaves together many threads of his long and distinguished career, 
but also throws down a challenge to those of us following in his 
formidable footsteps because its conceptual power is matched only 
by the size of the task that remains. 
 
Chapter 15  
The Chameleon State  
EU Law and the Blurring of the 
Private/Public Distinction in the Market 
Miguel Poiares Maduro 




The re-thinking of the traditional role of the state in the market has 
been accompanied by a variety of new forms of the exercise of public 
power and an increased blurring of the private/public distinction in 
the market.1 It is now common, for example, for the state to intervene 
in the market not through the traditional mechanisms of regulation or 
public ownership, but in a private legal form, as another market 
participant. In some instances, it is the state that grants private 
operators the shield of a public legal form. There are also instances in 
which the state imposes on private entities the pursuit of actions that 
it itself may not be legally authorised to undertake. In all these cases, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between private and 
public participations in the market and between the pursuit of 
traditional public goals and the pursuit of private interests the 
protection of which the state deems to be in the public interest. This 
difficulty does not simply represent a conceptual challenge for the 
law, it also blurs the traditional distinction between the market and 
the state as alternative modes of decision-making subject to different 
mechanisms of accountability. 
                                                 
1 This chapter is an updated and annotated version of the Keynote Address at the 
March 2006 European Law Conference at King’s College, University of London. 
Naturally, the views expressed in this article are so in a purely personal capacity. 
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In the realm of the EU, this phenomenon presents additional 
challenges, as the increased difficulty of distinguishing between 
forms of private and public action threatens to undermine the 
conceptual borders according to which the scope of some EU rules 
has been conceived. Furthermore, there is a risk that Member States 
may use this conceptual flexibility in such a way as to create forms of 
evasion from the application of the EU rules which they wish to 
reject. In some areas, such as free movement or state aid, for example, 
the state may feel tempted to assume a “private form” in order to 
evade the application of these rules, since, in principle, they are not 
applicable to private actors. In other areas, in contrast, regarding 
certain community rules which are only applicable to private activity, 
the state may give a “public form” to private behaviour in order to 
exempt itself from these rules. 
 
My analysis of a body of recent case law of the European Court of 
Justice will focus on three different areas in which this challenge 
emerges. I will try to identify how the Court has dealt with it in these 
different areas, and, finally, try to determine if there is (and, indeed, 
whether there can be) a coherent approach to this issue in its different 
manifestations. I would argue that such a coherent approach is 
emerging, and that it is founded upon a general requirement of 
consistency and coherence in state intervention in the market, and 
thus that this requirement aims to guarantee proper accountability of 
both the market and the state processes of decision-making. 
 
My analysis will focus on cases spanning from 2003 to 2006. 
However, in some instances, these cases confirm or develop earlier 
decisions of the Court to which I will refer. Additionally, there are 
several cases which are currently pending at the Court which are of 
relevance to the overall theme of this talk. This only serves to 
demonstrate what, I believe, will be the growing importance in the 
Court’s jurisprudence of cases concerning new forms of state 
intervention and/or participation in the market. 
 
I have selected three areas of recent case law to address in the context 
of the overall topic of this article: (1) the concept of an undertaking; 
(2) the application of competition rules to the state (i.e., the co-
ordinated application of Articles 10 and 81 EC); and (3) the so-called 
“golden share” cases. Other areas could have been included, 
including different aspects of the concept of state aid: its granting 
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through private resources, and the criteria of private creditor and 
private investor. 
1. The Concept of an Undertaking 
Articles 81 to 86 of the EC Treaty are only applicable to undertakings. 
They are, in principle, not aimed at controlling state regulation of the 
market, which is susceptible to restricting free competition, but are, 
instead, addressed at the anti-competitive behaviour of undertakings 
(including, however, public undertakings and undertakings to which 
the state has granted special or exclusive rights). The concept of 
undertaking is, therefore, essential to the definition of the scope of 
application of these competition rules. It is well established that an 
entity engaged in an economic activity constitutes an undertaking for 
the purposes of EU competition rules. In the light of this, the prima 
facie application of competition rules to the state or state entities is 
based upon one fundamental criterion: whether a certain activity of 
the state or a public body is considered to be “economic activity”. 
 
The Court has had the opportunity to clarify the concept of economic 
activity, as applied to the state, in a series of judgments, one of the 
latest being its decision in AOK.2 In this case, the Court had to assess 
the lawfulness of the practice of German “sickness funds” which set 
the maximum re-imbursement sums for medical drugs, a practice 
that was challenged by pharmaceutical companies. 
 
In order to determine whether the conduct of the German federal 
associations of sickness funds (“fund associations”) violated 
competition rules, the Court first had to establish whether these 
associations could be considered as undertakings for the purposes of 
Articles 81 to 86. The fund associations, supported by the 
observations of the Commission, argued that their activities were not 
economic activities since they exclusively pursued a social function, 
had no profitable goal, and were organised under a principle of 
solidarity. In turn, the pharmaceutical companies argued that, since 
the sickness funds were in competition with each other with regard to 
the amount of the contributions to be paid by the insured people, the 
services provided, and both the management and the organisation of 
their services, their activity was an economic activity, and that, 
                                                 
2 Joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband et al., 
[2004] ECR I-2493; see B.J. Drijber, (2005)42 CML Rev, pp. 523-533. 
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consequently, they ought to be considered as undertakings, subject to 
the application of competition rules. 
 
The judgment of the Court began by recalling, in paragraph 46, that 
“[t]he concept of an undertaking in competition law covers any entity 
engaged in economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the 
entity or the way in which it is financed”.3The Court then analysed 
the nature of the activity in question. It recalled that, in the social 
security domain, it has developed a series of criteria which permit the 
exclusion of certain activities from the concept of economic activity. 
This is notably the case for entities that pursue an exclusively social 
goal, and whose activities are founded on a principle of solidarity, are 
devoid of a profit purpose, and where the contributions paid do not 
correspond to the services provided.4 However, the Court also 
recognised that even entities that partly fulfil those criteria may still 
be considered as undertakings.5 In other words, if the activity in 
question takes place in competition with other economic operators 
and/or if, even when pursuing goals of solidarity, it is, in effect, 
dominated by a principle of capitalisation, it must be qualified as an 
economic activity. 
 
In the case in hand, the sickness funds exercised an activity with an 
exclusive social function, devoid of any profit purpose and were 
founded on the principle of solidarity. Moreover, the competition 
which was possible among them was restricted to a very limited set 
of circumstances and was also subject to a principle of solidarity 
(through the existence of a mechanism for re-distribution among the 
different sickness funds). The court concluded that this limited 
competition was not sufficient to attribute to their activity the nature 
of economic activity: 
 
The sickness funds are therefore not in competition with one 
another or with private institutions as regards grant of the 
obligatory statutory benefits in respect of treatment or 
medicinal products which constitutes their main function.6 
 
                                                 
3 AOK, cited above, paragraph 46. 
4 Ibid., paragraph 47. 
5 Ibid., paragraphs 49 and 50. 
6 Ibid., paragraph 54. 
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Furthermore, the fact that the Court has consistently maintained that 
the nature of an economic activity must be established per se, and not 
in the light of the overall activity of the entity in question (in other 
words, a certain entity can perform both economic and non-economic 
activities for the purposes of the application of competition rules), did 
not affect the outcome of this case, since the Court considered that, by 
simply determining the precise maximum amounts to be re-imbursed 
for medical drugs as imposed by the law: 
 
the associations of sickness funds did not pursue a self-interest 
that could be distinguished from the purely social goals of the 
sickness funds.7 
 
Thus, the judgment in AOK further clarifies the notion of economic 
activity and can help us shed light upon the underlying normative 
criterion that determines when state activity ought to be considered 
as an economic activity subject to competition rules. 
 
Looking back, the starting point for the Court’s inquiry into the 
notion of economic activity was the Höfner and Elser judgment. Here, 
the Court held that a public monopoly on employment procurement 
could be qualified as pursuing an economic activity since 
“employment procurement has not always been, and is not 
necessarily, carried out by public entities”.8 In itself, this might lead 
us to think that any activity susceptible to being performed by a 
private entity (or a profit-making entity in the more restrictive sense 
mentioned in the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs9) would have 
to be included in the concept of an economic activity. This, however, 
would be too broad since, potentially, any activity (including 
defence) is susceptible to being carried out by private entities. It is for 
this reason, I would argue, that the Court has, in subsequent 
decisions, introduced some limits and refined this broad definition. 
The Höfner and Elser criterion is still frequently cited, but it has, in 
fact, been refined by a more detailed and complex set of criteria, as in 
the AOK case. 
 
                                                 
7 Ibid., paragraphs 62 and 63. 
8 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 22; see P.J. Slot, (1991) 
28 CML Rev, pp. 964-988. 
9 A.G. Jacobs’ Opinion in case AOK, cited, delivered the 22 May 2003. 
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In fact, the broad reference in Höfner and Elser to activities susceptible 
to being carried out by private entities has to be contextualised by the 
circumstance which, in that case, the state de facto accepted the 
competition of some private operators with the public monopoly. 
What was relevant was that such activity took place in a market 
context as demonstrated by competition with private operators. 
When the court referred to activities which can be pursued by private 
entities, it therefore referred to activities which are carried out under 
market conditions. This effectively is in accordance with the criteria 
developed by the Court in all its subsequent decisions, and 
highlighted in the recent AOK judgment. It is in this light, too, that 
one should also read the reference in former Advocate General 
Jacobs’ Opinions as to whether these activities could, at least in 
principle, be carried out by a private undertaking in order to make a 
profit.10 The comparison with potential private operators is not 
relevant in all cases in which the latter could perform a certain 
activity, but only where they either already actually exercise that 
activity in competition with the state, or could do so under conditions 
similar to how it is exercised by the state. It is in this instance that the 
comparison criterion helps us to determine whether the state activity 
takes place in a market or under market conditions. 
 
What is relevant is to ascertain whether the state excludes a certain 
activity from the market (in which case, it would be a non-economic 
activity), or whether the state, either in competition or under a 
monopolistic regime, pursues that activity as a market activity (in 
which case, it must be considered as being an economic activity). This 
inquiry can be carried out by using two concurrent criteria already 
highlighted in the AOK case. 
 
First, if the activity is pursued in the same market by competing 
private and public bodies, the public bodies must also be subject to 
competition rules in order to avoid situations in which, while 
competing with private entities, the public bodies simultaneously 
claim immunity from competition law. The existence of private 
operators is, in itself, sufficient evidence that a market exists with 
regard to an activity which requires the application of competition 
rules. This was the purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court in 
                                                 
10 See paragraph 27 of the Opinion in the AOK case and case C-222/04, Cassa di 
Risparmio, [2006] ECR I-289, Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs, paragraph 78. 
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AOK on the nature of the competition with regard to the activity 
undertaken by the sickness funds. A more recent case, Cassa di 
Risparmio,11 dealt with the concept of an undertaking in the context of 
state aid, and concerned whether banking foundations could be 
considered as being undertakings for the purposes of receiving state 
aid. Here, the Court made an even clearer reference to this test by 
determining that there was no economic activity if the activity had an 
exclusive social character and was not exercised in a market in 
competition with other operators. 
 
Second, even where the state has created a statutory monopoly for 
pursuing a certain activity, it is possible for its own activity to be 
carried out under market conditions; in this case, it still ought to be 
subject to competition rules. This is the focus of the inquiry 
undertaken in many of the Court’s decisions (including AOK) on 
whether the activity in question is carried out with an exclusive social 
function and under a principle of solidarity, or whether it is carried 
out under a principle of capitalisation. To determine which of these 
principles dominates the activity in question, the Court has 
developed a set of balancing criteria which depend on the area in 
question, and include the services provided, how contributions are 
determined, its mandatory nature, the forms of solidarity embodied 
in the scheme, etc.12 
 
To sum up, one could say that what determines whether a certain 
public activity amounts to an economic activity depends upon 
whether such an activity constitutes state participation in a market (as 
distinct from state intervention in the market). Modifying and 
refining the initial Hofner and Elsner definition, economic activity 
exists when the activity in question is carried out by the state in the 
same way that a private operator in the market would pursue it 
(under a principle of capitalisation), or in competition with private 
operators. It must be recalled that this test serves only to determine 
whether the activity in question falls within the scope of the 
application of competition rules. It is still possible for the state to 
combine market and non-market conditions in a certain sector of 
activity, including imposing restrictions upon competition. However, 
in this case the activities in question would have to be assessed under 
                                                 
11 Case C-222/04, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, [2006] ECR I-289. 
12 AOK, cited above. 
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the conditions put forth in Article 86(2). These will be undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest 
whose pursuit of the tasks attributed to them has to be balanced with 
the goals of the competition rules under the criteria put in Article 
86(2). 
 
It is important to note that the case law is based on determining the 
true nature of the state action and imposes a requirement of 
consistency upon the state. If the state decides to undertake a certain 
activity under market conditions or to delegate it in part to the 
market, it must be subject to competition rules. Instead, if the 
Member State fully maintains a certain activity outside the market, 
precluding any competition and carrying it out under the principle of 
solidarity and not capitalisation, the activity is not subject to EU 
competition rules. 
 
It is clear that by limiting the application of Articles 81 to 86 to 
undertakings, the EC Treaty did not intend to subject all Member 
State activities to competition rules. However, Article 86 also makes it 
clear that certain forms of Member State activity are covered by those 
rules. The need for consistency or coherence means that, if a state 
conducts itself as an economic operator, Articles 81 to 86 have to 
apply. The same principles guide the application of competition rules 
to the Member State whenever it ratifies, implements or re-inforces 
decisions taken by undertakings, as we will see next. 
2. Article 10 and Competition Rules                
Granting Public form to Private Behaviour 
Another form of blurring the distinction between private and public 
actions may also require the application of competition rules to the 
state. In this case, the predominant fear is that state measures which 
are not subject to these competition rules may, in effect, simply 
replace the anti-competitive behaviour of certain undertakings. It is 
not public authority that assumes a private form but, rather, private 
interests which may be disguised under the cover of state authority. 
 
In principle, Articles 81 and 82 are only applicable to undertakings. 
However, it is also well known that the Court has interpreted these 
provisions together with the principle of loyal co-operation of Article 
10 EC to establish that “while it is true that Article 86 [now Article 82 
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EC] is directed at undertakings, nonetheless it is also true that the 
Treaty imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in 
force any measure which could deprive that provision of its 
effectiveness”.13 
 
Some have argued that this general statement of the Court ought to 
constitute the basis for an extensive application of competition rules, 
leading to its application to state rules whenever the latter could be 
said to threaten the objectives of the former. On the other hand, some 
favour a more literal reading of the Treaty provisions and argue that 
state legislation ought to be excluded from the scope of the 
application of competition rules independent of its impact on the 
values protected by the EC competition rules. While the first thesis 
emphasises the values of free competition embodied in EC economic 
law, the second thesis is based upon the assumption that EC rules 
ought not to interfere with the economic model of the state, and this 
is reflected in the Treaty-exclusive application of competition rules to 
undertakings. 
 
Since the broader statement of the GB-Inno decision, the Court has 
taken a more careful but, in my view, substantially well-founded 
path in controlling State measures under these provisions. As we 
shall see below, the underlying normative approach is similar to that 
which guides the Court’s case law on the concepts of economic 
activity and undertakings. According to a well-known line of cases, 
Articles 81 and 82 are only infringed by state measures in two cases: 
where a Member State requires or favours the adoption of 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices which are contrary to 
Article 81 EC or re-inforces their effects,14 or where the state divests 
its own rules of the character of legislation by delegating to private 
economic operators the responsibility for taking decisions which 
affect the economic sphere.15 In the first case, the agreement between 
private undertakings is external to the state, although it is required, 
favoured or has its effects re-inforced by the latter. In the second case, 
                                                 
13 Case 13/77, GB-Inno-BM, [1977] ECR I-2115, paragraph 31. 
14 Case C-198/01, CIF, [2003] ECR I-8055, paragraph 46; see P. Nebbia, 41 CML Rev 
2004, pp. 839-849. 
15 Case 136/86, Aubert, [1987] ECR 4789, paragraph 23; case C-35/96 Commission v 
Italy, [1998] ECR I-3851; case C-35/99, Arduino, [2002] ECR I-1529, paragraph 35, and 
Order of 17 February 2005 in case C-250/03 Mauri [2005] ECR I-1267, paragraph 30. 
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the state delegates its decision-making authority to the private 
entities. 
 
In two well-known and relatively recent Opinions, Advocates 
General Jacobs and Léger have expressed their concern about the 
limits inherent to this approach, which they perceive as being too 
dependent on establishing the previously anti-competitive behaviour 
of the private parties themselves.16 As a consequence, they have 
proposed somewhat revised criteria to determine the application of 
Articles 81 and 82 to measures taken by Member States. For these 
AGs, the measure in question does not constitute an infringement of 
Articles 10 EC and 81 EC, if (1) its adoption is justified by the pursuit 
of a legitimate public interest, and/or (2) if the Member States 
actively supervise the involvement of private operators in the 
decision-making process. However, in Arduino,17 the Court 
apparently remained faithful to its traditional approach. The case 
concerned Italian legislation which fixed maximum and minimum 
honorariums for lawyers. While the final decision belonged to the 
Italian Minister, the Italian Bar association played an important role 
in the setting of the fees, subject to final governmental approval. 
 
I believe, however, that the Court’s traditional approach, if properly 
developed and understood, contains, in itself, sufficient elements to 
respond to the concerns of Advocates General Jacobs and Léger and 
may not be as restrictive as has been suggested. The risk with their 
proposal lies in the fact that the conditions imposed on the state were 
cumulative, which meant that any measure liable to affect 
competition would always have to be assessed in terms of the pursuit 
of a legitimate public interest. This might be too broad, and might 
risk overloading the Court by attributing to Articles 81 and 82 a role 
in reviewing most of the Member States’ economic legislation. 
Instead, the second criterion suggested by Advocates General Jacobs 
and Léger can, and, in my view, ought to, be understood as being 
compatible with the criteria developed in the case law of the Court in 
this area. 
 
                                                 
16 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavlov, 
[2000] ECR I-6451, paragraphs 160-163. 
17 Arduino cited above; see A.J. Vossestein, (2002) 39 CML Rev, pp. 841-863. 
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These criteria appear to be dominated by the need to assess the true 
nature of state intervention in the market. The inquiry is whether the 
state’s legislative process is dominated by a concern to protect the 
public interest, or, conversely, whether the degree to which private 
interests are being taken into account is likely to alter the overriding 
objective of the state measure, which is, therefore, to protect these 
interests. In my view, this requires a substantive interpretation of the 
test of delegation to private actors, which would be in accordance 
with Jacobs and Léger’s requirement of effective Member State 
supervision. This interpretation guarantees that the application of 
competition rules is excluded only where it is due to a real 
submission to the public interest, and not where it is the product of 
capture of the political process by private actors. This requires a 
substantive assessment of the degree of involvement of the private 
entities in the legislative process, in order to guarantee that their 
participation at the stage at which a rule is proposed, or their 
presence within a body responsible for the drafting of the rule, does 
not have a determining influence on the content of the rule, and 
outweighs the taking of other interests into consideration. The 
purpose is to prevent the control of the public decision-making 
process by the private entities whose competition is at stake, leading 
to a legislative provision whose sole or predominant purpose might 
be the protection of certain private entities from the elements of 
competition, to the detriment of the public interest. I understand that 
such a procedural test might impose a certain burden on national 
courts, which would have to be entrusted with the factual analysis of 
such an effective state supervision. I believe, however, that this is 
both a more feasible and more normatively defensible solution than a 
solution based upon the anti-competitive effects of state measures. 
 
I also believe that the Court’s judgment in Arduino fits this approach. 
There, the Court stressed that it considered there to be real 
supervision by the state, and maintained that “it does not appear that 
the Italian State has waived its power to make decisions of last resort 
or to review implementations of the tariff”.18 The Court’s 
disagreement with the Advocate General was more at the level of this 
fact-based assessment, rather than on a more profound normative 
level. 
 
                                                 
18 Arduino, cited above, paragraph 40. 
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That the Court did not intend to restrict the application of 
competition rules further to the state was made clear in a subsequent 
case which appeared to maintain a broad interpretation of the 
application of competition rules and re-inforced its traditional 
arguments by making reference to the fact that: 
 
[S]ince the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, the EC 
Treaty has expressly provided that in the context of their 
economic policy the activities of the Member States must 
observe the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition (see Articles 3a(1) and 102a of the EC Treaty, now 
Article 4(1) EC and Article 98 EC).19 
 
In contrast to the case law reviewed in the previous section, the 
concern in these cases is not with the fact that a state may take a 
private form, and, in so doing, evade the application of certain EC 
rules; instead, the danger is that private interests may effectively 
control Member State decision-making to such an extent that the 
latter may simply serve as an instrument to protect the anti-
competitive behaviour of the former. Again, a requirement of 
consistency is imposed upon Member State action. To evade the 
application of competition rules, its measures must correspond to an 
effective state intervention in the market, formulated in the light of 
the public interest in a decision-making process which is not 
controlled by the private entities that are supposed to be in 
competition in that market. 
3. Golden Shares 
The final area of case law that I wish to look at deals with the well-
known “golden shares” cases. These are shares in privatised 
companies which the state has retained, and which grant it special 
rights in the context of a variety of important decisions concerning 
these companies and their business activities. In a series of 
infringement actions brought against several Member States by the 
European Commission, these measures were challenged on the 
grounds that they violated the free movement of capital and the 
rights of establishment. The cases in which the Court initially 
developed its approach date from the end of 2002.20 But this approach 
                                                 
19 Case C-198/01, C.I.F., [2003] I-8055, paragraph 47. 
20 Case C-367/98, Commission v Portugal, [2002] ECR I-4731; case C-483/99, 
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was even more fully articulated in a judgment from 2003,21 and 
recently confirmed in a judgment of 2 June 2005.22 Mostly, I believe 
that this line of cases can help us provide a broader context to the two 
other areas of case law, which are both in the domain of competition 
law. 
 
As in other areas of Community law, the Court is called in to define 
the limits that the EU legal order imposes upon the forms of Member 
State intervention in the market which, instead of constituting classic 
exercises of state intervention in the market (either by regulating the 
market or by public ownership of certain economic activities) make 
use of private instruments or market mechanisms while attempting to 
retain some form of public control over the latter. The question arises, 
in these instances, with regard to the limits and the control imposed 
on the forms of Member State action once the state has chosen the 
pursuit a certain function through traditional market mechanisms. 
 
Advocate General Damaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer has argued that, 
since the state could, in principle, retain full control over certain 
companies though public ownership (which is, notably, protected by 
Article 295), it should also be possible for the state to retain a more 
limited form of control by retaining certain special rights in 
privatised companies.23 Stated in even broader terms: 
 
It is almost unthinkable that the Treaty should be intended to 
allow the Member States to retain the full shareholding in any 
undertaking, with the maximum restriction on the freedoms of 
establishment and movement of capital which that implies, and, 
at the same time, to stand in the way of a liberalised system 
subject to limited administrative conditions which are non-
discriminatory and, therefore, more in keeping with the aim of 
integration. To put it another way: if withdrawing financial 
activities from the private sector, by allocating them to publicly 
owned bodies (nationalisation or socialisation, pure and 
simple), creates a special system of ownership, as opposed to 
                                                                                                                   
Commission v France, [2002] ECR I-4781; case C-503/99, Commission v Belgium, [2002] 
ECR I-4809; case C-98/01, Commission v United Kingdom, [2003] ECR I-4641; see 
H.Fleischer, (2003) 40 CML Rev., pp. 493-501. 
21 Case C-463/00, Commission v Spain, [2003] ECR I-4581. 
22 Case C-174/04, Commssion v Italy, [2005] ECR I-4933. 
23 Commission v Spain, cited above, and Commission v United Kingdom, cited above. 
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the ordinary system of ownership, there is no reason why a 
system of private ownership subject to special powers should 
not be viewed in the same way or should be treated less 
favourably.24 
 
The Court did not follow this reasoning and took the view that 
Member States could not “plead their own systems of property, 
referred to in Article 222 of the Treaty, by way of justification for 
obstacles, resulting from privileges attaching to their position as 
shareholder in a privatised undertaking, to the exercise of the 
freedoms provided for by the Treaty”.25 
 
In my view, this position of the Court is in line with its case law in the 
two previous areas that I have reviewed, notably that related to the 
definition of the economic activity in which the state acts as a market 
participant. There is an obligation of coherence that is imposed upon 
the Member State once it decides to open a certain sector to the 
market.This requirement is particularly important in the case of the 
privatisation of former state companies. In effect, while the Member 
State is entitled to maintain public ownership of certain companies by 
the Treaty, it is not entitled to be selective in the access that it grants 
to certain economic sectors once these are open to the market. If the 
state were entitled to maintain special forms of market control over 
privatised companies, it could easily frustrate the application of free 
movement rules by granting only selective and potentially 
discriminatory access to substantial parts of the national market. It is 
for this reason that once a Member State decides to privatise a certain 
company, the protection of the free movement of capital demands 
that the economic autonomy of this company be protected, except in 
cases where it is necessary to safeguard certain fundamental public 
interests recognised by Community law. The intervention of the state 
can no longer be determined by the purpose of securing economic 
control over the company in a manner which is contrary to the 
normal operation of the market. It can only be linked to pursuing a 
possible general economic interest which is associated with the 
company in question. 
 
                                                 
24 Commission v Portugal, France and Belgium, cited above, paragraph 66. 
25 Commission v Spain, cited above, paragraph 67. 
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The Court has recognised that “certain concerns may justify retention 
by Member States of a degree of influence within undertakings that 
were initially public and subsequently privatised”.26 However, from 
the case law of the Court, it is clear that such influence must not be 
aimed at retaining economic or market control over the company, 
and must be limited to the objective of guaranteeing the fulfilment of 
certain public interest obligations. Once the state has taken the 
decision that it is in the public interest to privatise a certain company 
or sector of activity, it cannot attempt to retain economic control over 
the company by restricting, in effect, market access to that company. 
While the state may choose to maintain a certain company under 
public ownership, once it decides to privatise it, it must not set in 
place rules which can restrict access to that company by certain 
market operators, to the advantage of others or to the advantage of 
the state itself. Restrictions are therefore only acceptable if they are 
necessary for the pursuit of certain public interests attributed to these 
companies and are not put in place to guarantee the maintenance of a 
state economic control over these companies. It is for this reason that 
the Court has stressed the “principle of respect for the decision-
making autonomy of the undertaking concerned”.27 As a 
consequence, if, on the one hand, the Court accepts that derogations 
to the fundamental principle of the free movement of capital may be 
accepted “if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society”,28 on the other hand, these 
derogations are limited to what is necessary to guarantee that “the 
performance, under economically acceptable conditions, of the tasks 
of general economic interest which it has entrusted to an 
undertaking” are not put in jeopardy.29 It is also for these reasons that 
the state must identify the specific public interests that are worthy of 
protection, and that the rules which grant special rights to the state 
should be based upon objective and precise criteria that do not go 
beyond that which is necessary for pursuing that public interest and 
guaranteeing the possibility of effective review by the courts. 
 
As in other areas, one can identify a requirement of consistency or 
coherence that is imposed on Member States. Once a decision has 
                                                 
26 Commission v Belgium, cited above, paragraph 43. 
27 Ibid., paragraph 49. 
28 Ibid., paragraph 47. 
29 Commission v Spain, cited above, paragraph 82. 
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been taken to subject a certain area to the market, the state can no 
longer use its authority to exclude the application of certain EC rules 
that govern the internal market in that domain. If exceptions are 
authorised, this must be done under a limited set of circumstances 
and under the supervision of Community law and the courts (as is 
the case in the area of competition law with Article 86(2)). 
4. Conclusion 
The areas reviewed here are only examples of the increasing 
challenges that are arising for the application of EU rules to the new 
forms of state participation or intervention in the market, and the 
difficulty to distinguish between private and public legal forms of 
action. Clearly, this analysis could be extended to other areas. In the 
area of state aid, for example, it is foreseeable that this issue will gain 
importance as new legal forms are adopted by both the state and by 
private operators, or as the state comes up with new instruments for 
intervention which will make it more difficult to determine what 
constitutes state aid and what does not.30 
 
However, the Court appears to be answering these challenges by 
developing a case law that is both flexible and built upon solid 
normative foundations. The criterion underlying these different areas 
of case law appears to be that a requirement of coherence or 
consistency is imposed on the state in its relationship with the 
market. This criterion can be said to make sense not only as a 
necessary tool for allowing the scope of EU rules to adapt to the 
changing faces of the state but also, in broader terms, for 
guaranteeing the different mechanisms of accountability inherent in 
the market and the state. 
 
The power the state exercises in the political sphere is subject to 
democratic control. The market, in contrast, provides a different form 
of accountability which is dominated by competition, which is, itself, 
protected by competition rules. When the exercise of state power 
takes a public form and occurs outside the market, it is subject to the 
classical mechanisms of political and democratic accountability. Such 
public exercises of power are also assumed to take place under a 
decision-making logic which differs from that of the actors in a 
market (though both can, at times, pursue the same goals). Instead, 
                                                 
30 See the recent case Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, cited above. 
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the use of a private legal form and the substitution of state 
intervention in the market by state participation in that market often 
entails the exclusion of these forms of state activity from the 
traditional mechanisms of political accountability. It is, therefore, 
essential, both in terms of proper accountability of the state and of 
control of any form of power, for such activity to be subjected to the 
mechanisms of accountability and the control of power inherent to 
the market. Finally, a consistency requirement is also important for 
the purposes of guaranteeing the transparency necessary for the 
functioning of the mechanisms of political accountability existent in 
the state’s political process. This requires the state to make the logic 
of its decision-making correspond to what it itself proclaims. 
 
This requirement of coherence also operates at the level of the market 
in two ways. First, by guaranteeing that, when the state acquires a 
private form and is no longer subject to the classic mechanisms of 
public accountability, it becomes subject to the alternative mechanism 
of accountability inherent in the market (mainly competition). 
Second, by guaranteeing that the state is not allowed to intervene to 
protect certain private operators from the mechanisms of 
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European integration is in crisis. The crisis affects not only political 
integration, as illustrated by the failure of the Constitutional Treaty 
and the Treaty of Lisbon, but, less visibly, although not less 
importantly, also integration through law – in particular, legal 
adjudication as a common enterprise of European and national 
courts, newly labelled “judicial governance”.1 The critical state of 
judicial governance may, perhaps, best be shown in two core and 
socially “exposed” fields of the European economic constitution: 
consumer and labour law. With regard to the former, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) may increasingly be criticised for interpreting it 
as a law of economic integration only, without caring about consumer 
protection. For example, in a number of cases, including Gonzalez 
                                                 
1 See, in general, S. Frerichs, Judicial Governance in der Europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft, 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008). 
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Sanchez and Skov,2 by elevating the outdated and patchy 1985 Product 
Liability Directive to a maximum harmonisation standard precluding 
stronger consumer protection under national law, the Court has 
unexpectedly deprived consumers affected by defective foodstuffs 
and medicines of important remedies available under national law.3 
In labour law, one may currently observe an even more serious clash 
of the market freedoms, collective agreements and collective action 
rights. In the recent Laval4 and Viking5 cases, the ECJ allowed 
undertakings incorporated in Eastern European countries to undercut 
wages stipulated by collective agreements in Western European 
countries, and severely restricted the trade unions’ rights to strike 
actions against such forms of “social dumping”. In the Rüffert6 case on 
public procurement, the Court even went as far as to forbid the 
respecting, until that time mandatory under regional German law for 
tenders, of minimum wages stipulated by collective agreements. Yet, 
if labour competition were to intensify at the expense of Western 
European workers who cannot survive in their home countries with 
lower Eastern European wages, the fear of the “Polish plumber”, who 
became so prominent in the French “no” to the Constitutional Treaty, 
may eventually materialise. Never in the history of European 
integration has it, to date, happened that workers and trade unions 
are apparently beginning to distrust the EU on a large scale,7 and that 
eminent academics voice crude warnings, such as “stop the ECJ”.8 
 
These problems are predominantly political in nature. Indeed, they 
reflect unavoidable tensions between legitimate objectives of the 
integration process, such as the free market versus consumer and 
worker protection, Eastern European aspirations to access the 
Western European labour markets versus Western European defence 
action of the social state. However, the conviction driving this chapter 
is that these tensions do not just have political, economic and social 
                                                 
2 Case C-402/03. 
3 See Cases C-183/99 González Sánchez [2002] ECR I-3901; C-52/00 Commission v 
France [2002] ECR I-3827 and C-154/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-3879. 
4 Case C-341/05 nyr. 
5 Case C-438/05 nyr. 
6 Case C-346/06 nyr. 
7 Compare, for example, European Trade Union Confederation, Resolution: ETUC 
response to ECJ Judgments Viking and Laval, available at: www.etuc.org. 
8 R. Herzog and L. Gerken, Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung of 8 Sept. 2008, also available at: www.cep.eu; F. Scharpf, 
Mitbestimmung 7-8/2008, 18 et seq. (interview). 
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origins. Instead, just as with any other exercise of public power, 
judicial governance has a twofold dimension: input and output, i.e., 
procedure and substance. Though little reflected in European 
practice, a great deal of the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends 
on the input dimension, i.e., an unbiased, inclusive, deliberate, quick 
and effective procedure, and a sound legal reasoning and 
methodology in court decisions. 
 
Yet, the ECJ’s legal reasoning and methodology is often viewed as 
defective. To start with, the ECJ’s style of legal reasoning, inspired by 
the French tradition, is too succinct and leaves too little room for 
arguments and persuasion, which would be a pre-requisite for the 
acceptance of the decision by the losing party and by the Member 
State whose national legal order might be affected by the judgement. 
Beyond that, the Court’s reasoning is usually very formalistic and, 
contrary to the legislative procedure, does not normally extend to 
assessing the impact of a decision in the social and economic reality 
of national systems. An even more important criticism attaches to the 
ECJ’s substantive orientation. Indeed, the Court if often reproached to 
perform the function of an “EU house court”, with the maximisation 
of effet utile being its chief interpretative criterion. This translates into 
an expansionist approach which constantly extends the reach and 
effectiveness of European law. 
 
This chapter will theoretically reconstruct and refine, illustrate 
examples of, and propose an alternative to, the Court’s 
methodological expansionism. In a first part, I will expound the thesis 
that the judicial expansionism of the past decades was, 
notwithstanding its methodologically revolutionary character, 
generally acceptable in substance, as it was oriented at 
approximating, in breadth, depth and effectiveness, the EC/EU to a 
quasi-federal constitutional system and did not, generally, go beyond 
other existing federal systems. This thesis will be illustrated by 
pointing to important judge-made innovations in the structural and 
substantive constitution (Section 2). In the last years, though, the 
thesis continues, the Court increasingly practises a new kind of 
judicial expansionism which is not longer compatible with, but goes 
beyond, the federal constitutional paradigm. Instead, the new 
approach is characterised by methodological weaknesses and biases 
which translate into a serious imbalance in the European economic 
constitution – effet utile is being turned into an effet néoliberal. This 
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trend will be shown by reconstructing two major instances of 
methodological defects in labour law: the Court’s basic freedoms-bias 
in dealing with conflicting fundamental rights in primary law, and its 
excessive application of the pre-emption doctrine in secondary law. It 
is submitted that this constitutional imbalance puts at risk not only 
the methodological integrity of European judicial governance, but 
also the social and political legitimacy of the European system tout 
court (Section 3). What is required from the Court, I conclude, by 
drawing on Christian Joerges, is nothing less but an abandonment of 
judicial expansionism and a reorientation towards an alternative 
methodological meta-principle. This may be labelled reflexive 
balancing and aims at a methodologically impartial and politically 
sensitive co-ordination of European and national law (Section 4). 
 
2. Judicial Expansionism in the Elaboration of the 
European Economic Constitution 
Famously, important parts of the EC’s structural (dealing with the 
legal relationship of the EC/EU and its Member States) and 
substantive constitution were not contained in the Treaty of Rome, 
but were developed by the ECJ in decade long jurisprudence. In the 
latter, the core provisions on the free movement of goods, services, 
labour, companies and capital were developed from commands 
directed to Member States modelled on GATT 1947 first into 
subjective rights which excluded discrimination, then into 
prohibitions of limitations and positive action commands, and, 
finally, were extended even horizontally, i.e., among private parties.1 
Even though this line of judicial law making is truly revolutionary, 
and would certainly not have been foreseen by the founding fathers 
of the EC in 1958, it has developed the free trade provisions into a 
common and widespread instrument – namely, fundamental 
economic rights which are also contained in national constitutions. 
Such rights enjoy, by definition, direct effect and protect their holders 
not only against discrimination, but also other unjustified, in 
particular, disproportional, limitations; and even their horizontal 
applicability among citizens and enterprises represents a widespread 
development in many, if not most, European states.2 
                                                 
1 See, instead, of many, J.H.H. Weiler, “The Constitution of the Common 
Marketplace”, in: P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 349. 
2 See A. Colombi Ciacchi, G. Brüggemeier and G. Comandé, Fundamental Rights and 
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With regard to the structural constitution, this may again be regarded 
as ultimately relatively similar to federal systems. It is true that, 
starting from the public international law origin of the Community, 
the Court-made doctrines of direct effect, supremacy and state 
liability, were indeed revolutionary; the same is true for its often 
overlooked procedural counterpart, the transformation of the 
preliminary reference procedure (Article 234 EC), which was 
originally only meant to ensure uniform interpretation of EC law, 
into a mechanism of constitutional review of national law. Yet, the 
ensuing result, namely, that there exists a “higher law of the land” 
which is directly applicable and trumps over lower (regional) law is 
no anomaly, but rather the regular state of affairs in federal systems; 
the remarkable point is only that the founding fathers of the EC did 
not, apparently, envisage such a system. Even the direct effect of 
directives does not constitute a major exception. It may be true that 
the concept of directives, which according to Article 249 EC constitute 
implementation commands directed to the Member States only, is a 
special European feature. Yet, the Court’s doctrine of direct effect is 
built on the universally recognised principles of venire contra factum 
proprium in the Roman law tradition, and resp. estoppel in the 
Common Law – whereby nobody is to be allowed to gain advantages 
by disrespecting the law. 
 
Finally, the state liability doctrine which the ECJ deduced from 
nothing more than “the system of the Treaty”3 in Francovich and the 
follow-up decisions does have European structural specificities. 
Indeed, due to the limited number of cases referred, the ECJ was not 
yet able to elaborate it into a comprehensive framework. Instead, 
among the elements for a liability claim, only the violation of a right 
guaranteed in EC law has been defined exhaustively at European 
level, whereas the causality and scope of the recoverable damage still 
need to be defined by national law, which is resorted to gap-filling. 
Thus, taken together, state liability law in Europe constitutes a 
complex, and probably typically European, mixture of European and 
national law. However, beyond these structural specificities, the 
                                                                                                                   
Private Law in the European Union, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
3 Case C-6/90 and C 9/90, Francovich, ECR 1991, 5537. See, for example, in English, R. 
Caranta, “Judicial Protection against Member States: A New Jus Commune takes 
Shape”, (1995) 32 CMLR, p. 703. 
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existence, as such, of a state liability doctrine covering “legislative 
injustice” is a typical feature of all European states. 
 
All in all, it may be concluded that major features of both the 
structural and the substantive constitution have been developed by 
courageous and, partly, even revolutionary moves of the Court, 
which went massively beyond the original design of the Treaty of 
Rome and converted the EC/EU into a quasi-federal system. Yet, 
when compared to other federal systems, and apart from the fact that 
no other system has been created through judicial law-making to a 
similar extent, the structural and substantive constitution of the 
EC/EU have only limited peculiarities. As the federal transformation 
of the EC has been tacitly approved by the Member States over the 
years, this kind of old judicial expansionism may eventually claim 
legitimacy. 
 
3. Recent Judicial Expansionism Translating into 
Neoliberal Results 
In recent years, European integration has entered a new phase in 
various respects. With regard to form, the successful model of – 
politically less visible – incremental integration been partly replaced 
by an integration of “grands projets”, which have, up until now, been 
far less successful: the Nice Fundamental Rights Charter, the White 
Paper on Governance, which claimed a new form for the exercise of 
political power by the EC/EU, the Constitutional Treaty and, what 
may be viewed as its societal counterpart, the project of a European 
Civil Code. With regard to substance, economic integration seems to 
have reached a new phase in which the persistence of different 
national varieties of capitalism is no longer accepted.4 Instead, radical 
liberalisation efforts systematically challenge the institutions of 
continental style organised capitalism, in which a certain equilibrium 
between economic efficiency and social state objectives had been 
established. This trend is illustrated by the struggles over the 
Takeover and the Services Directives, which have also negatively 
affected the ratification debate of the constitutional treaty. 
 
                                                 
4 This thesis is defended by M. Höpner and Armin Schäfer, “A New Phase of 
European Integration”, MPIFG Discussion Paper 07/4. 
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This shift in economic integration is also supported by a novel kind of 
judicial expansionism practised by the ECJ. This is characterised not 
so much by new and more fanciful methodological inventions, but by 
the legal political results of law-making in politically sensitive fields. 
Indeed, the special feature of this new judicial expansionism seems to 
be that is goes beyond the federalisation paradigm and thus 
translates into a serious imbalance in the European economic 
constitution, with effet utile being turned into an effet néoliberal. 
 
This trend is, perhaps, most visible in the instrumentalisation, by the 
ECJ, of parties’ strategies to circumvent national regulation in order 
to favour integration, often with a de-regulatory flavour. Such a 
connotation may be associated with the famous Centros and Inspire 
Art cases in which the ECJ accepted the use of foreign letterbox 
companies, the English private limited company in particular, 
explicitly to circumvent national corporate law requirements inter alia 
on minimum capitalisation. Indeed, the ECJ decided that it is 
legitimate for a company to be governed no longer by the law of the 
place of its doing business (the so-called real-seat-theory), but by the 
law of the place of its incorporation (the incorporation theory) even if 
the actual place of activity is then transferred into another country. 
Whilst the ensuing liberalisation of company law may still be viewed 
as acceptable on account of its rationalising effects, it might become 
critical if extended to socially sensitive parts of national company 
law, such as the German co-determination system.5 
 
Beyond Centros and its progeny, it is submitted that more dangerous 
effects of the ECJ’s new judicial expansionism might materialise in 
consumer and labour law: namely, the Court’s articulation of 
fundamental rights and market freedoms in primary law, which, in 
certain cases, amounts to a pro-market freedoms-bias (1), and its 
                                                 
5 Beyond the economic constitution, the jurisprudence on the mutual recognition of 
driving licences based upon Directive 91/439/EC may, incidentally, be assessed in a 
similar light (see Cases C-239/06 and C-343/06, Wiedemann and Funk. In these 
decisions, the Court held that a Member State must recognise a driving licence taken 
in a foreign state even when the licence had been withdrawn in the home state, for 
example, for drunk-driving and the exclusionary period for the re-issuance of the 
licence had not yet elapsed. The only requirement is that the interested person must 
actually have a registered domicile in the foreign state – a connecting factor which 
can be easily manipulated.  
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excessive application of the pre-emption doctrine in secondary law 
(2). 
 
3.1. The Court’s Articulation of Fundamental Rights and 
Market Freedoms 
In the Court’s articulation of fundamental rights and market 
freedoms, there have been important new developments in recent 
years. To start with, the 1999 Nice Charter has consolidated and 
extended the reach and intensity of the protection of fundamental 
rights in Europe. Though not yet formally integrated into EC law due 
to the failure of the Constitutional and the Treaty of Lisbon, both of 
which had contained the Charter, European institutions including the 
ECJ and the European Commission have often referred to the Charter 
and elevated its provisions to directly binding general legal 
principles. 
 
Whereas the fundamental rights contained in the Charter may only 
be invoked against EC/EU measures, and not against national 
measures others than implementation und execution measures of 
EC/EU law (Article 51 Charter), the ECJ has apparently disrespected 
this limitation in the Karner6 case. In this case, a trader had challenged 
the prohibition, contained in Austrian unfair competition law, of 
advertising that the sold goods that originated from an insolvent 
estate when the goods no longer formed part of that estate. After 
excluding a violation of the free movement of goods by assigning the 
case to the Keck exception of non-discriminatory selling 
arrangements”, the Court also scrutinised the compatibility of this 
result with the freedom of commercial speech as laid down in Article 
10 ECHR. It answered this question in the affirmative as the national 
provision clearly fell within the margin of discretion granted to 
national law. In reality, the Court would not even have been allowed 
to examine the compatibility of a purely national provision with the 
ECHR as part of EC law. The opaque justification brought forward by 
the Court according to which the national measure fell the within 
scope of application of EC law is absolutely not convincing as the 
application of the basic freedoms had been excluded before and no 
other affected provision of EC law had been mentioned. Perhaps, 
extending fundamental rights even beyond the scope assigned to 
                                                 
6 Case C-71/02, ECR 2005, I-00. 
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them by the Charter might be an invitation to the Member States 
which opted out to join the Charter, so as to enable them to insist on 
the limits to judicial review laid down therein. 
 
Another strange combination of fundamental rights and the basic 
freedoms appeared in the Carpenter case: the spouse of a British 
citizen, who was a national of the Philippines, applied for a permit to 
stay in the UK, but her application was rejected and a deportation 
order was issued. The Court held this decision to violate Mr. 
Carpenter’s (!) freedom of services, which was strangely extended so 
as to cover the protection of family life under Article 8 ECHR as well. 
According to the Court, the latter’s ability to provide services to 
clients in other EU states would have been impaired if his spouse was 
deported, due to the fact that she was responsible for the children 
when the husband was away on business. With all sympathy for this 
decision and for the Carpenters’ family life, treating the wife as the 
husband’s accessory in exercising his freedom of services is 
methodologically simply undefendable. Beyond that, it remains 
completely unclear when a fundamental freedom may be used to 
extend the scope of application of a basic freedom right. A more 
happy articulation of fundamental rights and basic freedoms took 
place in the Schmidberger and Omega cases. In the former, the Austrian 
government had granted permission for the Brenner motorway to be 
closed in order to allow a demonstration against the levels of 
pollution in the Alps caused by the heavy traffic. Schmidberger was a 
German company that transported goods on lorries, which argued 
that the closure of the Brenner Pass interfered with the free 
movement of goods. The latter was argued to apply also among 
private parties, in the sense that Member States had an obligation to 
counteract its violation by one party. In its decision, the ECJ 
recognised that the closure of the Brenner Pass restricted the free 
movement of goods, and then considered whether the restriction of 
the free movement of goods could be justified due to the concerns of 
the Austrian Government to protect the right of freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly as laid down in Articles 10 and 
11 of the ECHR. Emphasising the huge margin of discretion that the 
Member State authorities enjoyed in this “balancing of interests” 
exercise, it concluded that the Austrian measures were lawful. 
Importantly, the ECJ did not subject fundamental rights to a more or 
less strict and one-sided proportionality scrutiny, as it normally does 
in cases of limitations to the market freedoms. Instead, extending this 
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text bilaterally, as it were, the Court also argued that restrictions of 
human rights by market freedoms need to be justified: 
 
Consequently, the exercise of those [fundamental] rights may 
be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to 
objectives of general interest and do not, taking account of the 
aim of the restrictions, constitute disproportionate and 
unacceptable interference, impairing the very substance of the 
rights guaranteed. 
 
Remarkably, the latter restriction integrates the German concept of a 
minimum content of a fundamental right (Wesensgehalt) into EC law. 
An analogous approach was taken by the Court in the Omega 
decision. Omega was a German company operating a laser 
installation known as a “laser-drome”. The police authority of the city 
of Bonn issued an order prohibiting the operation of games involving 
firing at human targets. The argument was that these games 
constituted a violation of human dignity as guaranteed in Article 1 (1) 
of the German Constitution. Even though the appeal initiated by 
Omega against this order was dismissed by the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), the latter 
was, however, uncertain as to whether the prohibition was 
compatible with the freedom to provide services and the freedom of 
movement of goods as guaranteed in the EC Treaty. The ECJ referred 
to its judgment in Schmidberger, and confirmed that the protection of 
fundamental rights justifies, in principle, a restriction upon market 
freedoms. The ECJ shared the opinion of the Advocate General that 
“the Community legal order undeniably strives to ensure respect for 
human dignity as a general principle of law”. Thus, just as in 
Schmidberger, the ECJ accepted the government’s reasons, and 
allowed that measures which seek to ensure respect for human rights 
may be justified. 
 
Unfortunately, the high methodological standard practised in these 
two cases was not perpetuated in subsequent jurisprudence in the 
Viking, Laval and Rüffert cases on the conflict of the freedom of 
services with trade unions’ right to collective action. 
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3.1.1. Freedom of services versus trade unions’ right to 
collective action: the Viking, Laval and Rüffert cases 
Facts 
In Viking, a Finnish firm, owned a ferry, the Rosella, which plied its 
trade between Helsinki and Tallinn. The Rosella sailed under the 
Finnish flag and had a predominantly Finnish crew. Viking wanted 
to re-register the ferry in Estonia. The International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF) has a long-standing and well-known 
campaign against the use of flags of convenience: in other words, the 
use of the flag of one country (typically with lower labour standards) 
by a beneficial owner situated in another country. The ITF and its 
affiliate, the Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU), planned to take 
industrial action against Viking with a view to preventing the firm 
from re-flagging the Rosella. Viking applied to the High Court in 
London for an injunction to stop the trade unions’ boycott, on the 
grounds that it infringed Article 43 EC, the right to freedom of 
establishment. The English courts’ jurisdiction over the case was 
found to be established pursuant to the Brussels Regulation. At first 
instance, the English court held that the unions were in breach of 
Article 43. It did not consider it necessary to refer to the ECJ, and 
granted an injunction to restrain the unions’ industrial action. The 
unions appealed. The Court of Appeal was much less certain that 
Article 43 was applicable to the unions, noting that the case raised 
complex issues about the article’s role in cases between private 
parties which had not previously been addressed by the ECJ. 
Moreover, even if the unions were to be held to be in breach of Article 
43, there were serious questions with regard to whether the unions’ 
actions amounted to direct or indirect discrimination, and, if so, 
whether or not these actions could be justified. The Court of Appeal 
decided that these issues should be referred to the ECJ. After detailed 
consideration, the Court refused to grant Viking an interim injunction 
against the unions pending the hearing of the case by the ECJ. 
 
In Laval, a Latvian building firm won a government contract to 
renovate school premises in Vaxholm, Sweden. The firm posted some 
Latvian workers to Sweden to work on the building site. The local 
branch of the Swedish builders’ union (Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet) opened negotiations with Laval’s Swedish 
subsidiary with the aim of extending the relevant sectoral collective 
agreement to the posted workers and negotiating wages for them. 
The negotiations failed and the union (supported by the electricians’ 
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union) began a blockade of Laval’s building sites. This effectively put 
a stop to all work on Laval’s sites and eventually resulted in Laval’s 
Swedish subsidiary going into liquidation. Laval brought an action in 
the Swedish courts. The firm sought a declaration that the collective 
action was unlawful, an injunction to stop the action, and 
compensation from the unions for the losses that it had suffered. The 
Swedish labour law court (Arbetsdomstolen) referred questions to the 
ECJ on the interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC, 
and Article 49 EC, on freedom to provide services.  
 
In Rüffert, a German company won a tender with the Land 
Niedersachsen which involved construction work in a prison located at 
Göttingen. The public procurement law of that Land states that: 
 
[T]he contracts for building services shall be awarded only to 
undertakings which, when lodging a tender, undertake in 
writing to pay their employees, when performing those 
services, at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective 
agreement in the place where those services are performed (…) 
 
The German company sub-contracted the work to a Polish company 
and it turned out that the Polish workers actually earned less than 
half of their German colleagues on the site. Therefore, the Land 
Niedersachsen annulled the contract and imposed financial penalties 
on the company. 
 
Again, the ECJ produced a judgment along the lines of the Posting of 
Workers Directive. In its view, the situation in Niedersachsen did not 
fulfil the criteria to fix pay as set out in the Directive as the law does 
not itself fix any minimum rate of pay and the collective agreement in 
question had not been declared universally applicable. Again, the 
Court argued that the Posting of Workers Directive outlines the 
maximum level of protection for posted workers, and that, in a 
collective agreement, as in this case, a higher level of protection 
cannot be laid down. 
 
The Decisions of the Court 
In Viking, the Court pointed out, in a first step, that Article 43 EC 
could be applied horizontally, i.e., also with regard to collective 
agreement regulating gainful employment and the provision of 
services, and collective measures such as strikes which aim at the 
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conclusion of such an agreement were inextricably linked with the 
latter and were, therefore, covered as well. This horizontal extension 
of Article 43 was motivated by the fact that, given that working 
conditions are regulated in some states by legal regulation and in 
others by collective agreement, another result would create 
inequality. In a more fundamental respect, the Court held that 
collective measures protected by the freedom of association are not 
exempt from the freedom of establishment by virtue of § 137 V EC 
which excludes European harmonisation measures in this field. 
Instead, according to the Court, in the areas which fall outside the 
scope of the Community’s competence, the Member States are, in 
principle, free to enact regulation, but it must, nevertheless, comply 
with Community law. This apparently innocent sentence means 
nothing less than that the scope of application of the market freedoms 
is basically unlimited. Moreover, the Court argued that the protection 
of fundamental rights including social rights is within the scope of 
application of Community law, which aims not only at economic, but 
also at social, integration. 
 
In a second step, the Court examined whether – as the right to 
register a ship in another country is protected by the freedom of 
establishment, and collective measures had effectively limited that 
right – the collective action rights of trade unions constituted a lawful 
limitation of that freedom. This assessment was delegated by the ECJ 
to the national courts, who have to respect, however, a set of provisos 
laid down by the ECJ, which render it somewhat unlikely that 
collective measures would pass the test. In particular, on account of 
the proportionality principle, collective action would be allowed only 
to the extent that it was actually necessary for the protection of 
workers, and this would not be the case if their jobs were not in 
danger. Generally, no justification would be available if the ship-
owner’s freedom to register a vessel in another Member States was 
completely impaired. In such an event, the protection of workers 
would not be available as a defence. Indeed, as ITF’s policy of 
combating the use of flags of convenience also applied to the re-
registering of vessels in states with a higher level of workers’ 
protection, it was not a suitable measure to promote this aim in the 
first place. 
 
The Laval decision crucially revolves around the compatibility of the 
collective measures undertaken by the Swedish trade union with the 
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Posted Workers Directive, which will be dealt in more detail with 
below. Without analytically clarifying the relationship between the 
directive and Article 49, the Court continued to reason that the 
compatibility of the trade unions’ action with the latter provision 
would also need to be examined. After repeating that such action, 
based upon the unions’ fundamental rights, was not outside the 
scope of application of Article 49 and that that provision applied 
horizontally, the Court also confirmed that Article 49 had been 
limited by the unions’ strike and blocking actions. Then, the ECJ 
turned to the key issue of the justifications of this restriction through 
over-riding reason of public interest. As a matter of principle, the 
Court continued, a collective measure which aims at protecting 
workers against social dumping is an appropriate public interest, as 
the activities of the EC/EU as defined in Article 2 EC, and confirmed 
in several European and international conventions and other legal 
instruments, include not only an internal market, but also a social 
policy. Whereas a blockade is still covered by the objective of 
protecting workers, the Court concluded, the specific obligations in 
question which the trade unions tried to impose on the undertaking 
were no longer covered. This followed from the fact that several 
obligations went beyond the minimum standard of working 
conditions laid down in the directive. With regard to negotiations on 
minimum wages, these would, in principle, be allowed by the 
directive, but were not, in a national context: 
 
[C]haracterised by a lack of provisions, of any kind, which are 
sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not render it 
impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an 
undertaking to determine the obligations with which it is 
required to comply as regards minimum pay. 
 
Finally, the Court found that the Swedish law on worker co-
determination which stipulated that foreign collective agreements 
could not be invoked in Sweden were discriminatory and therefore in 
violation of Article 49. 
 
The Rüffert case also dealt with the Posted Workers Directive (see 
below) and Article 49 EC. Regarding the latter provision, the ECJ did 
not admit any justification based upon the rationale of protecting 
workers, as the regional legislation only applies to the public, and not 
to the private, sector. The ECJ also rejected other defence arguments: 
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the financial sustainability of social security systems – which had 
prompted the Federal Constitutional Court to admit compliance with 
collective agreements (Tariftreue) – or ensuring the freedom of 
collective bargaining and the freedom of association. 
Methodological critique 
The conflict at issue between the European freedom of services and 
the national fundamental right of trade unions to take collective 
action may be labelled a diagonal conflict in which, logically, the 
supremacy of European law must not be applied formalistically for 
the very reason that different subject matters are touched upon. 
Instead, a more complex solution is wanted with a set of conditions 
that need to be respected. 
 
First, it is still acceptable that the Court does not exempt collective 
agreements and action by trade unions from the applicability of the 
basic freedoms altogether, as it had decided in Albany with regard to 
the relationship of antitrust law and collective agreements. Indeed, 
such a solution would have allowed for an unlimited restriction of 
the freedom of services and would have excluded any balancing and 
compatibilisation of the two colliding fields. It is true that this 
jurisprudence constitutes a remarkable extension of the horizontality 
doctrine, which has, up until now, only been applied to collective 
actors, such as sports associations7 or employers8 with factual 
regulation power over others; in contrast, trade unions may only 
militate in favour of the conclusion of collective-agreements, and, 
hence, they do not possess unilateral regulatory power. But when the 
legal order, in order to enable societal self-regulation in the public 
interest (“private governance”), assigns a high degree of regulatory 
power and collective rights to the industrial parties together, they 
should, when exercising these powers, be bound to consider 
fundamental rules of general interest – such as the European market 
freedoms, which articulate the European interest in the free 
circulation of goods, etc. However, the constitutionally protected 
status of trade union rights urges a limitation of the reach and 
intensity of the market freedoms’ influence on collective agreements, 
so as to enable a smooth co-ordination of both constitutional 
principles. 
                                                 
7 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch, ECR 1974, 1405; C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des 
Sociétés de Football Association ASLB/ Jean-Marc Bosman, ECR 1995, I-4921. 
8 Case C-281/98, Angonese, ECR 2000, I-4139. 
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Not exempting collective agreements from the application of the basic 
freedoms is not, moreover, logically incompatible with Article 137 V 
EC, as this provision only excludes a harmonisation competence in 
this field. Yet, the impossibility of re-regulating a situation in which 
de-regulation has taken place through the application of the basic 
freedoms should induce the Court to grant a significant margin of 
discretion to national law – as it otherwise faces the danger of a 
“terrorist approach”, in the sense of putting a “de-regulatory” bomb, 
although it is unable to do the “re-regulatory” reconstruction work 
afterwards. 
 
Unfortunately, the Court has not opted for such desirable judicial 
self-restraint. Instead, its way of articulating the basic freedoms with 
industrial relations is not methodologically neutral, but confers 
significant advantages on the former. To start with, the basic 
freedoms are chosen as reference provisions against which industrial 
action needs to justify itself under the narrow limitations of the 
proportionality principle. This is, of course, the Court’s ordinary way 
of scrutinising the compatibility of any national legislation with the 
basic freedoms. However, this approach is inadequate in the case of 
fundamental rights – which, in all Member States’ legal systems and 
also in European law (to name just the Charter), enjoy the same rank 
and dignity as the basic freedoms. Why should industrial action 
rights – which have been established in the Member State only after 
century-long painful struggles and which are indispensable 
components of the welfare state upon which the social peace is built – 
need to justify themselves before the basic freedoms – why not, 
provocatively speaking, just the other way round? Who has ever 
decided on the supremacy of the basic freedoms in Europe over any 
other constitutional rights? As already mentioned, the Court had 
adopted an adequate “bilateral” perspective on the articulation of 
fundamental rights and market freedoms in Schmidberger and Omega, 
but it is neither clear nor coherent why it has not done so in the cases 
under review. As a result, the Court should not choose one right as a 
reference provision, but should evenly balance both, so as to 
maximise the practical effectiveness of both – a procedure named 
“practical concordance” in German methodology. Such a balancing 
exercise would also include adapting the justifications available for 
the restrictions of market freedoms to the specific situation of private 
parties in horizontal constellations such as the present one – a 
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problem which had already been addressed in the context of the 
Bosman decision. 
 
Contrary to what some might think, the defective methodological 
approach by the Court is not a minor issue, but generates important 
consequences. Indeed, the Court only briefly sketches industrial 
action rights as part of the general interest, and, therefore, as in 
principle admissible limitations to the basic freedoms, before it turns 
to focusing in much greater detail on the proportionality conditions 
that those rights need to satisfy. Thus, neither their autonomous 
scope of protection, nor their indispensable hard core are de-limited 
and reflected in any way. Moreover, industrial action rights are 
implicitly downgraded by the Court by presenting them as part of the 
general interest only. In their historically prior and still most 
important function, fundamental rights are subjective defence rights 
of citizens and enterprises against the state; they are, in other words, 
exceptions to the general interest, not incorporations thereof. 
 
Beyond this, collective action rights are also treated inadequately in 
the framework of the proportionality principle: the Court protects 
them only to the extent they are necessary to ensure the protection of 
workers, which is treated as the paramount objective. Consequently, 
in the Court’s view, collective action rights are not suitable to restrict 
the market freedoms when invoked in order to counteract the transfer 
of an undertaking to a country with a higher standard of labour 
protection. The same is true when security of employment is not at 
stake – as it had been argued in Viking when the company offered to 
carry out the re-flagging without dismissing crew members. As a 
result, when collective action rights are tied to the protection of 
workers, they are ultimately reduced to safeguarding existing jobs 
alone. 
 
However, in the European constitutional tradition, collective actions 
have a completely different dimension: they are generally protected 
in their own right, not as the accessories of other rights. Collective 
agreements and action rights represent a sphere of societal self-
organisation which goes beyond the protection of workers, but is 
directly relevant to the legitimacy of modern “multi arena-
governance” (Héritier), composed of a wide array of private and 
public elements. As a result, the Court should have analysed whether 
the self-organising capacity of Swedish trade unions as part of the 
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Swedish civil society would have been affected in its hard core if it 
forced Sweden to accept foreign collective agreements and social 
dumping upon the basis of the market freedoms. These implications 
of collective action rights should also have been reflected in a less 
restrictive application of the horizontality doctrine. Whereas this 
doctrine may, perhaps, be extended legitimately to important 
collective agreements and action rights substituting themselves 
effectively for state regulation on working conditions, the trade 
unions should, at any rate, be accorded a larger margin of discretion 
in exercising their collective rights. Ultimately, all these 
considerations should have conducted the Court to the fundamental 
question of whether it was entitled to interfere with, and gravely 
damage, the Swedish social model in which the self-regulation of 
workers, tenants and consumers, which plays a far larger role than 
elsewhere in Europe, and has enabled social peace and prosperity for 
at least the last century. 
3.2. The Excessive Application of the Pre-emption 
Doctrine in Secondary Law 
Another methodological weakness which has translated itself into a 
serious neo-liberal imbalance in the European economic constitution 
is provided by the Court’s excessive application of the pre-emption 
doctrine in secondary law. As a correlate of the supremacy doctrine, 
pre-emption means that national provisions which concur with 
European provisions are displaced because European legislation has 
already dealt exhaustively with the subject matter in question or laid 
down the conditions for the applicability of national law 
exhaustively. Thus, contrary to the supremacy doctrine, it is 
irrelevant whether a national provision is in conflict or not with EC 
provisions if the national norm only falls in a pre-empted area, which 
may also be a small area. Clearly, the pre-emption doctrine has a 
huge interventionist potential, as it may declare inapplicable a whole 
field of national law on account of a perceived contradiction with 
European law. In a constitutional macro-perspective, pre-emption 
indicates a shift of legislative competence in a given field from a 
concurring to an exclusive European competence. 
 
Pre-emption is, in some cases, prescribed by conflicts of law rules 
contained in European legal instruments. Normally, however, the 
assessment of whether a certain area, or sub-field, is regulated 
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exhaustively by the European legislator belongs to the ECJ, which 
has, as always, a huge degree of discretion in the application of this 
doctrine. The following example of the interpretation of the Posted 
Workers Directive in the Laval and Rüffert cases will show that, 
unfortunately, the Court applies this doctrine too restrictively, which 
curtails national law too much and overstretches the regulatory 
capacity of European law. 
3.2.1. The Posted Workers Directive 
The Posted Workers Directive of 1996, which regulates the working 
conditions of workers posted to another Member State, was enacted 
for several motives. First, in the leading case Rush Portuguesa of 19909, 
the ECJ had indicated, albeit only in an obiter dictum, that Member 
States were entitled to apply their entire legislation in the field of 
social and labour law including collective agreements to posted 
workers. Clearly, this legal position strengthens national industrial 
systems, including the position of trade unions, but weakens the 
chances of foreign companies to access domestic markets, and thus 
the effectiveness of the freedom of services. To counteract this trend, 
the Commission was in search of a compromise which would limit 
this freedom less.10 The Member States, at that time only Western 
European States (!), not only wanted to regulate the legal position of 
posted workers, but also wanted to protect their labour markets 
against low wage competition (“social dumping”) from other 
Member States. In this context, Germany and other Member States 
also wanted to safeguard their own pre-existing special legislation on 
posted workers, which might have come under pressure had the ECJ 
ordered the unaltered application, on anti-discrimination grounds, of 
ordinary national legislation in the field of social and labour law to 
posted workers as well. 
 
The principal aims of the Posted Workers Directive are indicated in 
its 5th Recital: promoting transnational services through fair 
competition and the protection of workers, leaving Member State law 
on collective action unaffected (Rec. 22). Though not explicitly 
mentioned, the objective of counteracting social dumping may also be 
read into the term “fair competition”. Technically, the directive did 
                                                 
9 Case C-113/82, ECR 1990, 1965. 
10 M. Corti, “Le decisioni ITF e Laval della Corte di Giustizia”, (2008) 27 Rivista 
Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, p. 254 et seq. 
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not envisage the harmonisation of substantive law, but limited itself 
to a private international law solution. According to its Article 3, host 
Member States are required to ensure the application to posted 
workers of a set of important working conditions, including 
maximum work periods, minimum paid annual holidays and 
minimum rates of pay, as stipulated in their own law and/or 
collective agreements or arbitration awards declared universally 
applicable; if neither of the two instruments exist in a Member State, 
the latter is also allowed to base itself upon collective agreements or 
awards generally applicable to all similar undertakings in the 
geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned 
and/or collective agreements concluded by the most representative 
employers’ and labour organisations at national level and applied 
throughout the country, provided that equal treatment of domestic 
and posted foreign workers is ensured (Article 3 para. 8). According 
to Article 3 para. 7, though, these provisions “[s]hall not prevent 
application of terms and conditions of employment which are more 
favourable to workers”. 
 
The meaning of this provision is not entirely clear, and it might even 
seem that these ambiguous terms were chosen on purpose, as a kind 
of liberalist trap. It is true that the wording of the provision covers 
any more favourable employment conditions, irrespective of who has 
enacted them. However, it is also clear that this interpretation would 
admit any national rules, even rules which, under the pretext of 
granting high protection to posted workers, de facto shield the 
national labour market from posted workers by making their use 
prohibitively expensive. As a result, it has been submitted in the 
literature that the directive’s objective of co-ordinating the laws of the 
Member States in order to ensure effective minimum protection 
(Recital 13) required a limitation of this provision to more favourable 
rules of the enterprise’s state of origin.11 
 
As mentioned, under the Swedish social model, industrial relations 
play a central role, and the regulation of working conditions is largely 
left to the industrial partners. This model does not fit well with the 
system of the directive. Conditions on working time and all the other 
types of conditions mentioned in the directive, with the exception of 
minimum wage conditions, are contained in the Swedish 
                                                 
11 Corti (loc. cit.), p. 259 et seq. 
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implementation statute, but collective agreements often lay down 
more favourable conditions for workers. Wage conditions are left 
entirely to collective negotiation, but minimum wages, in the 
technical sense, do not exist; instead, staggered wages reflecting the 
different categories of workers are usually negotiated for single 
building projects. Moreover, the collective agreement the Swedish 
trade unions wanted to force on Laval contained further provisions 
(inter alia rules on protection against dismissal, on contributions to 
insurance schemes and on compensations for union activities) which 
are not contemplated in the directive at all. 
3.2.2. The Interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive in 
Laval and Rüffert 
In Laval, the ECJ ruled that all three types of clauses and conditions 
contained in the collective agreement were incompatible with the 
directive. Significantly, and though this term is actually never used, 
the Court based this assessment upon a formalistic pre-emption 
reasoning. 
 
With regard to the provisions on wages, the Court held that, as the 
negotiation of wages had been left to the trade unions, they had not 
been stipulated in one of the ways allowed by the directive, i.e. by 
national law, or by the collective agreements or the arbitration 
awards declared universally applicable, or by representative 
collective agreements chosen by Member State authorities as the 
relevant basis for minimum working conditions. Therefore, no lawful 
designation of minimum provisions by state authorities could be 
recognised. 
 
With regard to the second group of working conditions contemplated 
by Article 3 a-g and implemented by Swedish legislation, the Court 
stressed that it was not lawful that working conditions contained in 
collective agreements could go beyond the minimum standard fixed 
by law. Instead, the directive needed to be interpreted not only as a 
minimum standard, but also a maximum standard, under which only 
the rules of the enterprise’s state of origin could be invoked as more 
favourable rules in the sense of Article 3 (7). Otherwise, the Court 
argued, the directive would be deprived of its effet utile – apparently 
that of enabling only a limited restriction of the freedom of services 




With regard to the third group of working conditions, i.e., conditions 
not contemplated by Article 3 a-g, but contained in the relevant 
collective agreements (such as conditions on contributions to pension 
and accident relief schemes), these are not at all justifiable unless they 
are necessary to uphold public order as defined in Article 3 (10), 
which was not the case here. 
 
In Rüffert, the Court applied basically the same schematic pre-
emption reasoning as in Laval. The requirement, contained in the law 
for public tenders of the Land Niedersachsen, of a declaration by the 
undertaking that the collective agreements of the relevant sector 
would be complied with was not covered by Article 3 (1) 1st indent of 
the directive, as it clearly did not lay down any minimum wages 
itself; the collective agreement in the construction sector at issue was 
not covered by Article 3 (1) 2nd indent and (8) of the directive as it 
had not been declared universally applicable; nor could it be 
qualified as a representative collective agreement in the sense of 
Article 3 (8) as it had not been qualified as such by a public authority; 
moreover, it did not constitute an agreement “generally applicable to 
all similar undertakings in the geographical area and in the 
profession or industry concerned” as foreseen in Article 3 (8) as it was 
not applicable to private construction works. 
3.2.3. Methodological Critique 
The formalistic application of the directive triggers a host of 
methodological criticisms. At a technical level, it is questionable how 
the Court could, as it did, simply scrutinise the compatibility of 
national legislation and collective agreements with the directive. 
Indeed, no mention is made of the direct effect doctrine or 
interprétation conforme, and the lack, well established in earlier 
jurisprudence since Marshall, of the horizontal direct effect of a 
directive. Assuming that the Court did not want to discard all its 
previous jurisprudence on this matter, the only methodologically 
possible way to explain the Court’s reasoning would be to read the 
whole content of the directive implicitly into the scope of application 
of Article 49 EC. Indeed, whereas the Court kept the scrutiny of 
Article 49 EC and the directive separate in the motivation of the 
decisions, it quoted both sources together in their operative 
summary. However, this approach is highly problematical, as 
reading all the detailed provisions of a directive into primary law 
would level out the difference between primary and secondary law 
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and unduly assign the directive more weight on account of the 
hierarchy of norms. 
 
The main substantive criticism attaches to the excessive pre-emptive 
effect accorded to the directive by the Court, notably through its 
restrictive interpretation of Article 3 (7). Generally, this interpretation 
presses the multiplicity of regulation, extending to posted workers, 
on working conditions in all Members States and of both public and 
private origin, into the straitjacket of a few legal provisions, which, 
most probably, were not intended by their drafters as an exhaustive 
regulation of the whole field. Indeed, as shown by its clash with the 
Swedish system of industrial relations, the Posted Workers Directive 
is manifestly incapable of doing to justice to the host of social models 
that exist in Europe.  
 
This predominantly legal policy-based criticism may be specified 
analytically in various respects. First, the Court’s limitation of Article 
3 para. 7 to more favourable norms on the working conditions of the 
country of origin is far from being persuasive. When the ECJ tries to 
base this interpretation upon the effet utile of the directive, it should 
be noted that it deprives Article 3 para. 7 of any meaningful effet utile 
in the first place. Indeed, under the Article 8 para. 2 of the Rome I – 
regulation, labour contracts are governed, in the absence of a valid 
choice of law, by the law of the country in which the worker usually 
works. This rule also applies in the case of a transitory posting to 
another country. As a result, the law of the country of origin is 
already applicable according to ordinary conflict of laws rules. The 
mandatory norms of the Posted Workers Directive allow for an 
exception to these rules only when the labour regulation in the 
country of origin does not comply with the minimal working 
conditions of the country of destination, as contemplated in Article 3 
a – g of the directive. In the event that the law of the country of origin 
is more favourable for the worker than the law of the country of 
destination, the former applies anyway. Therefore, if limited, as the 
Court did, to the law of the country of origin, Article 3 para. 7 of the 
directive is deprived of any meaningful scope of application. 
 
Second, it is questionable that the Court extends the directive’s pre-
emptive effect to any private collective agreement governing working 
conditions. Indeed, the directive only refers to the regulation of 
working conditions in legal or administrative provisions, collective 
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agreements declared universally applicable, or representative 
agreements selected by public authorities; its extension beyond these 
categories not only constitutes a massive limitation on private 
autonomy, but also prevents Member States from regulating such 
agreements constructively in any other way. The excessive horizontal 
pre-emptive effect accorded to the directive by the Court is rendered 
worse by the fact that, pursuant to Article 3 (10), the directive 
restrictions are only justifiable on grounds of public order (which is 
much more restrictive than the justifications applicable to the market 
freedoms under the Cassis doctrine), and that the Court even denies 
these exceptions to be invoked by trade unions.12 Third, whereas the 
clash of fundamental rights of collective action and market freedoms 
has been dealt with in the scrutiny of Article 49 EC, the former have 
not been resorted to in the interpretation of the directive – 
notwithstanding the general duty of interpreting secondary law 
instruments in the light of higher-ranking sources, such as 
fundamental rights, in particular. One constructive way to pay heed 
to trade unions’ fundamental right to collective action would be to 
restrict the escape clause for more favourable working conditions in 
the sense of Article 3 (7) of the directive to the terms laid down in 
collective agreements; such terms could then still be subject to a basic 
review under Article 49 EC. However, even within the Court’s pre-
emption approach, there would have been interpretative leeway for 
an approach deferring to the autonomy of Member States and the 
trade unions: As AG Mengozzi has plausibly shown in Laval, the 
Swedish system, which implicitly delegates the determination of 
working conditions, including minimum wages, to the industrial 
parties, could have been assessed as a functional equivalent to 
working conditions laid down by law or by representative collective 
agreements in the sense of Article 3 (8) of the directive. 
3.3. Evaluation 
Taken together, these methodological defects and biases in the 
articulation of fundamental rights and market freedoms and the 
application of the pre-emption doctrine confer decisive advantages to 
European market values over social values protected at national level. 
This novel kind of judicial expansionism goes beyond the state of 
affairs in federal constitutional systems as administered by national 
constitutional courts. In these systems, one may not find a balancing 
                                                 
12 ECJ, Rüffert, at no. 84. 
From effet utile to effet neoliberal 445
 
of economic and social values, in which the former enjoy massive 
methodological advantages which translate into a neo-liberalisation 
of the whole system. Also, whilst different versions of pre-emption 
doctrines exist in all federal systems, we are not aware of any 
similarly aggressive recent application of this doctrine, which puts 
the social institutions to which we owe peace and prosperity under 
pressure, and which prevents state authorities from fulfilling their 
regulatory responsibility in entire areas of law. As opposed to the old 
judicial expansionism which successfully approximated the EC/EU 
to a federal constitutional system, this new from of judicial 
expansionism cannot claim legitimacy, but, instead, puts at the risk 
the very legitimacy of the European system. Against this background, 
it might actually be that this form of judicial expansionism can only 
be stopped politically, for example, through the establishment of a 
competing judicial body to safeguard national legislative autonomy 
and competences, as recently proposed again by Roman Herzog. 
Nevertheless, we do still nurture the, perhaps, naïve hope that 
European judicial governance may be reformed from within, i.e., by 
the legal system itself. To this end, we claim that the ECJ needs to 
accept a widely different constitutional role for itself in the European 
multi-level system, similar to Christian Joerges’ vision of European 
law as a conflicts of laws instrument in the US tradition, capable of 
balancing both national and European interests. 
 
4. A Plea for a New Constitutional Role of the EC 
in the European Multi-level System 
In order exercise a more legitimate adjudication, the ECJ would need 
to abandon its role of motor of the integration, and evolve into a true 
constitutional court aiming at a methodologically impartial and 
politically sensitive co-ordination of European and national law. This 
mandate may be further specified by multi-level governance theory, 
which focuses on the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance. 
According to this theory, the legitimacy of judicial governance is 
highest when it draws on the European constitutional provision in 
order to compensate “nation state failures”. These include 
discrimination of all kind, the shifting of the externalities of domestic 
policies to neighbour states, violations of universal constitutional 
norms, such as freedom and equality rights, and also obvious 
irrationalities and inefficiencies of national governance, which harms 
both national and European citizens. Conversely, democratically 
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rooted legitimate national institutions, social state institutions, in 
particular, which the EC/EU is not realistically able to establish at 
European level, should not be affected by European intervention. In 
procedural terms, legitimate judicial governance should, as far as 
possible, refrain from hierarchically commanding and controlling 
national legal systems, but should, instead, focus on their stabilisation 
and compatibilisation with European basic values – based upon the 
insight that procedural framework-setting is more legitimate than the 
substantive balancing of competing values, which are often essential 
elements of the national identity. This kind of governance should aim 
at integrating all affected interests, including those of citizens and 
enterprises from other Member States not directly involved in the 
proceedings at issue. To this end, the ECJ would need to enter into a 
more constructive dialogue with national courts, in which the 
different legal traditions and their rooting in the different social, 
economic and political models should be considered, just as the 
different factual consequences of decisions in the various Member 
States should be. As a basic rule, the degree of European intervention 
should depend on the extent to which nation state failures exist. 
 
Applying these guidelines to the articulation of fundamental rights of 
collective action, national social models and European market 
freedoms, we may subscribe to the answer given by Christian Joerges 
and Florian Rödl: 
 
National welfare state traditions do not, by definition, 
constitute a form of national state failure. Instead, the curtailing 
of legal guarantees of the social state through supranational law 
does not represent an acceptable intervention into national 
democracies but amounts to the demise of modern democratic 
self-determination.13 
 
Following these guidelines, the cases Viking, Laval and Rüffert would 
have needed to be decided differently. 
                                                 
13 Ch. Joerges and F. Rödl, Von der Entformalisierung europäischer Politik und dem 
Formalismus europäischer Rechtsprechung im Umgang mit dem “sozialen Defizit” 
des Integrationsprojekts, ZERP DP 2/2008. 
 
 
Chapter 17  









Can Community law resolve the conflict between the Member States’ 
individual concern to control their public services, and their common 
concern to integrate Europe’s service markets and keep them 
competitive? The question is, of course, far from new and follows 
familiar processes. The breadth of this subject-matter is considerable, 
including Europe’s liberalised or partially liberalised network 
industries (electronic communications, utilities, postal services), but 
also non-harmonised services, such as waste and water management, 
health and social services.1 All these are referred to as “public 
services” below. 
 
All of Europe’s networked industries have been affected by de-
regulation as a consequence of negative integration – the application 
of EC competition law – and regulatory competition, leading to 
                                                 
1 See European Commission, Communication on ‘Services of general interest, 
including social services of general interest: a new European commitment’, COM 
(2007) 725 final, 20 November 2007. 
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liberalisation and privatisation, and, eventually, to re-regulation by 
way of European-wide standards. The Commission continues its 
liberalisation course with some determination, and plans to introduce 
the value of competition into further public service sectors; thereby 
increasing Europe’s influence over public services as they become 
subject to the full body of EU economic law.2 The Court, on the other 
hand, continues to develop EU economic law in a way that suggests 
its interference in welfare states, including its core sectors of 
education, and social and health services, has not even come close to 
reaching its limits.3 
 
In the context of negative integration or re-regulation, one theme 
dominating both EC competition law and the secondary legislation in 
this field is the level of autonomy afforded to Member States to define 
certain services as “services of general interest” and to protect them 
from the market so as to give effect to social goals. Whilst these social 
goals will regularly be distributional (i.e., to achieve the distribution 
of certain goods in a way that the market cannot achieve), they may 
occasionally be further reaching, as they may include the protection 
of a “public service ethos” or other values. 
 
In the networked industries, Member States have ceded a degree of 
freedom in the interest of liberalisation and the harmonisation of 
standards; but whilst they have withdrawn a great deal of their direct 
involvement in these sectors, they have retained both the control and 
the responsibility of defining and imposing “public service 
obligations” on market operators, in order to guarantee a broad 
minimum service to all citizens. The objective of these legislative 
“packages” is to reconcile the concern of the Member States to control 
their welfare states, with the Commission’s concern with regard to 
the Internal Market. And one dominant view amongst academics 
especially in the UK (where liberalisation and privatisation has so far 
outpaced the rest of the Community) has been to analyse these as 
attempts to reconcile citizenship and social rights with the Internal 
Market.4 Whilst the legislation generally concentrates on upholding 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 G. Davies, “The Process and Side-Effects of Harmonisation of European Welfare 
States”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/06, NYU School of Law, 2006. 
4 Malcolm Ross, for example, attests a “re-orientation of both values and governance” 
at Community level (M. Ross, “Promoting Solidarity: From Public Services to a 
European Model of Competition?” (2007) 44 C.M.L.Rev., p. 1057, at 1057). Tony 
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competition by avoiding cartels, these public service obligations are 
seen as an effective way of ensuring that considerations of equity and 
access to all are not overridden by the concern for profit and 
shareholder value which drive market providers. 
 
But are public service obligations the solution to many of the deep 
value-conflicts that underlie the debate on Europe’s role in relation to 
public services? Do they capture all the existing values and benefits 
that we find underlying solidarity models of public service, and the 
enfranchising function of certain public services? Can we trust 
regulators to exert their influence on social issues, dressing them up 
as a public service obligation, in this way? 
 
This chapter discusses these questions. It suggests that a sensible 
design for Community public service law will have to start from first 
principles: the concern for individual autonomy, the capacity of 
European citizens to shape their own lives. Autonomy can be, and 
has been, in much of the classical writings on political liberalism,5 
seen in either a more formal or a more material way, but only from 
the perspective of the private individual, and not from their capacity 
to interact with other individuals as a political community in order to 
shape their collective destiny and, more particularly for the purpose 
of this chapter, the social obligations that they owe to one another in 
recognition of their mutual solidarity. 
 
The chapter begins by setting out the various interpretations of 
individual autonomy (and their formal and material aspects), but 
argues that autonomy really depends on whether citizens retain 
                                                                                                                   
Prosser observes a “degree of synthesis of substantive principles” between the value 
of competition and public service values in Community law (T. Prosser, The Limits of 
Competition Law: Markets and Public Services, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
p. 239). Mark Freedland has spoken of an “ironic reversal of the role of the 
Community as the guardian of liberal free trade” into “the residual guardian of 
[national] welfarist ideals, in however diluted a practical form”, (Mark Freedland, 
“Law, Public Services, and Citizenship – New Domains, New Regimes?”, in: M. 
Freedland and S. Sciarra, Public Services and Citizenship in European Law: public and 
labour law perspectives, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 28). 
5 See, for example, F.A. von Hayek, The Political Order of a Free People, (London: 
Routledge, 1979) and J. Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire, (London, Hogarth 
Press, 1926). These are explored in R. Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society: An 
Historical Argument, (Cambridge MA; Polity Press, 1992). See, also, C. Sunstein, Free 
Markets and Social Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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control over which interpretation dominates, in any one context, in 
their legal system. It also shows how these issues are relevant to the 
debate on public services. It also explains how Community law has 
affected our individual and collective autonomy, yet has also 
internalised it within the original “compact” between the Community 
and the Member States, which leaves control over welfare with the 
latter. 
 
The discussion then turns to the historical realities of public service 
organisation in the Member States and discusses the Community’s 
influence, especially in the network-based industries. The aim is to 
illustrate how the “compact” really works in practice, and how it 
respects the autonomy principle. This is followed by a more critical 
assessment of these effects, in which it is suggested that, while the 
Community legislation manages to respect some distributional 
choices, it is somewhat less effective in paying the same respect to 
collective choices involving values. 
2. Public Service, Law and Autonomy 
At the heart of the debate about public service liberalisation in 
Europe lies the fact that the market, for all its effectiveness in 
producing efficiency and wealth, functions upon the basis of a formal 
conception of our individual autonomy.6 It is this lack of concern for 
genuine equality of opportunity in a world in which not all citizens 
come to the market as equals, which creates, in the words of Tony 
Prosser, “at minimum a tension between the application of 
competition law to key public services, such as the public utilities, 
and the principles underlying the distinctive nature of these 
services”.7 
 
Self-determination, or autonomy, is about the opportunity to pursue 
one’s own good in one’s own way, the problem being that, even if all 
individuals are regarded by the state as being formally equal, material 
inequalities can just as effectively constrain their opportunity to 
pursue their own good in their own way. The beauty of freedom is 
lost on those who have insufficient means to support their daily 
needs, and, although they are free in law, they cannot live their lives 
                                                 
6 See, also, N. Boeger, “Solidarity and EC Competition Law”, (2007) 32 E.L.Rev., p. 
319. 
7 T. Prosser, supra note 4, p. 17. 
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as they would wish. The core function of the national welfare state is 
to achieve real equality of ability by securing the material conditions 
for the actual exercise of individual autonomy, in order to secure for 
all individuals a genuine opportunity to use the instruments which 
the state makes available to them to structure their relations with 
each other.8 Whilst this most obviously involves direct transfers 
(social benefits), it also involves the guarantee of essential services to 
all citizens irrespective of wealth or privilege, including health and 
care services, social services (for example, social housing), local 
infrastructure (for example, waste disposal services), utilities, 
transport, post, TV, telephone and, most recently, internet, etc. The 
universal access to these services, both socially and geographically, 
produces material equality between citizens by equalising the 
chances to live an independent life as a pre-condition for them to 
participate in market activity, and to better their own lot in this way. 
 
But as the state sets itself up as public provider, and for this purpose 
juridifies ever more spheres of activity (“service”) that would 
otherwise be left to individuals to structure according to their own 
choices and desires (using either the market or non-economic forms 
of exchange (“caring and sharing”)), it will increasingly come to 
control the lives of its citizens by imposing on their relationships the 
state’s own idea of what will further their autonomy best. In this way, 
its social programmes threaten the very autonomy which they aim to 
protect. Social programming on the one hand, and private autonomy 
on the other are, in Habermas’ words, locked into a “zero-sum 
game”. In his words: 
 
[W]hat is awarded to the State in capacities for social regulation 
seemingly must be taken, in the form of private autonomy 
[from the individual] … From this point of view, the State and 
private actors are involved in a zero-sum game – what the one 
gains in competence the other loses.9 
 
The inter-action between state and individual in this way will reduce 
the latter’s autonomy, and is likely to produce other negative 
                                                 
8 Consider the concepts of “freedom from” and “freedom to”, in: I. Berlin, “Two 
Concepts of Liberty”, in: Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969), p. 118; see, also, J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, (Cambridge MA: Polity 
Press, 1996). 
9 J. Habermas, “Paradigms of Law” (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review, p. 771, at 775. 
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consequences such as regulatory capture, bureaucratisation, 
stagnation, high prices and a low quality of public services. 
 
One way of avoiding this dilemma is, of course, to adhere to a rather 
more formalistic conception of individual autonomy by leaving the 
provision of public services to the spontaneous ordering of the 
market and relying upon its economic incentives to increase 
efficiency and consumer welfare. However, choosing this option, it 
has to be accepted that reliance on the market to provide “public” 
services can lead to conflicts between the motives of the market – 
concern for profit and shareholder value – and concern for the 
material equality that motivates the welfare state. The market 
presumes that we come to it as equals (formal equality), and it has 
little concern for material equality unless it is made to do so: in 
simple terms, an obligation to secure universal access, affordability or 
quality of public services may well secure social cohesion and social 
solidarity, but it is just as likely to undermine profitability. A 
minimum of social law or regulation or, indeed, political intervention 
(public ownership) to enforce these social concerns does, as a matter 
of historical reality, exist in every modern welfare state. No state, in 
reality, divests itself entirely of the responsibility to provide these 
services, even if some states prefer a competitive model whenever 
possible, simply tweaking market incentives in order to introduce a 
minimum of social protection. As a consequence of this 
responsibility, every state relies on law as a medium to secure the 
conditions for its citizens’ autonomy, and how “formal” or “material” 
that law should be is subject to political debate. Formal law, on the 
one hand, provides the instrument for individuals to order their 
relationships with one another so as to maximise their individual 
gain, but has no regard for the material inequalities that affect their 
real opportunity to do so. Material law, on the other hand, is sensitive 
to these material inequalities and is about the real equality of legal 
ability for individuals. Within the legal corpus of any modern state, 
there will be both formal and material law, and some law that is more 
material than formal, and some that is more formal than material. The 
point is that it is for the political community, working through the 
institutions of the state and engaging in continuous political 
deliberation, to determine the mix that will best secure its citizens’ 
autonomy. 
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This last point is most important in so far as it highlights a degree of 
futility in the debate between the “socialist” and the “liberal” ideals 
of political ordering, which seems to lock the political community 
into a continuous oscillation between these two positions.10 Instead, it 
leads us to focus on a third perspective, turning to the observation 
that the balance between formal and material law must be determined 
by those who will be the subjects of the mix. We are only truly 
autonomous if we are truly self-governing, and this encompasses not 
only our private autonomy, as addressees of the law, and its mix of 
formal and material norms, but also our public autonomy, as co-
authors of that mix. To focus exclusively on optimising the private 
autonomy of individuals, by determining the appropriate balance 
between formal and material equality for itself, views us simply as 
the addressees of the law and fails to make any connection with our 
public autonomy. In order to self-govern themselves truly as a 
political community, citizens require a set of rules (“constitution”) 
which ensures their entitlement to participate in the process of law-
making (norm-setting). This is what Habermas calls the “procedural” 
paradigm of law that aims to realise the autonomy of citizens fully by 
taking into account the fact that this has a public, as well as a private, 
dimension. It is by giving effect to the procedural paradigm of law, 
which ensures collective self-determination (public autonomy), that 
we can avoid the dilemma of the welfare state, whereby the state’s 
social programmes can threaten the very autonomy that they aim to 
protect. As long as these programmes are adequately connected to 
processes of democratic participation within the state, which tie them 
to the choices that individuals make as the citizens of a political 
community, they will truly reflect the collective political autonomy of 
the citizens as a democratic society. 
3. Community Law and the Community “Compact” 
The Community’s nature as a supranational and principally 
economic union of Member States, on the other hand, characterises its 
relationship with both the individual and the collective self-
determination of European citizens. In the absence of a European 
demos conferring “thick” democratic legitimacy on the European 
institutions,11 its role continues to be characterised by an absence of 
                                                 
10 See D. Chalmers, “The Reconstitution of European Public Spheres”, (2003) 9 ELJ, p. 
142. 
11 The “no demos” problem set out by Joseph Weiler; the demos being marked by an 
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any authority to develop, at Community level, the far-reaching social 
programming upon which our welfare states depend. The idea that 
autonomy can be fully realised only when both its public and private 
elements are secured, highlights that the Community suffers, as Fritz 
Scharpf has most famously diagnosed, from an “asymmetry” or 
“social deficit” characterising its constitutional make-up.12 Following 
this idea, the principle of autonomy imposes a negative obligation on 
the Community not to tread where the nation state, albeit imperfect 
in its own ways,13 operates as the locus of democratic legitimacy. It 
must fulfil its integrating role whilst paying respect to the fact that, as 
far as the development of social programmes goes, our control over 
the law-making process (i.e., their legitimacy) remains best secured at 
domestic level. This obligation is inherent in the original compact 
between the Member States and the Community, whereby the 
Member States retain sovereignty over their welfare states and the 
Community is assigned competencies to further the Internal Market, 
whose rules the Member States accept as a basis for resolving 
conflicts that touch upon their common concerns, particularly the 
desire to integrate their national markets. By insisting on such a 
compact, Community law protects our collective self-determination 
in a very real sense, by giving effect to the choices which we take as a 
national political community (demos) where we determine how we 
wish to order our society. “Unity in diversity” is the term Christian 
Joerges has chosen to describe this constellation of Europe, referring 
to its capacity to enforce a degree of mutual obligation between 
European citizens, and the Member States, towards one another, 
whilst striving to maintain and uphold the level of “thick” collective 
solidarity within the nation state and, more particularly, the national 
welfare state.14 
 
                                                                                                                   
“organic-cultural identification and sense of belongingness”, see J.H.H. Weiler, 
“Does Europe need a constitution? Demos, telos and the German Maastricht 
Decision”, (1995) 1 ELJ, p. 219, at 256. 
12 F.W. Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of 
Diversity”, (2002) 40 JCMS, p. 645. 
13 See, for example, D. Marquand, Decline of the Public, (Cambridge MA: Polity, 2004). 
14 See, for example, Ch. Joerges, Democracy and European Integration: A Legacy of 
Tensions, a Re-Conceptualisation and Recent True Conflicts?, European University 
Institute, Florence, working paper LAW No. 2007/25 and Rethinking European Law’s 
Supremacy, European University Institute, Florence, working paper LAW No. 
2005/12. 
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The Community has far from addressed its social asymmetry. The 
Court’s constitutional interpretation of the Community’s economic 
law can formalise national laws, imposing the law of the market on 
materialised national laws. To avoid the “formalising”, de-regulatory, 
effects of negative integration, the Member States are given the 
opportunity, but also carry the burden, of justifying their social 
programmes before the Court. European legislation increasingly re-
introduces harmonised standards (such as universal service 
requirements) at European level, also with a view to prevent and 
react to the formalisation (de-regulation) of national law. These 
processes have extensively affected the networked industries, where 
the application of EC competition law has led to the abolition of 
public monopolies. The application of derogations, most notably 
Article 86(2) EC, has softened the process but has not stemmed the 
tide, and extensive sector-specific Community legislation has been 
enacted to secure the objectives of both liberalisation and certain 
social standards (see further below).  
 
What the Community has yet failed to address is the paradox 
between its continuing lack of legitimacy – for want of a European 
demos – to take on the broad social programming that takes place at 
nation state level, and, on the other hand, its growing role as 
legislator re-instating social standards at European level to stem the 
consequences of de-regulation following negative integration.15 
Problematic as they are in their practical implementation, it is 
precisely because of this paradox that the principles of the original 
compact continue to characterise the Community’s constitutional 
make-up. 
 
This, finally, takes us back to the debate over public services in 
Europe. In this and the previous section, I have sought to illustrate 
that, at the heart of this debate lies the genuine concern of every 
political community, working through the instruments of the state, to 
pursue its own good in its own way, and to be in control of its own 
fate. By creating the appropriate institutional design for public 
services (“public service regime”) in their own national territory, each 
Member State in effect strives to maximise not only the private 
                                                 
15 M. Poiares Maduro, “Europe’s Social Self: The Sickness unto Death”, in: J. Shaw 




autonomy of its citizens, by ensuring that there be an appropriate mix 
between material and formal laws, but also their collective public 
autonomy, by securing the appropriate means of public 
accountability, so as to uphold the citizens’ collective control over 
their own destiny. As these public services are subjected to the 
pressure of formalisation (de-regulation) in the Community’s 
constitutional constellation, the Community faces the paradox of a 
gradual role reversal between the Community and the Member 
States, where increasingly, Community legislation addresses material 
standards, but without any “thick” legitimation to develop and 
enforce social programmes. The Community’s compact, whereby the 
Member States retain control over these programmes, plays a vital 
role in securing the citizens’ collective public autonomy in the 
Community’s constitutional constellation. 
 
The next section turns to the concrete reality of public service regimes 
in Europe. The argument advanced is, broadly speaking, that there 
has been a degree of convergence amongst public service regimes, 
especially in the networked sectors, following their liberalisation 
upon the basis of Community law. Whilst in some Member States, the 
introduction of competitive markets unsettled long-standing legal 
values, or even constitutional protection of public service values, in 
others, such as the UK, it meant that public service values would now 
be expressed through law, where they had not enjoyed legal 
protection before. 
4. Continental and Anglo-Saxon Public Service 
Traditions 
There exists, across the EU, a diversity of public service regimes and 
traditions (tradition here referring to the regime as seen in its 
historical context). Accounting for their variety would, however, go 
way beyond the scope of this chapter. In the following description, I 
shall therefore draw heavily on the existing materials, especially on 
Tony Prosser’s16 recent study of what he loosely terms the 
“Continental” and “Anglo-Saxon” public service traditions (the 
former mainly based upon French and Italian experiences, the latter 
based upon those in the UK).  
 
                                                 
16 T. Prosser, note 4 supra. 
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Prosser’s research makes apparent some historical differences 
between the two traditions. Broadly speaking, the Continental 
tradition is marked by a system of public service, whereby public 
service values are protected in the corpus of administrative law, and, 
in the case of France, through strong constitutional principles that 
firmly embed a public responsibility to ensure public service 
provision. In the UK tradition, on the other hand, public services 
have developed rather more pragmatically as a conglomeration of 
various essential facilities, the provision of which is, in the main, 
protected by political means and political discretion. Both traditions 
originate, broadly speaking, from the end of the Nineteenth century 
when public service emerged for the first time as a reference 
principally to basic utilities that were provided as part of municipal 
infrastructure, as a response to the industrialisation of society and the 
change in its basic needs that this signified for the population at the 
time. But while their historical origins broadly coincide, real 
differences exist at the level of principle, that also reflect on their 
organisation. In the UK, utilities were regarded as a matter for public 
organisation, but mainly for pragmatic reasons. The point was to 
organise them most effectively in order to allow individuals to 
pursue their lives freely and participate in the industrial age. This 
meant, amongst other things, that throughout much of the Twentieth 
century, the UK’s public service regimes was organised mainly by 
political means, notably through the nationalisation of utilities. Public 
service values and “the public interest” would be protected as a 
matter of political discretion, either of the relevant minister or the 
bodies designated for that purpose, which Prosser, however, 
describes as “remarkably ineffective”.17 
 
In the Continental jurisdictions, on the other hand, it soon emerged 
that public responsibility to provide essential facilities to all citizens 
was regarded as a matter of principle and theorised accordingly.18 
Thus, the notion of public service became important not only as a 
matter of practical organisation, but also as a real way for the 
community to identify its solidarity obligations towards one another. 
This is reflected in a high level of theorisation of public service, 
especially with regard to utilities. 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 42. 
18 Ibid., p. 94. 
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In France, these theoretical underpinnings derive from the writings of 
Leon Duguit and his work, which follows the ideas of the social 
theorist Emile Durkheim. Duguit considered the value of fraternité to 
be at the heart of the society of the French republic, and, accordingly, 
reasoned that social solidarity and the co-operation of social groups 
through public service formed an essential part of that society.19 He 
drew heavily on Durkheim in formulating social interdependence 
and social morality as quintessential to man in society, and 
eventually in established his claim that there lay a moral and legal 
obligation on the state to ensure the provision of certain basic services 
to all citizens.20 These obligations eventually led to the constitutional 
protection and enshrinement of “public service” as a French 
constitutional principle which continues to date. 
 
Very similar ideas are embedded in German public law (we may add 
the German model as a further example of a Continental public 
service regime). Whilst lacking the status of a constitutional dogma,21 
the German doctrine on public service (Daseinsvorsorge) is equally 
strong in imposing on the state a responsibility as public provider.22 
Its theoretical roots, formulated by the jurist Ernst Forsthoff, who 
drew on the earlier writings of the philosopher Karl Jaspers and the 
public lawyer Otto Mayer, identify state authority, rather than 
solidarity, as the driving force of public services; asserting that only a 
“strong state” relying on public administration was capable of 
effectively managing the provision of essential public services.23 
                                                 
19 L. Duguit, Law in the Modern State, (1970, translation F. and H. Laski, first published 
in English 1919); or, in original French, his Les transformations des droit public, (1913). 
20 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (1984, translation W.D. Halls); see, 
also, T. Prosser, ‘Regulation and Social Solidarity’, (2006) 33 J.L.S., p. 364, at 379-381. 
21 Although, see S. Broß, “Daseinvorsorge – Wettbewerb – Gemeinschaftsrecht”, 
(2003) 18 Juristenzeitung , p. 874, who argues to the effect that the principle is 
protected in the German constitution (Grundgesetz) as interpreted by the German 
constitutional court. 
22 See D. Scheidemann, Der Begriff der Daseinsvorsorge: Ursprung, Funktion und 
Wandlungen der Konzeption Ernst Forsthoffs, (Göttingen/Zurich: Muster-Schmidt, 
1991); C. Schütte, Progressive Verwaltungswissenshcaft ouf konservativer Grundlage 
– Zur Verwaltungslehre Ernst Forsthoffs, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006); E.-J. 
Mestmäcker, “Daseinsvorsorge un Universaldienst im europäischen Kontext”, in: F. 
Ruland, B. Baron von Maydell and H.-J. Papier (eds), Verfassung, Theorie und Praxis 
des Sozialstaats, (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998), p. 635. 
23 E. Forsthoff, Die Verwaltung als Leistungsträger (Stuttgart/Berlin: Kohlhammer, 
1938); and his Lehrbuch des Verwaltungsrechts, 1st volume (10th ed., Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 1973). 
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Naturally, this meant an emphasis on hierarchy, with a strong system 
administrative law which lent itself to this task. Even though the 
German doctrine has shed much of its original emphasis on state 
authority, the use of administrative law to organise the provision of 
public services systematically as a matter of public law, even where 
they rely on co-operation between public and private sectors, 
continues to date,24 as does the perception of a public responsibility to 
ensure their provision. 
 
One can trace these historical differences between the Continental 
tradition and the Anglo-Saxon tradition to date. Today’s Anglo-Saxon 
regime, still dominated by its history of political liberalism, lends 
itself to economic ordering.25 Continuing to take a pragmatic attitude 
to the development of public service values, the British legislator 
tends to rely heavily on ordinary competition law to regulate public 
services (ensuring efficiency and consumer choice), but has not, as 
yet, subjected the protection of public service values to any 
systematic codification at any level. Britain has reached a level of 
liberalisation which, the UK Office of Fair Trading reports, extends 
further than that which is currently enforced at Community level.26 
This situation has left the UK, which is not normally keen to take on 
European harmonisation initiatives, in a sort of model role in the 
continuing liberalisation process, with considerable influence as part 
of the mutual sharing of best practice, and, more concretely, the 
drafting of legislation.27 
 
                                                 
24 M. Bullinger, “Französischer service public und deutsche Daseinsvorsorge”, (2003) 
18 Juristenzeitung, p. 597. 
25 T. Prosser and M. Moran, “Privatization and Regulatory Change: the Case of Great 
Britain” in: idem (eds), Privatization and Regulatory Change in Europe, (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 1994), Chapter 3. 
26 The UK Office of Fair Trading, for example, considers that “due to the extent of de-
regulation and liberalisation of the economy that has occurred in the United 
Kingdom, it is unlikely that there will be a significant number of cases in which 
previous European Commission decisions [on the exception for ‘services of general 
economic interest’ from competition law] will be directly relevant when considering 
whether the exclusion applies in the United Kingdom”. Office of Fair Trading, 
Services of General Interest Exclusion, competition law guideline published 2004, point 
1.12. See, also, Prosser and Moran, supra note 25. 
27 E. Szyszczak, The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 141. 
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For the Continental regimes, on the other hand, liberalisation has 
only arrived relatively recently, and, as a rule, as a consequence of 
Community law. It has sparked real conflicts between economic 
principles and economic law on the one hand, and constitutional and 
administrative law and principles on the other. In these jurisdictions, 
a body of public service law based upon the idea that the state has a 
duty to ensure the equal treatment of citizens irrespective of its 
economic resources, which traditionally, has taken priority over 
competition law in cases of conflict, still exists.28 Whilst this does not 
mean that the Continental regimes are irreconcilable with 
liberalisation, it means that, in these regimes, there continues to be a 
strong emphasis, in both public debate and legal design, on the 
distinction between the organisation of public service which may well 
be market-based, and the substantive responsibility for that 
organisation which remains firmly with the state.29  
5. Liberalisation and the Community legislation 
Today, these regimes and traditions do have to be seen in the light of 
the gradual, piecemeal, liberalisation and re-regulation of the 
network-based industries. These developments were initially 
motivated by the application of ordinary EC competition law in those 
sectors, whereby existing inefficiencies in national public service 
regimes began to be exposed.30 In addition, the UK’s advanced 
liberalisation programmes served by way of example, and the 
Commission could conveniently pick up on the UK’s experience. This 
chapter is not the place to recount the liberalisation process of the 
various sectors in detail and there certainly is a great selection of 
material providing such accounts.31 Instead, I shall outline three 
characteristics of the Community legislation in this field. 
 
The first characteristic of this legislation is that it generally views full 
liberalisation as an ideal which, even if not fully realisable, should be 
                                                 
28 Prosser, note 4 supra, p. 2. 
29 Ibid., pp. 106-107 and p. 239. 
30 For a recent summary, see Szyszczak, note 27 supra, Chapters 2-4. 
31 See, for example, Szyszczak, note 27 supra, Chapter 5; Prosser, supra note 4, 
Chapter 8; P. Slot and A. Skudder, “Common Features of Community Law 
Regulation in the Network-Bound Sectors”, (2001) 38 C.M.L.Rev., p. 87; C. Henry and 
A. Jenemaitre (eds), Regulation of Networked Utilities: the European Experience, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
Public service, autonomy and EU law 461
 
realised as far as possible.32 This is linked closely to a second idea, 
namely, that, as the Commission states, “the objectives of developing 
high-quality, accessible and affordable services of general economic 
interest and of an open and competitive internal market are 
compatible and should be mutually supportive”.33 The key feature of 
the legislation is, therefore, “controlled liberalisation”, defined as 
“gradual opening-up of the market accompanied by measures to 
protect the general interest, in particular through the concept of 
universal service to guarantee access for everyone … ensuring 
adequate standards for cross-border services that cannot be 
adequately regulated only at national level”.34 In reality, this has 
taken a number of legislative packages in each sector (following 
periodic review and renewal), and, in some sectors, it has been more 
effective or speedier than in others. 
 
The second characteristic of the legislation is the central role of public 
service obligations as the measures to protect the general interest of 
the service in question, which the Commission stresses continually. 
Member States may impose these obligations on market operators in 
order, broadly, to achieve distributive outcomes that the market alone 
could not achieve (often but not always referred to as “market 
failures”). The legislation also generally provides how they may 
finance these social goals; they will regularly be given a choice. The 
most important public service obligation has been the universal 
service obligation. A brief look at the telecommunications sector 
illustrates its central significance. The most developed liberalised 
regime in the Community to date, the telecommunications sector, has 
broadly been considered a success story in terms of protecting social 
goals within the context of liberalisation.35 The liberalisation of 
telecoms also produced a first time legal definition of universal 
service as “a minimum set of services of specified quality which is 
available to all users independent of their geographical location and, 
                                                 
32 See, for instance, the third Postal Directive (2008/06/EC amending Directive 
97/67/EC) which effects full liberalisation of the postal sector by 2010 and, in some 
Member States, 2012. The Directive abolishes the remaining reserved areas, but does 
include a universal service obligation. 
33 Commission, Communication on Services of General Interest, note 1 supra, at point 
2.2. 
34 Commission, Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2003) 270 final, at 
point 5. 
35 T. Prosser, note 4 supra, at p. 186. 
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in the light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price”.36 
Sauter vividly describes that the introduction of such a legal 
obligation meant a real benefit for telephone-users, as waiting times 
for telephone connections were reduced dramatically.37 
 
Apart from real improvement in terms of accessibility, a second 
advantage of the universal service concept is that it can introduce 
transparency. Prosser, for example, considers that “the closer 
specification of universal service and of the means of its financing has 
flushed out the costs of providing a universal service much more 
clearly and, at least in the UK, this has proved to be considerably less 
than suppliers had claimed”.38 
 
The third characteristic of the sector-specific legislation is that it has 
led to the establishment of a number of independent national 
regulatory authorities in Member States, implementing and 
monitoring the sector-specific legislative framework.39 Their role is 
generally to work closely with national governments on the one 
hand, and to report to the Commission on the other. However, not all 
sector-specific legislation defines the role of regulatory agencies in as 
much detail as, for example, the initial legislation on 
telecommunications did. In the postal sector, for example, the reform 
of the postal regulators, ensuring their independence, impartiality 
and transparency issues, is an important regulatory issue. In some 
Member States, for example the UK, some of these regulatory 
agencies have competition law competences (for example, Ofcom). A 
number of questions still surround the role of regulatory agencies, 
including whether they are too much or too little interventionist, 
whether they are sufficiently accountable, produce transparent 
                                                 
36 See, for example, Directive 97/33/EC on Interconnection in Telecommunications 
with regard to ensuring Universal Service and Interoperability through Application 
of the Principles of Open Network Provision [1997] O.J. L101/24 (‘Interconnection 
Directive’), Article 2(1)(g). 
37 W. Sauter, “Universal Service Obligations and the Emergence of Citizens’ Rights in 
European Telecommunications Liberalization”, in: M. Freedland and S. Sciarra, 
Public Services and Citizenship in European Law: public and labour law perspectives, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 123. 
38 T. Prosser, note 4 supra, p. 187. 
39 N. Petit, “The Proliferation of National Regulatory Authorities Alongside 
Competition Authorities: A Source of Jurisdictional Confusion”, in: D. Geradin, R. 
Munoz and N. Petit (eds), Regulation through Agencies – A New Paradigm of European 
Governance, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005). 
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regulation, and whether they are too much or too little politically 
independent.40 
 
Bearing these concerns in mind, one of the most crucial features of the 
Community’s sector-specific legislation is, therefore, that, whilst it 
delegates to the regulators the implementation of the liberalisation 
packages, it still leaves political responsibility with the public 
authorities of the Member States, who will, of course, be restricted by 
the terms of the legislation. Such responsibility includes, in particular, 
the responsibility to define universal service obligations, and even 
though, in practice, governments are likely to undertake this task in 
co-ordination with the regulator, it is here that we find the clearest 
expression to date of a continuing public responsibility to provide 
these services as essential facilities. It is here that the Community’s 
compact takes effect; leaving to the national level, as the democratic 
locus in the Community, the decision of how it wishes to formulated 
these social obligations, within the bounds of the legislation. 
6. What Public Service Obligations do and do not 
do 
Considering these features, one would conclude that this legislation 
makes a real attempt at protecting our (national) autonomy by 
leaving the responsibility to define and impose public service 
obligations on market operators with the political institutions of the 
Member States.41 In particular, it leaves the Member States with a 
margin of appreciation as to how far they take these obligations, 
within the bounds prescribed by the legislation. However, I shall use 
the remainder of this section to make a number of remarks which 
suggest that we have to take our autonomy more seriously than this. 
 
In this context, the starting point has to be at the very heart of the 
Community’s primary law. Article 86(2) EC provides the central 
substantive norm in this respect. It provides that the EC Treaty’s 
rules, and especially EC competition law, apply to undertakings 
entrusted with services of general economic interest in so far as those 
rules do not obstruct, in law or in fact, the performance of those 
                                                 
40 See: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/riskAndRegulationMagazine/magazine/summer2
005/independentRegulatoryAgenciesInEurope.htm, accessed on 20 January 2008. 
41 See the commentary cited supra note 4; see, also, Sauter, note 39 supra. 
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services. This provision is relevant well beyond the Treaty’s primary 
law. Much of the liberalisation packages present the goal of 
“controlled liberalisation”, to which they pay so much attention, in 
the context of the balance between competition and public service 
enshrined in Article 86(2) EC. It therefore sets out a central 
framework that runs not only through EC competition law as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, but 
also through the relevant secondary legislation, the Commission’s 
competition decisions and finally the Commission’s communications 
on public services. 
 
The orthodox view, represented by the Commission and some 
academic commentators, is that this provision sets out a narrow 
derogation from the Treaty rules in favour of public services, subject 
however to a strict proportionality test,42 requiring (a) a causal link 
between the measure in question and the objective of general interest, 
(b) that the restrictions caused by the measure are balanced by the 
benefits of the general interest, and (c) that the objective of general 
interest cannot be achieved through other less restrictive means.43 
 
The Court, and some more recent academic commentary, on the other 
hand, both interpret Article 86(2) EC as setting out a softer test, which 
allows the Member States a greater margin of discretion than a strict 
proportionality set. In particular, this softer test will not go as far as 
asking whether the anti-competitive measure in question was the 
least restrictive measure to attain the general interest in question; 
instead, the test is whether it was objectively necessary (and suited) 
to attain a legitimate goal.44 In a frequently cited passage, Ross 
                                                 
42 See Commission, Communication on Services of general interest in Europe, COM 
(2000) p. 580; Commission, Report to the Laeken European Council on Services of 
General Interest COM (2001) p. 598; van der Woude, “Article 90: Competing for 
Competence”, ELR: Competition Law Checklist 1991 (1992) 60, at 62; Buendía Sierra, 
“Article 86: Exclusive Rights and other Anti-Competitive State Measures”, in: J. Faull 
and A. Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of Competition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 273; E.-J. Mestmäcker, “Daseinsvorsorge un Universaldienst im 
europäischen Kontext”, in: F. Ruland, B. Baron von Maydell, and H.-J. Papier (eds), 
Verfassung, Theorie und Praxis des Sozialstaats, (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998). 
43 Buendía Sierra, note 43 supra, p. 315. 
44 J. Baquero Cruz, “Beyond Competition: Services of General Interest and European 
Community Law”, in: G. de Búrca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State In Search of 
Solidarity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 196. Similarly, N. Boeger, 
“Solidarity and EC Competition Law”, (2007) 32 E.L.Rev., p. 319: the Court allows 
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constructs the jurisprudence as a methodological shift “from 
economic measurement to value judgement”, whereby the Court now 
concentrates “on the justifications for protecting the service”, rather 
than the economic viability of the service provider.45 
 
The legislation, on the other hand, very much reflects the 
interpretation of Article 86(2) EC favoured by the Commission; read 
in this way, the provision relays a positive incentive to draft public 
service obligations, and provisions relating to their financing, so as to 
create the least interference with the market whilst protecting their 
social goals. It also means that, in practice, the goal of competition is 
being prioritised in the legislation, while public service obligations, 
and especially universal services, tend to be formulated as a 
minimum service.46 The underlying rationale is that public service 
obligations, and the regulation of their financing, are seen as 
regulatory impositions on the market, which should be restricted to 
correcting market failures in a way that does not impose unnecessary 
costs on the regulated firms.47 
 
This balance does affect the actual drafting of public service 
obligations. The Commission’s proposal for the Third Postal 
Directive, for example, expresses the definition of the universal 
service in most precise terms – all citizens must have their mail 
collected and delivered at least once a day, five days a week – but 
also in a way that very much suggests this would be a minimum level 
of social protection compatible with the primary goal, to introduce 
and maintain an open and competitive market.48 Arguing in similar 
vain, Baquero Cruz finds that, throughout the legislation, out of all 
                                                                                                                   
Member States a wider margin of appreciation, giving effect to the Community’s 
compact, and regards solidarity as a “political trump” that the Member States may 
invoke against Community competition law. 
45 M. Ross, “Article 16 E.C. and services of general interest: from derogation to 
obligation?”, (2000) 25 E.L.Rev., p. 22, at 24; taken up again in: M. Ross, note 6 supra; 
see, also, L. Soriano, “How proportionate should Anti-Competitive State Intervention 
be?’, (2003) 28 E.L.Rev., p. 112; and, finally, T. Prosser, note 4 supra, p. 15 (“the 
approach of the European courts has changed, from treating public services (or 
‘services of general interest’) as unwelcome impediments to completing the single 
internal market to seeing them instead as independently valuable expressions of 
citizenship rights.”). 
46 Baquero Cruz, note 44 supra, p. 211. 
47 Szyszczak, note 27 supra, p. 143. 
48 See, further, note 34 supra. 
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the funding options (including direct state subsidies, cross-
subsidisation or the creation of a compensation fund through the 
introduction of fees on new service providers or users), the creation 
of a public service fund is regularly the preferred option from the 
Community’s point of view as it is the least distorting of 
competition.49 
 
Not only does the priority, which the legislation gives to the value of 
competition, affect the actual drafting of those public service 
obligations that are being included in the legislation, it also means 
that some public service values may simply not find recognition as a 
public service obligation in the legislation and, eventually, fall by the 
wayside. Again referring to the postal sector, one example would be 
what the French Conseil d’Etat has referred to as the dimension humaine 
majeure – the enfranchising function – of French postmen. The Conseil 
explains: 
 
[…] rien ne emplace le passage régulier, jour après jour, dans 
chaque localité et auprès de chaque usager, d’un agent bien 
identifie et appurtenant a un service bien implante sure tout le 
territoires. Cette sole présence est plus porteur en elle-même de 
service public et de la solidaire que celui-ci exprime, que les 
prestations proprement dites confies au prépose [...]50 
 
In other words, the Conseil ascribes to postmen and postwomen not 
only a transport function, but also an import role in respect of 
community cohesion: the “human face” of the postmen and 
postwomen reflects the integration of the individual into a collective, 
into the state as the political community of all citizens. In its 
statement, the Conseil thus describes the essence of Duguit’s 
understanding of public service as comprising an inclusive element, 
whereby it makes visible the “human” face of the state as a collective 
or political community, marked by a sense of mutual obligation and 
social solidarity which is part of human nature.51 
 
                                                 
49 Baquero Cruz, note 44 supra, p. 205. 
50 Rapport public 2002, Etudes et documents No. 53, Doc. Franc., pp. 215 et seq., in 
particular, p. 354. 
51 See note 19 supra. 
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One may put the Conseil’s emphasis of these “human” functions 
down as one of those fiercely national points of view, which, some 
would say, fails to catch the mood of times. The postal sector is today 
characterised by the influence of new technology, the growth in 
internet purchasing and the use of e-mail, leading to an increased 
volume of parcel post and reduction of the letter market.52 Business 
customers dominate the market, demanding efficiency, greater 
capacity and lower costs. It is certainly correct that there are today all 
the incentives for citizens and for businesses in particular to require 
an efficient postal service. But to conclude that, for this reason, 
citizens will not want to preserve these ancillary human functions of 
postal services would be premature. Instead, the challenge lies in 
translating these functions into the liberalisation process, especially if 
we are to take the Commission’s remarks above, where it insists that 
liberalisation need not mean a sacrifice of “services of general 
interest”, at face value.53 Martin Bullinger, for example, suggests an 
“open service architecture” as a first step, whereby national postal 
incumbents are required to further open their local distribution 
networks to new entrants.54 
 
Whether one has strong feelings for (French) postal workers or not, 
the example illustrates a more fundamental issue, namely, that there 
are some choices citizens will decide to take as a community, 
operating through the institutions of the state or local government, 
that it may simply not be possible to transpose, by way of recognition 
as public service, obligations within the paradigm of “market failure” 
regulation. The regulatory literature is full of accounts of this type of 
regulation as one amongst several regulatory techniques.55 The 
advantage of this regulatory pluralism is that, in each context 
(bioethics, healthcare, environment, etc.), the technique can be 
matched so as to give best effect to the substantive policy choices.56 
                                                 
52 Szyszczak, note 27 supra, p. 151. 
53 Commission, Communication on Services of General Interest, note 1 supra, at point 2.2; 
cited in the text to note 34 supra. 
54 M. Bullinger, note 24 supra, p. 604. 
55 See, for example, T. Prosser, “Regulation and Social Solidarity”, note 21 supra; J. 
Black, “Critical Reflections on Regulation”, LSE Centre for the Analysis of Risk and 
Regulation, Discussion paper 4 (2002); B. Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of 
Competition: The Bureaucratic Politics of Regulatory Justification, (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing 2003); B. Morgan and K. Yeung, Introduction to Law and Regulation, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
56 C. Scott, “Services of General Interest in the European Union: Matching Values to 
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The Community’s liberalisation process, by entrenching the 
economics-based market failure approach to regulation, tends to 
neglect the existence of a plurality of regulatory approaches, thereby 
creating a problem in situations in which the Community legislation 
should, in reality, give effect to political choices concerning rather 
elusive social or moral values, rather than quantifiable distributional 
choices. These values may prove “unquantifiable” in the monetary 
terms of a cost-benefit analysis (i.e., assessment of whether the 
“benefit” of regulating the market outweighs the “cost” for market 
operators) and therefore impossible to identify as a “market failure”; 
or, as is more likely, if attempts are being made, there is a danger that 
some of its protection will be lost. One can think of a number of 
values in this context. David Marquand’s work provides a fruitful 
ground for examples.57 
 
One of the areas in which this may well be the case is the protection 
of a “public domain”, and especially of the “public ethos” 
characteristic of this domain. Marquand defines the public domain by 
reference to its: 
 
[D]istinctive culture and decision rules. In it citizenship rights 
trump both market power and the bonds of clan and kinship. 
Professional pride in a job well done or a sense of civic duty or 
a mixture of both replaces the hope of gain the fear of loss (and, 
for that matter, loyalty to family, friends or dependants) as the 
spur to action.58 
 
Ralph Darendorf specifies: 
 
In the public domain people act neither of the kindness of their 
hearts, nor in response to incentives, monetary or otherwise, 
but because they have a sense of serving the community.59 
 
These statements make it clear that the public domain and the public 
ethos are both formulations of a set of rules which sets out ideals of 
human interactions, in the same way as, for example, the economic 
                                                                                                                   
Techniques”, (2000) 6 ELJ, p. 310. 
57 Marquand, note 13 supra. 
58 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
59 R. Dahrendorf et al., Report on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion in a Free Society, 
(London: Commission on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion, 1995), p. 39. 
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rules of the market are. However, they are based upon fundamentally 
different value judgements, and, in essence, a fundamentally 
different view of human nature. There are obvious parallels with 
Duguit’s conception of social solidarity and public service, and also 
with Forsthoff’s work, referred to above. The public responsibility to 
provide public services, which their work emphasises, and the sense 
of duty to a community (the “ethos” of public service), are essentially 
two sides of the same coin. A third and related value in this respect is 
public trust. Again, trust can be more concretely understood here by 
reference to rule-bound behaviour, rather than in the sense of an 
implicit trust or “understanding” (referring to cronyism or clanship), 
for example, amongst close-knit village communities, which would 
be impossible to transpose into a more open community. Marquand 
puts it thus: 
 
Citizens trust each other because, and to the extent that, they 
are citizens: because, and to the extent that, they know that 
public institutions are governed by an ethic of equity and 
service.60 
 
Does the Community legislation allow Member States to regulate the 
market in order to protect any of these values? Would it be 
permissible, for example, for a Member State to ring-fence market 
segments in order to secure public trust in public service operations? 
What if the Member State was prepared to impinge, for that purpose, 
on market principles more than would be necessary (and go beyond 
what is permissible in order to ensure the provision of a minimum 
service by way of public service obligation)? One could think of such 
measures being discussed, for example, following large public health 
scares or corporate scandals. Public broadcasting is an example in 
which the Community does, indeed, recognise the cultural necessity 
to ensure civic trust in the quality of these public programmes, and 
allows for regulation to that effect.61 In other liberalised sectors, 
however, the sector-specific Community legislation would regularly 
prevent the Member States from taking those steps. Incidentally, in 
those sectors where general competition law alone provides the legal 
framework, the Court of Justice may accommodate some of these 
                                                 
60 Marquand, note 13 supra, p. 34. 
61 Prosser, note 4 supra, Chapter 10. 
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choices. In Ambulanz Glöckner,62 for example, the Court was faced 
with the question of whether a public authority could benefit from a 
derogation from EC competition law pursuant to Article 86(2) EC, in 
which it had reserved the provision of ambulance services to certain 
non-profit providers. The legal arrangement shielded these services 
from the for-profit incentives of commercial providers and was set up 
to ensure, amongst other things, a quality of service that people could 
trust. This, in itself, can be seen as a value for the local community, 
which the authorities may see worthy of protection. The Court, 
applying the softer “necessity” test under Article 86(2) EC, rather 
than a strict “least restrictive measure” requirement, thus accepting 
that the public authorities had a margin of appreciation, concluded 
that Article 86(2) EC could apply if all the conditions of that provision 
were fulfilled. Almost certainly, a strict proportionality review would 
have meant the measure in question would have been declared 
disproportionate.63 
 
The legislation is certainly not unconcerned with the positive effects 
of public trust and public ethos, and one central aim of the 
Commission’s strategy so far has been ensure those same effects 
through on-going control, monitoring and evaluation of the quality of 
the services (“consumer satisfaction”), transparency and quality of 
decision-making processes.64 However, this process, whilst it may 
take an interest in similar effects, shows little interest in public trust 
and public ethos as self-standing values. Instead, it relies on 
economics-based assessments, and sees these as ways to identify 
asymmetries in the market, and then to improve efficiency and 
delivery further.65 Marquand and Dahrendorf however introduce an 
entirely different perspective altogether, rooted in social rather than 
economic theory. It takes a real interest in public trust and ethos as 
political values, and sees them as ends in themselves, making for a 
civilised community and improving our collective identity. 
Regulation is being imposed for this reason; indeed, it is not being 
                                                 
62 Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] E.C.R. I-8089. 
63 Boeger, note 7 supra. 
64 Commission, Communication on Services of General Interest, note 1 supra, at point 
4.3. See, also, Commission, White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2004), 
p. 374. 
65 Clear in: Commission, Communication from the Commission: A Methodological 
Note for the Horizontal Evaluation of Services of General Economic Interest, COM 
(2002) final, p. 331. 
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“imposed” at all, as this would imply an “imposition” from the 
perspective of the market. Instead, the regulation grows organically 
out of the political choice of the community to order itself in this way, 
prioritising these social values over economic values. It reflects, in a 
very real sense, our collective self-determination as a society. 
Whether we revert to regulation in this way will, of course, depend 
on our understanding of ourselves as individuals and as a collective, 
and may well mandate an understanding of our autonomy which is 
much more radically materialised than that revealed in the 
Community legislation described above (in particular, its market 
failure approach to regulation). Such an understanding is, perhaps, 
best expressed in T.H. Marshall’s famous definition of social 
citizenship, which, in his words, ensures: 
 
[A] general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life 
… an equalisation between the more and the less fortunate at all 
levels.66 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have suggested that, in considering Europe’s role in 
the field of public services, we have to start from basic principles. 
These principles are enshrined in the Community’s compact whereby 
Member States retain the political control over their welfare states 
whilst the Community enforces their common economic interests. At 
the heart of such compact lies a concern for our individual autonomy 
– the capacity of European citizens to shape their own lives. This 
capacity may be defined in a more formal or a more material sense, 
and, in reality, there will, in any political community, exist a mixture 
between the two interpretations; there will, in any one legal system, 
exist a body of materialised and formal law. It is for the political 
community, working through the institutions of the state, to 
determine the appropriate mixture between the two and to this effect, 
it will rely on the existing rules (the constitution) which ensure that 
the addressees of the law retain control over law-makers. Such 
political control is best secured at national level where, for all their 
practical flaws, democratic structures remain constitutionally 
embedded. In the absence of equivalent democratic structures at 
Community level, the role of the Community is, in principle, confined 
                                                 
66 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1950), p. 56.  
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to furthering the Member States’ common economic concerns (even if 
it involves the setting of European standards which – and here lies 
the paradox – address common social concerns) whilst protecting our 
political autonomy negatively, by respecting the political freedom of 
the Member States. 
 
This, I suggested, is the yardstick against which we should measure 
Europe’s role in the field of public services. In practice, the 
Community legislation in the network-based sectors goes some way 
to giving effect to the Community’s compact. It reconciles the 
Member States’ quest for political autonomy on the one hand, and 
their common concern for economic integration and competition on 
the other, for example, by leaving the political responsibility for 
defining and imposing public service obligations, within the bounds 
of the legislation, to the Member States. Responsibility, in this sense, 
carries both an imperative and a freedom. Whilst, on the one hand, it 
means that Member States cannot divest themselves of the 
responsibility to make sure that these services are provided on an 
equitable basis (set out in the public service obligation), it means, on 
the other, that they are, by and large, relatively free in how they 
implement these obligations, within the bounds of the Community 
legislation. 
 
I finally drew attention to a number of ways in which the legislation, 
in its current form, appears to pay insufficient attention to the 
Community’s compact. First, it adopts an interpretation of 
Community law that gives relative priority to market integration and 
competition over public service, based upon a narrow interpretation 
of Article 86(2) EC (a strict proportionality test) which is not 
mandated by the EC Treaty or, indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Following such an interpretation, the legislation, secondly, prioritises 
a regulatory approach based upon an economic rationale of market 
failure. As a result of the dominance of market failure regulation, 
some public service values may well find expression in the political 
process in the Member States, but may not translate into public 
service obligations and accordingly, find no means of protection in 
the Community’s legislative framework. Thus, in its current form, the 
legislation shows a propensity to entrench the values of a market 
society and to crowd out other values, such as the public service 
ethos, the public domain or public trust, thereby reducing the 
autonomy of our political communities in Europe to determine for 
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themselves what importance they wish to attach to these collective 
values in their political organisation, in the field of public services. 

 
Chapter 18  
Services of General Economic Interest 
(SGEI) and Universal Service Obligations 








This chapter aims to discuss the following research question: What is 
the scope for using the legal concept of services of general economic 
interest to guarantee the provision of universal service in curative 
health care (or multi-product hospital care)? 
1.1. Article 86(2) as an Exception to the Treaty Rules for 
Undertakings 
The starting point is that Article 86(2) EC provides an exception to 
(or: exemption from) the Treaty rules in relation to undertakings that 
have been entrusted with carrying out services of general economic 
interest. This exception covers both the Member States’ authorities 
which entrust carrying out services of general economic interest to 
one or more undertakings, and the undertakings concerned. It means 
that they are exempt from the relevant rules, i.e., these do not apply 
to them to the extent necessary to carry out their tasks. This mainly, 
but not exclusively, regards the application of the competition rules 
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(i.e., vis-à-vis the Member States, the market freedoms can also be 
relevant1).” 
 
The exception of Article 86(2) EC is especially important, because, 
otherwise, European law can be characterised as essentially a binary 
system, classifying entities either as undertakings (i.e., carrying out 
economic activities bearing economic risk), or not, with important 
consequences in terms of the legal obligations that follow: 
 
• as soon as services are provided by undertakings, the 
competition rules instantly apply in full force; 
• if, on the other hand, the entities concerned are not 
undertakings, but are “solidarity”-based, they are excluded 
from the competition rules altogether. 
 
This may occur while the actual services concerned are very similar 
or even identical, and has been the basis for much dissatisfaction with 
the EU legal framework. It leads to the central paradox that vertically 
integrated services provided by public authorities tend to be ignored 
by the Treaty, whereas introducing even a modicum of competition 
among undertakings providing the same services can lead to the 
Treaty articles being applied to the point where legitimate public 
interests may be threatened.2 
 
Evidently, this binary system complicates efforts to introduce 
competition gradually or partially, while doing so is frequently not 
only a political necessity, but also desirable from the perspective of 
system stability in a liberalisation context (for example, to offer an 
adjustment period or transition phase, or to experiment with greater 
and smaller degrees of market freedom). 
 
                                                 
1 Such as with regard to the free movement of goods and services, and the freedom of 
establishment. Articles 31 (commercial monopolies) 81 and 82 (prohibitions on cartels 
and dominance abuse) EC can also be relevant vis-à-vis Member States. See J.L. 
Buendia Sierra, “Chapter 6: Article 86”, in: J Faull and A Nikpay (eds), The EU law on 
competition, (2nd edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
2 Thus Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637; Case 
C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395; and Case T-319/99 FENIN [2003] ECR II-357, 
the solidarity element prevailed. The opposite occurred in, for example, Case C-
328/94 FFSA [1995] ECR I-6025 and Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751; Joined 
Cases C-115/97, C-116/97, C-117/97 and C-219/97 Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025; and 
Case C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999] ECR I-6121. 
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Article 86(2) EC offers a way out of this binary system, because it 
allows proportionate restrictions on competition to be imposed to the 
benefit of undertakings charged with services of general economic 
interest. It allows a tailor-made solution for each service of general 
economic interest. In The Netherlands, multi-product hospitals 
markets are an important example of markets that are presently 
encumbered with state regulation, for which the introduction of 
greater degree of competition is contemplated. This is the reason why 
Article 86(2) EC is examined here as a possible EU legal framework 
for multi-product hospitals. Another area for which Article 86(2) EC 
may be relevant is long-term care. 
1.2. The Research Question in Detail 
In greater detail, the research question addressed in this chapter is as 
follows: Does the Community law concept of services of general 
economic interest form a possible and appropriate legal framework 
for those parts of multi-product hospital care in The Netherlands that 
are deemed: 
 
• Of general public interest (for example, “universal service”); 
and 
• Not suitable for competitive provision (i.e., subject to market 
failure)? 
 
It should be noted that, so far, the debate on services of general 
economic interest is not clearly focused in economic terms, especially 
with regard to the use of the market failure concept. However, both 
the incidence of services of general economic interest and the 
proportionality of the solutions found could usefully be couched in 
economic terms. 
 
Hence, an additional research question could be whether standard 
economic reasoning on market failure could be applied to determine 
the scope or services of general economic interest, and whether, in 
this case, the outcomes obtained might differ from those of the 
existing process. This question will only be addressed briefly, as a 
possible precursor to further inquiry. 
1.3. Scope 
The scope of the discussion in this chapter is the relevant EU law on 
competition, free movement, state aid and public procurement. 
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National law is not examined in any detail at this stage, but may be 
taken up in future. Likewise, it may be decided to broaden this 
chapter horizontally, for example, by extending it to cover long-term 
care. 
1.4. Structure 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: after this introduction, first, 
the general scope of Article 86(2) will be discussed; second, the 
debate on services of general economic interest is described; third, 
various definition issues including that of universal service, will be 
addressed, as well as the link with market failure; fourth, the scope of 
the Article 86(2) EC derogation, notably including proportionality, is 
discussed; fifth, public service compensation and state aid are 
discussed; sixth, this framework will be applied to the multi-product 
hospital sector, and finally, some conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. The Legal Basis and Basic Purpose of Article 
86(2) 
2.1. Legal basis 
Services of general economic interest (SGEI) find their legal basis in 
Articles 16 and 86(2) of the EC Treaty itself, as well as in Article 36 of 
the Charter on Fundamental Rights. These provisions will be 
discussed briefly here. 
2.1.1. Article 86 EC 
Article 86 of the EC Treaty – as originally introduced in the 1957 
Treaty of Rome at the outset of the European Economic Community – 
provides a special regime for public monopolies, and for 
undertakings granted “special and exclusive rights” by the Member 
States, in respect to “the rules contained in the Treaty”. 
 
Within the context of Article 86 EC, Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty 
provides a special rule for “services of general economic interest” (SGEI) 
which reads as follows: 
 
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of 
general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-
producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in 
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this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as 
the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, 
in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as 
would be contrary to the interests of the Community. 
 
The Article 86(2) EC exception is neither specified nor limited (in 
Article 86 EC or elsewhere) in the Treaty. 
 
While it is possible for the Commission to set out its own 
interpretation of Article 86(2) EC in greater detail by means of 
Commission Decisions or Directives based upon Article 86(3) EC, this 
possibility has rarely been used. An important reason for the 
Commission’s reticence is that the European Parliament and Council 
object to the use of these instruments, which allow the Commission to 
“legislate” single-handedly. The Parliament and the Council see this 
as lacking in democratic legitimacy, which is perceived as 
undesirable given the general “democratic deficit” of the EU. The 
European Parliament, in particular, favours instruments adopted 
upon the basis of “co-decision”, which give it a role equivalent to that 
of the Council. Thus, the call for a Framework Directive adopted 
upon the basis of co-decision also addresses a situation which is 
unsatisfactory for the European Parliament from an institutional 
point of view. The Commission tries to accommodate these concerns 
by consulting the European Parliament informally on horizontal draft 
measures based upon Article 86(3) EC. 
2.1.2. Article 16 EC 
Thirty years after Article 86 was introduced in the EEC Treaty, a new 
Article 16 EC on services of general economic interest was introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. This ambiguous text reads: 
 
Without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87, and given the place 
occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared 
values of the Union as well as their role in promoting territorial 
and social cohesion, the Community and the Member States, 
each within their respective powers and within the scope of 
application of this Treaty, shall take care that such services 
operate on the basis of principles and conditions that enable 




On the one hand, the core legal elements of the concept of services of 
general economic interest are confirmed (“without prejudice to”), 
while, on the other, they are connected to a diffuse set of objectives as 
if to balance these against the market freedoms. Moreover, a 
declaration attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam underlined the need 
to interpret this provision in the light of the existing case law on 
Article 86(2) EC. 
 
The ambiguity of Article 16 EC may further increase due to the 
following addition, that was proposed by the European Convention 
in Article III-122 of the proposed Constitutional Treaty, which 
otherwise repeats Article 16 EC: 
 
European laws shall define these principles and set these 
conditions without prejudice to the competence of the Member 
States, in compliance with the Constitution, to provide, to 
commission and to fund such services. 
 
It is not clear who will adopt these laws, the Commission, based upon 
Article 86(3) EC3 – with the drawbacks from a democratic perspective 
mentioned above – or the European Parliament and the Council, 
based upon Article 95 EC, or a combination of both. Perhaps, this 
provision will eventually be used as (part of) the legal basis for a 
future Framework Directive on Services of General Economic Interest 
(i.e., if there is sufficient political support for this among the Member 
States and in the European Parliament).4 
 
In addition, an interpretative protocol will be added to Article 16 
Protocol on Services of General Interest in the upcoming review of 
the Treaty after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty: 
 
Article 1:  
The shared values of the Union in respect of services of general 
economic interest within the meaning of Article 16 EC Treaty include 
in particular: 
 
                                                 
3 Article 86 EC is renumbered Article I-166 by the proposed Constitutional Treaty. 
4 The European Trade Union Federation ETUC, and the Socialist People Party block 
in the European Parliament (PSE) are campaigning for a Framework Directive, 
collecting citizens’ signatures for a petition in this direction. 
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• the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional 
and local authorities in providing, commissioning and 
organizing services of general economic interest as closely as 
possible to the needs of the users; 
• the diversity between various services of general economic 
interest and the differences in the needs and preferences of 
users that may result from different geographical, social or 
cultural situations; 
• a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal treatment 




The provisions of the Treaties do not affect in any way the 
competence of Member States to provide, commission and 
organise noneconomic (sic) services of general interest.5 
 
This protocol appears to add little of substance with regard to 
services of general economic interest themselves, other than 
highlighting, once again, the topicality of this issue and the deep 
concerns held by the Member States that something essential may slip 
from their control. However, it may be that, in the future, the values 
of “a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal treatment 
and the promotion of universal access and of universal rights” will be 
fleshed out further as basic principles of services of general economic 
interest. The provision on “non-economic services of general 
interest”, absurd as it may be (are the provisions on equal treatment 
of men and women in the workplace and the Working Times 
Directive no longer to apply to public librarians?) need not detain us 
here. 
2.1.3. Article 36 Charter on Fundamental Rights 
Meanwhile, the concept of services of general economic interest has 
likewise found its way into Article 36 of the Charter on Fundamental 
Rights, as follows: 
 
The Union recognises and respects access to services of general 
economic interest as provided for in national laws and 
practices, in accordance with the Treaty establishing the 
                                                 
5 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 21/22 June 2007. 
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European Community, in order to promote the social and 
territorial cohesion of the Union. 
 
Substantively, these provisions add little, if anything at all, to Article 
86 EC or to the case law of the Court on this provision. Hence, the 
remainder of this chapter will not address Article 16 EC Treaty or 
Article 36 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights, but will be limited 
to Article 86 EC. First, we will examine its role and structure. 
2.2. The Role and Structure of Article 86 EC 
Article 86 EC provides a special regime not only for undertakings 
entrusted with providing services of general economic interest, which 
may be public monopolies, but also more generally for undertakings 
granted “special and exclusive rights” by the Member States, with 
respect to “the rules contained in the Treaty”. It should be noted that 
this exception covers all Treaty rules, i.e., not only (“in particular”) 
the free movement and the competition rules, but also the rules on, 
for example, state aid and public procurement. 
 
Consequently, Article 86 EC is a key provision concerning the 
distinction between the public and the private spheres in EU law. It is 
structured as follows: 
 
Article 86(1) EC formulates the general rule prohibiting the Member 
States from taking, concerning public undertakings or undertakings 
enjoying special and/or exclusive rights, any measures contrary to 
the rules contained in the Treaty. These treaty rules are further 
specified as the anti-discrimination provisions of Articles 28 and 49 
(i.e., free movement), the competition rules, and the rules on state aid. 
Article 86(2) provides a limited derogation from this general rule for 
services of a general economic interest and revenue-producing 
monopolies. This exception is limited to cases in which the rules of 
the Treaty, in particular, the free movement and competition rules, 
would obstruct such enterprises in the performance of their public 
interest tasks, and where the state measures involved do not encroach 
on the Community interest – i.e., repeating the familiar EU law 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. 
Under Article 86(3) EC, the Commission is empowered to enforce the 
prohibition in Article 86(1) and the application of Article 86(2) EC by 
way of Directives and Decisions. As is the case for Article 86 EC itself, 
such Article 86(3) EC Directives are addressed to the Member States, 
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not to undertakings directly (an undertaking charged with infringing 
Article 82 EC, for example, could, however, invoke the applicability 
of Article 86(2) EC in its defence).6 
 
Article 86 EC is addressed to the Member States, not to undertakings 
directly. In summary, it prohibits the Member States from taking, in 
relation to the specific categories of undertakings mentioned above, 
any measures contrary to the Treaty, with a limited exception for 
services of general economic interest. The application of both the 
general rule and its exception are subject to Commission supervision. 
As such, Article 86 EC is also an elaboration of the principle of 
Community “good faith” set out in Article 10 EC (effet utile) that has 
led to extensive case law on market interventions by the Member 
States (but which will not be discussed here). 
 
So far, there are few examples of horizontal measures based upon 
Article 86 EC. These are: 
Rules on financial transparency of public undertakings (dating back 
to 1980);7 
Rules on public service compensation (of 2005, twenty-five years 
later).8 
 
                                                 
6 The provisions of Article 86 EC read as follows:” (1) In the case of public 
undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive 
rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary 
to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in 
Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89; (2) Undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing 
monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the 
rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to 
the interests of the Community; (3) The Commission shall ensure the application of 
the provisions of this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate 
directives or decisions to Member States.” 
7 Now codified in: Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the 
Transparency of Financial Relations between Member States and Public 
Undertakings as well as on Financial Transparency within certain Undertakings, OJ 
2006 L318/17. 
8 Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation, OJ 
2005 C297/04; and Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of 
Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation 
granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest, OJ 2005 L312/67. 
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Apart from this, there are only sectoral rules regarding services of 
general economic interest in various network sectors, which (apart 
from those relating to the telecommunications sector9) are not based 
upon Article 86. These will be discussed in Section 4.3. below. 
However, as mentioned above, if Article III-122 of the Proposed 
Constitutional Treaty (ever) enters into force, it may eventually be 
used as an additional legal basis for a Framework Directive on 
Services of General Economic Interest. 
 
In the proposed Constitutional Treaty, Article 86 EC is renumbered 
Article I-166, without changes apart from the fact that the 
Commission would henceforth be able to adopt Regulations instead of 
Directives. Because Regulations are directly binding and do not 
require implementing legislation at national level, this means the 
Commission’s legislative powers with regard to services of general 
interest (and special and exclusive rights) would actually be 
strengthened. This is remarkable considering the long-standing 
objections held by the European Parliament and the Council against 
Commission legislation based upon Article 86(3) EC that were 
already mentioned above.10 
3. The Debate on Services of General Economic 
Interest 
3.1. Scope of the Debate 
A number of landmark decisions by the Court of Justice in the 
telecommunications sector in the 1990s sparked a debate on Article 86 
EC. In these cases, brought by a number of Member States against the 
Commission, the Court accepted that the Commission could abolish 
exclusive and special rights in this sector by means of Commission 
Directives.11 Proponents of state intervention subsequently felt 
strengthened by further cases such as Corbeau (in which the Court 
found that exclusive rights and cross-subsidies between various 
activities could be acceptable in the context of ensuring the financial 
                                                 
9 Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the 
markets for electronic communications networks and services OJ 2002 L249/21. 
10 It remains contested whether or not Article 80(3) EC Directives should be 
considered legislation, rather than an authoritative interpretation of the Treaty by the 
Commission. 
11 Case C-202/88 Terminal Directive [1991] ECR I-1223; Joined cases C-271/90, C-
281/90 and C-289/90 Services Directive [1992] ECR I-5833. 
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stability of a universal service system for postal services). They 
sought to broaden the scope for public interest exception in Article 
86(2) EC respectively to limit the Commission’s powers in order to be 
able to continue to intervene in “key” economic sectors without 
Community intervention based upon breaches of the Treaty.12 
 
In this debate, parties fearing liberalisation and privatisation based 
upon EU law campaigned to give the “service public” a sound basis in 
the Treaty itself. Often, France was the standard-bearer for such 
efforts. However, the Commission appears to have been successful in 
drowning its opposition in a decade-long consultation exercise 
generating a series of papers that might charitably be defined as 
“harmless”.13 Although the service public concept was eventually 
written into the new Article 16 EC on services of general economic 
interest of the Treaty of Amsterdam cited above, this was done in a 
manner involving no substantive changes to Article 86 EC, and which 
was characterised in the French Senate as a mere “consolation 
prize”.14 Equally harmlessly, the service public concept has found its 
way into Article 36 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights (likewise 
cited above).15 
 
As mentioned, the ambiguity of Article 16 was enhanced by the 
addition that was proposed by the European Convention in Article 
III-122 of the proposed Constitutional Treaty: “European laws shall 
define these principles and conditions”. According to the White 
Paper on Services of General Interest, “this provision will provide an 
                                                 
12 Case C-320/91 Procureur du Roi v Paul Corbeau (Corbeau) [1993] ECR I-2533. 
13 See the barrage of communications from the Commission: Services of general 
interest in Europe, OJ 1996 C281/3; Services of general interest in Europe, OJ 2001 
C17/4; Report to the Laeken European Council – Services of general interest, 
COM(2001)598 final; Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2003), 270 
final; White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2004) 374 final; 
Implementing the Community Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest 
in the European Union, COM (2006), 177 final. 
14 Rapport d’information fait au nom de la delegation pout l’Union européenne sur les 
services d’intérêt general en Europe (No. 82, 2000-2001 of November 2000, rapporteur 
Hubert Haenel), at 20, cited in J. Baquero Cruz, “Beyond Competition: Services of 
General Interest and European Community Law”, in: G. de Búrca (ed), supra note 1, 
p. 177. 
15 “The Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest 
as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, in order to promote the social and territorial 
cohesion of the Union”. 
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additional legal basis for Community action in the field of services of 
general economic interest, within the powers of the Union and within 
the scope of application of the Constitution”.16 
 
The White Paper also states, in the context of the question of whether 
a Framework Directive on Services of General (economic) Interest is 
needed, that this question will only be examined once the Proposed 
Constitutional Treaty enters into force. In the absence of such a 
Framework Directive, it should be noted that, apart from the Treaty 
provision on Article 86(2) EC itself, at present, no specific legal 
instruments beyond the Electronic Communications and 
Transparency Directives, and the Public Service Compensation 
framework (Notice and Decision) exist. In other words, the field is 
still very much open, and the debate has so far produced very little 
apart from underlining the importance of Article 86(2) EC. 
 
One outcome of the debate has been that, in addition to services of 
general economic interest and services of general interest, the “social 
service of general interest” has been identified, in spite of the fact that 
“under Community law, social services do not constitute a legally 
distinct category of service within services of general interest”.17 
Although there are a large number of services that might qualify as a 
social service of general interest, the question of what they would 
then qualify for has been wisely left open. Because they were 
specifically excluded from the Services Directive,18 which gave rise to 
the discussion on social services of general interest, health services 
are not covered by this concept (although long-term care is), and are, 
                                                 
16 White Paper, supra note 13, p. 6. 
17 COM (2006) 177, Implementing the Community Lisbon programme: social services of 
general interest in the European Union, at 4. The specific characteristics of such social 
services of general economic interest are listed as including one or more of the 
following: they operate on the basis of solidarity, in particular by the non-selection of 
risks or the absence, of equivalence between individual contributions and benefits; 
they are comprehensive and integrate the response to differing needs; they are not 
for profit; they include the participation of voluntary workers; they are strongly 
rooted in (local) cultural traditions; an asymmetric relationship between providers 
and beneficiaries exists that requires third party financing. 
18 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market, OJ 2006, L376/36, Article 2f: “This 
Directive shall not apply to: (…) healthcare services whether of not they are provided 
via healthcare facilities and regardless of the ways in which they are organized and 
financed at national level or whether they are public or private.” 
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instead, subject to a separate Commission consultation process.19 
Social services of general interest will, therefore, not be discussed any 
further here. 
 
In substance, then, there is no relevant change: the entire public 
debate on services of general economic interest can be seen as a 
holding exercise by the Commission, intended to diffuse political 
tension on this topic, without having had much of an impact on the 
scope or meaning of services of general economic interest. A benefit 
of this outcome is that the Treaty, and EU law, have not been saddled 
with a far-reaching service public clause that could cripple future 
liberalisation efforts, for example, in network sectors or the social 
sphere. The drawback of this limited outcome is that certain basic 
elements such as definitions, the purpose of services of general 
economic interest, and the nature of the proportionality test remain 
hazy. 
 
Before examining the relevant concepts and definitions in further 
detail, the position on the services of general economic interest of the 
main actors involved is briefly restated. 
3.2. Position on Services of General Economic Interest 
of the Main Actors 
Broadly speaking, three (types of) institutional actors have developed 
sometimes contrasting positions on the subject of services of general 
economic interest. 
3.2.1. Commission 
The Commission has been engaged in a drawn out consultation 
process over the past ten years concerning services of general 
economic interest, initially concerning services of general economic 
interest as such, then on services of general interest in the context of 
the Lisbon programme, and finally on social services of general 
interest in the context of the proposed Constitutional Treaty. As 
mentioned above, this was essentially a containment exercise, i.e., a 
defensive approach designed to forestall any weakening of the 
Commission’s position and/or of Article 86 EC more broadly. More 
recently, the role of the Commission has become more pro-active: 
 
                                                 
19 Community action on health services, supra note 13. 
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• By including, in Article III-122 of the Draft Constitution, an 
additional legal basis for Community action in the area of 
services of general economic interest and, in Article III-166, 
the possibility of Commission Regulations, instead of 
Directives; 
• By adopting a Community framework based upon a 
Commission Notice and a Commission Decision in the area of 
public service compensation and state aid, following 
innovative case law by the Court of Justice (Altmark Trans).20 
 
It appears that the Commission would be interested in enacting or 
sponsoring a General Framework Directive on services of general 
economic interest, but is waiting for the adoption and entry into force 
of the (revised) proposed Constitutional Treaty before making its 
move. 
3.2.2. Member States 
The Member States, in most cases led by France,21 have likewise 
approached services of general economic interest defensively, albeit 
from the opposite side: they have invoked the concept as a 
competition defence in individual cases, while trying to construct 
alternative concept such as service public that would provide, in their 
view, even better cover for state intervention in the market process. 
When discussing the proposed Constitutional Treaty, however, they 
failed to agree on curtailing the scope of Article 86(2) EC and settled 
for ambiguous wording that added nothing much that was relevant 
to the text. 
 
Because the Commission appears to have been successful in its 
attempt to keep Article 86(2) EC afloat, now, maybe, is the time for 
the Member States to adopt a more pro-active approach and to 
develop more systematic ideas about services of general economic 
interest at national level. This concept, after all, might be useful to 
shield certain services from competition, in so far as they are justified 
(i.e., necessary) in order to carry out a legitimate public service task. It 
can, therefore, be a useful tool for a process of managed liberalisation, 
                                                 
20 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR I-7747. 
21 Although, the service public idea resurfaced as one of the “key” objectives of The 
Netherlands (the other Member State that had voted “no” in a referendum on the 
proposed Constitutional Treaty) in negotiating a revised (Constitutional) Treaty. 
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for example, to help contain escalating costs in the social sphere 
regarding sectors such as healthcare and/or pensions, which are no 
longer affordable as state-run systems. 
3.2.3. The Court of Justice 
The Court can be said to have constructed a system that allows the 
Member States the freedom to intervene on behalf of services of 
general economic interest, even to the point of creating or 
maintaining monopolies, albeit subject to a non-discrimination and 
proportionality test. 
 
Its recent case-law on public service compensation greatly increases 
the significance of the Article 86(2) EC exception, while stressing the 
need for a formal act of entrustment in order to benefit from this 
privileged regime. In other words, it appears to set out some decisive 
markers on the requirements to be met while sweetening the package 
by offering a safe haven from the state aid regime. Arguably, this has 
changed the incentive structure for the Member States, although they 
may be slow to realise this, continuing (as, recently, in the Dutch 
position on changes needed to the proposed Constitutional Treaty 
that led to the protocol that will be annexed to Article 16 in the 
impending Treaty revision and was discussed in Section 2.1. above) 
to propose primitive carve-outs from the Treaty regime that lack any 
precedent, broader legal basis or economic rationale. 
 
4. Definition Issues 
4.1. Overlapping and Incomplete Definitions 
It should not come as a surprise that, as the outcome of a consultation 
process that was, arguably, not even intended to produce clear 
results, the definitions and use of concepts in this area are muddy. 
For example, the White Paper on Services of General Interest states: 
 
Services of general interest are at the core of the political debate. 
Indeed, they touch on the central question of the role public 
authorities play in a market economy, in ensuring, on the one 
hand, the smooth functioning of the market and compliance 
with the rules of the game by all actors and, on the other hand, 
safeguarding the general interest, in particular, the satisfaction 
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of citizens’ essential needs and the preservation of public goods 




The debate on the Green Paper has strongly confirmed the 
importance of services of general interest as one of the pillars of 
the European model of society. (…) It has also confirmed the 
existence of a common concept of services of general interest in 
the Union. This concept reflects Community values and goals 
and is based on a set of common elements, including: universal 
service, continuity, quality of service, affordability, as well as 
user and consumer protection.23 
 
It does not immediately inspire great confidence that services of 
general interest are here declared to constitute no less than a pillar of 
the European model, while this category (“services of general 
interest”) is, as such, non-existent in EU law. However, this term was 
apparently devised to be able to discuss the implications of the fact 
that the Treaty’s internal market and competition rules cover only 
economic activities. In the course of the debate on Article 86, at least 
four different partially overlapping concepts have played a role: 
 
• services of general economic interest; 
• universal service (obligations); 
• services of general interest; 
• social services of general interest.24 
 
4.1.1. Focus on Services of General Economic Interest and 
Universal Service Obligations 
Because there are no formal or generally accepted definitions of these 
concepts, their mutual demarcation is tricky. For example: 
 
• There is no standard definition of services of general economic 
interest in the Treaty or in secondary legislation,25 but it is an 
                                                 
22 Green Paper, supra note 13, p. 3. 
23 White Paper, supra note 13, p. 4. 
24 See the documents referenced at supra note 13. 
25 White paper, supra note 13, p. 7. 
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EU law concept that appears in the Treaty. Descriptions of 
services of general economic interest provided by the 
Commission overlap with those of universal service. 
• There is no standard definition of universal service 
(obligations) and it does not appear in the Treaty, but 
universal service obligations have been specified in secondary 
sectoral legislation, notably for telecommunications (and 
postal services). Moreover, the concept is applied (but not 
under this name) in other network sectors, in particular, 
transport and energy. 
• There are no standard definitions of services of general 
interest or of social services or general interest and it would 
not matter much if there were, as they are not EU law 
concepts, but were introduced to facilitate and defuse the 
debate on services of general economic interest. They are 
thought to overlap, at least in large part, with services of 
general economic interest. 
 
Only services of general economic interest and universal service 
obligations are EU legal concepts. Moreover, health services (or at 
least curative care, notably hospital services) have, in any event, been 
excluded from the scope of (social) services of general interest. 
Therefore, the focus of this chapter will be on the former two, i.e., 
services of general economic interest and universal service. 
4.2. The Lack of a Definition of Services of General 
Economic Interest 
Another way of looking at the absence of a definition is that the 
definition of services of general economic interest itself was left open 
because the EC Treaty gives the Member States a wide freedom to 
define missions of general economic interest and to establish the 
organisational principles of the services intended to accomplish them. 
This interpretation is plausible also given that successive (proposed) 
amendments of the Treaty have not come up with a definition. 
 
Another reason why there is no list of services of general economic 
interest, or of services that are not, is that the concept of services of 
general economic interest is a dynamic one. Perceptions of what such 
services comprise, or what they do not, vary between time and 
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place.26 Thus, according to the Commission’s Green Paper on services 
of general interest: 
 
The range of services that can be provided on a given market is 
subject to technological, economic and societal change and has 
evolved over time. (…) Given that the distinction is not static in 
time, (…) it would neither be feasible nor desirable to provide a 
definitive a priori list of all services of general interest that are 
to be considered non-economic.27 
 
Because the concept of services of general economic interest is a fluid 
one, providing a list of such services is not very useful. Nevertheless, 
there are several descriptions of the key elements of services of 
general economic interest that are useful. For example, the Green 
Paper listed the following as common elements of a Community 
concept of services of general economic interest: 
 
[…] in particular: universal service, continuity, quality of 
service, affordability, as well as user and consumer protection.28 
 
According to the White Paper, however, services of general economic 
interest mean the following: 
 
[…] in Community practice, there is broad agreement that the 
term refers to services of an economic nature which the Member 
States or the Community subject to specific public service 
obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion (emphasis 
added).29 
 
                                                 
26 Clearly, it is possible to provide a list of sectors in which the Court or the 
Commission have accepted the existence of a service of general economic interest in 
past cases: river port operations; establishing and operating a public 
telecommunications network; water distribution; the operation of television services; 
electricity distribution; the operation of particular transport lines; employment 
recruitment; basis postal services; maintaining a postal service network in rural 
areas; regional policy; port services; waste management; ambulance services; and 
basic health insurance. However this does not mean that these services should be 
regarded as services of general economic interest in all Member States, at all times. 
See Buendia Sierra, note 1 supra, pp. 629-30. 
27 Green Paper, note 13 supra, p. 14. 
28 Ibid., p. 15. 
29 White Paper, note 13 supra, p. 7. 
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Here, the link between services of general economic interest and 
specific public service obligations is worth noting. Territorial 
coverage obligations are also mentioned frequently. It should be 
noted that all of these factors are also mentioned in relation to 
universal service, which raises the question what the relationship 
between universal service and services of general economic interest 
is.30 This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 
The Member States’ freedom to designate services of general 
economic interest is almost absolute up until the moment pre-
emption occurs, i.e., the point where the relevant services are defined 
by Community legislation, based either upon Article 95 EC 
harmonisation measures or on Article 86(3) EC Commission 
Decisions or Directives, or both. Until that time, the Commission 
merely checks the definition of services of general economic interest 
for “manifest error”. The Community element is introduced only at 
the level of the proportionality test of the measures concerned. 
Hence, pre-emption and proportionality are two important categories 
that will likewise be discussed further below. 
 
First, however, the relevance of the requirement of an act of 
entrustment, respectively a comparable legal context, will be 
addressed as constitutive elements of a service of general economic 
interest. 
4.2.1. Act of Entrustment 
Whether open-ended or not, a service of general economic interest in 
principle requires an explicit act of entrustment: this can be seen as a 
constitutive act (i.e., creating the service of general economic interest 
where there was none previously).31 
 
The Court has made this absolutely clear with regard to public 
service compensation, where, in order to be classified as not 
constituting state aid, the compensation in question has to be paid to 
an entity formally entrusted with services of general economic 
                                                 
30 See Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France [1998] ECR I-3949, paras 44-7 which 
suggest universal service obligations are co-extensive with services of general 
economic interest. 




interest.32 The act of entrustment should involve a clearly identified 
addressee as well as clearly defined obligations based upon objective 
and transparent parameters, established in advance, for the 
calculation of compensation. Compensation should not exceed cost, 
plus a reasonable rate of return, and in cases where a public tender 
procedure is not followed the compensation should be based upon 
that of a (hypothetical) efficient undertaking.33 This requirement, 
again, underlines the importance of the provision of specific public 
service obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion (for which 
compensation is required) as the core of a service of general economic 
interest. 
 
Evidently, solutions that are not market-based are likely to require 
public funding of some sort. Nevertheless, it is clear that an explicit 
measure of entrustment as a constitutive legal act is highly desirable 
in any event. This is so not just to build up a file for the defence (as 
has frequently been the focus of Member States so far), but also in 
order to have a sound basis for the proportionality test that the 
services of general economic interest must meet. 
4.2.2. Existence derived from Broader Legal Context 
Nevertheless, the need for an act of entrustment – at least where there 
is no issue of public service compensation – is not absolute. The 
Commission has held that, in the absence of a legal act clearly 
entrusting a market party with services of general economic interest, 
it is also possible that the existence of a service of general economic 
interest can be derived from the broader legal context. It has, in fact, 
done so with regard to health insurance companies in state aid cases 
in relation to risk equalisation schemes.34 This is based upon a 
generous reading of a single Court judgment to this effect: 
                                                 
32 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans, note 20 supra; Community framework for State Aid, 
note 8 supra; and Commission Decision on Article 86(2) EC and State aid, note 8 
supra. 
33 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans, note 20 supra, paras 89-93. 
34 Risk equalisation decisions concerning Ireland and The Netherlands. Aid measure 
N46/2003 Risk equalisation system – Ireland; Aid measures N 541/2004 and N 
542/2004 Financial reserves and risk equalisation system – The Netherlands. In The 
Netherlands, as a matter of national law relating to services of general economic 
interest in the context of the cartel prohibition in Article 11, the prohibition of 
dominance abuse in Article 25 and the context of merger control, Article 41(3) of the 
Competition Act, in the absence of a formal legal act, it is possible, in highly 
exceptional circumstances to derive the existence of a service of general economic 
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The Member States […] cannot be precluded, when defining the 
services of general economic interest which they entrust to 
certain undertakings, from taking account of objectives 
pertaining to their national policy or from endeavouring to 
attain them by means of obligations and constraints which they 
impose on such undertakings (emphasis added).35 
 
This does not, however, constitute “carte blanche” for the Member 
States, as the services of general economic interest concerned must 
somehow be separated from other economic activities.36 Because, in 
addition, no public service compensation must be at issue (or it is 
subject to the state aid rules), and thus the relevance of this approach 
is likely to be limited in terms of the number of cases affected. 
4.3. The Definition of Universal Service 
The second important concept that requires further discussion is 
universal service. In the debate on services of general economic 
interest, universal service has been defined as follows: 
 
[…] to guarantee access for everyone, whatever the economic, 
social or geographic situation, to a service of a specified quality 
at an affordable price.37 
 
Slightly different descriptions are: 
 
The concept of a universal service refers to a set of general 
interest requirements ensuring that certain services are made 
available at a specified quality to all consumers and users 
throughout the territory of a Member State, independently of 
geographical location, and in the light of specific national 
conditions, at an affordable price.38 
                                                                                                                   
interest from “a conglomerate of rules, agreements and decisions”. Kamerstukken II 
1995/96, 24 707. nr 3, p 64. 
35 Case 157/94 Commission v The Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, para 40. 
36 State aid cases N541/2004 and N542/2004, at 27, with reference to Case C-179/90 
Porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889. 
37 Green Paper, supra note 13, p. 4. 
38 Ibid., at 16, with reference to Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service 





In a liberalised market environment a universal services 
obligation guarantees that everybody has access to the service 
at an affordable price and that the service quality is maintained 
and, where necessary improved.39 
 
Ubiquitous access and uniformity are, thus, important features of 
universal service. At the same time, however, continuity, quality of 
service, affordability, and user and consumer protection are 
mentioned alongside universal service as objectives of public policy 
in their own right.40 Likewise, the common elements of services of 
general interest cited above include: 
 
[U]niversal service, continuity, quality of service, affordability, 
as well as user and consumer protection.41 
 
Again, universal service is juxtaposed along public policy objectives 
that it might well be judged to include. 
The clearest definition is, perhaps, the following one: 
 
It establishes the right of everyone to access certain services 
considered as essential and imposes obligations on service 
providers to offer defined services according to specified 
conditions including complete territorial coverage and at an 
affordable price.42 
 
This clarification of universal service as a universal right for 
consumers, on the one hand, and a set of obligations imposed on 
undertakings, on the other, should be highlighted as one of the key 
characteristics of universal service. 
 
However, there is, again, a partial overlap (affordability) with values 
that are elsewhere presented as possible public policy objectives in 
their own right. Hence, it remains an open question as to whether 
universal service includes these other values or not – although it is 
                                                 
39 Green Paper, supra note 13, p. 16. 
40 Ibid., pp. 16-19. 
41 White Paper, supra note 13, p. 4. 
42 Ibid., p. 8 (emphasis added). 
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difficult to envisage a meaningful universal service obligation that 
would, apart from accessibility and affordability, fail to provide a 
specific level of quality (as imposing full national coverage for free at 
zero quality would be pointless). 
 
However, universal service and services of general economic interest 
do not fully coincide. The concept of services of general economic 
interest is broader, and may include other values, besides those set 
out in universal service obligations. 
 
Therefore, it is proposed here to regard the various public policy 
objectives listed alongside universal service as a catalogue of related 
objectives that belong to the sphere of universal service and must be 
linked in a meaningful manner in order to achieve a worthwhile 
universal service guarantee in a particular case. The three core public 
policy values for healthcare in The Netherlands, quality, affordability 
and accessibility, would fit very well with such a concept of universal 
service albeit that in the context of imposing universal service 
obligations to be met by particular undertakings, they would need to 
be specified at a particular level, i.e. as a deliverable. 
 
Universal service is further described as both a flexible and a 
dynamic concept, the basic principles of which are to be defined at 
Community level, which can subsequently be implemented by the 
Member States.43 In a liberalisation setting based upon Community 
legal instruments (such as in telecommunications and postal services) 
this may well be appropriate, but it can scarcely be the model in 
which Community legal instruments regulating liberalisation are 
absent – as is presently the case in healthcare. In summary, the 
existing reasoning on universal service obligations is incomplete and 
not always clear. On the bright side, this means that there is room for 
a national interpretation of these obligations, much like there is for 
services of general economic interest in general. 
 
It should also be noted that, despite the conceptual haziness 
described above defining universal service obligations in 
telecommunications and postal services, and having de facto universal 
obligations in energy, has proven to be of the greatest importance in 
enabling the liberalisation of these services: once the main public 
                                                 
43 Green Paper, supra note 13, p. 16. 
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policy concerns were tackled in this manner, the road to liberalising 
the remainder of the relevant service was opened. In The 
Netherlands, the situation concerning healthcare is similar, given that 
a broad national consensus on the need for liberalisation already 
exists in the absence of EU law or policy on this point. Here, too, basic 
public policy concerns must first be addressed in relation to services 
not deemed fit for liberalisation on public policy grounds as a pre-
condition for further liberalisation of services for which competitive 
provision is feasible. 
 
Because services of general economic interest and universal service 
obligations are the key relevant EU law categories their 
interrelationship will be examined further in the next paragraph. 
5. Services of General Economic Interest, 
Universal Service Obligations and Market Failure 
This brief section is dedicated to formulating some proposals on how 
to link the concepts of services of general economic interest, universal 
service and market failure. The starting point is the manner in which 
universal service has, so far, been defined at EU level in practice. 
5.1. Examples of Universal Service defined at EU level 
So far, there is only a handful of sectors – mainly concerning 
networked industries – where universal service has been defined at 
Community level. 
5.1.1. Natural Gas 
Article 3 of the Directive on Common Rules for the Internal Market in 
Natural Gas (Gas Directive) does not use the words “universal 
service”, but it does deal with public service obligations and 
consumer protection.44 It allows Member States to impose on gas 
operators in the general economic interest, public service obligations 
which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, 
quality and price of supplies, and environmental protection, 
including energy efficiency and climate protection. In addition, they 
may take appropriate measures to protect customers in remote areas, 
and may appoint a supplier of last resort. In addition, the Member 
                                                 
44 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas, repealing 
Directive 98/30/EC, OJ 2003, L176/57. 
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States may claim exemption from certain provisions in the Gas 
Directive, to the extent that their application would obstruct the 
services of general economic interest concerned. 
5.1.2. Electricity 
Article 3 of Directive on common rules for the internal market in 
electricity (Electricity Directive) provides for an exception for services 
of general economic interest in much the same language.45 In this 
case, however, it is explicitly provided that the Member States are to 
ensure a universal service46 in relation to all household customers 
and, where appropriate, small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
including the possibility of appointing a supplier of last resort and of 
imposing an obligation to provide connection according to specified 
terms. Additional consumer protection measures and an exemption 
from certain provisions in the Electricity Directive, to the extent that 
their application would obstruct the services of general economic 
interest concerned, are also provided. 
5.1.3. Postal Services 
Chapter 2 of the Directive on Common Rules for the Internal Market 
in Postal Services (Postal Directive) is dedicated to extensive rules 
governing universal service in the postal service.47 Defined as “the 
permanent provision of a postal service of specified quality at all 
points in the territory at affordable prices for all users”, the universal 
service obligations concerned are specified in great detail in the 
Directive as minimum norms to be met. The expression “services of 
general economic interest” is not used as such, nor are such services 
addressed apart from universal service: i.e., no services of general 
economic interest other than universal service are covered. It should 
be noted that the proposed amendments of the Postal Directive, apart 
from spelling out universal service obligations in much greater detail, 
abolishes and prohibits exclusive and special rights in this sector.48 
                                                 
45 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity, repealing 
Directive 96/92/EC, OJ 2003, L176/37. 
46 “That is the right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their 
territory at reasonable, easily and clearly comparable and transparent prices”. 
47 Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
1997 on Common Rules for the Development of the Internal Market of Community 
Postal Services and the Improvement of Quality of Service, OJ 1998, L15/14. 
48 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 97/67/EC concerning the full accomplishment of the internal market of 
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5.1.4. Electronic Communications 
The entire Directive on Universal Service and Users’ Rights relating 
to Electronic Communications (Universal Service Directive) is 
dedicated to universal service and users rights in this field.49 Member 
States must ensure that services covered by the Universal Service 
Directive are “made available at the quality specified to all end-users 
in their territory, independently of geographical location and, in the 
light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price”. This 
covers access at a fixed location, directory enquiry services and 
directories, public pay telephones and special measures for disabled 
users, and a minimum set of leased lines. Member States may 
designate one or more undertakings to guarantee the provision of 
universal service and detailed rules on the compensation for 
universal service tasks are provided. No services of general economic 
interest other than universal service are covered. 
 
From these examples, it may be surmised that, at least where services 
of general economic interest have so far been defined at Community 
level: 
 
• within the context of services of general economic interest, 
other types of public service obligations can, and do, exist 
alongside universal service obligations; 
• universal service obligations may be imposed either on all 
undertakings active in the market, or on a limited number of 
operators (provider of last resort); 
• services of general economic interest and universal service 
obligations, in particular, have been highly useful tools in 
achieving a working consensus underpinning the 
liberalisation of the bulk of the network sectors concerned. 
5.2. Services of General Economic Interest in relation to 
Universal Service Obligations 
The above section on definitions leaves a number of questions on the 
relationship between service of general economic interest and 
                                                                                                                   
Community postal services, COM (2006) 594 final. 
49 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on Universal Service and Users’ Rights relating to Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services (Universal Service Directive), OJ 2002, L108/51. 
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universal service (obligations) unanswered, which will be addressed 
here: 
 
• What is the scope of a service of general economic interest in 
relation to the scope of universal service, or universal service 
obligations? Do they overlap or coincide? 
• Can one exist without the other? Are they different in scope 
and content, and, if so, how? 
• How are they applied or imposed, and by which legal means? 
 
Given the absence of a definition and a legal framework for services 
of general economic interest (such as a Framework Directive may 
provide in future), at first sight, it remains unclear whether an entire 
sector (such as public transport, refuse collection or health services) 
could be designated as a service of general economic interest, or only 
those parts where restrictions on the application of the Treaty are 
held to be necessary in order for the tasks concerned to be performed 
(with possibly some related services – as ancillary restraints – 
necessary to make public service provision feasible or affordable). 
 
Likewise, it is not quite clear what the role of universal service or 
universal service obligations should be in this context. 
5.2.1. Proportionality 
First of all, it is proposed, here, to deal with this issue from a 
perspective of proportionality. That is to say that, in principle, it 
would appear more in line with proportionality to limit the 
application of the services of general economic interest concept to 
those cases in which it is clear in advance that particular restrictions 
in relation to EU law obligations concerning free movement, 
competition, state aid and/or public procurement will be necessary 
(and, therefore, proportional) to enable the undertaking(s) charged 
with the service of general economic interest to provide those 
services, in the sense that these services could not otherwise be 
provided to the requisite standard. Where this is not the case, 
reserving particular services to specific undertakings would simply 
not be necessary – and would, therefore, fail the proportionality 
standard included in Article 86(2) EC. 
 
Approaching this issue from the other end, for example, starting from 
sectors in which governmental intervention takes place in the public 
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interest as a whole would mean embracing practically all current 
areas of public policy without any clarity in advance on the question 
of whether meaningful restrictions would be involved that actually 
require resorting to Article 86(2) EC. It is also unlikely that, in this 
case, a proper discussion would take place on the proportionality of 
the restrictions on competition that would be necessary 
(proportional) to ensure that they met the Article 86(2) EC standards. 
This is, therefore, not a workable alternative. 
 
This issue is further complicated by the role of universal service 
obligations. Arguably, these should coincide with services of general 
economic interest, to the extent that they constitute the deliverables 
which form the objective of entrusting an undertaking with carrying 
out a service of general economic interest, and any restrictions 
necessary are necessary in order for the undertaking concerned to be 
able to carry out its universal service obligation based upon a stable 
economic footing. In other words, the service of general economic 
interest would then constitute the provision of universal service plus, 
conceivably, those non-universal service elements of the service 
necessary in order to enable its provision (ancillary restraints) or to 
make this provision affordable (funding regime).50 
 
However, at least in theory, the concept of services of general 
economic interest can cover public service obligations that are not 
universal service obligations in that they are in the general interest 
but not linked to territorial coverage (security of supply – and 
continuity – are examples of this). 
5.2.2. Public Service Compensation 
Apart from the issue of proportionality, another anchor point is the 
act of entrustment required by the Court to keep public service 
compensation out of the realm of state aid, which will be discussed in 
greater detail in a separate section below (Altmark Trans). 
 
The link between formal entrustment and an Article 86(2) EC 
exemption from the state aid regime for public service compensation 
suggests that the Court supports the coincidence or concurrence 
                                                 
50 It is sometimes held that other types of services of general interest than universal 
service are conceivable. In the absence of concrete examples this further distinction is 
not used here. See Buendia Sierra, supra note 1, pp. 642-3. 
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between services of general economic interest and universal service 
(obligations). Clearly, the most suitable time to undertake this formal 
entrustment process would be a liberalisation context when certain 
(parts of) services break out of the solidarity-based vertically 
integrated state provision, so the market freedoms and competition 
rules become relevant. Coincidence does not mean that a service of 
general economic interest must fully correspond with a universal 
service obligation: it may do so, but may also cover additional 
elements. 
5.3. Services of General Economic Interest and Market 
Failure 
When deciding on the scope of services of general economic interest 
and universal service obligations, the concept of market failure 
(and/or government failure) is a logical starting point: after all, it is 
only in these cases that the services concerned are not already 
provided to the requisite standard by the market (and/or by public 
authorities) that market parties must be entrusted with the provision 
of particular services in the public interest.51 It is submitted here that 
only where markets, in the absence of governmental action, fail, will 
it be possible to meet the EU law standard of necessity 
(proportionality)52 that is required to invoke successfully the EU law 
concepts of services of general economic interest and universal 
service.53 
Evidently, a Member State does not have to intervene or take 
additional measures if the public interest objectives (such as 
accessibility, quality and affordability) are ensured by the functioning 
of the market mechanism alone. However, if a Member State finds the 
market alone does not ensure the provision of the relevant public 
goods – i.e. market failure occurs – EU law allows the Member State 
                                                 
51 Sometimes economic and non-economic objectives are distinguished. This is wrong 
because the alleged non-economic objectives can usually be couched in terms of 
public goods and attempts to improve their delivery. 
52 Admittedly, the strictness of this test would still depend on whether or not pre-
emption by means of secondary EU law had occurred. As will be discussed further 
below, it is proposed here that this test would be one of whether a measure is 
“manifestly disproportionate” in cases where there is no Community legislation 
occupying the field, and “least restrictive means” where Community rules apply. 
53 The concept only becomes relevant in EU law terms when a Member State invokes 
Article 86(2) EC. In other words, as long as a Member State does not claim the 
exception it need not be able to demonstrate a market failure. 
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to designate (one or several) universal service providers and to 
compensate them. Intervention should be objective, transparent, non-
discriminatory and proportionate. This will ensure both legitimacy 
(rule of law) and overall welfare (social dimension). 
 
Remarkably enough, to date, the definition of services of general 
economic interest under Community law has not systematically or 
explicitly been connected with instances of “market failure”.54 At the 
same time, there is ample discussion of the proportionality of services 
of general economic interest: it, therefore, appears logical to introduce 
the concept of market failure and the consequences thereof as a 
guiding principle in formulating the scope of services of general 
economic interest.55 If market forces, left to themselves, sufficed to 
provide the public good at stake, there would be little point in 
intervening. 
 
For example, in health care insurance markets, two types of market 
failure are commonly said to exist: 
 
• Adverse selection: whereby insurers compete on the risk 
profile of their customers, seeking to attract lower-risk 
consumers, rather than on the provision of services; 
• Information asymmetry: which means that providers of health 
care have much better information about the need and scope 
for treatment, and the quality of the services provided than 
consumers and insurers. At the same time, consumers have 
better information about their own behaviour than the 
insurers, who act as third-party payers. This leads to: 
o Producer moral hazard: the problem that 
producers provide too much production (more 
than is efficient and socially desirable) and/or 
too little (less than is efficient and socially 
desirable), of the wrong kind, at quality levels 
that are too low and price levels that are too 
high; 
                                                 
54 See, however, J.W. van de Gronden, “The internal market, the state and private 
initiative: A legal assessment of national mixed public-private arrangements in the 
light of European law”, (2006) 33 Legal Issues of European Integration, p. 105. 
55 An exception is the Green Paper, supra note 13, p. 3 
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o Consumer moral hazard: the problem that third-
party payments (by insurers) may lead 
consumers to consume more health services than 
they would if they had to finance these services 
directly. 
 
In The Netherlands, these market failures have been addressed by 
mandatory universal health insurance, a prohibition on risk selection 
and on premium-differentiation backed up by a risk-equalisation 
fund (risk pooling and risk-adjusted transfer payments), an 
obligation on insurers to contract for adequate levels of care, and 
efforts to improve stock-taking, availability and exchange of quality 
data. Government intervention, in other words, has served to ensure 
that the relevant public good – universal affordable healthcare 
insurance coverage – was attained. According to the Commission, the 
sum of the measures concerned corresponds to entrusting the health 
insurers with a service of general economic interest.56 
 
Asymmetric information as well as problems of moral hazard, 
adverse selection and agency problems (when providers of health 
services oversell) are present in health care markets other than health 
insurance. Some of these problems can, in large part, be resolved by 
means of market-based solutions. 
 
For example, consumers of healthcare are uncertain and have 
asymmetric information compared to the providers of health services. 
They are unaware of if and when they will fall ill (stochastic 
demand), which types of health care and how much of these they 
need, and where to buy them (idiosyncratic preferences, costly search 
and co-ordination) and whether a treatment will be or has been 
effective (experience and credence good). However, consumers do 
not usually shop directly for health care, but act through secondary 
markets or intermediaries, with insurers absorbing the risk of 
uncertain demand, primary care physicians aiding consumers in their 
search for health services, and hospitals co-ordinating the need for 
complex health services. Finally, the risk of over-consumption may, 
for instance, be remedied by imposing capitation fees that allow 
hospitals and physicians to share the risk of over-consumption. 
                                                 
56 At present subject to appeal in Case T-84/06 Azivo v Commission, action brought on 
13 March 2006 on Aid measures N 541/2004 and N 542/2004. 
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In other cases, it may be necessary to intervene, for example, to 
guarantee access to emergency services within certain minimum 
time-limits or distance limits, according to public good standards 
which may be higher than what the market would provide on its 
own. Academic (teaching) hospitals, research, top-referential care and 
expensive pharmaceuticals are, at first sight, other possible 
candidates for such intervention. 
 
It should be noted that a market failure could be addressed in terms 
of, for example, imposing a universal service obligation, which could 
then still be implemented consistently with market principles, i.e., by 
market parties playing by market rules. Compensation from general 
tax revenues does not create a barrier to entry (and is subject to 
parliamentary control as part of the budget procedures). Funding by 
market participants should ensure that participants only contribute to 
the financing of the universal service obligation and not of other 
activities which are not directly linked to the provision of the 
universal service obligation. 
 
One pertinent example is provided by the risk equalisation funds in 
health insurance mentioned above. In the event that such a solution is 
not feasible, in some cases there may be a case for public provision or 
public service compensation (again, various forms could be 
envisaged that range from a universal service fund to funding from 
general taxation revenues). In summary, an economics-focused 
approach to services of general economic interest seems appropriate, 
even though this is, so far, not made explicit by existing documents 
on services of general economic interest. The reasoning used to argue 
the proportionality of the measure imposed would have to address 
this issue. 
 
Finally, it is important to realise that numerous market-based 
remedies of market failure are imaginable. For example, failures in 
primary markets can be remedied by means of creating secondary 
markets, and/or introducing intermediaries, guarantees and 
standards, quality-certification, etc. This is the case because, 
frequently, market failure is not the result of “too much” competition, 
but more probably the result of a lack of possibilities to compete, 
and/or a lack of (tradable) property rights. 
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6. Scope of the Article 86(2) EC Exemption 
A number of formal legal categories determine whether Article 86(2) 
EC is at issue. These concern, first, whether the entity is involved is 
an undertaking, second, whether it has been entrusted with a task of 
general economic interest, and third, whether the restrictions 
imposed are in line with the legitimate public task. 
6.1. The Concepts of Undertaking and Solidarity 
This sub-section deals with the question of which types of entities 
may claim an Article 86(2) EC exemption. In the first place, it should 
be noted that the word “economic” in services of general economic 
interest refers to the nature of the activity concerned, and not to the 
public interest which may be non-economic in nature, for example, 
the promotion of public health.57 The notion of “economic” services 
in important, in that the exemption of Article 86(2) EC applies to 
undertakings: public authorities acting as such are not subjected to 
the competition rules. 
6.1.1. Undertakings 
The first question is, therefore, how to define the concept of 
“undertaking”. The case law of the Court on the concept of 
undertaking is functional in nature. This means that the legal form 
under which an entity is classified under national law is irrelevant: 
 
[...] having recourse to Member States’ domestic law in order to 
limit the scope of provisions of Community law undermines 
the unity and effectiveness of that law and cannot, therefore, be 
accepted. Consequently, the fact that a body has or has not, 
under national law, legal personality separate from that of the 
state is irrelevant in deciding whether it may be regarded as a 
public undertaking within the meaning of the Directive.58 
Instead, the core issue is whether or not the entity concerned is 
engaged in an economic activity: 
 
                                                 
57 See Buendia Sierra, supra note 1, p. 644. 
58 Case 118/85 Transparency Directive [1987] ECR 2599, para 11. See the Opinion of 
AG Cruz Vilaca in Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479, para 32. It is nevertheless 
used as a “sanity check” in clear cases. See Opinion of AG Jacobs, Case C-41/90 
Höfner [1991] ECR I-1979, paras 22-3. 
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In the context of competition law (...) the concept of an 
undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic 
activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way 
in which it is financed.59 
 
An economic activity in turn is defined as follows: 
 
[…] any activity consisting of supplying goods and services in a 
given market by an undertaking constitutes an economic 
activity, regardless of the legal status of the undertaking and 
the way in which it is financed.60 
 
Offering goods or services in a market, in particular doing so for 
payment, and assuming the financial risks involved, means engaging 
in an economic activity as an undertaking. Likewise, offering goods 
or services in competition, or offering goods and services that could 
be subject to competition, means engaging in an economic activity as 
an undertaking. Thus, in the 1991 Höfner Case, the Court held that: 
 
The fact that employment procurement activities are normally 
entrusted to public agencies cannot affect the economic nature 
of such activities. Employment procurement has not always 
been, and is not necessarily, carried out by public entities.”61 
 
Similarly, concerning ambulance services in its 2001 Glöckner Case, 
the Court held that: 
 
                                                 
59 Case C-41/90 Höfner, supra n. 58, para 21. See Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 
Poucet and Pistre, supra n. 2, para 17; Case C-244/94 FFSA, supra note 2, para 14; Case 
C-67/96 Albany, supra note 2, para 77 ; Joined Cases C-115/97, C-116/97, C-117/97 
and C-219/97 Brentjens, supra note 2, para 77; and Case C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken, 
supra n. 2, para 67; Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov et al v Stichting 
Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten (Pavlov) [2000] ECR I-6451, para 74; Case C-218/00 
Cisal [2002] ECR I-691, para 22; Joined Cases C- 264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-
355/01 AOK [2004] ECR I-2493, para 46. 
60 Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451. 
61 Case C-41/90 Höfner, supra note 58, paras 22 and 23. See Case C-55/96 Job Centre 
Coop [1997] ECR I-7119; Case C-258/98 Giovanni Carra et al [2000] ECR I-4217. n Case 
C-82/01P Aéroports de Paris [2002] ECR I-9297, para 82, the Court confirmed “the fact 
that an activity may be exercised by a private undertaking amounts to further 
evidence that the activity in question may be described as a business activity”. 
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Such activities have not always been, and are not necessarily, 
carried on by such [private non-profit] organisations or by 
public authorities.62 
 
It is, therefore, possible to base a finding that a particular entity is an 
undertaking upon the fact that the activities concerned could be 
performed in competition. Clearly, this is the case for most activities. 
Hence, it may be concluded that “very few bodies involved in the 
organisation of health care are not to be considered undertakings”.63 
6.1.2. Solidarity 
Financial solidarity and exclusion from competitive provision, on the 
other hand, are required for classification as a scheme which has an 
exclusively social function which means that the entities concerned 
are not regarded as undertakings and are excluded from the 
application of the competition rules altogether (but not from the 
market freedoms and public procurement rules). That is to say, in this 
case, Article 86(2) EC does not come into play because the activities 
concerned fall completely outside the scope of competition. In this 
case, the following factors are generally weighed:64 
 
• The objective pursued by a scheme; 
• Its compulsory nature; 
• The manner in which contributions (i.e., not based upon 
person-specific risks) and benefits are calculated and managed 
(i.e., based upon the redistribution of contributions or on 
capitalisation involving active fund management); 
• The overall degree of state control; 
• Redistribution within the scheme by cross-subsidisation; 
• The existence of competing schemes. 
 
By examining, on the one hand, whether the entity concerned is 
active on a market, respectively, the activities concerned could be 
provided under competitive conditions, and, on the other, whether or 
not the elements of solidarity prevail, it can be ascertained whether a 
                                                 
62 Case C-475/99 Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089, para 20. 
63 See V. Hatzpoulos, “Health law and Policy: The Impact of the EU’, in: G. de Búrca 
(ed), supra note 1, p. 148. 
64 Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre, supra note 2; Case C-355/00 
Freskot [2003] ECR I-5263. See Hatzpoulos, supra note 63, p. 111. 
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particular entity should be regarded as an undertaking to which the 
competition rules apply. If it is a public authority, the competition 
rules do not apply, and Article 86(2) EC is irrelevant. If it is an 
undertaking, and if it engages in providing services of general 
economic interest, Article 86(2) EC may be invoked as an exemption, 
provided the demands of proportionality are met. 
6.1.3. Rule of Reason 
Finally, it should be noted that it is possible that undertakings engage 
in activities that restrict competition, but are not caught by the 
competition rules because they pursue an overriding public interest 
objective in a proportional manner. So far, this exception (or rule of 
reason) has only been applied in the context of Article 81 EC 
(restrictive agreements), not Article 82 EC (dominance abuse), and 
remains highly contested.65 
6.2. EU Law Rules Affected by Article 86(2) EC 
As mentioned above Article 86(2) EC serves to balance the 
Community objectives of market integration with national public 
service objectives. At the outset, it should be noted that these two are 
not necessarily in conflict, because opening up services to 
competition frequently leads to lower prices and a greater range of 
choice for consumers, i.e., to net improvements in the services 
concerned. 
 
Keeping this in mind, the next question is which type of EU rules 
may be subject of the Article 82(2) EC exemption. The relevant rules 
are these on: 
 
• free movement (of goods, services and capital, freedom of 
establishment); 
• competition; 
• state aid; 
• public procurement; 
• commercial monopolies; 
• concessions. 
 
                                                 
65 Case C-67/96 Albany, supra note 2; Joined Cases C-115/97, C-116/97, C-117/97 and 
C-219/97 Brentjens, supra note 2; Case C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken, supra note 2; Case 
C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577; and Case C-519/04 P Medina [2006] ECR I-6991. 
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In principle, the rules on free movement and public procurement and 
concessions apply to public authorities, and the competition and state 
aid rules apply to undertakings. 
 
The Community objective of market integration and national public 
policy objectives are not necessarily in conflict: the opening of 
services to competition generally leads to lower prices and increased 
choice for consumers.66 Sometimes, however, national policy 
objectives and Community policy objectives have to be co-ordinated. 
It is for this purpose that Article 86(2) exists: 
 
[…] which provides that services of general economic interest 
are not subject to the application of Treaty rules to the extent 





This means that under the EC Treaty and subject to the 
conditions set out in Article 86(2) the effective performance of a 
general interest task prevails, in case of tension, over the 
application of Treaty rules.67 
 
The starting point, therefore, is that Article 86(2) EC provides an 
exception for services of general economic interest, to the Treaty 
rules. Second, however, this exception only applies to the extent that 
this is strictly necessary for performing the functions of services of the 
general economic interest concerned. This raises the issues of 
proportionality and pre-emption. 
6.3. Proportionality and Pre-emption 
In the first place, it is important to highlight that, because Article 
86(2) EC is an exception, it is interpreted in a restrictive manner and 
must be invoked by the parties that seek to benefit from it: i.e., the 
Member State and/or the undertaking concerned, if challenged, must 
invoke the exemption and accordingly must meet the relevant burden 
of proof. This section is primarily concerned with the question of 
what this burden of proof is in the context of proportionality. 
                                                 
66 See Buendia Sierra, supra note 1, p. 626. 




Under Community law, there are, in principle, two types of 
proportionality test, with a different degree of stringency. To 
determine whether national measures can qualify as entailing 
infringements of the Treaty rules that are “necessary” in order to 
ensure services of general economic interest, it is, therefore, 
important which type of proportionality test is applied, and when. 
The two types of proportionality test are: 
 
• Manifestly disproportionate (the “mild” test). In this case, it 
will suffice if the measures imposed are prima facie suitable to 
achieving the task at hand; 
• Least restrictive means (the “strict” test). In this case, of all 
imaginable measures, the one chosen must involve the least 
restrictions on market freedom. 
 
Key to this issue is the 1990 agriculture case Fedesa, in which the 
Court distinguished between the “manifestly disproportionate” and 
“least restrictive means” regimes, in a case regarding the legality of a 
number of Council Directives in the agricultural field, as follows: 
 
The Court has consistently held that the principle of 
proportionality is one of the general principles of Community 
law. By virtue of this principle, the lawfulness of the 
prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition 
that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in 
order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the 
legislation in question; when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and 
the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the 
aims pursued. 
 
However, with regard to judicial review of compliance with 
those conditions it must be stated that in matters concerning the 
common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a 
discretionary power which corresponds to the political 
responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty. 
Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere 
can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate 
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having regard to the objective which the competent institution 
is seeking to pursue.68 
 
It is submitted here that, with regard to the Member States, the same 
logic applies, but with a reverse outcome: where there is no 
Community norm that has occupied the field (pre-emption), the 
lighter “manifestly disproportionate” administrative law test 
prevails; where pre-emption has occurred, Member States may only 
intervene based upon “the least restrictive means”. 
 
This issue has been resolved in the Corbeau and Almelo Cases where 
the Court was willing to accept monopolies for services of general 
economic interest that were broader in scope than the universal 
service concerned.69 Implicitly, therefore, such restrictions (ancillary 
restraints) were held not to be manifestly disproportionate, while 
they would, clearly, have failed a least restrictive means test, because 
other measures (such as funding of universal service obligations from 
general tax revenue) would clearly have been available. In such cases, 
the Member State has to be prepared to demonstrate that the broader 
scope is necessary to perform the universal service obligation, i.e., 
that the performance thereof is not merely hindered or made more 
difficult, but would otherwise be impossible.70 This requires 
comparing the net cost of providing a universal service against the 
economic advantages inherent in the state measure at issue, as well as 
any other forms of compensation received (such as state aid).71 
Evidently, over time, circumstances may change. 
 
The conclusion that pre-emption is relevant to the proportionality test 
may be drawn from the Electricity cases. When faced with the Article 
226 EC Treaty, infringement cases concerning national electricity 
monopolies in The Netherlands, France and Italy, the Court has 
clearly opted for judicial restraint by stating the burden of proof on 
                                                 
68 Case C-331/88 Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023, paras 13-4 (emphasis added), with 
reference to Case 265/87 Schraeder [1989] ECR 2237, paras 21-2. 
69 Case C-320/91 Corbeau, supra note 12, paras 15 et seq; Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] 
ECR I-1521 paras 46 et seq. See Case C-475/99 Glöckner, supra note 62, which suggests 
the outer limit of such ancillary restraints is the ability to meet demand, i.e., to 
maintain efficient operations in the associated services (in this case, patient transport 
services in addition to emergency services). 
70 Case T-260/94 Air Inter [1997] ECR II-997, paras 138-9. 
71 Buendia Sierra, supra n 1, at 640-1. 
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the Member States “cannot be so extensive as to require the Member States 
[…] to […] prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure, which by 
definition would be hypothetical, could enable those tasks to be performed 
under the same conditions”.72 
 
The Court went on to show that the Commission had neglected to 
elaborate on the nature of the Community interest involved – even in 
terms of the effect on Community trade.73 It clearly held that the 
Commission should have acted under Article 86(3) EC to back up its 
allegations: 
 
[…] it was incumbent on the Commission, in order to prove the 
alleged failure to fulfil obligations, to define, subject to review 
by the Court, the Community interest in relation to which the 
development of trade must be assessed. In that regard, it must 
be borne in mind that Article 90(3) [now Article 86(3)] of the 
Treaty expressly requires the Commission to ensure the 
application of that article and, where necessary, to address 
appropriate Directives or Decisions to Member States.74 
 
Specifically, the Court held that the Commission should have 
demonstrated how “in the absence of a common policy in the area 
concerned, development of direct trade between producers and 
consumers, in parallel with the development of trade between major 
networks, would have been possible”.75 Hence, in the absence of 
Community measures, the Court will not consider itself bound to 
judge on the feasibility of alternative regulatory solutions, even if 
these may, theoretically, be more consistent with EU law. 
                                                 
72 Case C-157/94 Dutch Electricity Monopoly [1997] ECR I-5699, para 58; Case C-
159/94 French Electricity and Gas Monopoly [1997] ECR I-5815, para 101; Case C-
158/94 Italian Electricity Monopoly [1997] ECR I-5789, para 54 (emphasis added). 
73 Case C-157/94 Dutch Electricity Monopoly, supra note 72, paras 66-73; Case C-159/94 
French Electricity and Gas Monopoly, supra note 72, paras 109-16. 
74 Case C-157/94 Dutch Electricity Monopoly, supra note 72, para 69; Case C-159/94 
French Electricity and Gas Monopoly, supra note 72, para 113. 
75 Case C-157/94 Dutch Electricity Monopoly, supra note 72, para 58; Case C-159/94 
French Electricity and Gas Monopoly, supra n. 72, para 71 (emphasis added). See Joined 
Cases C-147/97 and C-148/97 Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-3061. Here, in the absence 
of agreements on terminal dues between postal operators that would allow Deutsche 
Post to execute its public service task in a financially balanced manner, legislation 
allowing Deutsche Post to charge international mail at (higher) national rates did not 
cause it to infringe Article 86 EC. 
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As no Community framework is, to date, in place for health care – 
i.e., there is no pre-emption of national rules by Community rules – 
this means that the mild “not manifestly disproportionate” test 
should be applied. In fact, this is also the test applied by the 
European Commission in the Irish and Dutch risk equalisation 
scheme cases.76 
 
In order to pass this test, the following must be shown: 
 
[…] in order that the derogation to the application of the rules 
of the Treaty set out in Article 90(2) [now Article 86(2)] thereof 
may take effect, it is not sufficient for the undertaking in 
question merely to have been entrusted by the public 
authorities with the operation of a service of general economic 
interest, but it must be shown in addition that the application of 
the rules of the Treaty obstructs the performance of the 
particular tasks assigned to the undertaking and that the 
interests of the Community are not affected […].77 
 
Thus, depending on the criterion used the proportionality test 
involves two or three steps: 
 
• a causal link between the measure and the objective of general 
interest must be established; 
• the restrictions caused by the measure are balanced by the 
benefits obtained in terms of the general interest (this is last 
step of the “not manifestly disproportionate” test); and 
• finally, the objective cannot be achieved by less restrictive 
means (this is the last step of the “least restrictive means” 
test). 
 
It is held here that – in the absence of pre-emption – the second step 
would suffice in the context of a “not manifestly disproportionate” 
test. Meanwhile, it should be noted that this approach to 
                                                 
76 Risk equalisation decisions concerning Ireland and The Netherlands. Aid measure 
N46/2003 Risk equalisation system – Ireland; Aid measures N 541/2004 and N 
542/2004 Financial reserves and risk equalisation system – The Netherlands. 
77 Case C-179/90 Porto do Genova, supra note 36, para 26, citing Case 311/84 CBEM v 
Compagnie Luxembourgeoise [1985] ECR 3261, para 17, and Case C-41/90 Höfner, supra 
note 58, para 24. 
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proportionality remains contested and merits further separate 
consideration in follow-up research across various EU law 
procedures in which the concept is applied. 
6.4. A Three Step Approach 
In order to minimise the issues of overlap and to provide a logical 
sequence in the steps that need to be taken in defining a service of 
general economic interest and its related universal service and other 
public service obligations, the following three-step approach is 
proposed: 
 
• First, the universal service and/or other public services 
should be defined: this means deciding which rights are 
deemed to exist (or to be necessary) with regard to a 
particular service to consumers. 
• Second, an analysis is necessary of which of these consumers’ 
rights, as a result of market failure, would not be adequately 
provided in a market setting – i.e., after market-based 
remedies against the market failure concerned are imposed – 
and might, therefore, require imposing universal service 
obligations or other public service obligations, and what the 
precise content of these obligations would be. This latter 
question can be determined based upon the following 
questions: 
o What would be the proportionate remedy to the 
market failure concerned that could benefit from 
an exemption? Is it necessary to impose 
obligations on all undertakings in the market or 
should one or more operators with specific 
obligations be designated? Again, when looking 
at remedies, solutions that allow competition to 
work (for example, the risk equalisation system) 
should be considered as a first choice. 
o Do the undertakings concerned need an 
exemption from certain Treaty obligations in order to 
perform their task to the required standard? 
• The third question is that of the need for ancillary restraints. 
Should the undertakings concerned receive any rights and/or 
obligations in excess of the scope of the universal service and/or other 
public service obligations themselves? 
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o The answer to this last question then defines the 
scope of the service of general economic interest.78 
o An act of entrustment and an objective, transparent 
and proportional compensation mechanism are 
required (subject to the Altmark Trans case law of 
the Court and the Commission framework on 
public service compensation). 
6.4.1. Choice of Organisation 
It is for the public authorities involved to decide whether they 
provide these services directly through their own administration, or 
whether they entrust the service to a third-party (private or public 
entity). Designating “in house” service providers as charged with 
services of general economic interest can lead to an infringement of 
the competition rules in the following three cases: 
 
• where the public service requirements concerned are not 
(properly) specified;79 
• where the provider charged is manifestly unable to meet 
demand;80 
• where there is an alternative way of fulfilling the service of 
general economic interest requirements that would have a less 
detrimental effect in competition.81 
 
Where a third-party is selected, the public procurement rules will 
generally apply, or, in the event that this is not the case, rules of 
transparency, equal treatment, mutual recognition and the protection 
of individual rights will apply (alongside the norms set out in 
Commission’s Communication on Concessions under Community 
Law). 
 
7. Compensation for Public Service Obligations 
Relatively recently, a complete framework for public service 
compensation has been created, as the Court’s decision in Altmark 
                                                 
78 The notion that a service of general economic interest might involve services 
broader than the universal service concerned in order to guarantee its economic 
viability can be traced back to Case C-320/91 Corbeau, supra note 12. 
79 Case C-66/86 Silver Line Reisebüro [1989] ECR 803. 
80 Case C-41/90 Höfner supra note 58. 
81 Green Paper, supra note 13, at 24, citing the CFI in Case T-266/97 Vlaamse Televisie 
Maatschappij [1999] ECR II-2329. 
518 Sauter
 
Trans was followed by a Commission Notice and Decision on this 
issue. The importance of this framework goes beyond compensation 
as such, because it addresses the issue of the legal basis and changes 
the incentive structure for Member States and undertakings alike. As 
a result, there are now clear benefits to a formal designation as a 
service of general economic interest. At the same time, a clear legal 
basis facilitates the carrying out of a proper proportionality test. 
7.1. Four-part Test 
In its Altmark Trans Case of 2003, the Court, for the first time, set out a 
four-part test to determine whether or not, in the context of Article 
86(2) EC, state aid might be involved: 
 
• First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public 
service obligations to discharge, and the obligations must be 
clearly defined. […]; 
• Second, the parameters of the basis upon which the 
compensation is calculated must be established in advance in 
an objective and transparent manner, in order to avoid it 
conferring an economic advantage which may favour the 
recipient undertaking over competing undertakings […]; 
• Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to 
cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of 
public service obligations, taking into account the relevant 
receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those 
obligations. […]; 
• Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public 
service obligations, in a specific case, is not chosen pursuant to 
a public procurement procedure which would allow for the 
selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at 
the least cost to the community, the level of compensation 
needed must be determined upon the basis of an analysis of 
the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and 
adequately provided […] so as to be able to meet the 
necessary public service requirements, would have incurred 
in discharging those obligations […].82 
                                                 
82 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans, supra note 20, paras 89-93. See Joined Cases C-34/01 
to C-38/01 Enirisorse SnA v Ministero delle Finanze (Enirisorse) [2003] ECR I-14243, 
para 31 et seq. The Enirisorse case finally clarified that collecting and allocating (part 
of) charges levied on other undertakings to the benefit of an undertaking charged 
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Compensation for public service missions that meets these criteria 
will not constitute state aid. If such compensation does not meet these 
criteria, it will be subject to the state aid rules. Note the fourth 
condition of Altmark Trans which provides for the situation “where 
the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations, in a 
specific case is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement 
procedure”, in which case the funding is based not upon actual costs 
but on the costs of a (hypothetical) effective undertaking. 
7.2. The Commission Notice and Decision 
Following the Altmark Trans judgment of the Court of Justice, the 
Commission has spelled out the conditions under which 
compensation for services of general economic interest is not 
considered state aid. However, it should be noted that a related 
question is whether charging particular undertakings with the 
provision of services of general economic interest is subject to the 
public procurement rules. 
 
The Commission has built on Altmark Trans by adopting a Notice 
with a Community framework for state aid in the form of public 
service compensation (Commission Notice),83 and a Commission 
Decision to deal with those cases in which the public service 
compensation concerned does not meet the Altmark Trans criteria and 
therefore constitutes state aid (Commission Decision).84 
 
The Commission Notice re-states the fact that Member States have 
wide discretion in designating services of general economic interest, 
and that the Commission can only control for manifest errors in this 
designation. It encourages the Member States to consult widely, in 
particular among consumers, prior to defining public service 
obligations. An official act is required, which must specify the: 
 
• precise nature and the duration of the public service 
obligations; 
• undertakings and the territory concerned; 
                                                                                                                   
with services of general economic interest may constitute state aid. 
83 Community Framework for State Aid, supra note 8. 




• nature of any exclusive or special rights assigned to the 
undertaking; 
• parameters for calculating, controlling and reviewing the 
compensation; 
• arrangements for avoiding and repaying any over-
compensation. 
 
Concerning compensation, the Notice emphasises that cross-
subsidisation on activities not constituting services of general 
economic interest constitutes incompatible state aid. Compensation 
must be based upon costs plus a reasonable profit, including “all or 
some of the productivity gains during an agreed limited period”. A 
reasonable rate of return means taking into account the risk or 
absence of risks incurred by the undertaking, in particular, in the 
presence of special and exclusive rights. Accounting separation is 
required where the undertaking concerned carries out other activities 
alongside the provision of services of general economic interest. 
Detailed rules pertaining to costs include a definition of the costs to 
be taken into account as covering all variable costs associated with 
the service of general economic interest and, where applicable, a 
proportion of fixed costs common to other activities. 
 
The Commission Decision is dedicated to public service 
compensation that does not meet the criteria set out in Altmark Trans 
and/or in the Commission Notice, and, consequently, constitutes 
state aid that may be either admissible as such, or inadmissible (i.e., 
that is illegal and must be repaid). In order to avoid the need for 
notification, a de minimis rule is linked to quantified aid limits 
specified per sector, provided the service of general economic interest 
is imposed by an official act that meets the requirements set out in the 
Notice (and listed above). The Decision explicitly provides that 
hospital funding is exempt from the obligation of prior notification of 
services of general economic interest provided by hospitals under the 
state aid rules as long as it is proportionate to the actual costs of the 
services provided, irrespective of the amounts received, and 
provided that these services are qualified as services of general 
economic interest. Thus, Paragraph 16 of the pre-amble of the 
Commission Decision on SGEI compensation states:85 
                                                 
85 Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of 
the EC Treaty to State Aid in the form of public service compensation granted to 
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[…] hospitals providing medical care, including, where 
applicable, emergency services and ancillary services directly 
related to the main activities, notably in the field of research 
[…] should benefit from the exemption from notification 
provided for in this Decision, even if the amount of 
compensation they receive exceeds the thresholds laid down in 
this Decision, if the services performed are qualified as services of 
general economic interest by the Member States. [emphasis added] 
 
It appears that the possibility of benefitting from this provision in 
itself would put an exceptional premium on formally qualifying the 
relevant parts of hospital services as services of general economic 
interest. 
 
8. Particular Reasons for Researching Services of 
General Economic Interest in Hospital Care 
Health services were considered, in principle, to form part of the 
services of general economic interest in the White Paper,86 and to 
form the topic of a paper on health services and social services. 
However, after health services were eventually dropped from the 
Services Directive,87 they were not covered by the White Paper on 
Social Services of General Interest,88 but by a separate communication 
                                                                                                                   
certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest, OJ 2005, L312/67, preamble, para 16. 
86 White Paper, supra note 13, pp. 16-17. 
87 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ 2006, L376/36, Article 2f 
excludes health services. The Services Directive contains a special regime for services 
of general economic interest. According to its Article 1(3) The Directive does not 
require the Member States to abolish their monopolies, nor does it derogate from the 
freedom of the Member States to designate services of general economic interest, and 
the financing of services of general economic interest is outside the scope of the 
Services Directive. Its Article 15(4) on the freedom of establishment provides that 
services of general economic interest are not subject to the procedural requirements 
set out in that Article in so far as their application obstructs the performance, in law 
or in fact, of the particular task assigned to them. Article 17(1) determines that 
services of general economic interest benefit from a derogation from the freedom to 
provide services. 
88 White Paper, supra note 13, p. 3. 
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(which, in turn, was focused on trans-national provision of health 
services and not on services of general economic interest).89 
 
There are a several reasons for researching the possible usefulness of 
the concept of services of general economic interest in relation to 
healthcare in The Netherlands. 
 
• First, it appears that the liberalisation of (important) parts of 
curative hospital care (but also planned future liberalisation of 
long-term care) gives rise to increasing problems in EU law 
terms. Oddly, full state provision is met with relative 
indifference in EU law, whereas even partial liberalisation 
gives rise to tension in relation to the competition, state aid 
and free movement rules, to name but a few. 
• Arguably, qualification as (a) service(s) of general economic 
interest could be a safe haven for those parts of curative 
hospital care that have “universal service” characteristics, but 
are not suited for provision under competitive terms, and, 
therefore, require an alternative funding regime to the market 
mechanism. 
• Second, simultaneously the European Commission, after a 
number of years of defensive back-pedalling on services of 
general economic interest, has latched onto recent case law 
(notably Altmark Trans)90 to launch a more pro-active 
approach on the funding side of the SGEI issue (“public 
service compensation”). Notably, a legal act is required to 
benefit from the services of general economic interest 
exemption under the state aid regime, with important 
consequences for funding. For hospital services in particular, 
an even more relaxed EU regime is in place, provided that a 
formal act of entrustment with carrying out a service of 
general economic interest is involved. 
• Third, at the same time, after being excluded both from the 
Services Directive and the recent Communication on Social 
Services of General Interest, hospital services are the subject of 
a special track based upon a separate consultation.91 The 
                                                 
89 Community action on health services, supra note 13. 
90 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans, supra n. 20. 
91 Community action on health services, supra note 13. Note, however, that there is no 
comparable exception for long-term care, which is consequently covered by the 
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Commission was scheduled to report on this before the 
summer of 2007. 
• It should be noted that, although health services are not 
covered by the Services Directive, they remain subject to the 
Treaty provisions on free movement and competition.92 Thus, 
the exception to these rules for services of general economic 
interest remains relevant. 
• Fourth, both the Commission and the Court have recognised 
the existence of services of general economic interest in 
respect of general health insurance,93 respectively emergency 
ambulance services.94 In combination with the finding that 
most health services are provided by undertakings, this means 
that, in principle, there should be appreciable scope for 
defining services of general economic interest in health care, 
respectively multi-product hospital services.95 
 
Both health care and long-term care (of which the former is not 
covered by the Services Directive and social services of general 
interest, while the latter is covered by both) are subject to market 
failures that could provide reasons for the services of general 
economic interest instrument to be applied. 
 
Focusing on multi-product hospital markets, the main areas in which 
market-based solutions are, at present, usually considered insufficient 
to remedy the market failures at hand are the following four: 
 
• Emergency care (including emergency ambulance services); 
• Top-referential care; 
• Academic training and care; 
• Very expensive and rare pharmaceuticals. 
 
These areas are mentioned here only by way of example – it may well 
be that, where economies of scale in emergency care and top-
                                                                                                                   
Services Directive. The consequences of this remain to be explored. 
92 Providing Healthcare is an economic activity: Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 
Pavlov, supra note 59. Third-party paying makes no difference to this: Case C-352/85 
Bond van Adverteerders [2988] ECR 2085. 
93 Aid measures N 541/2004 and N 542/2004, at present subject to appeal in Case T-
84/06 Azivo v Commission, action brought on 13 March 2006. 
94 Case C-475/99 Glöckner, supra note 62. 
95 Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov, supra note 59. 
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referential care are significant, competition “for” the market is 
possible, instead. Likewise, if better product descriptions and better 
measures of output for academic training and care become available, 
market-based solutions may well work here, too. 
 
Nevertheless, excluding (even by way of example) these areas from 
the market-oriented reform now planned in The Netherlands for 
multi-product hospitals (subject to a price-cap based upon yardstick 
competition) means that alternative funding systems and regulatory 
solutions have to be found. And if political pressures are taken into 
account, they are, at least presently, the prime candidates for a 
designation as services of general economic interest. 
 
For long-term care, the main category, in which the scope for market-
based solutions is extremely limited, concerns care for the multiply-
handicapped for which funding cannot be based upon risk-
equalisation schemes. It should be noted, however, that even where 
competition on insurance markets may, in this case, not be feasible, 
this should not mean that competition among providers could not 
work (even at the level, much neglected in today’s practice, of using 
proper procurement mechanisms). The latter should, therefore, be 
examined as the solution of first resort. 
 
Other examples that may be relevant candidates for services of 
general economic interest include, for example, immunisation 
programmes, where considerable externalities are at play. 
 
9. Conclusion 
In principle, the national public interest should usually be in line with 
the EU market freedoms and competition law, because the latter 
result in lower prices and greater choice for consumers. However, 
where market failure may lead to sub-optimal provision of public 
goods (such as the desired level of health care or of specific 
healthcare services, such as emergency services), there may be a case 
for public intervention in terms of imposing universal service 
obligations (provider of last resort) on one or more undertakings that 
are active in the market. Even in this case, competitive provision 
within certain limits may be feasible (for example, health insurance 
markets subject to universal coverage without risk selection) and 
should be explored even within the context of services of general 
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economic interest – not least in order to meet the requisite 
proportionality standard. 
It is for the purpose of balancing the public interest and market 
freedoms that Article 86(2) EC provides an exception to the Treaty 
rules for services of general economic interest. This exception only 
applies to the extent that this is strictly necessary for performing the 
functions of services of general economic interest concerned. It serves 
to reconcile the public interest identified as such at national level as 
the reason for introducing a service of general economic interest with 
respect for the Treaty rules by means of a proportionality test. 
 
In the absence of a Community standard, the applicable 
proportionality test is whether the infringements of the Treaty rules 
were “manifestly disproportionate” or not. Where secondary 
Community law applies (i.e., pre-emption of national norms by 
Community norms) a stricter “least restrictive means” test may be 
applied. In a number of economic sectors (notably the network 
industries or utilities such as electronic communications, postal 
services and energy) the scope and content of services of general 
economic interest has been defined at Community level by means of 
Directives. This has served to identify clearly the scope of the 
exceptions involved and thereby the application of the general rule, 
i.e. the development of open markets with full competition. 
 
Based upon the Community experience to date, a service of general 
economic interest normally consists of: 
 
• universal service rights for consumers and related universal 
service obligations for one or more undertakings; 
• and/or of other public service guarantees; 
• and of ancillary services necessary to fulfil those universal 
service obligations and other public service guarantees; 
• and of a compensation mechanism (financial remuneration). 
 
To be recognised as such, in principle, services of general economic 
interest are set out in an act of entrustment, the contents of which 
have been specified in the Community Framework on Public Service 
Compensation based upon the Altmark Trans judgment of the 
European Court of Justice. Compensation is based upon costs plus a 
reasonable rate of return. Where public procurement procedures 
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were not used to select the provider of the service of general 
economic interest, the standard used is that of an efficient firm. If 
these standards are met, the state aid rules do not apply. 
 
If services of general economic interest fail to meet the criteria set out 
in Altmark Trans, but are designated for healthcare according to the 
standards set out for an act of entrustment, the related financial 
compensation does not require prior notification as state aid. If 
services of general economic interest are designated as such, this has 
an impact not only on EU law but, at least in The Netherlands, also in 
national law, given the use of a services of general economic interest 
standard across the board in the Dutch competition law: i.e., 
concerning the cartel prohibition, prohibition of dominance abuse 
and merger control. 
 
The proportionality test (necessity) requires that the scope of services 
of general economic interest remains restricted to the necessary 
minimum. In the context of harmonisation, this text is based upon the 
least restrictive means, while, in the absence of harmonisation, the 
Member States retain greater freedom, and the relevant test is 
whether the measures concerned are manifestly disproportionate. 
This approach can help to resolve debate on the possibility of 
liberalising certain health services given that, for example, universal 
service to consumers can be guaranteed in this way, opening up the 
road to liberalisation. 
 
Using the instrument of services of general economic interest requires 
taking clear decisions to define closely the public interest involved, 
because the scope of services of general economic interest is limited 
to what is necessary to attain the relevant public interest objectives. 
Market failure arguments will be key here. By defining services of 
general economic interest, the scope for liberalisation and market-
based provision of the remaining services also becomes clearer. This 
exercise would, therefore, be particularly useful in markets in 
transition where, in a liberalisation context, the need for public 
interest exceptions is raised. Hence, services of general economic 
interest deserve to be analysed further as a tool to guarantee the 
public interest in the context not only of multi-product hospital care, 
but also in relation to long-term care. 
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In the context of a more thorough analysis inter alia, the following 
question should be addressed: Would the application of the services 
of general economic interest framework not only provide for the 
requisite exceptions to free movement, state aid, public procurement 
and competition rules – but also be compatible with adequate 
safeguards against distortions of competition in the competitive 
segments of the multi-product hospital market(s)? And, if so, how 
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The appellation “helas” has twice been applied to Europe, latterly by 
Jürgen Habermas, in a collection of essays dating from 2008,1 but also 
much earlier by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, whose characterisation 
of the European context is surely just as fitting now as it was at the 
time of the great take-off of European legal studies in the late 1970s.2 
Nonetheless, the current situation could not be more different. 
Contemporary Europe is suffering acute growing pains: it can no 
longer master its mass of competences; its Court, once the real hero of 
the integration project, is now much criticised – and that with 
unprecedented bitterness; its high constitutional ambitions have been 
                                                 
* Translated by Michelle Everson. 
1 Jürgen Habermas, Ach Europa, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008). 
2 Enzensberger’s cry of “Alas Europe” relates to a travel journal which he published 
only in 1987, but which was undertaken much earlier; useful references may be 
found about Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s unwilling Eurocentrism in, idem, Politische 
Brosamen, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982), p. 31 et seq.). 
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rejected in popular referenda, and downgraded to a “Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union” – whose new modesty has not 
yet been fully appreciated, and which is subject to judicial review in 
the German constitutional court. In those early years, Europe’s 
problems were very different: all that Europe suffered from then was 
an utter disregard. Within universities, European law was an optional 
subject with very little resonance. Public lawyers took some note of 
its institutional characteristics, national bureaucracies tackled the 
plethora of obstacles to free trade, competition law operated as a 
means of market integration, but European private law was non-
existent The appearance, only a few years later, of a charismatic 
Commission President who would assert the Community character of 
80% of the law touching upon the European economy,3 was, then, a 
far-off dream that disturbed no-one’s slumbers.4 Clearly, much has 
happened since, and, equally clearly, this “much” has not been the 
quite the right thing. 
 
2. Structuring the Argument 
The importance of the re-orientation of European law demanded by 
the title of this chapter will be exemplified mainly with regard to the, 
so-called, European social dimension. This topic was the object of 
grievous French-German quarrels during bargain over the Treaty of 
Rome, but was then widely neglected during the so-called golden age 
of “embedded liberalism”. Only very occasionally was a warning 
articulated that a European project founded within economic and 
technocratic precepts would very soon face its own crisis of 
acceptance.5 
                                                 
3 Jacques Delors, “Europa im Umbruch: Vom Binnenmarkt zur Europäischen Union”, 
in: EU Commission (ed), (1992) 9 Europäische Gespräche, p. 12. 
4 Certainly, Delors’ statement is anything but clear: see Thomas König and Lars 
Mäder, “Das Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates und der Mythos einer 80-Prozent-
Europäisierung in Deutschland”, (2008) 49 Politische Vierteljahresschrift, pp. 438-463; 
Annette Töller, “Mythen und Methoden: Zur Messung der Europäisierung der 
Gesetzgebung des Deutschen Bundestages jenseits des 80-Prozent-Mythos”, (2008) 
39l Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, pp. 3-17; Daniel Göler, “Europäisierung hat viele 
Gesichter. Anmerkungen zur Widerlegung des Mythos einer 80-Prozent-
Europäisierung”‚ (2009) 50 Politische Vierteljahresschrift, pp. 75-79. 
5 A Bremen patriot may be entitled to mention that Bremen’s mayor, Hans Koschnik, 
was among the very few to articulate such concerns in his opening speech, “Vom 
Europa der Kaufleute zum Europa der Bürger” (From an entrepreneurial Europe to a 
citizens” Europe), at the Gustav-Radbruch Forum of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Sozialdemokratischer Juristen, Bremen, 6-7 April 1979, (pp. 9-18 of the documentation) – 
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At that time, such concerns were new. Today, they are far more 
common. This observation is designed to segue smoothly into the 
questions posed in the following sections. First, attention is paid to 
the question of why “social Europe” played such a subordinate role 
within the institutional design of the Community, and why it was 
possible to disregard it for so long (Section 3). Second, three modes of 
addressing “institutionalised” Europe’s “social deficit” are presented, 
in order to facilitate a more nuanced and comprehensive description 
of the institutional status quo (Section 4.1) and, alongside, a starkly 
distinctive alternative (Section 4.2), as well as an attempted corrective 
review of treaty alterations made from Maastricht to Lisbon (Section 
4.3). Titular aspirations are then elaborated in the fourth section 
(Section 5) and are then, finally, given exemplary expression in a 
summarising conclusion (Section 6). 
 
3. The Social Deficit within the Integration Project 
History can no longer be altered, but can only be told and re-
interpreted. The Schuman plan of 1950, which is deemed to be the 
birth hour of the integration project,6 prepared the way for a 
fundamental shift, for the overcoming of a warlike past of nationally-
defined enemies and dictatorial regimes. In contrast to this heritage, 
the new Europe promoted “peace, prosperity and 
supranationalism”.7 The politicians of the founding generation, 
                                                                                                                   
and, on that occasion, announced the founding of Bremen’s “Centre for European 
Law and Politics” with its specific, at the time quite original, orientation (a 
memorandum of 1979, admitted by the present author, on the agenda of the centre 
warned: Over time, “the institutional structure of the EC” would reveal itself as 
lacking in the necessary capacity to overcome “growing political, economic and 
social problems”, since “the guarantee given for economic freedoms [in the EEC 
Treaty] favoured a form of economic internationalisation”, which would not only 
overburden the steering capacity of the nation states, but also that of the EC, and that 
would, at the same time, make implementation of national social programmes even 
harder. Given this problem, the vital issue was one of the identification of an 
integrationist research perspective, informed by the social sciences and by lessons 
drawn from the study of the political economy, within which the conditions could be 
discovered under which the institutionalisation of the EC might be made reconcilable 
with a social constitution (Christian Joerges, “Aufgaben und Organisationsstruktur 
eines Zentrums für Europäische Rechtspolitik”, Manuscript, Bremen, 1979). 
6 6 May 1950 (http://www.centre-robert-schuman.org/docs/declaration-robert-
schuman-9-mai-1950.pdf.). 
7 Thus, Joseph H.H. Weiler in one of his most impressive essays, “Fin-de-Siècle 
Europe”, in: Renaud Dehousse (ed), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?, 
(Munich: Beck, 1994), pp. 203-216. 
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indelibly marked by their wartime experiences, were not concerned 
with the establishment of a democratic polity. They were, nonetheless, 
aware that their purely economically-oriented integration projection, 
limited to the creation of a common market, neglected the welfare 
state structures that were constitutive of the founding Member States. 
Infinitely more demanding options than those enshrined within the 
Treaty of Rome were discussed: Fritz Scharpf, in one of his most 
trenchant analyses, asks: 
 
[W]here would we now be if, in the 1^956 negotiations leading 
to the Treaties of Rome and the creation of the European 
economic Community, French (socialist) Prime Minister, Guy 
Mollet, had had it his way? 
 
Mollet had attempted to make harmonisation of social regulation and 
tax burdens a pre-condition for the integration of industrial markets – 
and had garnered support for his plans from the French economic 
sector. 
 
Would this attempt to harmonise social policies have 
succeeded, or would it have blocked the entire European 
integration project?8 
 
This is a good question, but it is also one that, clearly, nobody can 
answer. 
3.1. The De-coupling of the Economic from the Social 
Constitution 
In the same article, Scharpf characterises the history of what actually 
happened within Europe as being one of the “de-coupling” of 
economic integration from the social constitution (or from the various 
social constitutions of the Member States). The Member States 
retained their competence to regulate the social sphere; Europe, in 
contrast, became responsible for the opening up of national 
economies and their sublimation within a common market. “De-
coupling” is not simply an analytical concept, it also has negative 
connotations, reminding us that social and economic constitutions are 
married together within welfare state democracies, thus also raising 
                                                 
8 Fritz W. Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of 
Diversity”, (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 645-670, at 645-646. 
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the question of the potential impact of a divorce between these two 
devoted partners – or, in other words, asking whether the economic 
integration of Europe might also lead to social disintegration within 
its Member States. 
 
Indeed, contemporary academic commentary on Europe rarely, if 
ever, addressed such uncomfortable challenges in this stark form. 
Looking back, however, we can still discern how the then current 
conceptualisations of the governance of an integration project that 
was already underway, avoided any such difficulties. Instead, these 
questions were either re-formulated, strategically operationalised, or 
simply ignored. 
 
Most strikingly, Hans Peter Ipsen, the Nestor of German European 
law, provided a conceptually rigorous reformulation of integration 
within his grandiose theory of “purposive associations”.9 This 
characterisation of Europe lay at the heart of Ipsen’s attempts to 
reconcile the European Economic Constitution with the democratic 
constitutions of the Member States. The formulation similarly proved 
sufficiently progressive to encompass the increasing variety of 
competences that Europe had garnered for itself, alongside “the 
economic” sphere. Nonetheless, by virtue of his qualification of the 
tasks to be achieved at European level as “material technocratic 
competences”, he likewise immunised the Community against 
demands for “political” democratic control. This approach drew 
predominantly upon the preparatory work of Ernst Forsthoff, for 
whom “the social” was, by virtue of its very nature, an administrative 
task, which was incompatible with the governing “rule of law” ideal 
that was found within the German Constitution.10 We will return to 
this theme in the course of this chapter.11 
                                                 
9 Hans Peter Ipsen, “Der deutsche Jurist und das Europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht”, 
Verhandlungen des 43. Deutschen Juristentages, (Munich: Beck, 1964) Volume 2, p. 14 et 
seq.; idem, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1972), p. 176. 
10 Ernst Forsthoff, “Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtstaates”, (1954) 12 
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, pp. 8-35. This legacy 
gets surprisingly little attention even in Marcel Kaufmann’s thorough analysis of 
Ipsen’s work (see his Europäische Integration und Demokratieprinzip, ((Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1997)), p. 157 et seq., p. 212 et seq.) and in Peer Zumbanses more recent 
discussion of Fortshoff’s work, see his Ordnungsmuster im modernen Wohlfahrtsstaat, 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), p. 106 et seq. 
11 See Section V below. On the relationship between the traditions, see Christian 
Joerges, “Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of the Integration 
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Commentary on the new European integration constellation made 
strategic use of German “ordo-liberalism”, doing so most intensely 
within so-called “second generation” conceptualisations. For a first 
generation, who played their part in the development of the concept 
of “the social market economy” during the early years of the 
Republic,12 and, above all, for Walter Eucken,13 the ordering 
structures of the social and the economic spheres “were 
interdependent constitutions”.14 The negative consequences of de-
coupling were only easily ignored for as long as Europe remained 
marginally important, so that it was still possible – notwithstanding 
the opening up of national markets – to take the continuing 
functioning of socially-oriented “embedded liberalism” for granted.15 
Once this situation changed, however, a second ordo-liberal 
generation, under the leadership of Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, took 
a change in direction that proved to be of paradigmatic importance.16 
The ordering-interdependence theorem was discarded, and Europe 
became, instead, the protector of an economic constitution dedicated 
to a “system of free competition”, a constitution which had, as its 
mission, the alteration of national orders in order to ensure their 
conformity with the ordo-liberal system. 
 
The most influential of all European lawyers, J.H.H. Weiler was able 
to confound our question with his elegant thesis that Europe led a 
                                                                                                                   
Project”, in: Christian Joerges and Navraj S. Ghaleigh, Darker Legacies of Law in 
Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 167-191. 
12 Philip Manow, “Modell Deutschland as an interdenominational compromise”, 
Minda De Gunzburg Centre for European Studies, Working Paper 003/2001. 
13 Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1951), 
in the paperback edition (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1959), p. 124 et seq. 
14 Milène Wegmann, Früher Neoliberalismus und europäische Integration: 
Interdependenz der nationalen, supranationalen und internationalen Ordnung von 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1932-1965), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), especially p. 
351 et seq., for the importance of the political and social constitution for the project of 
economic integration (pp. 359-366). 
15 See Fritz. W. Scharpf (note 8 supra) and more recently Stephan Leibfried and 
Herbert Obinger, “Nationle Sozialstaaten in der Europäischen Union, Zukünfte eines 
‘Sozialen Europas’”, in: Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer (eds), Die politische 
Ökonomie der europäischen Integration, (Frankfurt aM/New York: Campus, 2008), pp. 
335-368. 
16 References in Christian Joerges, “What is left of the European Economic 
Constitution? A melancholic eulogy”, (2005) 30 European Law Review, pp. 461-489, at 
469 et seq. 
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form of double-existence, as a supranational legal community, on the 
one hand, and as an intergovernmental association, on the other.17 In 
this manner, Weiler’s reconstruction of the establishment of a 
supranational legal order by the ECJ was, likewise, also founded 
upon the realpolitik of political bargaining processes, so that he might 
assert the duty of politics to pay tribute to the social sphere. 
3.2. Europe as Agent of Reform 
In a startling twist of academic fate, Weiler only published the vital 
parts of his Ph.D dissertation, detailing his theory of the dual nature 
of the EC, in the 100th edition of the Yale Law Journal in 1991, there, 
contemporaneously – and still pre-Maastricht, but post the Single 
European Act (1987)18 – to refute them in the light of the introduction 
of the principle of majority-voting that foreclosed the important exit 
options of the Member States, which Weiler, the prophetic European 
law scholar who had trained in international law, did not wish to see 
foreclosed.19 However, the pattern of European evolution was not 
only to destroy Weiler’s theorem, but was also to undermine all 
established integration theories. 
 
The prime suspect in this process was the programme “for the 
completion of the internal market”, with which Jacques Delors, 
President of the Commission from 1985 onwards, was able to 
convince European politicians that Europe had to be, and could be 
freed, from its much-ridiculed “euro-sclerosis”. Many of Delors’ 
followers, but by no means Delors himself, had, as their primary aim, 
the radicalisation of the finalité of integration; that is, to paraphrase 
Karl Polanyi, the construction of an “disembedded market polity”, or, 
to deploy the vocabulary of Michel Foucault, to bring an end to statal 
control over markets through the establishment of the mastery of 
markets over the states.20 
Nonetheless, the results were not as expected. What had begun as an 
attempt to strengthen European competitiveness quickly descended – 
                                                 
17 The core theses of his unpublished dissertation can be found in Joseph H.H. 
Weiler, “The Community system: the dual character of supranationalism”, (1981) 1 
Yearbook of European Law, pp. 257-306. 
18 “The Transformation of Europe”, (1990-91) 100 Yale Law Journal, pp. 2403-2485. 
19 Weiler, ibid., at 2453 et seq., 2466 et seq.; see, also, Fin-de-Siècle (note 7). 
20 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France (Paris: 
Seuil/Gallimard, 2004), in particular, the lectures of 7 February 1979 (pp. 105-134) 
and of 14 February 1979 (pp. 135-164). 
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together with its corollary (deregulation) strategy – into a process 
whereby the EU was implicated within an increasing number of 
policy areas, and was thus required to develop an ever more complex 
regulatory machinery. The primary motivator here was the interest of 
the European legislator and the Commission in “social regulation” 
(consumer, labour and environmental protection), or new policy 
areas, the significance of which the ordo-liberal proponents of a 
“pure” economic constitution had fatally under-estimated. Of similar 
importance, but much less surprising, was the speed with which the 
integration process within the reach of the completion of the internal 
market was “deepened”, and thus impacted upon an increasing 
number of policy areas. The significance of this development was not 
so much to be found in the intensity of its real-world impacts, but 
rather with regard to the symbolism of Europe’s growing “social 
deficit”, and the corollary introduction of new attempts to increase 
the European presence within the sphere of labour and social policy. 
With the Maastricht social protocol – “the agreement on social 
policy” – EU competences were broadened in the area of labour and 
employment policies, so that the once stark distinction between 
Europe’s (apolitical) Economic Constitution and the political 
responsibility of the Member States for labour and social policy was 
now hopelessly blurred. 
 
4. The De-coupling of Economic and Social 
Constitutions as a Challenge to Law 
The long-term implications of the institutional concretisation of the 
European social deficit were, nonetheless, not yet visible. This was 
not simply by virtue of the fact that “embedded liberalism” still 
appeared to be remarkably stable, but was also a result of the degree 
to which the de-coupling of economic and social constitutions was 
reproduced within the dominant legal framework (Sections 5.1 and 
5.2). In other words, it was very easy to relegate the problem to the 
status of one which might be solved solely within the semantics of 
intergovernmental bargaining and legal policy (Section 5.3). 
 
4.1. The Internal Market as Agent of Inter-statal 
Redistribution 
The European social deficit then took a very dramatic turn with the 
expansion of the Union. The issue was no longer simply one of the 
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social deficit: in addition, the matter now included the intensification 
of socio-economic disequilibrium throughout the extended Union. 
This discrepancy was far greater than the development 
disequilibrium that had formed the subject matter to be overcome in 
earlier accession negotiations; transfer payments, however, – or a 
European Marshall plan, following the example of German re-
unification – were not placed on the agenda.21 
 
The ECJ has reacted to this new European constellation with three 
decisions, which have already become legendary.22 In each of these 
                                                 
21 The dozens of layers of enlargement support projects promoted by the EU and its 
Member States did not install fully-fledged social welfare regulations comparable to 
those of most of the old Member States; see, on the enlargement policies, the bitter 
remarks by M. Blecher, “Order or Noise – Order from Noise? Probleme der 
Entwickungszusammenarbeit (im Recht) und ihre Reform”, (2007) 40 Kritische Justiz, 
p. 166 et seq. As he underlines, the distinction between economic supra-nationalism 
and national welfarism which was “decoupled” in the West was not only blurred in 
the East, where functional equivalents were simply non-existent. The accession states 
had, instead, to comply with the relatively meagre social policies of the acquis, 
without being in a position to establish any of the welfare models, which were (still) 
in place in the West. Large numbers of East European citizens were driven into 
economic migration with all its highly ambivalent social implications. On the other 
hand, the transformation of East European societies coincided with the increasing de-
regulation strategies against the same social welfare structures in “old Europe” 
including the resort to “precarious” forms of labour and the weakening of classical 
unionist representation. These “developments”, M. Blecher concludes, can be 
interpreted as the evolution of a new (and surely not democratically legitimated) 
factual “super-supremacy”: the accomplishment of neo-liberal economic policies 
which have become the new global governmentality programme or dispositive 
(Foucault) subjecting all forms of present association to its rules. This new modus 
operandi has everywhere restructured economic, political, legal and social 
“constitutions”, introducing a new form of governance in which entrepreneurial self-
determination, self-care and self-responsibility of individual and social “bodies” 
have become core factors. Any reconstruction of the European integration project 
and of its “social deficit” must take this new (global) background and the 
concomitant re-politicisation of former “apolitical” contexts into account. See, also, 
M. Blecher, “Law in Movement”, in: J. Dine, A. Fagan (eds), Capitalism and Human 
Rights, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 80 et seq.; and ibid., “Diritto in Movimento. 
Verso un Nuovo Diritto Comune”, in: M. Blecher, G. Bronzini, J. Hendry, Ch. Joerges 
and R. Ciccarelli (eds), Rivendicare il Comune. Governance e Nuovi Movimenti Sociali, 
(Rome: EDS, forthcoming 2009). 
22 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation und Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, judgment of 11.12.2007; Case C-
341/05, Laval und Partneri Ltd. v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan und Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet, judgment of 18.12.2007; Case C-346/06, Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk 
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cases, the Court has demanded the opening up of old European 
markets to service-providers from the new Member States, who, 
either on their own initiative, or in co-operation with western 
European investors, have busied themselves with the lowering of 
labour costs. The conflicts that have greeted such a legally-
constructed utilisation of comparative cost advantages have, for the 
most part, been depicted in both academic and political 
commentaries not as inter-class conflicts, but as conflicts between rich 
and poor nations, less often as collisions between the workforce of 
saturated and low-cost labour markets (intra-class conflict). 
Justification for the law’s wide-ranging toleration and promotion of 
such practices has similarly been greeted as a cheap form of 
reparation for the acceptance of the “acquis communitaire” by the 
accession countries.23 Naturally, such descriptions cannot be found in 
this form within the reasoning of the ECJ. Here, the Court has, 
instead, based its argumentation upon the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the treaties; freedoms that trump national labour-law 
provisions blocking market access, and even apply to oppositional 
strike measures that are legal within the Member States. The attempt 
to assert national labour law is curtly dismissed by the ECJ in its 
response to the arguments of the Danish Government in Viking: 
 
In that respect it is sufficient it is sufficient to point out that, 
even if, in the areas which fall outside the scope of the 
Community’s competence, the Member States are still free, in 
principle, to lay down the conditions governing the existence 
and exercise of the rights in question, the fact remains that, 
when exercising that competence, the Member States must 
nevertheless comply with Community law [...] Consequently, 
the fact that Article 137 EC does not apply to the right to strike 
or to the right to impose lock-outs is not such as to exclude 
collective action such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
from the application of Article 43 EC.24 
                                                                                                                   
Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, judgment of 3.4.2008. 
23 See Michelle Everson, “European citizenship and the disillusion of the common 
man”, in Section 2 of this volume, (text accompanying note 59 et seq.), arguing starkly 
against those approaches. 
24 Viking (paras 40 et seq). On the problems attending the regulation of competences 
in Article 137 EC, see Florian Rödl, “The Labour Constitution”, in: Armin v. 
Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2nd ed., forthcoming 2009), Section III.2. 
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Among the authors who have underlined the dramatic implications 
of this reasoning is Loϊc Azoulai, who has reconstructed it as a deep-
seated alteration in the configuration of the integration project and its 
law.25 The EC Treaty institutionalised European integration as a 
sectoral (“partial”) project. In the meantime, however, we are now 
confronted with a new context of comprehensive (“total”) integration, 
a form of integration that proceeded in rarely spectacular, but always 
seemingly logical, series of adjudicational steps taken by the ECJ to 
apply European law.26 This observation is correct characterization of 
the facticity the integration process. . It is also true, the law of 
integration entails the constituting of a “moving target”, a legal 
situation that Ipsen, very early on in the history of integration, 
characterised as an “ever changing constitution” 
(“Wandelverfassung”).27 But change, we should assume, requires 
methodological rules and substantive justification; it must, surely, be 
constituted, so as to occur in a “constitution of change” and to ensure 
the validity of legal changes.28 Here, however, Azoulai seems to 
restrict his analysis to a reconstruction of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
He discusses the competence-based challenges to the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence, as well as the problem of the restriction of the right to 
strike by means of comprehensive application of the economic 
freedoms – but then observes simply that the ECJ has risen above 
such challenges.29 An ascription of such powers to the ECJ, however, 
would be extremely troublesome. It would raise the Court to the 
                                                 
25 “The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy” (2008) 45 Common Market 
Law Review, pp. 1335–1356. 
26 “What the authors of the Treaty had in mind when drawing up the conditions for 
the construction of the common market was an economic integration, that is to say a 
“partial integration”. In these conditions, the pre-eminence of the Treaty rules whose 
aim was to break open the national markets (free movement) was self-evident. The 
precedence of those rules was all the more accepted as their scope seemed to be 
limited to the economic and commercial sphere. It is no longer quite the same when 
one moves to a regime of “total integration”, which is the present situation. Because 
the scope of application of Community law has constantly widened, there is virtually 
no area of economic and social life which escapes, in principle, the effect of the Treaty 
rules.” (Azoulai, ibid., 1346). 
27 Hans Peter Ipsen, “Europäische Verfassung – Nationale Verfassung” (1987) 
Europarecht, pp. 195-213, at 201). 
28 See Christian Joerges, “Europäische Konstitutionalisierung”, in: Hauke Brunkhorst, 
Regina Kreide and Cristina Lafont (eds), Habermas-Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Wirkung, 
(Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, forthcoming 2009). 
29 Azoulai (note 24), p. 1341 et seq. 
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status of pouvoir constituant of the Union, affords it a power that 
allows it – autonomously and en passant – to rip national 
constitutional law up by its roots. Azoulai also makes it clear that this 
form of constitutionalising Europe is repugnant to him.30 Yet, it is 
nonetheless true that his characterisation of the current jurisprudence 
of the ECJ is an adequate reconstruction of the Court’s move towards 
an “integration through markets” project that radicalises Jacques 
Delors’ internal market programme.31 
4.2. The De-coupling of the Social from the Economic 
Constitution as a “Social” Integration Compromise 
Florian Rödl has defended a contrasting approach.32 In common with 
Azoulai, he insists that the de-coupling of labour and economic 
constitutions within Europe has not resulted in the creation of a state 
of nature within which the law is as indifferent to the social 
conditions of European citizens as it was during the era of laissez-faire 
liberalism. In contrast to Azoulai, however, who establishes a duty of 
solidarity out of the fait accompli of the eastern enlargement and the 
continuous advance of the integration telos – a duty which requires 
the workers of old Europe, as well as their unions, to tolerate wage 
competition with cheaper eastern European labour – Rödl argues 
from an historical perspective. Even though the EC Treaty contains 
no comprehensive normative expression of a labour constitution 
along the lines of those found within the Member States, the Member 
States (together with the Community following the Treaty of 
Amsterdam) have committed themselves in Article 117 EC to “the 
improvement of living and working conditions in Europe” and have 
                                                 
30 “This extension produces a legitimacy problem, and also, in practice, a problem of 
boundaries”, Azoulai (note 24), p. 1341 et seq. 
31 Azoulai correctly draws attention to relevant passages (ibidem, p. 1347) found in 
the opinion of AG Maduro and within his earlier well-known dissertation (We the 
Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), especially at p. 50 et seq.: “…workers throughout 
Europe must accept the recurring negative consequences that are inherent to the 
common market’s creation of increasing prosperity…, (Viking, para. 58); a comment 
that is also to be relativised in the light of the postulating commentary that “society 
must commit itself to … the provision of economic support to those workers who, as 
a consequence of market forces, come into difficulties”; see, further, note 72. 
32 Florian Rödl, “Constitutional integration of labour law constitutions”, in: Erik O. 
Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl (eds), Law, Democracy and Solidarity in a 
Post-national Union, (London-New York: Routledge, 2008), 152-172; see, also, idem, 
“The Labour Constitution” (note 23). 
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likewise made it clear that the improvements supplied by the 
“workings of the common market” are expected to be furnished in 
line with the “procedures” foreseen by the Treaty, and are further 
required to be reconcilable with “its legal and administrative 
provisions”.33 
 
Rödl’s arguments are expounded in accordance with the thoughts of 
the socially-reforming protagonists of critical theory:34 The normative 
promise of the liberal model is not fulfilled in that it disregards the 
theoretical pre-conditions upon which it rests. Instead, such pre-
conditions are, far more, “political-normative yardsticks”, against 
which the elaboration of the EU labour constitution must be judged. 
A real-world process of integration cannot simply call upon the 
compromesso storico of the EEC Treaty in order to justify an 
undermining adjudicative attack – and thus the further realisation of 
the integration project – upon formal legal reasoning or the 
interpretative canon of von Savigny. By contrast, Rödl demonstrates 
how jurisprudence on Article 117 EC has continuously evolved, and 
thus asserts that the vital question is that of the clarification of the 
conditions under which it applies.35 
 
His methodological approach protects him from the potential 
equivocation – between facticity and validity – which is risked by 
Azoulai. Instead, Rödl must confront the possibility – most disturbing 
to the lawyer who concerns himself with positive law – that the 
existing labour constitution of the EU cannot be reconciled with its 
normative promise. Rödl makes explicit reference to this difficulty, at 
the same time detailing the reasons why it has arisen:36 the 
divergences between the welfare traditions of old European states are 
fundamental in their character, an economic disequilibrium that grew 
even greater following eastern European enlargement, as well as the 
stagnation in the establishment of social Europe following ratification 
of the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), as the gulf between normative 
                                                 
33 “The Labour Constitution” (note 23), Section II.1. 
34 The classic being, Jürgen Habermas, Zum Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, 
(Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1957); for reconstruction of the argument and application to 
modern circumstances, see John P. McCormick, Weber, Habermas, and Transformations 
of the European State: Constitutional, Social, and Supranational Democracy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
35 “The Labour Constitution” (note 23), Section II.3. 
36 Ibid., Section III.2. 
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promise, and the necessary legislative competences to realise it, has 
grown ever wider. 
 
The consequences to be drawn appear obvious, but are cautiously 
formulated: rather than amuse itself with the creation of a unitary 
labour constitution, the EU must learn to live with its variety of 
traditions and conflicting interests. The EU must establish a 
“supreme body of conflicts law”, which will facilitate its treatment of 
variety within this “social integration compromise”.37 Rödl asserts 
that, in addition to a necessary concretisation of the “visionary norms 
of Article 117 EC” that is founded within a conflict-of-laws logic, 
there is still much room for the realisation of the free movement of 
workers under Article 39 EC and for focused measures of legal 
harmonisation. He underlines the fact that such a supranational form 
of conflicts law need not be created from scratch, but may, likewise, 
find its anchor and normative orientation within the “constitutional 
association of states” (Verfassungsbund),38 a point to which we shall 
return below.39 
4.3. The Project of the Constitutional Treaty 
In stark contrast to Azoulai and Rödl, who, however divergently, 
have sought to identify the social dimension of the EU within 
applicable European law, European politics and conventional legal 
science have continued to place their seemingly unlimited faith in the 
project of an incremental realisation of the European social 
dimension. The most important steps upon which such a hope is built 
were addressed above.40 Incremental efforts were intensified as the 
European Convention took up its work in February 2002 and 
declared that it viewed its given task as being one of establishing a 
European Constitution. By virtue of this interpretation of its mandate, 
the Convention was also required to commit itself to the corollary 
evolution of a social Europe within its draft constitution. The 
fundaments which characterise the Convention’s draft have, by and 
large, been taken up unaltered within the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (TFEU). These are: the duty to establish a “highly 
competitive social market economy”,41 the preservation of services of 
                                                 
37 Ibid., Section III.3. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Section V. 
40 See, above, Section II.2. 
41 Article 3(3), TEU (consolidated version of 15 April 2008). 
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general economic interest as “shared values of the Union”,42 the 
recognition of “social rights”,43 and the new co-ordination 
competences for labour (similarly, employment) and social policies.44 
 
It is unsurprising that the political process was unable to identify new 
solutions for the problem of social Europe at such short notice. It is a 
bit more surprising that the current academic commentary seems so 
complacent. Stability within the debate may have much to do with 
the enormous expansion of European secondary law and the ever 
more intense impact of European primary law and jurisprudence. 
Parallel to this expansion, long-standing internal divisions within 
European law have now intensified to the degree that we are witness 
to sectoral fragmentation within the law, with the result that different 
groups of European lawyers are no longer in a position even to take 
note of each other’s work, much less, to understand it. This is also 
true for so-called “generalists”, who will now find it even harder to 
identify overarching evolutionary aspects within individual areas of 
law. The Europeanisation of once purely national legal science seems 
not to have helped much: certainly, the business of reading and 
writing across national borders has intensified; but the Anglo-Saxon 
lawyers, who have done so much to promote Europeanisation, still 
seem unable to find a way out of their own national maze of 
particularistic legal thinking. 
 
                                                 
42 Article 14 (ex Article 16 TEC); these services are certainly an important dimension 
of “social Europe”; see Wolf Sauter and Nina Boeger in this volume and out of an 
enormously growing literature recently Ulla Neergard, “Services of General Interest: 
What Aims and Values Count?”, in: Ulla Neergaard, Ruth Nielsen and Lynn 
Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law - From Rome to Lisbon, 
(Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2009), pp. 191-224; Graça Maria Araujo Fonseca, 
“The process of Europeanization of services of general economic interest. Remarks 
on particular cross-sectoral substantial and organizational features”, Ph.D Thesis, 
EUI Florence, 2009; these services are, however, by no means an equivalent to 
Hermann Heller’s Sozialstaatlichkeit; see, comprehensively, Claudio Franzius, 
Gewährleistung im Recht, (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2009), p. 32 et seq., p. 151 et seq., 
alongside with his “Hermann Heller: Einstehen für den Staat von Weimar”, 
(Manuscript Berlin 2009). 
43 Fundamental Rights Charter of the European Union, Title IV, solidarity. 
44 See, above all, Article 5(2) and (3) TFEU. The legal impact of this supposed 
constitutionalisation of processes of public co-ordination, in contrast to the 
provisions of Article 147(1) TFEU [ex Article 127 EEC] and Article 153(2)(a) TFEU [ex 




Paradoxically enough, the insensitivity of Anglo-Saxon scholarship 
towards the constitutional dimension of Europe’s social deficit has its 
parallels “overseas”. The general indifference of German European 
lawyers to the social deficit, also derives, and ironically so, from the 
fact that, during the constitutional debates of the early Bonn 
Republic, the majority of German public lawyers distanced 
themselves, from the ordo-liberal thesis that the Constitution had 
established its ordered rule, and had thus asserted itself against the 
constitutive powers of a democratically-legitimated parliamentary 
democracy. Ordo-liberal theory and politics remained the domain of 
economic and private lawyers, and this schism has also been 
reproduced within European legal debates. Within universities, the 
new subject of European law was placed under the umbrella of 
public law; meanwhile, economic lawyers were able to assert their 
theoretical and practical positions within European competition law. 
Here, such lawyers fought unequivocally for the dominance of the 
theory of the European Economic Constitution and,45 concomitantly, 
were comprehensively able to refuse to engage with efforts to supply 
Europe with democratic legitimation.46 At the same time, 
representatives of public law freed themselves from the technocratic 
influences of Ipsen and Forsthoff, in order to take part in discussions 
on the European democratic deficit – similarly, and, for the most part, 
if not exclusively,47 failing to construct the question of the socially-
constitutive power of Europe as a democratic problem. This 
constellation is reproduced within Anglo-Saxon constitutionalism. 
The socio-political implications of integration and the overcoming of 
the social deficit institutionalised within the European construction 
are treated as practical-political problems, and are never understood 
as a constitutive pre-condition for the democratisation of the Union. 
Instead, the relevant elements within the Convention’s draft 
constitution and within the Treaty of Lisbon are greeted with 
                                                 
45 The leading light here is Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, whose most important 
contributions may be found in his collected volume, Wirtschaft und Verfassung in der 
Europäischen Union: Beiträge zu Recht, Theorie und Politik der europäischen Integration, 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003). 
46 See, only, Peter Behrens, “Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft”, in: Gert Brüggemeier (ed), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1994), pp. 73-90). 
47 For a notable exception, see Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Welchen Weg geht 
Europa?, (Munich: Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung, 1997), p. 23 et seq). 
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pragmatic relief, as, at the very least, possessing potential for 
incremental advance. 
 
5.  The Conflicts Law Alternative 
The problem of the welfare state is the practical-political bête-noire of 
the European project. What is left to us when we postulate that the 
ability to create an economic and social order is a constitutive pre-
condition for democratic legitimacy, but simultaneously recognise 
that the EU harmonisation of the economic and labour constitutions 
of the Member States is impossible, so that Europe must reckon with 
lasting socio-economic divergence between its constituent Member 
States? The treatment of legal divergence is the domain of conflicts 
law. How can this discipline be expected to aid in the overcoming of 
the problem of the social deficit? Its “poverty of social values” is 
legendary.48 The same is true of its methodological nationalism, a 
nationalism that is actively cultivated by its most prominent 
representatives.49 
5.1.  European Law as Supranational Conflicts Law 
Rather than repeat the line of argument that re-interprets European 
law as a new form of supranational conflict of laws,50 commentary is 
here restricted to a depiction of its core messages. 
 
Conflicts law as democratic commandment: A starting thesis, and one 
upon which the entire construction is built, argues that the schism 
between decision-makers and those who are impacted upon by 
                                                 
48 Konrad Zweigert, “Zur Armut des Internationalen Privatrechts an sozialen 
Werten”, (1973) 37 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht, p. 
435. 
49 See, the incisive analysis in the habilitation of Klaus Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und 
Sachrecht. Zu Struktur, Standort und Methode des internationalen Privatrechts, (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1981); see, also, Florian Rödl, “Weltbürgerliches 
Kollisionsrecht: Über die Form des Kollisionsrechts und seine Gestalt im Recht der 
Europäischen Union”, Ph.D Thesis, EUI, Florence, 2008, p. 48 et seq. 
50 For early versions, see Christian Joerges, “The Europeanisation of Private Law as a 
Rationalisation Process and as a Contest of Legal Disciplines -- an Analysis of the 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts”, (1995) 3 European Review of 
Private Law, pp. 175-192; “The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: 
Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective”, 
(1997) 3 European Law Journal, pp. 378-406; “Deliberative Supranationalism” – A 




decision-making is now growing ever greater. This schism is 
explained by Niklas Luhmann within his sociological risk theory: 
according to Luhmann, the problem arises because decision-making 
on risks is always characterised by the fact that the potential damage 
is not simply borne by individual decision-makers, and nor is it only 
suffered by the persons profiting from the decision.51 The famously 
contrasting problem construction – one which is favoured here – is 
grounded within democratic theory. It is most clearly elaborated in 
an essay by Jürgen Habermas,52 made public prior to the publication 
of his theory of the democratic constitutional state (Between Facts and 
Norms53), and later explained in greater detail:54 increasingly, 
constitutional states are unable to guarantee the inclusion of all of 
those persons who are impacted upon by their policies and politics 
within their internal decision-making processes. The notion of self-
legislation, however, which postulates that the addressees of a law 
are, at the same time, its authors, demands “the inclusion of the 
other”. 
 
The supranationality of European conflicts law: This normative argument 
in favour of a new understanding of existing EU law is significant in 
various respects. First, and primarily so, since it also furnishes a 
justification for the validity of the supranational jurisdiction – one 
which is notable only by its absence in the conventional juridical 
derivation of the principle of supremacy.55 As a consequence of their 
manifold degree of interdependence, the Member States of the Union 
are no longer in a position to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of 
their policies. A European law that concerns itself with the 
                                                 
51 Soziologie des Risikos (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991); colourfully and laconically 
summarised in, for example, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1995), pp. 141-143. 
52 Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität, (Zurich: Erkner, 1991). 
53 Faktizität und Geltung, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), see Annex III, pp. 
632-660. 
54 Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag: 2001), p. 86 et seq. 
55 Unrivalled, the reconstruction of J.H.H.Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” 
(1991/2:2413 et seq.); for a less praiseworthy forerunner of the supremacy doctrine, 
see Matthias Schmoeckel, Die Großraumtheorie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
Völkerrechtswissenschaft im Dritten Reich, insbesondere der Kriegszeit, (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1994), p. 226); Schmoeckel analyses, inter alia, Hans Peter Ipsen, 
“Reichsaußenverwaltung”, in Brüsseler Zeitung (3.4.1943), reproduced in Hans 
Werner Neulen, Europa und das 3. Reich, Einigungsbestrebungen im deutschen 
Machtbereich 1939-1945, (Munich: Universitas, 1987), pp. 111-115. 
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amelioration of such external effects, i.e., which seeks to compensate 
for the failings of the national democracies, may induce its legitimacy 
from this compensatory function. With this, European law can, at 
last, free itself from the critique that has accompanied it since its 
birth; a critique that states that it is not legitimate. It can thus operate 
to strengthen democracy within a contractual understanding of 
statehood, without needing to establish itself as a democratic state. 
 
The reconstruction potential: Clearly, such a democratic exoneration of 
European law is only possible to the exact degree that it may be 
reconstructed within this perspective, or that it may be furnished 
with a conflicts law orientation. This, however, is already, often 
enough, the case: European law has given legal force to principles 
and rules which serve the purpose of supranational “recognition” – 
the non-discrimination principle, the supranational definition and 
demarcation of legitimate regulatory concerns, the demands for 
justification for actions that are imposed upon national legal systems, 
and the proportionality principle – which supplies a legal yardstick 
against which respect for supranationally-guaranteed freedoms may 
be measured – and the demand that all public exercise of power pays 
due regard to fundamental rights. All these principles and rules may 
be understood as a concretisation of a supranational conflicts law, 
which guarantees that the actions of the Member States are 
reconcilable with their position within the Community. 
 
Internal differentiation of conflicts law within the multi-level European 
system: The metaphor of the multi-level system asserts that European 
“rule” cannot be organised hierarchically.56 This argument is 
reflected, not only within the apportionment of competences within 
the EU, but also by the fact that vast discrepancies exist in the 
operational resources available at each ruling level. Accordingly, we 
are able to distinguish between three forms of legal collision – 
vertical, “diagonal” and horizontal. Diagonal collisions are an 
important and unique feature of multi-level systems. They are a 
constant feature of life within the EU, since the competences required 
for problem-solving are, at times, to be found at the level of the EU 
                                                 
56 The reference is to Renate Mayntz, The Architecture of Multi-level Governance of 
Economic Sectors, MPIfG Discussion Paper (07/13), .22-24; idem, “Von der 
Steuertungstheorie zu Global Governance”, in: Gunnar Folke Schuppert and Michael 




itself, and, at other times, at the level of the Member States. This 
division of competences gives rise to two forms of potential conflict – 
on the one hand, between divergent EU and national political 
orientations, and, on the other, between divergent interest 
constellations in the Member States – so that very particular 
mediation arrangements must be identified. This need for mediation 
is true for all multi-level systems, but is particularly pressing in the 
case of the EU, where the existence of diagonal conflict has had, as its 
corollary, the evolution of a particularly intense degree of 
administrative co-operation, the institutionalisation of advice-giving 
instances, and the systematic construction of non-governmental co-
operative relationships. This infrastructure may be understood as 
furnishing the integral components of a conflicts law, a law that may 
no longer restrict itself to the individual adjudication of situational 
cases of conflict, and which must, instead, constantly busy itself with 
the finding of general solutions to universal problems. At the same 
time, such conflicts law must be methodologically and 
organisationally open to evolution, which has seen the development 
of post-interventionist regulatory practices and legal forms within 
national law. Accordingly, we may identify three types of European 
conflicts law, which operate in three dimensions:57 conflicts law of the 
“first order” is flanked on the one side, by a conflicts law, which, 
most specifically in the realm of European comitology, has concerned 
itself with the elaboration of material (substantive) regulatory 
options, and, on the other side, by a conflicts law, which governs the 
supervision of para-legal law and self-regulatory organisation. 
Conflicts law as the procedural constitutionalisation of Europe: It follows 
from the preceding sections that it would be factually and 
normatively mistaken to regard European law as a system of law 
dedicated to the incremental construction of a comprehensive legal 
edifice. Europe must, at last, take its own motto – found within the 
draft constitutional treaty (“unified in diversity”58) – to heart, and 
                                                 
57 See, for more detail, Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, “Zum Funktionswandel 
des Kollisionsrechts II: Die kollisionsrechtliche Form einer legitimen Verfassung der 
post-nationalen Konstellation”, in: Gralf-Peter Calliess et al. (eds), Soziologische 
Jurisprudenz: Festschrift für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
forthcoming 2009); for similar terminological usage, though built upon a different 
conceptual base, Poul F. Kjaer, “Three-dimensional Conflict of Laws in Europe”, 
ZERP-DP 2009 (forthcoming). 
58 Article I-8 Draft European constitutional treaty (ABl. C 310/1, 16/12/2004); a 
formulation now dispensed with within the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of 
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learn to accept the fact that its diversity will accompany it far into the 
future, so that conflict born of diversity will continue to characterise 
the process of European integration. It must further concede that this 
“process” should be overseen by a conflicts law, which, by virtue of 
its identification of the principles and rules that govern conflict, will 
generate the law of the European multi-level system. Europeanisation 
is not simply a process of change, it is also a learning process. Law 
cannot pre-determine the substance of such processes, but may yet 
secure its own normative character, by virtue of its self-dedication to 
the processes of law-making/legal-justification (Recht-Fertigung), 
which mirror and defend the justice and fairness within law.59 
5.2.  Exemplary Application 
The current jurisprudence of the ECJ on collective labour law60 
provides us with a dramatic mirror to the virulence of interest 
conflicts and political differences within the Union. At the same time, 
each of the cases detailed below concerns the consequences of the 
European “social deficit”, or the incomplete addressing of the social 
sphere within the institutionalisation of the integration project. 
Unfortunately, there is little room here for a detailed re-construction 
of these judgments. However, an effort is made to identify the major 
disjunction between the conceptual orientation of the ECJ and the 
approach promised by a European conflicts law. In turn, this 
juxtaposition facilitates the documentation of the main regulative 
principles offered by the conflicts law perspective. 
                                                                                                                   
theEU. 
59 See Rudolf Wiehölter, “Recht-Fertigungen eines Gesellschafts-Rechts”, in: Ch. 
Joerges and G. Teubner (eds), Rechtsverfassungsrecht: Recht-Fertigung zwischen 
Privatdogmatik und Gesellschaftstheorie, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004), p. 13 et seq.); the 
English version (“Just-ifications of a Law of Society”, in: Oren Perez and Gunther 
Teubner, (eds), Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005), pp. 65-77, available at: http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/ifawz1/teubner/RWTexte/justum.pdf; see, for a constructive 
application to EU law, Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner, The Making of the EU 
Constitution: Judges and Lawyers Beyond Constitutive Power, (Milton Park: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007), in particular, p. 41 et seq. 
60 See note 21 supra. 
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5.2.1. Viking and the Relationship between Economic and 
Labour Law 
The legal conflict found in the case of Viking was mentioned briefly 
above.61 Finnish workers and unions mobilised against the re-
flagging of a Finnish registered ferry, threatening strike action. They 
feared that Finnish sailors, remunerated under a Finnish collective 
bargaining agreement, would, in time, be replaced by cheaper 
contracted labour. According to Finnish law, both the collective 
bargaining agreement and the threatened strike in its defence were 
afforded legal protection. The employer, Reederei Viking, however, 
made recourse to European law, claiming that the Union’s threatened 
strike action, together with the political activities (promotion of 
international solidarity strikes) of, inter alia, the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (“ITF”), were irreconcilable with 
Viking’s freedom of establishment as guaranteed by Article 43 EC. 
 
If the preceding arguments have convinced, it should be clear to the 
reader that the case entailed conflict between two incompatible legal 
regimes. European law guaranteed freedom of establishment (and 
provision of a service), but did not govern industrial disputes, 
referring, instead, to national law in this area (Article 137(5) EC). The 
arguments presented by each side in this case, revealed the 
uncomfortable fact that the realm of European law has now almost 
completely forgotten the primary elements of conflicts law. The 
defendants argued that: 
 
Freedom of association, industrial disputes regulation and lock-
outs lay beyond the jurisdiction of Article 43 and its guarantee 
for freedom of establishment, since, according to Article 137(5) 
EC, the Community […] had no competences. 
 
This is, according to the defendants, the conflict was taking place 
outside the EU. By the contrasting token, however, the ECJ was very 
happy to accept the “hint” given by the plaintiff that, although 
Finland might enjoy the fundamental freedom to construct its own 
law on industrial disputes, “this competence must, at the same time, 
be exercised with due respect for Community law”.62 To the Court, 
then, it would appear that the de-coupling of labour and economic 
                                                 
61 Section III.1. 
62 Viking (note 21), para. 40. 
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law leads to the subordination of the former. Both parties construct 
their thoughts in line with the category of a vertical collision. They 
make no effort to identify a conflict-ameliorating collision norm, and, 
instead, press for an out-and-out decision. For the defendants, the fact 
that Community law guarantees the rights of establishment of Union 
citizens is of no interest, since EU law has no jurisdiction over 
industrial disputes. For the plaintiffs – and, most particularly, the 
Commission in the character of the Commissioner for the Internal 
Market, Charlie McCreevy – the Community guarantee for 
establishment is concomitant with a finding that national labour law 
must be disapplied. 
 
The fatal superficiality of such conceptions becomes readily apparent, 
where, following the legendary insight of Ernst Rabel,63 the case is 
reconstructed in line with the primary operation of conflicts law, 
namely, the operation called characterisation. This operation cannot 
supply us with ready-made answers, but it does make us aware of 
what is at stake in the present conflict. To cite Antoine Lyon-Caen: 
 
Dans les sociétés d’Europe de l’Ouest, le droit du travail s’est 
constitué par émancipation du droit du marché, dénommé 
moyennant les variations terminologiques qu’il importe de ne 
pas oublier: liberté du commerce ici, freedom of trade ailleurs… 
Ce n’est pas que des règles sur le travail n’existaient pas avant 
cette émancipation, mais elles relevaient d’avantage d’une 
police du travail, partie plus ou moins autonome d’une police 
du ou des marchés.64 
What do we gain when we adopt this perspective? Most 
fundamentally, this construction reveals that the problem is one 
                                                 
63 “Das Problem der Qualifikation”, (1931) 5 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationals Privatrecht, pp. 241-288. 
64 Antoine Lyon-Caen, “Droit communautaire du marché v.s. Europe sociale”, 
contribution to the conference “Die Auswirkungen der Rechtsprechung des 
Europäischen Gerichtshofes auf das Arbeitsrecht der Mitgliedstaaten”, of 26th June 
(Berlin), organised by the Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs; 
available at:  
http://www.bmas.de/coremedia/generator/27028/property=pdf/2008__07__16__s
ymposium__eugh__lyon-caen.pdf; for a congenial interpretation of the French 
tradition, see Emmanuel Dockès, “L’Europe antisociale”, (2009) 12 Etudes, pp. 11-17, 
and previously, Alain Supiot, “L’Europe gagnée par « l”économie communiste de 
marché »”. Le Monde, 25 January 2008 and, inter alia, Revue du Mauss permanente 
(http://www.journaldumauss.net), and Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 April 2008. 
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which has dramatic constitutional dimensions. Equally, however, this 
perspective makes it clear that the controversy must not be resolved 
by a decision that asserts the supremacy of the freedom of 
establishment. The jurisprudence of the ECJ is rich in alternative and 
better models. Amongst these, the much called-upon decision in 
Albany is striking,65 since, in this case, the ECJ was happy to restrict 
itself and its own jurisdiction,66 avoiding the temptation to label 
Dutch collective pension schemes as “cartels” under European 
Competition law, and seeking, instead, to establish an “national 
autonomy preserving, contemporaneously, community-oriented” 
mode of co-existence between these two legal forms.67 Various 
suggestions have been made, detailing an appropriate conflicts-
oriented solution, one which does not derive from the supremacy 
principle – AG Maduro argues in favour of compensation for workers 
impacted upon by re-flagging from – apparently national – funds, 
which do not, however, exist.68 Florian Rödl concludes, following his 
analysis of the division of competences laid down in Article 137 EC, 
that Member State constitutions “must evolve norms, which open up 
a legal realm for inter-European transnational labour conflicts and for 
transnational collective bargaining agreements”.69 What might an 
ECJ, however, undertake to do in the lengthy interlude before 
national labour constitutions have been adjusted? Once again, we 
might identify illuminating models within existing jurisprudence 
which have promoted successful legal development without, 
however, foreclosing processes of political adjustment.70 Certainly, 
this may have grown harder within the current political constellation, 
which requires the ECJ to identify both the peculiarities and the limits 
to its own constitutional mandate. Talk of “judicial self-restraint”, 
however, no longer suffices. In a final analysis, the ECJ is not a central 
or final constitutional instance with the power to review the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States. 
                                                 
65 Case C-67/96 ECR [1999] I-5751. 
66 See, however, Brian Bercusson, “The Trade Union Movement and the European 
Union: Judgment Day”, (2007) 13 European Law Journal, pp. 279-308. 
67 See, for incisive detail, Michelle Everson, “Adjudicating the Market”, (2002) 8 
European Law Journal, pp. 152-171. 
68 See, the AG’s opinion, para. 59, but also the critique of Azoulai (note 24), p. 1354. 
69 “Labour Constitution” (note 23), Section IV.3. 
70 See, the analyses of Christian Joerges, “The Challenges of Europeanization in the 
Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline”, (2005) 24 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, pp. 149-196; also available at: 
http://www.iue.it/PUB/law04-12.pdf. 
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5.2.2. Viking and the Strike as a Social Right 
Commentaries on the ECJ judgments emphasise that these cases also 
contain the first explicit recognition that the right to strike is also a 
“fundamental right”, forming “a fundamental right which forms an 
integral part of the general principles of Community law the 
observance of which the Court ensures”.71 The positive tone of the 
sentence, nonetheless, deceives, masking the nature of the conflict 
that the ECJ was called upon to solve. The conflict derives from the 
incompatibility of national regulation on industrial disputes with the 
EU’s economic freedoms, and cannot, therefore, simply be resolved 
by means of transposition of the conflictual relationship into a purely 
European legal realm, whereby it is then solved – per natura – by 
means of the declaration of the hierarchical precedence of the four 
freedoms. This transposition of the conflict to the European legal 
realm, however, is not a simple flight of legal fancy on the part of the 
ECJ, which, instead, achieved this result by asserting that the right to 
strike relates to the fundamental principles of the EU. Given that 
these principles were primarily established in order to review 
legislative action, their application here – against private actors – is, 
nonetheless, inappropriate. 
5.2.3. Laval and the Limits to the Doctrine of Pre-emption 
Laval, formally registered in Latvia, tendered for the work of 
renovating a school in the suburbs of Stockholm, winning the 
contract as a result of its cheaper labour costs. In May 2004, Laval sent 
a dozen workers to the building site. Laval engaged in negotiations 
on entry into the local Swedish collective-bargaining agreement, but 
these failed. As work finally began in November 2004, Swedish 
unions reacted with boycott measures of such intensity that Laval 
ceased its operations. Just as was the case in Laval, such measures 
were legal under Swedish law. The ECJ was able to refer to its Laval 
judgment, given only a week before. In addition, the opportunity 
arose to review the application of the Posted Workers Directive,72 
which is the sole focus of the following section. 
The Directive, adopted in 1996, following tortuous negotiations, 
concerns the “importation” into high-wage economies of cheaper 
labour from low wage economies. The Directive identified a 
compromise solution for the conflicts of interest which arise in such 
                                                 
71 Case C-438/05, para. 44. 
72 Directive 96/71/EC, OJ L18/1996, 1. 
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situations: Article 3 (1) of the Directive prescribes the application of 
certain defined working conditions to such arrangements, and 
demands, in particular, that the legally-binding minimum wage 
legislation of the host nation be applied for posted workers (Article 
3(1)(c)). In its function, this is a collision norm, which both protects 
posted workers and secures the interests of employees within high 
wage economies, ensuring that the potential for the undercutting of 
wage levels within the host state is restricted.73 
 
In its transposition of the Directive, Sweden sought to remain true to 
its industrial system of collective-bargaining, relying upon Article 
3(8) of the Directive, which Swedish regulators construed as being an 
indication that such arrangements would continue to be valid. And, 
indeed, the general principles of Community law would seem to 
suggest that such an expectation was well-founded. In principle, 
Member States retain a regulatory competence in relation to those 
matters that can be demonstrated to belong to the category deemed 
by the Community to be valid “matters of public concern”. Naturally, 
secondary law limits such national competence – but only to the 
degree that the claim to pre-emption by Community law of the area 
of national competence is sustainable. By the same token, the 
preamble of the Directive explicitly states (Recital 22) that the 
Directive does not impact upon “the laws of the Member States 
concerning collective action to defend the interests of the trades and 
professions”. At the same time, Article 3 (1) (c) of the Directive states 
that minimum rates of pay are “defined by the national law and/or 
practice of the Members States to whose territory the worker is 
posted”. These provisions seem a bit opaque. The doctrine of pre-
emption doctrine seems to provide orientation in the deciphering of 
their impact on national autonomy – and that impact becomes 
dramatic if one interprets this doctrine in line with a leading law 
book:  
 
The sovereignty of EU law requires not only that it takes 
precedence over national law, but also that EU law, alone, 
determines its legal effects. It is a matter for EU law to 
determine which fields it governs, and what legal effect it 
                                                 
73 For reconstruction of the fundamentals of conflicts law, see Florian Rödl, 
“Weltbürgerliches Kollisionsrecht” (Ph.D thesis, EUI, Florence, 2008), p. 234 et seq. 
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has in those areas. These questions are anchored in the 
doctrine of pre-emption. 74  
 
This definition of the doctrine draws upon a wholly orthodox 
understanding of the supremacy principle. Nonetheless, it 
similarly encapsulates the idea that the pre-emption doctrine 
serves the conflicts law function of demarcating and co-
ordinating Community tasks with national competences. This 
interpretation is supported by the – very few – recent analysis 
of the practical application of the doctrine by the ECJ,75 and 
may also be justified at the terminological level.76 
 
An argument is to be found within the judgment, according to which, 
the Swedish practice of safeguarding wage-levels by means of legal 
recognition of collective-bargaining agreements, is not reconcilable 
with the Community interest: Swedish rules seemingly suffer from: 
 
[A] lack of provisions, of any kind, which are sufficiently 
precise and accessible that they do not render it impossible or 
excessively difficult in practice for such an undertaking [foreign 
service provider] to determine the obligations with which it is 
required to comply as regards minimum pay.77 
 
However, precisely this form of indeterminacy is inherent to all 
industrial relations systems relying upon collective-bargaining, so 
that, in effect, the ECJ is thus demanding, no more nor less, than a 
complete re-formulation of Swedish law, in order that it pay due 
respect to the calculating interests of big business. With this, the 
starting thesis again rears its ugly head that European integration is 
now dissolving national labour constitutions in favour of a market-
oriented economic constitution. 
                                                 
74 Damian Chalmers, in: Damian Chalmers et al. (eds), European Union Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 188. 
75 Eugene D. Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic 
Community: A Framework of Analysis”, (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review, pp. 
447-472 (the author argues in favour of recognition of “all instances of actual or 
potential conflict between Member State law and Community law... The division of 
competences and the principle of subsidiarity serve as orientation aids”, at 471). 
76 Andreas Furrer, Die Sperrwirkung des sekundären Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die 
nationalen Rechtsordnungen, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994). 
77 Laval (note 21), para. 110. 
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A recent study, which seeks to demonstrate just how Sweden might 
adapt to the demands of the ECJ, has supplied the intelligent and 
carefully elaborated suggestions that, although industrial conflict 
measures should continue to draw upon and be based within existing 
collective-bargaining agreements, official information should be 
supplied by Swedish authorities on prevailing working conditions 
within Sweden.78 This suggestion may be understood to embody a 
process of mediation between the demands of Swedish workers and 
the interests of foreign service-providers. It, nonetheless, remains to 
be seen whether this suggestion will survive a review in line with the 
excessively high standards set by the ECJ. 
5.2.4. Rüffert and the Determination of the Purpose of National 
Laws 
In its Rüffert judgment, the ECJ further entrenched its position. Rüffert 
concerned the legality of a tender proffered by one of the German 
Länder, Lower Saxony, which contained a clause indicating that the 
public authorities were bound to respect existing collective-
bargaining agreements, so that tendering firms would also be 
required to abide by the relevant collective-bargaining agreements. 
Equally, partners contracting with public authorities would be 
required to transfer the duty to respect collective-bargaining 
agreements to any of these sub-contractors. Mr Rüffert, in his 
capacity as liquidator of the assets of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. 
KG, refused to recognise this obligation, sub-contracting individual 
tasks to a Polish firm. He was, accordingly, sued for non-performance 
by Lower Saxony. During the course of civil legal proceedings, the 
defendant argued that the state’s provisions contravened Article 49 
EC and the Posted Workers Directive. The ECJ confirmed this 
opinion: rules applying in Lower Saxony were irreconcilable with 
Article 49 since they prevented foreign service-providers from 
benefiting from lower wage costs within their country of origin. 
Lower Saxony’s rules on tendering contravened the provisions of the 
Posted Workers Directive since they did not encompass or establish a 
universal duty on the part of the public authorities to respect 
collective-bargaining agreements, but, instead, only did so with 
regard to public tendering processes. 
 
                                                 
78 Swedish Government Official Reports, Action in response to the Laval judgment, 
(Stockholm: Fritzes Customer Service, 2008). 
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This logic is simply depressing. At the legal level, it fails utterly to 
convince, since it determines the purpose of rules binding the state to 
collective-agreements, without any reference to, or regard for, the 
intensive political discussions from which such provisions derive; a 
process that has more generally – with regard to similar provisions 
maintained within the Land Berlin – been recognised by the German 
Constitutional Court to be in accordance with the provisions of the 
German Constitution.79 The German Constitutional Court does not 
share the ECJ’s complacent conclusion that “respect for collective-
bargaining does not constitute an employment protection measure”. 
Certainly, the Court recognises the potential that collective-
bargaining agreements may encroach upon constitutionally secured 
fundamental freedoms (above all, the right to property, Article 12(I) 
Basic Law). However, it was, nonetheless, convinced by the 
arguments of the Berlin legislator justifying such an encroachment: 
 
The combating of unemployment, together with measures that 
secure the financial stability of the social security system, are 
particularly important goals, for the realisation of which the 
legislator must be given a relatively large degree of decisional 
discretion, and especially so under current, politically very 
difficult, labour market conditions. This common interest, 
which the duty to respect collective bargaining agreements, 
contained within Article 1, paragraph 1, sentence 2 Berliner 
Vergabegesetz, seeks to serve, possesses an overwhelming 
importance.80 
 
The ECJ may be of a different opinion. It needs, however, to explain 
why its interpretation of the purpose of legislation might claim 
precedence, above all, over the judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court. European precedence is anything but self-
explanatory, since legislation on collective-bargaining agreements 
and the Posted Workers Directive concern two very different legal 
subjects. 
5.3. The ECJ as Puovoir Constituant? 
During legal conflict on the Treaty of Maastricht, the German 
Constitutional Court claimed for itself a “co-operative relationship” 
                                                 
79 Judgment of the First Senate (11 July 2006), 1 BvL 4/00. 
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with the ECJ in the matter of the protection of fundamental rights.81 
This expectation on the part of the Court is not referred to by the ECJ 
within its judgments on posted workers. The conflicts law 
perspective developed here, however, concerns the appropriate 
demarcation of the constitutional functions of each of these decisional 
instances. We argue that the legitimacy of European law 
predominantly derives from that fact that it compensates for the 
structural “democratic deficit” of the nation state model. And it is 
precisely this function, which the ECJ is called upon to stabilise. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the ECJ’s activities will often overlap 
the competences of national constitutional courts, this function, is, at 
core, an aliud. The ECJ is not a super-constitutional-court equipped 
with the power – en passant – to reformulate the constitutional orders 
of the Member States within preliminary reference proceedings. It 
must, instead, accept a very specific task, and one which the Member 
States are ill-equipped to fulfil: it must evolve a supranational law, 
one which mediates between the different European traditions and 
interests, and which appropriately resolves conflicts of interest. 
6. Conclusion 
“This may be true in theory, but it is not so in practice”, reads the 
famous saying of Immanuel Kant.82 In the conclusion to his Tractus, 
Kant considers the suggestion that Europe might be brought from a 
position of constantly endangered peace – a condition resting upon 
the so-called “balance of powers – to a condition of perpetual peace; a 
proposition which clearly requires ‘laws’”, “to which each state must 
subject itself”. Is this a simple utopia, a purely theoretical imagining? 
Kant laconically observes: “nowhere does human nature appear less 
appealing than in the relationship of great powers of entire peoples to 
one another and the proposition that a universal state” should be 
constructed, however “benevolent” it may sound, is always “laughed 
at”.83 Kant, the theoretician, however, does not allow himself to be 
confused: “what is true in theory by virtue of the imperative of 
reason, is also true in practice”, is his incisive view. But how might 
this correctly-recalled “reason” assert its practical importance within 
                                                 
81 Judgment of 12.10.1993, BVerfGE 89, 155, (1994) Common Market Law Reports, p. 57). 
82 I. Kant, “Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber 
nicht für die Praxis”, (Vol 9 of W. Weischedel’s Kant Edition, Werkausgabe der 
Wissenschaftlichen Buchgesellschaft, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1971)), p. 125 et seq.). 
83 Kant, ibid., 171 and 172. 
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the preternatural European world of states? This is a tortuous task, 
which must be faced by Europeans as if “moral-practical reason will 
finally triumph, all failed attempts notwithstanding”.84 
 
Given Europe’s current nature, such a degree of decisiveness may be 
difficult to find. There are good reasons for a fundamental debate on 
the social deficit within Europe’s integration project. Nonetheless, 
judgments such as those discussed here do not appear out of the blue, 
and the reactions that they provoke indicate that the issues raised are 
of highly sensitive significance. We know that there is no one 
comprehensive solution to the problem of the compatibility of the 
integration project with the social state. Meaningful treatment of 
Europe’s conflicts of interests will require constructive work in many 
areas – a “tortuous task”, indeed, just as Kant said. 
                                                 
84 Kant, ibid., 172. 
 
   
ARENA Reports  
 
09/1: Rainer Nickel (ed.): “Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe 
and Beyond: Patterns of Supranational and Transnational Juridification” 
(RECON Report No 7) 
08/8:  Savino Ruà: ”The Europeanization of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs 
of Finland” 
08/7:  Dirk Peters, Wolfgang Wagner and Nicole Deitelhoff (eds): “The Parlia-
mentary Control of European Security Policy” (RECON Report No 6) 
08/6:  Ulrike Liebert and Hans-Jörg Trenz (eds): “Reconstituting Democracy 
from Below: New Approaches to Civil Society in the New Europe” 
(RECON Report No 5) 
08/5:  Christian Joerges and Poul F. Kjaer (eds): “Transnational Standards       
of Social Protection: Contrasting European and International 
Governance” (RECON Report No 4) 
08/4:  Agustín José Menéndez and John Erik Fossum (eds): “The Post-
Sovereign Constellation: Law and Democracy in Neil D. MacCormick’s 
Legal and Political Theory” 
08/3 Andreas Heskestad: “Fra nasjonale enklaver til multinasjonale enheter? 
En kartlegging av Europakommisjonens kabinetter 1995-2007” 
08/2: Nina Fredrikke Meyer Stensholt: “Between Norms and Interests – EU 
Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean Neighbourhood” 
08/1: Martine Matre Bonarjee: “Primus inter pares? The Parliamentarisation 
and Presidentialisation of the European Commission: between 
European integration and organisational dynamics 
07/8:  Erik O. Eriksen (ed.): “How to Reconstitute Democracy in Europe? 
Proceedings from the RECON Opening Conference” (RECON Report 
No 3)  
07/7:  Joakim Parslow: “Turkish Political Parties and the European Union: 
How Turkish MPs Frame the Issue of Adapting to EU Conditionality” 
07/6:  Jonathan P. Aus: “Crime and Punishment in the EU: The Case of 
Human Smuggling” 
07/5:  Marit Eldholm: “Mot en europeisk grunnlov? En diskursteoretisk 
analyse av Konventet for EUs fremtid”  
07/4:  Guri Rosén: “Developing a European public sphere – a conceptual 
discussion” 
   
07/3:  Hans-Jörg Trenz, Maximilian Conrad and Guri Rosén: “The 
Interpretative Moment of European Journalism - The impact of media 
voice in the ratification process” (RECON Report No 2)  
07/2  John Erik Fossum, Philip Schlesinger and Geir Ove Kværk (eds): “Public 
Sphere and Civil Society? Tranformations of the European Union” 
07/1: Agustín José Menéndez (ed.): “Altiero Spinelli - From Ventotene to the 
European Constitution” (RECON Report No 1)  
06/2: Even Westerveld: “Sverige eller svenskenes EU? ” - hvordan ulike 
oppfatninger av EU kan påvirke valget av prosedyre for ratifiseringen av  
EU-grunnloven. 
06/1 Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl (eds): “Law and 
Democracy in the Post-National Union”. 
05/9: Camilla Myhre: “Nettverksadministrative systemer i EU? En studie av 
det norske Post- og teletilsynet” 
05/8: John Erik Fossum (ed.): “Constitutional processes in Canada and the EU 
compared” 
05/7: Espen D.H. Olsen: “Mellom rettigheter, kultur og cosmopolis: En 
teoretisk og empirisk analyse av europeisering og statsborgerskap” 
05/6: Marianne Takle: “From Ethnos to Demos? Changes in German Policy on 
Immigration” 
05/5:  Ingvild Jenssen: “The EU’s minority policy and Europe’s Roma: 
Cultural differentiation or cosmopolitan incorporation?” 
05/4: Grete Berggård Feragen: “Europeisering av norsk gasspolitikk” 
05/3: Erik O. Eriksen, John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez: “The 
European Constitution: the Rubicon Crossed?” 
05/2:  Helene Sjursen (ed.): “Enlargement in perspective” 
05/1: Gitte Hyttel Nørgård: “Mod et netværk-administrativt system i EU? Et 
studie af den danske IT og Telestyrelse” 
04/9:  Agustín José Menéndez and Erik Oddvar Eriksen (eds): “Fundamental 
Rights through Discourse. On Robert Alexy’s Legal Theory – European 
and Theoretical Perspectives” 
04/8:  Geir-Martin Blæss: “EU og Habermas’ diskursteoretiske 
demokratimodell. Et prosedyremessig rammeverk for et postnasjonalt 
demokrati?” 
04/7:  Veronika Witnes Karlson: “EU – en normativ internasjonal aktør?. En 
analyse av Russland i EUs utenrikspolitikk” 
04/6:  Frode Veggeland: “Internasjonalisering og styring av matpolitikk. 
Institusjoners betydning for staters atferd og politikk” 
   
04/5:  Carlos Closa and John Erik Fossum (eds.) “Deliberative Constitutional 
Politics in the EU” 
04/4:  Jan Kåre Melsæther: “Valgt likegyldighet. Organiseringen av 
europapolitisk informasjon i Stortinget og Riksdagen” 
04/3:  Karen Pinholt: “Influence through arguments? A study of the 
Commission's influence on the climate change negotiations” 
04/2:  Børge Romsloe: “Mellom makt og argumentasjon: En analyse av 
småstater i EUs felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk” 
04/1:  Karen Fløistad: “Fundamental Rights and the EEA Agreement” 
03/7:  Øivind Støle: “Europeanization in the Context of Enlargement. A Study 
of Hungarian Environmental Policy” 
03/6:  Geir Ove Kværk: “Legitimering gjennom rettigheter? En studie av 
arbeidet med EUs Charter om grunnleggende rettigheter, og 
sivilsamfunnets bidrag til dette” 
03/5:  Martin Hauge Torbergsen: “Executive Dominance in a Multi-level 
Polity. Europeanisation and Parliamentary Involvement in the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities” 
03/4:  Caroline Rugeldal: “Identitetsbygging i EU - En studie av EUs 
symbolstrategi” 
03/3:  Elisabeth Hyllseth: “Lovlig skatt eller ulovlig statsstøtte? En studie av 
norske myndigheters respons i konflikten med ESA om den norske 
ordningen med differensiert arbeidsgiveravgift” 
03/2:  Erik O. Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer (eds.): “European 
Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisation” 
03/01: Maria Hasselgård: “Playing games with values of higher importance? 
Dealing with ‘risk issues’ in the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs”.  
02/11:  Tommy Fredriksen: “Fra marked til plan. Europeisering av norsk 
lakseeksport”.  
02/10: Thomas A. Malla: “Nasjonalstat og region i den nye økonomien. En 
studie av hvordan betingelsene for politisk regulering av næringslivet i 
EU endres gjennom utbredelsen av markeder for elektronisk handel”. 
02/9:  Anne Elizabeth Stie: “Preconditions for Democracy: National Identity 
Versus Constitutional Patriotism. A Theoretical Analysis of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court’s Maastricht Judgement”.  
02/8:  Marianne Riddervold: “Interesser, verdier eller rettigheter? En analyse 
av danske posisjoner i EUs utvidelsesprosess”.  
02/7:  Helene Sjursen (ed.): “Enlargement and the Finality of the EU” 
02/6:  Various contributors: “Democracy and European Governance: Towards 
a New Political Order in Europe?” Proceedings from the ARENA 
European Conference 2002 
   
02/5:  Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez 
(eds.): “Constitution Making and Democratic Legitimacy” 
02/4: Heidi Moen: “Fører alle veger til Brussel? En studie av Vegdirektoratets 
tilpasning til EU og EØS-avtalen” 
02/3:  Trygve Ugland: “Policy Re-Categorization and Integration – 
Europeanisation of Nordic Alcohol Control Policies” 
02/2:  Julie Wedege: “Sosial rettferdighet og normativ legitimitet – En analyse 
av potensielle sosialpolitiske utviklinger i EU” 
02/1:  Øyvind Mehus Sjursen: “To motpoler konvergerer – En analyse av 
britisk og tysk tilnærming til politi- og strafferettssamarbeidet i EU” 
01/8:  Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Ménendez 
(eds): “The Chartering of Europe – The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in Context” 
01/7:  Jarle Trondal: “Administrative Integration Across Levels of Governance 
– Integration through Participation in EU-Committees”  
01/6:  Marthe Indset: “Subsidiaritetsprinsippet i EU etter IGC-96” 
01/5:  Liv Kjølseth: “Konflikt eller samarbeid? En analyse av medlemsstatenes 
adferd under Agenda 2000-forhandlingene og det institusjonelle 
forhandlingssystemet i EU”  
01/4:  Various Contributors: “Shaping the Union? Nordic Presidencies in the 
EU” Proceedings from the ARENA Annual conference 2000. 
01/3:  Svein S. Andersen (ed): “Institutional Approaches to the European 
Union - proceedings from an ARENA workshop” 
01/2:  Maria Martens: “Europeisering gjennom overvåkning - En studie av 
ESAs opprettelse og virkemåte”  
01/1:  Inger Johanne Sand: “Changes in the functions and the Relations of Law 
and Politics-Europeanization, Globalization and the Role of the New 
Technologies”  
00/8:  Ulf Sverdrup: “Ambiguity and Adaptation-Europeanization of 
Administrative Institutions as Loosely Coupled Processes”  
00/7:  Helene Sjursen (ed): “Redefining Security? Redefining the Role of The 
European Union in European Security Structures”, Proceedings from an 
ARENA Workshop  
00/6:  Christian Henrik Bergh: “Implementering av EU-direktiv i Norge, 
Postdirektivet – Nasjonal tilpasning i forkant”  
00/5:  Morten Dybesland: “Til felles nytte? Interesser og verdier bak nordisk 
utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid” 
00/4:  Andreas Holm Bakke: “National Welfare and European Capitalism? 
The Attempt to Create a Common Market for Supplementary Pension”  
   
00/3:  Ingeborg Kjærnli: “Ikke bare makt og nasjonale interesser? En analyse 
av EUs utvidelse østover i et integrasjonsteoretisk perspektiv”  
00/2:  Jon Helge Andersen: “Fra atlantisk sikkerhet til europeisk usikkerhet? 
En studie av utenriksdepartementets og forsvarsdepartementets 
responser på endrede sikkerhetspolitiske rammebetingelser”  
00/1:  Various contributors: “Nordic Contrasts. Norway, Finland and the EU.” 
Proceedings from the ARENA Annual Conference 1999  
99/5:  Elin Kristine Karlsson: “Babel i Brussel og Oslo? Flerspr¬kligheten i EU 
og respons i norske institusjoner”  
99/4:  Frøydis Eldevik: “Liberalisering av gassmarkedet i Europa. EUs 
gassdirektiv av 1998”  
99/3:  Theodor Barth & Magnus Enzell (eds.): “Collective Identity and 
Citizenship in Europe. Fields of Access and Exclusion”  
99/2:  Simen Bræin: “Europeisering som rettsliggjñring. EØS-avtalen, EU og 
det norske alkoholmonopolet”  
99/1:  Various contributors: “Between Autonomy and Influence - Small states 
and the European Union”, Proceedings from ARENA•s Annual 
Conference 1998  
98/2:  Heidi Olsen: “'Europeisering' av Universitetet: Fullt og helt - eller 
stykkevis og delt?”  
98/1:  Kjetil Moen: “Fra monopol til konkurranse. EØS, norsk 
legemiddelpolitikk og Norsk Medisinaldepot”  
97/5:  Jon Erik Dølvik: “Redrawing Boundaries of Solidarity? ETUC, Social 
Dialogue and the Europeanisation of Trade Unions in the 1990s”  
97/4:  Stig Eliassen & Pål Meland: “Nasjonal identitet i statslñse nasjoner. En 
sammenliknende studie av Skottland og Wales” 
97/3:  Frode Veggeland: “Internasjonalisering og Nasjonale Reformforsñk. EU, 
GATT og endringsprosessene i Landbruksdepartementet og 
jordbrukssektoren” 
97/2:  Vebjørn Dysvik: “The Road to Maastricht. Dynamic and Formative 
Forces in the EMU Process”  
97/1:  Jon Erik Dølvik: “ETUC and Europeanisation of Trade Unionism in the 
1990`s”  
96/2:  Tom Christensen: “Adapting to Processes of Europeanisation - A Study 
of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs”  
96/1:  Various contributors: “Enlargement to the East”. Proceedings from 
'European Thresholds' - ARENA Conference Series 
This report is based on the proceedings from a conference of RECON’s WP 9 
at the European University Institute in Florence. It deals with new approaches 
to supra- and transnational law-generating structures. These new approaches, 
namely Christian Joerges’ theoretical concept based upon the conflict of laws 
methodology, and additional ideas of constitutional pluralism and of participa-
tory transnational governance, are discussed from private, public and interna-
tional law perspectives. They strive to conceptualise – in legal categories – the 
efforts to re-constitute democratic governing in post-national constellations. 
The volume seeks to find new ways for a democratisation of European and 
transnational governance outside traditional models, and more convincing 
ways of a European and transnational ‘juridification’ that reconciles democracy, 
diversity, and social rights.
* * * * *
Reconstituting Democracy in Europe (RECON) is an Integrated Project 
supported by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme for 
Research. The project has 21 partners in 13 European countries and New 
Zealand and is coordinated by ARENA – Centre for European Studies at the 
University of Oslo.  RECON runs for five years (2007-2011) and focuses on the 
conditions for democracy in the multilevel constellation that makes up the EU.
